LESSON 12

Various Senses of Diverse, Different, Like, Contrary, and Diverse in Species

Chapters 9 & 10: 1018a 9-1018b 8

             447. Things are said to be other or diverse (diversa) of which either the forms or the matter or the intelligible structure of the essence is many; and in general the term other has senses opposite to those of the same.

             448. Things are said to be different (differentia) which, while being diverse, are the same in some respect, and not merely in number, but in species or in genus or proportionally. And so also are those things whose genus is not the same, and contraries, and all those things which have diversity or otherness in their essence.

             449. Things are said to be like (similia) which undergo the same modifications; or undergo more of the same than of different modifications; or whose quality is one.

             450. And whatever has a greater number or the more important of those contraries in reference to which alteration is possible is said to be like something else. And things are said to be unlike (dissimilia) in ways opposite to those in which they are like.

Chapter 10

             451. By opposites (opposita) we mean contraries, contradictories, relatives, and privation and possession.

             452. And opposites also mean the ultimate parts of which things are composed and into which they are dissolved, as in processes of generation and corruption. And those things which cannot be present at the same time in a subject which is receptive of them are called opposites: either they themselves or the things of which they are composed. Gray and white, for example, are not present at the same time in the same subject, and therefore the things of which they are composed are opposites.

             453. By contraries (contraria) we mean those attributes which, differing in genus, cannot be present at the same time in the same subject; and also those which differ most in the same genus; and those which differ most in the same subject; and those which differ most among those which come under the same power; and things which differ most either absolutely or in genus or in species.

             454. Other things are called contraries either because they have contrary attributes or because they are receptive of them; and others because they are capable of causing them or undergoing them, or because they are actually causing them or undergoing them, or because they are rejections or acquisitions or possessions or privations of such attributes.

             455. But since the term being and the term one are used in many ways, all other terms which are used in relation to them must follow upon them; so that the terms same, diverse and contrary vary according to each category.

             456. Those things are said to be diverse (or other) in species which belong to the same genus but are not subalternate. And so are those which belong to the same genus and have a difference; and also those which have contrariety in their substance. For contraries differ from each other in species, either all of them, or those which are called such in a primary sense; and so are those things whose intelligible structures differ in the lowest species of the genus (for example, man and horse do not differ in genus but their intelligible structures are different); and those attributes which belong to the same substance and have a difference. Things which are the same in species are said to be such in ways opposite to those just given.

COMMENTARY

             913. Here he explains the various ways in which the term diverse (or other) is used, and he gives three senses. Thus some things are said to be diverse in species because their species are many, as an ass and an ox; others are said to be diverse in number because their matters differ, as two individuals of one species; and others are said to be diverse because "the intelligible structure of the essence," i.e., the definition designating their substance, is different. For some things may be the same in number, i.e., from the viewpoint of matter, but diverse in their intelligible structure, as Socrates and this white man.

             914. And since many modes of diversity can be considered (for example, diversity in genus, and the diversity resulting from the division of the continuous), he therefore adds that the term diverse means the very opposite of the same; for to every way in which things are the same there corresponds an opposite way in which they are diverse. Hence things are said to be diverse in the same number of senses in which they are said to be the same.

             915. Yet the other ways in which things are said to be one, i.e., the same, can be reduced to those stated here. For diversity of genus is included in diversity of species, and diversity of quantity is included in diversity of matter, because the parts of a quantity have the character of matter in relation to the whole.

             916. Things are said to be "different" (448).

             Then he gives the various senses in which the term different is used, and there are two of them. First, any two things are said properly to be different which, while being diverse, are "the same in some respect," i.e., they have some one thing in common. And this is so whether they have some one thing in common numerically, as Socrates sitting and Socrates not sitting; or whether they have some one thing in common specifically, as Socrates and Plato have man in common; or whether they have a common genus, as man and ass share in the genus animal; or whether they share in some one thing proportionally, as quantity and quality both share in being. And from this it is evident that everything different is diverse, but not the reverse. For diverse things which agree in no respect cannot properly be called different, because they do not differ in some other respect but only in themselves; but that is said to be different which differs in some particular respect. The term different is used in a second way when it is taken commonly in place of the term diverse; and then those things are also said to be different which belong to diverse genera and have nothing in common.

