The first part of my contentions against Eunomius has with God’s help been sufficiently established in the preceding work, as all who will may see fro

 And let no one suppose that it is through pride or desire of human reputation that I go down to this truceless and implacable warfare to engage with t

 First of all, however, I think it advisable to run briefly over our own doctrinal views and our opponent’s disagreement with them, so that our review

 But to the best of my ability I will raise my voice to rebut our enemies’ argument. They say that God is declared to be without generation, that the G

 Now if the term ungenerate did not signify the being without origin, but the idea of simplicity entered into the meaning of such a term, and He were c

 But, saith he, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Granted: for the Son also is unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet is He the Son. But

 But this thing he leaves untold, and only says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is so spoken, saith he,

 But before we examine what he has written, it may be better to enquire with what purpose it is that he refuses to admit that ungenerate can be predica

 For after saying that the Only-begotten God is not the same in essence with the true Father, and after sophistically inferring this from the oppositio

 Accordingly, enveloping his former special-pleading in the mazy evolutions of his sophistries, and dealing subtly with the term ungenerate, he steals

 Seeing, then, the mischief resulting to the dupes of this fallacious reasoning—that to assent to His not being very God is a departure from our confes

 It will presently be time to bring to their own recollection the method of this argument. Suffice it first to say this. There is no faculty in human n

 If, then, the lower creation which comes under our organs of sense transcends human knowledge, how can He, Who by His mere will made the worlds, be wi

 How pitiable are they for their cleverness! how wretched, how fatal is their over-wise philosophy! Who is there who goes of his own accord to the pit

 This, then, was the meaning of his safe guidance on the way to what he sought—that he was not blindly led by any of the means ready to hand for his in

 He shows, I think, by the relation of these elements to each other, or rather by their distance, how far the divine nature is above the speculations o

 Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits. For it is both safer and more revere

 And on other accounts also it may be called safe to let alone the Divine essence, as unspeakable, and beyond the scope of human reasoning. For the des

 Wherefore Holy Scripture omits all idle inquiry into substance as superfluous and unnecessary. And methinks it was for this that John, the Son of Thun

 But, nevertheless, with only such a nature for their base of operations, they open their mouths wide against the unspeakable Power, and encompass by o

 I have said, then (for I make my master’s words my own), that reason supplies us with but a dim and imperfect comprehension of the Divine nature neve

 But although our great master has thus cleared away all unworthy notions respecting the Divine nature, and has urged and taught all that may be revere

 And yet it is plain to every one who has given any attention to the uses of words, that the word incorruption denotes by the privative particle that n

 While, however, we strenuously avoid all concurrence with absurd notions in our thoughts of God, we allow ourselves in the use of many diverse appella

 And if any one would distinguish such notions by words, he would find it absolutely necessary to call that which admits of no changing to the worse un

 I say, then, that men have a right to such word-building, adapting their appellations to their subject, each man according to his judgment and that t

 For God is not an expression, neither hath He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is of Himself what also He is believed to be, but He is named

 But in applying such appellations to the Divine essence, “which passeth all understanding,” we do not seek to glory in it by the names we employ, but

 But let us hear how, “in the way most needed, and the form that preceded” (for with such rhymes he again gives us a taste of the flowers of style), le

 If, then, the creation is of later date than its Creator, and man is the latest in the scale of creation, and if speech is a distinctive characteristi

 He says that God was what He is, before the creation of man. Nor do we deny it. For whatsoever we conceive of God existed before the creation of the w

 But that we might gain some sort of comprehension of what with reverence may be thought respecting Him, we have stamped our different ideas with certa

 They say that God is ungenerate, and in this we agree. But that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine essence, here we take exception. For we maint

 With such gibes at the term “conception,” he shows, to the best of his ability, that it is useless and unprofitable for the life of man. What, then, w

 But why enumerate the greater and more splendid results of this faculty? For every one who is not unfriendly to truth can see for himself that all els

 Now that He did not teach us such things by some visible operation, Himself presiding over the work, as we may see in matters of bodily teaching, no o

