§1. Preface.—It is useless to attempt to benefit those who will not accept help.
§4. Eunomius displays much folly and fine writing, but very little seriousness about vital points.
§7. Eunomius himself proves that the confession of faith which He made was not impeached.
§10. All his insulting epithets are shewn by facts to be false.
§13. Résumé of his dogmatic teaching. Objections to it in detail.
§19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is ‘single’ is only verbal.
§21. The blasphemy of these heretics is worse than the Jewish unbelief.
§23. These doctrines of our Faith witnessed to and confirmed by Scripture passages .
§34. The Passage where he attacks the ‘ Ομοούσιον , and the contention in answer to it.
§35. Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.
§36. A passing repetition of the teaching of the Church.
§38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms .
§39. Answer to the question he is always asking, “Can He who is be begotten?”
§40. His unsuccessful attempt to be consistent with his own statements after Basil has confuted him.
§41. The thing that follows is not the same as the thing that it follows.
§42. Explanation of ‘Ungenerate,’ and a ‘study’ of Eternity.
§3. He then shows, from the instance of Adam and Abel, and other examples, the absence of alienation of essence in the case of the “generate” and “ungenerate.”
Now seeing that Eunomius’ conflict with himself has been made manifest, where he has been shown to contradict himself, at one time saying, “He ought to be called ‘Son,’ according to nature, because He is begotten,” at another that, because He is created, He is no more called “Son,” but a “product,” I think it right that the careful and attentive reader, as it is not possible, when two statements are mutually at variance, that the truth should be found equally in both, should reject of the two that which is impious and blasphemous—that, I mean, with regard to the “creature” and the “product,” and should assent to that only which is of orthodox tendency, which confesses that the appellation of “Son” naturally attaches to the Only-begotten God: so that the word of truth would seem to be recommended even by the voice of its enemies.
I resume my discourse, however, taking up that point of his argument which we originally set aside. “We do not refuse,” he says, “to call the Son, seeing He is generate, even by the name of ‘product of generation520 γέννημα. This word, in what follows, is sometimes translated simply by the word “product,” where it is not contrasted with ποίημα (the “product of making”), or where the argument depends especially upon its grammatical form (which indicates that the thing denoted is the result of a process), rather than upon the idea of the particular process. Cf. Ps. xxxiii. 9, and Ps. cxlviii. 5, in LXX. (reading ἐγεννήθησαν). The words referred to are those in Acts ii. 36.,’ since the generated essence itself, and the appellation of ‘Son,’ make such a relation of words appropriate.” Meanwhile let the reader who is critically following the argument remember this, that in speaking of the “generated essence” in the case of the Only-begotten, he by consequence allows us to speak of the “ungenerate essence” in the case of the Father, so that neither absence of generation, nor generation, can any longer be supposed to constitute the essence, but the essence must be taken separately, and its being, or not being begotten, must be conceived separately by means of the peculiar attributes contemplated in it. Let us, however, consider more carefully his argument on this point. He says that an essence has been begotten, and that the name of this generated essence is “Son.” Well, at this point our argument will convict that of our opponents on two grounds, first, of an attempt at knavery, secondly, of slackness in their attempt against ourselves. For he is playing the knave when he speaks of “generation of essence,” in order to establish his opposition between the essences, when once they are divided in respect of a difference of nature between “generate” and “ungenerate”: while the slackness of their attempt is shown by the very positions their knavery tries to establish. For he who says the essence is generate, clearly defines generation as being something else distinct from the essence, so that the significance of generation cannot be assigned to the word “essence.” For he has not in this passage represented the matter as he often does, so as to say that generation is itself the essence, but acknowledges that the essence is generated, so that there is produced in his readers a distinct notion in the case of each word: for one conception arises in him who hears that it was generated, and another is called up by the name of “essence.” Our argument may be made clearer by example. The Lord says in the Gospel521 Cf. S. John xvi. 21 The force of λόγος here appears to be nearly equivalent to “idea,” in the sense of an exact expression of the nature of a thing. Gulonius renders it by “ratio.” S. Basil: the passages discussed are afterwards referred to in detail. that a woman, when her travail is drawing near, is in sorrow, but afterwards rejoices in gladness because a man is born into the world. As then in this passage we derive from the Gospel two distinct conceptions,—one the birth which we conceive to be by way of generation, the other that which results from the birth (for the birth is not the man, but the man is by the birth),—so here too, when Eunomius confesses that the essence was generated, we learn by the latter word that the essence comes from something, and by the former we conceive that subject itself which has its real being from something. If then the signification of essence is one thing, and the word expressing generation suggests to