             917. Next he indicates the kind of things which admit of difference in the first way, which is the proper one. Now those things which are said properly to differ must agree in some respect. Those which agree in species differ only by accidental differences; for example, Socrates insofar as he is white or just differs from Plato insofar as he is black or musical. And those things which agree in genus and are diverse in species differ by substantial differences. And since this is so, then those things are said to differ most properly which are the same in genus and diverse in species. For every genus is divided into contrary differences, but not every genus is divided into contrary species. Thus the species of color, white and black, are contraries, and so are their differences, expanding and contracting. And the differences of animal, rational and irrational, are contraries; but the species of animal, such as man, horse, and the like, are not. Therefore things which are said to differ most properly are either those which are contrary species, as white and black, or those species of one genus which are not contrary but have contrariety in their essence because of the contrariety of differences which belong to the essence of the species.

             918. Things are said to be "like" (449).

             Here he points out the various ways in which the term like is used, and in regard to this he does two things. First (449:C 918), he indicates the various ways in which this term is used; and second (451:C 922), he gives those senses in which the term unlike is used ("By opposites").

             In regard to the first he does two things. First, he gives the ways in which the term like is used; and second (450:C 920), he explains how one thing is said to be most like another ("And whatever").

             He gives three ways in which things are like. Now it is evident that oneness in quality causes likeness. Further, undergoing or affection (passio) is associated with quality, because undergoing is most noticeable in the case of qualitative change or alteration; and thus one species of quality is called affection or possible quality. Hence things are observed to be like not only insofar as they have a common quality but also insofar as they undergo or suffer something in common. And this can be taken from two points of view: either from that of the affection or undergoing, or from that of the subject in which the affection is terminated.

             919. Some things are like, then, for three reasons. First, they undergo or suffer the same thing; for example, two pieces of wood which are consumed by fire can be said to be like. Second, several things are like merely because they are affected or undergo something, whether this be the same or different; for example, two men, one of whom is beaten and the other imprisoned, are said to be like in that they both undergo something or suffer. Third, those things are said to be like which have one quality; for example, two white things are alike in whiteness, and two stars in the heaven are alike in brightness or in power.

             920. And whatever (450).

             Then he shows how one thing is said to be most like some other thing. For when there are several contraries of the sort which are observed to be alterable, whatever resembles some other thing in having the more important of these contraries is said to be more properly like that thing. For example, garlic, which is hot and dry, is said to be more properly like fire than sugar, which is hot and moist. The same holds true of any two things which are like some third thing in terms of only one quality; for whatever resembles some other thing in terms of some quality which is more proper to itself, is said to be more properly like that thing. For example, air is more properly like fire than earth; for air is like fire in reference to warmth, which is a quality proper to fire itself to a greater degree than dryness, in reference to which earth is like air.

             921. Then he states that things are said to be unlike in ways opposite to those in which they are like.

             922. By "opposites" (451).

             Here he distinguishes between the secondary parts of plurality, i.e., those contained under difference and diversity, which are its primary parts; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he gives the various ways in which the term opposite is used; second (453:C 925), those in which the term contrary is used ("By contraries"); and third (456:C 931), those in which things are said to be diverse or other in species ("Those things are said to be").

             In regard to the first he does two things. First (451), he gives the various ways in which we speak of opposites; and there are four of these: contradictories, contraries, privation and possession, and relatives. For one thing is contraposed or opposed to another either by reason of dependence, i.e., insofar as one depends on another, and then they are opposed as relatives, or by reason of removal, i.e., because one removes another. This occurs in three ways: either one thing removes another entirely and leaves nothing, and then there is negation; or the subject alone remains, and then there is privation; or the subject and genus remain, and then there is contrariety. For there are contraries not only in the same subject but also in the same genus.

             923. And opposites (452).     

             Second, he gives two ways in which things can be recognized as opposites. The first of these pertains to motion, for in any motion or change the terminus from which is the opposite of the terminus to which. Hence those things from which motion begins and those in which it ends are opposites. This is evident in processes of generation; for the white is generated from the not-white, and fire is generated from what is not-fire.