 For that one who proposes to himself to terrify or charm an audience should have plenty of conception to effect such a purpose, and should display to

 For it is not the case that, while the intelligence implanted in us by the Giver is fully competent to conjure up non-realities, it is endowed with no

 But as far as possible to elucidate the idea, I will endeavour to illustrate it by a still plainer example. Let us suppose the inquiry to be about som

 This example being understood, it is time to go on to the thing which it illustrates. This much we comprehend, that the First Cause has His existence

 Such are his charges against us not indeed his notions as expressed in his own phraseology, for we have made such alterations as were required to cor

 If, then, God gives things their names as our new expositor of the Divine record assures us, naming germ, and grass, and tree, and fruit, He must of n

 Such is the nature of this new-fangled Deity, as deducible from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures, and maintain

 But it may be said that the voice of the Father was addressed to the Holy Spirit. But neither does the Holy Spirit require instruction by speech, for

 But, says he, the record of Moses does not lie, and from it we learn that God spake. No! nor is great David of the number of those who lie, and he exp

 What, then, do we think of this passage? For it may be that, if we understand it, we shall also understand the meaning of Moses. It often happens that

 But to return to the matter in question. We assert that the words “He said” do not imply voice and words on the part of God but the writer, in showin

 For the case is different from that of men endowed by nature with practical ability, where you may look at capability and execution apart from each ot

 But if any one would give a more sensuous interpretation to the words “God said,” as proving that articulate speech was His creation, by a parity of r

 And the futility of such assertions may be seen also by this. For as the natures of the elements, which are the work of the Creator, appear alike to a

 And if any one cites the confusion of tongues that took place at the building of the tower, as contradicting what I have said, not even there is God s

 But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us that the Hebrew tongue is not even ancient like the others, but that along with other mirac

 For to suppose that God used the Hebrew tongue, when there was no one to hear and understand such a language, methinks no reasonable being will consen

 But this is denied by Eunomius, the author of all this contumely with which we are assailed, and the companion and adviser of this impious band. For,

 On these passages it is probable that our opponents will take their stand. And I will agree for them with what is said, and will myself take advantage

 But since the nature of most things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all that they connote being comprehended in one word, a

 In like manner before him Jacob, having taken hold of his brother’s heel, was called a supplanter , from the attitude in which he came to the birth. F

 But I will pass over his other babblings against the truth, possessing as they do no force against our doctrines, for I deem it superfluous to linger

 To pass on, then, to what remains. He brings forward once more some of the Master’s words, to this effect: “And it is in precisely the same manner tha

 But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired Scriptures can deny the fact. What then? Does Eunomius affirm th

 But, like a mighty wrestler, he will not relinquish his irresistible hold on us, and affirms in so many words, that “these names are the work of human

 “But God,” he says, “gave the weakest of terrestrial things a share in the most honourable names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, an

 This it is that our strong-minded opponent, who accuses us of dishonesty, and charges us with being irrational in judgment,—this it is that he pretend

 But what is our author’s meaning, and what is the object of this argument of his? For no one need imagine that, for lack of something to say, in order

 He does not, in fact, partake of that dignity which the meaning of those names indicates and whereas wise Daniel, in setting right the Babylonians’ e

 But in dwelling on such nonsense I fear that I am secretly gratifying our adversaries. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I

 But I fear that all we shall find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere tumours and sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessa

 Basil, he says, asserts that after we have obtained our first idea of a thing, the more minute and accurate investigation of the thing under considera

 And Moses, seeing God in the light, and John calling Him the true Light , and in the same way Paul, when our Lord first appeared to him, and a Light s

 I have deluged my discourse with much nonsense of his, but I trust my hearers will pardon me for not leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his in

 Then going farther, as if his object were thus far attained, he takes up other charges against us, more difficult, as he thinks, to deal with than the

 But all this is beside our purpose. Would that our charges against him were limited to this, and that he could be thought to err only in his delivery,

 But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself, it is logically connected with his whole discours

 But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable attribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son,

 Now that the idea of ungeneracy and the belief in the Divine essence are quite different things may be seen by what he himself has put forward. God, h

 But it will be well, I think, to pass over his nauseating observations (for such we must term his senseless attacks on the method of conception), and

 But if it were in any way possible by some other means to lay bare the movements of thought, abandoning the formal instrumentality of words, we should

 All his argument, then, in opposition to the doctrine of conception I think it best to pass over, though he charge with madness those who think that t

 But, like some viscous and sticky clay, the nonsense he has concocted in contravention of our teaching of conception seems to hold us back, and preven

 But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus’ nature-system, which he says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctr

 But, says he, since God condescends to commune with His servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very beginning He enacted words appropriat

 But our pious opponent will not allow of God’s using our language, because of our proneness to evil, shutting his eyes (good man!) to the fact that fo

 But most people, perhaps, will think this too far removed from the scope of our present inquiry. This, however, no one will regard as out of keeping w

 Since, then, it is improper to regard God as the inventor of such names, lest the names even of these idol gods should seem to have had their origin f

 And if we set forth the opinion of most commentators on these words of the Psalmist, that of Eunomius regarding them will be still more convicted of f

 But the names which the Lord gives to such stars we may plainly learn from the prophecy of Esaias, which says, “I have called thee by thy name thou a

 I will pass over, then, the abuse with which he has prefaced his discussion of these matters, as when he uses such terms as “alteration of seed,” and

 I pass in silence his blasphemy in reducing God the Only-begotten to a level with all created things, and, in a word, allowing to the Son of God no hi

 For, proceeding with his discourse, he asks us what we mean by the ages. And yet we ourselves might more reasonably put such questions to him. For it

 But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses i

 Such is our position our adversary’s, with regard to the precise meaning of this term , is such as can derive no help from any reasonings he only sp

 He says, “The Life that is the same, and thoroughly single, must have one and the same outward expression for it, even though in mere names, and manne

 But why do we linger over these follies, when we ought rather to put Eunomius’ book itself into the hands of the studious, and so, apart from any exam

 But if he should still answer with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only the term Father, and the term Creator, that are ap

 But let us examine a still more vehement charge of his against us it is this: “If one must proceed to say something harsher still, he does not even k

 What, then, does Eunomius say to this? “If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbegin

 What, then, out of all that we have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly, in which he returns to the charge and repeats himself in

 Such are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. For what need is there to go through all his argument with trifling prolixity? For in e

 Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one,

 But that he himself also may be brought to the knowledge of his own trifling, we will convict him from his own statements. For in the course of his ar

 Thus far our argument goes with him. But the riddle with which he accompanies his words we must leave to those trained in the wisdom of Prunicus to in

 But let us leave this, and along with it the usual foul deluge of calumny in his words and let us go on to his subsequent quotations (of Basil). But

 But who, pray, is so simple as to be harmed by such arguments, and to imagine that if names are once believed to be an outcome of the reasoning facult

 But I do not think that we need linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows. To the more attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our

 But now I do not know which it is best to do to pursue step by step this subject, or to put an end here to our contest with such folly. Well, as in t

 When, then, he is on the point of introducing this treatment of terms of “privation,” he takes upon himself to show “the incurable absurdity,” as he c

 Every term—every term, that is, which is really such—is an utterance expressing some movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound th

 Well, then, if God did not exist formerly, or if there be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be called either unending or without beginning and

 Thus much, then, is known to us about the names uttered in any form whatever in reference to the Deity. We have given a simple explanation of them, un

 How it is possible, then, to assign one’s gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man, who claims to be using words and phrases in their natural fo

 Well, if the term imperishable or indestructible is not considered by this maker of an empty system to be privative of destruction, then by a stern ne

 “But I do not see,” he rejoins, “how God can be above His own works simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him .” And on the strength of

 He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indestructible, generated beings as ungenerate, just in the same degr

 Therefore let us again handle this dictum of his: “God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death.” How are we to accept this statement,

 Still I cannot see what profit there is in deigning to examine such nonsense. For a man like myself, who has lived to gray hairs , and whose eyes are