             924. The second pertains to the subject. For those attributes which cannot belong at the same time to the same subject must be the opposite of each other, either they themselves or the things in which they are present. For the same body cannot be at the same time both white and black, which are contraries; nor can the terms man and ass be predicated of the same thing, because their intelligible structures contain opposite differences, i.e., rational and irrational. The same holds true of gray and white, because gray is composed of black, which is the opposite of white. And we should note that he expressly says, "in the same subject"; for certain things cannot exist at the same time in the same subject, not because they are opposed to each other, but because the subject is not receptive of the one or the other; for example, whiteness and music cannot exist at the same time in an ass, but they can exist at the same time in a man.

             925. By "contraries" (453).

             Then he states the various ways in which the term contrary is used, and in regard to this he does three things. First, he gives the principal ways in which things are said to be contrary. Among these he includes, first, one improper usage of the term, i.e., that whereby some attributes are called contraries which, while differing in genus, cannot belong at the same time to the same subject; for properly speaking contraries are attributes which belong to one genus. An example of this would be found if we were to say that heaviness and circular motion cannot belong to the same subject.

             926. Then he gives a second usage of the term, which is a proper one, according to which contraries are said to be things that agree in some respect; for contraries agree in three respects, namely, in reference to the same genus, or to the same subject, or to the same power. Then he uses these three to expose the things which are real contraries. He says that those attributes which differ most in the same genus are called contraries, as white and black in the genus of color; and those which differ most in the same subject, as health and disease in an animal; and those which differ most in reference to the same power, as what is correct and what is incorrect in reference to grammar; for rational powers extend to opposites. He says "most" in order to differentiate contraries from the intermediate attributes which lie between them, which also agree in the same genus, subject and power, yet do not differ to the greatest degree.

             927. Hence he adds the universal notion involved in things which are designated as contraries, namely, that contraries are things which differ most either absolutely or in the same genus or in the same species. They differ "absolutely," for example, in the case of local motion, where the extremes are separated most widely, as the most easterly and westerly points of the whole universe, which are the limits of its diameter. And they differ "in the same genus," as the specific differences which divide a genus; and "in the same species," as contrary differences of an accidental kind by which individuals of the same species differ from each other.

             928. Other things (454).

             Here he shows in what respect some things are said to be contraries in a secondary way because they are related to those things which are contraries in the primary way. For some things are contraries either because they actually possess contraries, as fire and water are called contraries because one is hot and the other cold; or because they are the potential recipients of contraries, as what is receptive of health and of disease; or because they are potentially causing contraries or undergoing them, as what is capable of heating and of cooling, and what is able to be heated and to be cooled; or because they are actually causing contraries or undergoing them, as what is heating and cooling or being heated and being cooled; or because they are expulsions or rejections or acquisitions of contraries, or even possessions or privations of them. For the privation of white is the opposite of the privation of black, just as the possession of the former is the opposite of that of the latter.

             929. It is evident, then, that he touches on a threefold relationship of contraries to things: one is to a subject which is either in act or in potency; another is to something that is active or passive in act or in potency; and a third is to processes of generation and corruption, either to the processes themselves or to their termini, which are possession and privation.

             930. But since the term (455).

             He gives a third way in which the term contrary is used, and he also shows why the foregoing terms are used in many ways. For since the terms one and being have several meanings, the terms which are based upon them must also have several meanings; for example, same and diverse, which flow from one and many; and contrary, which is contained under diverse. Hence diverse must be divided according to the ten categories just as being and one are.

             931. Those things (456).

             He now explains the various ways in which things are said to be diverse (or other) in species, and he gives five of these. First, they belong to the same genus and are not subalternate; for example, science and whiteness both come under quality, yet they are not distinguished from each other by opposite differences.

             932. Second, they belong to the same genus and are distinguished from each other by some difference, whether such differences are contrary or not, as two-footed and four-footed.

             933. Third, their subjects contain contrariety; i.e., those things which are distinguished by contrary differences, whether the subjects are contrary themselves (as white and black, which are distinguished by the differences "expanding" and "contracting") or not (as man and ass, which are distinguished by the differences "rational" and "irrational"). For contraries must differ in species, either all of them, or those which are called contraries in the primary sense.

             934. Fourth, the lowest species are diverse and are the last in some genus, as man and horse. For those things which differ only in species are said more properly to differ in species than those which differ both in species and in genus.

             935. Fifth, they are accidents in the same subject, yet differ from each other; for many accidents of one and the same kind cannot exist in the same subject. And things are said to be the same in species in ways opposite to those given above.