 But it is time now to expose that angry accusation which he brings against us at the close of his treatise, saying that we affirm the Father to be fro

 “The evangelist Luke, when giving the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and stepping up from the last to the first

 With what eyes will you now dare to gaze upon your guide? I speak to you, O flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man who

 Such, to use your own words, is the “evil,” as one might expect, not indeed “of valuing the character for being clever before one is really such” (for

But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself, it is logically connected with his whole discourse. For after saying that it is absurd to compare God with corn and with Christ, he says of God that He is not, like them, subject to change; but in respect to the Only-begotten, keeping silence on the question whether He too is not subject to change, and thereby clearly suggesting that He is of lower dignity, in that we cannot compare Him, any more than we can compare corn, with God, he breaks off his discourse without using any argument to prove that the Son of God cannot be compared with the Father, as though our knowledge of the grain were sufficient to establish the inferiority of the Son in comparison with the Father. But he discourses of the indestructibility of the Father, as not in actuality attaching to the Son. But if the True Life is an actuality, actuating itself, and if to live everlastingly means the same thing as never to be dissolved in destruction, I for myself do not as yet assent to his argument, but will reserve myself for a more proper occasion. That, however, there is but one single notion in indestructibility99    Indestructibility. Such terms (“not-composite,” “indivisible,” “imperishable”) were the inheritance which Christian controversy received from the former struggle with Stoicism. In the hands of Origen, they had been aimed at the Stoic doctrine of the Deity as that of corporeal Spirit, which does not perish, only because there is no cause sufficient. “If one does not see the consequences of such an assertion, one ought to blush” (in Johann. xiii. 21). The consequences of course are that God, the Word, and our souls, made in His image, are all perishable; for all body, in that it is matter, is by the Stoic assumption, liable to change., considered in reference to the Father and to the Son alike, and that the indestructibility of the Father differs in no respect from that of the Son, no difference as to indestructibility being observable either in remission and intension, or in any other phase of the process of destruction, this, I say, it is seasonable both now and at all times to assert, so as to preclude the doctrine that in respect of indestructibility the Son has no communion with the Father. For as this indestructibility is understood in respect of the Father, so also it is not to be disputed in respect of the Son. For to be incapable of dissolution means nearly, or rather precisely, the same thing in regard to whatever subject it is attributed to. What, then, induces him to assert, that only to the Ungenerate Deity does it belong to have this indestructibility not attaching to Him by reason of any energy, as though he would thereby show a difference between the Father and the Son? For if he supposes his own created God destructible, he well shows the essential divergence of natures by the difference between the destructible and the indestructible. But if neither is subject to destruction,—and no degrees are to be found in pure indestructibility,—how does he show that the Father cannot be compared with the Only-begotten Son, or what is meant by saying that indestructibility is not witnessed in the Father by reason of any energy? But he reveals his purpose in what follows. It is not because of His operations or energies, he says, that He is ungenerate and indestructible, but because He is Father and Creator. And here I must ask my hearers to give me their closest attention. How can he think the creative power of God and His Fatherhood identical in meaning? For he defines each alike as an energy, plainly and expressly affirming, “God is not indestructible by reason of His energy, though He is called Father and Creator by reason of energies.” If, then, it is the same thing to call Him Father and Creator of the world because either name is due to an energy as its cause, the results of His energies must be homogeneous, inasmuch as it is through an energy, that they both exist. But to what blasphemy this logically tends is clear to every one who can draw a conclusion. For myself, I should like to add my own deductions to my disquisition. It is impossible that an energy or operation productive of a result should subsist of itself without there being something to set the energy in motion; as we say that a smith operates or works, but that the material on which his art is exercised is operated upon, or wrought. These faculties, therefore, that of operating, and that of being operated upon, must needs stand in a certain relation to each other, so that if one be removed, the remaining one cannot subsist of itself. For where there is nothing operated upon there can be nothing operating. What, then, does this prove? If the energy which is productive of anything does not subsist of itself, there being nothing for it to operate upon, and if the Father, as they affirm, is nothing but an energy, the Only-begotten Son is thereby shown to be capable of being acted upon, in other words, moulded in accordance with the motive energy that gives Him His subsistence. For as we say that the Creator of the world, by laying down some yielding material, capable of being acted upon, gave His creative being a field for its exercise, in the case of things sensible skilfully investing the subject with various and multiform qualities for production, but in the case of intellectual essences giving shape to the subject in another way, not by qualities, but by impulses of choice, so, if any one define the Fatherhood of God as an energy, he cannot otherwise indicate the subsistence of the Son than by comparing it with some material acted upon and wrought to completion. For if it could not be operated upon, it would of necessity offer resistance to the operator: whose energy being thus hindered, no result would be produced. Either, then, they must make the essence of the Only-begotten subject to be acted upon, that the energy may have something to work upon, or, if they shrink from this conclusion, on account of its manifest impiety, they are driven to the conclusion that it has no existence at all. For what is naturally incapable of being acted upon, cannot itself admit the creative energy. He, then, who defines the Son as the effect of an energy, defines Him as one of those things which are subject to be acted upon, and which are produced by an energy. Or, if he deny such susceptibility, he must at the same time deny His existence. But since impiety is involved in either alternative of the dilemma, that of asserting His non-existence, and that of regarding Him as capable of being acted upon, the truth is made manifest, being brought to light by the removal of these absurdities. For if He verily exists, and is not subject to be acted upon, it is plain that He is not the result of an energy, but is proved to be very God of very God the Father, without liability to be acted upon, beaming from Him and shining forth from everlasting.

Ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀσέβεια τοῦ λόγου τοσαύτη. καιρὸς δ' ἂν εἴη καὶ αὐτὴν ἐξετάσαι τὴν εἰς τὴν βλασφημίαν κατασκευήν, ἐν τίνι πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τῷ λόγῳ δι' ἀκολουθίας συνήρτηται. εἰπὼν γὰρ ἄτοπον εἶναι τῷ σίτῳ καὶ τῷ Χριστῷ τὸν θεὸν παραβάλλειν περὶ τοῦ σίτου φησὶν ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς καθ' ὁμοιότητα τούτων πρὸς μεταβολὴν ἐπιτήδειος, περὶ δὲ τοῦ μονογενοῦς τὸ μὴ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρὸς μεταβολὴν ἐπιτήδειον σιωπήσας καὶ διὰ τούτου σαφῶς ἐνδειξάμενος τὸ ταπεινὸν τῆς ἀξίας, ἐν τῷ μὴ δεῖν αὐτὸν ὡς καὶ τὸν σῖτον τῷ θεῷ συγκρίνειν ἀφῆκε τὸν λόγον μετέωρον, οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ λογισμῷ κατασκευάσας ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ τὸ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τοῦ υἱοῦ ἀπαράθετον, ὡς ἱκανῶν ὄντων τῶν περὶ τὸν κόκκον θεωρηθέντων καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα κατὰ τὸ ταπεινότερον παραλλαγὴν συνενδείξασθαι. ἀλλὰ « περὶ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ πατρὸς » διαλέγεται ὡς « οὐκ ἐξ ἐνεργείας προσούσης αὐτῷ ». ἐγὼ δὲ εἰ μὲν ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστιν ἡ ὄντως ζωὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐνεργοῦσα καὶ εἰ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ σημαινομένῳ τό τε ἀεὶ ζῆν καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε εἰς φθορὰν διαλύεσθαι οὔπω τῷ λόγῳ προστίθημι, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἰδίοις ταμιεύσομαι τόποις. ὅτι μέντοι μία « ἡ » τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἐστὶ διάνοια ὡσαύτως ἐπί τε τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ νοουμένη καὶ κατ' οὐδὲν τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ἄφθαρτον τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ υἱοῦ παραλλάσσει, οὔτε ὑφέσει τινὶ καὶ ἐπιτάσει οὔτε τινὶ ἄλλῳ διαφορᾶς τρόπῳ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν παραλλαγῆς εὑρισκομένης, τοῦτο καὶ νῦν φημι εὔκαιρον εἶναι καὶ ἀεὶ λέγειν, ὡς ἂν μηδεμίαν ἔχοι διὰ τούτου χώραν ὁ λόγος αὐτῷ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν ἐννοίᾳ τῷ πατρὶ προσμαρτυρῶν τὸ πρὸς τὸν υἱὸν ἀκοινώνητον. ὡς γὰρ περὶ τὸν πατέρα ἡ ἀφθαρσία καταλαμβάνεται, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς εἶναι οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλεται. τὸ γὰρ τῆς φθορᾶς ἀπαράδεκτον, ὅπερ ἀφθαρσία καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέγεται, ἴσον μᾶλλον δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον ἐφ' οὗπερ ἂν λέγηται. τί οὖν μαθὼν μόνῳ προσμαρτυρεῖ τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ θεῷ τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἐνεργείας εἶναι τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν αὐτῷ, ὡς διὰ τούτου τὴν κατὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς παραλλαγὴν τοῦ πατρὸς δεικνύων; εἰ μὲν γὰρ φθαρτὸν ὑποτίθεται τὸν κτιστὸν ἑαυτοῦ θεόν, καλῶς τῇ τοῦ φθαρτοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἄφθαρτον διαφορᾷ τὴν κατὰ φύσιν παραλλαγὴν ἀποδείκνυσιν: εἰ δὲ ἀνεπίδεκτος φθορᾶς ὡσαύτως ἑκάτερος καὶ οὔτε τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτε τὸ ἧττον ἐν τῇ κατὰ φύσιν ἀφθαρσίᾳ καταλαμβάνεται, πῶς δείκνυσι τοῦ πατρὸς πρὸς τὸν μονογενῆ υἱὸν τὸ ἀσύγκριτον; ἢ τί βούλεται τὸ μὴ ἐξ ἐνεργείας προσμαρτυρεῖσθαι τῷ πατρὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον;
Ἀλλ' ἐκκαλύπτει τὸν σκοπὸν τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα λόγῳ. « οὐκ ἐξ ἐνεργειῶν », φησίν, « ἄφθαρτός ἐστιν καὶ ἀγέννητος ὡς πατήρ τε καὶ δημιουργός ». τούτῳ μοι προσέχειν μάλιστα τὸν ἀκροατὴν ἀξιῶ. πῶς ταὐτὸν οἴεται τῶν δύο τούτων ὀνομάτων τὸ σημαινόμενον, τῆς δημιουργίας λέγω καὶ τῆς πατρότητος; ἐνέργειαν γὰρ εἶναι τούτων ἑκάτερον ἐπίσης ὁρίζεται σαφῶς οὕτω διαγορεύων τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι ἄφθαρτος μὲν οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστί, πατὴρ δὲ καὶ δημιουργὸς ἐξ ἐνεργειῶν ὀνομάζεται. εἰ τοίνυν ταὐτόν ἐστι πατέρα τε καὶ δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι, τῷ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἀμφοτέρων αὐτῷ γίνεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων αἰτίαν, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα καὶ τὰ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἀποτελέσματα ὁμογενῶς ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ἐξ ἐνεργείας ὁμοίως εἶναι. τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ποῖον βλασφημίας πέρας διὰ τῆς ἀκολουθίας ἐκφέρεται, παντὶ δῆλόν ἐστι τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ βλέπειν πρὸς τὸ ἀκόλουθον. ἐγὼ δ' ὅσα περὶ τούτων λογίζομαι, βούλομαι προσθεῖναι τῇ συνεξετάσει τῶν λόγων. οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνέργειαν ἀπεργαστικήν τινος πράγματος αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς συστῆναι, μή τινος ὑποδεχομένου τῆς ἐνεργείας τὴν κίνησιν, οἷον ἐνεργεῖν τί φαμεν τὸν χαλκεύοντα, ἐνεργεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν ἐκκειμένην ὕλην τῇ τέχνῃ. οὐκοῦν ἀναγκαίως ἔχει σχέσιν τινὰ ταῦτα πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἡ ἐνεργητικὴ καὶ ἡ παθητικὴ δύναμις, ὧν εἰ χωρισθείη τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἕτερον, οὐκ ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ συσταίη καὶ τὸ λειπόμενον. εἰ γὰρ μὴ τὸ πάσχον εἴη, τὸ ἐνεργοῦν οὐκ ἔσται. τί οὖν ἐκ τούτου κατασκευάζεται; εἰ οὐ συνίσταται καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἡ ἀποτελεστική τινος πράγματος, μὴ ὑποκειμένου τοῦ πάσχοντος, ὁ πατὴρ δέ, καθὼς οὗτοί φασιν, οὐδὲν ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐνέργεια, παθητὸς ἄρα διὰ τούτων ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς ἀποδείκνυται πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν τῆς ὑφιστώσης αὐτὸν ἐνεργείας τυπούμενος. ὡς γὰρ τὸν τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργόν φαμεν παθητικήν τινα καὶ εὔεικτον ὕλην ὑποβαλόμενον ἐνεργὸν ἑαυτοῦ τὴν δημιουργικὴν οὐσίαν ποιῆσαι, ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὰς ποικίλας τε καὶ πολυειδεῖς τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ ποιότητας πρὸς τὴν ἑκάστου τῶν γινομένων ἀπεργασίαν τεχνικῶς ἐπιβάλλοντα, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν νοητῶν ἕτερον τρόπον οὐχὶ ποιότησιν, ἀλλὰ προαιρετικαῖς ὁρμαῖς διαμορφοῦντα τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὕτως ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἰ ἐνέργειάν τις ὁρίζοιτο τὴν πατρότητα, οὐκ ἄλλως ἀποδείξει τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, μὴ κατά τινα παθητικὴν πάντως ἀπεργασθεῖσαν ὕλην. εἰ γὰρ ἀπαθὴς νομισθείη, ἀντίτυπος πάντως ἡ ἀπάθεια τῷ ἐνεργοῦντι γενήσεται, κωλυομένης δὲ τῆς ἐνεργείας οὐκ ἔσται πάντως τὸ ἐνεργούμενον. ὡς δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ παθητὴν διὰ τούτων τοῦ μονογενοῦς τὴν οὐσίαν ποιήσουσιν, ἵνα τὴν ἐνέργειαν δέξηται, ἢ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ προφανὲς τῆς ἀσεβείας ὀκνοῦντες τὸ μηδὲ ὅλως αὐτὴν εἶναι κατασκευάσουσιν. ὃ γὰρ παθεῖν ἀποπέφυκεν, οὐδὲ τὴν ποιητικὴν ἐνέργειαν ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ πάντως προσίεται. ὁ τοίνυν ἐνεργείας τινὸς ἀποτέλεσμα τὸν υἱὸν ὀνομάζων ἕν τι καὶ τοῦτον τῶν παθητῶν διορίζεται ὅσα δι' ἐνεργείας ἔσχε τὴν πρόοδον, ἢ εἴπερ ἀρνοῖτο τὸ πάθος, καὶ τὴν ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ μετὰ τοῦ πάθους ἀρνήσεται. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καθ' ἑκάτερον τῶν κατὰ τὸ διλήμματον προφαινομένων σαφὴς ἡ ἀσέβεια καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι λέγειν καὶ τὸ παθητὸν αὐτὸν οἴεσθαι, πρόδηλος ἡ ἀλήθεια διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀτόπων ἀναιρέσεως ἀναφαινομένη. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἀληθῶς ἔστι καὶ παθητὸς οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἐξ ἐνεργείας ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ὡς εἰκὸς ἀληθινὸν εἶναι θεὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπαθῶς ἐξ ἀϊδίου ἀπαυγασθέντα τε καὶ ἐκλάμψαντα.