us another conception, their clever contrivances are quite gone to ruin, like earthen vessels hurled one against the other, and mutually smashed to pieces. For it will no longer be possible for them, if they apply the opposition of “generate” and “ungenerate” to the essence of the Father and the Son, to apply at the same time to the things themselves the mutual conflict between these names522 If, that is, they speak of the “generated essence” in contra-distinction to “ungenerate essence” they are precluded from saying that the essence of the Son is that He is begotten, and that the essence of the Father is that He is ungenerate: that which constitutes the essence cannot be made an epithet of the essence. The argument appears to be this:—The Anomœans assert, on the ground that He is created, that the Son’s essence is τρεπτὸν, liable to change; where there is the possibility of change, the nature must have a capacity of inclining one way or the other, according to the balance of will determining to which side the nature shall incline: and that this is the condition of the angels may be seen from the instance of the fallen angels, whose nature was inclined to evil by their προαίρεσις. It follows that to say the Son is τρεπτὸς implies that He is on a level with the angelic nature, and might fall even as the angels fell. With the following passage may be compared the parallel account in the Book of Wisdom (ch. xiii.).. For as it is confessed by Eunomius that the essence is generate (seeing that the example from the Gospel explains the meaning of such a phrase, where, when we hear that a man is generated, we do not conceive the man to be the same thing as his generation, but receive a separate conception in each of the two words), heresy will surely no longer be permitted to express by such words her doctrine of the difference of the essences. In order, however, that our account of these matters may be cleared up as far as possible, let us once more discuss the point in the following way. He Who framed the universe made the nature of man with all things in the beginning, and after Adam was made, He then appointed for men the law of generation one from another, saying, “Be fruitful and multiply523 Gen. i. 28. Cf. Heb. i. 4, and foll. It is to be noted that Gregory connects πάλιν in v. 6, with εἰσαγάγῃ, not treating it, as the A.V. does, as simply introducing another quotation. This appears from his later reference to the text. Cf. Is. xli. 4, xliv. 6, xlviii. 12 (LXX.). If the whole passage is intended to be a quotation, it is not made exactly from any one of these; the opening words are from the second passage referred to; and perhaps this is the only portion intended to be a quotation, the second clause being explanatory; the words of the second clause are varied in the repetition immediately afterwards..” Now while Abel came into existence by way of generation, what reasonable man would deny that, in the actual sense of human generation, Adam existed ungenerately? Yet the first man had in himself the complete definition of man’s essential nature, and he who was generated of him was enrolled under the same essential name. But if the essence that was generated was made anything other than that which was not generated, the same essential name would not apply to both: for of those things whose essence is different, the essential name also is not the same. Since, then, the essential nature of Adam and of Abel is marked by the same characteristics, we must certainly agree that one essence is in both, and that the one and the other are exhibited in the same nature. For Adam and Abel are both one so far as the definition of their nature is concerned, but are distinguished one from the other without confusion by the individual attributes observed in each of them. We cannot therefore properly say that Adam generated another essence besides himself, but rather that of himself he generated another self, with whom was produced the whole definition of the essence of him who generated him. What, then, we learn in the case of human nature by means of the inferential guidance afforded to us by the definition, this I think we ought to take for our guidance also to the pure apprehension of the Divine doctrines. For when we have shaken off from the Divine and exalted doctrines all carnal and material notions, we shall be most surely led by the remaining conception, when it is purged of such ideas, to the lofty and unapproachable heights. It is confessed even by our adversaries that God, Who is over all, both is and is called the Father of the Only-begotten, and they moreover give to the Only-begotten God, Who is of the Father, the name of “begotten,” by reason of His being generated. Since then among men the word “father” has certain significances attaching to it, from which the pure nature is alien, it behoves a man to lay aside all material conceptions which enter in by association with the carnal significance of the word “father,” and to form in the case of the God and Father a conception befitting the Divine nature, expressive only of the reality of the relationship. Since, therefore, in the notion of a human father there is included not only all that the flesh suggests to our thoughts, but a certain notion of interval is also undoubtedly conceived with the idea of human fatherhood, it would be well, in the case of the Divine generation, to reject, together with bodily pollution, the notion of interval also, that so what properly belongs to matter may be completely purged away, and the transcendent generation may be clear, not only from the idea of passion, but from that of interval. Now he who says that God is a Father will unite with the thought that God is, the further thought that He is something: for that which has its being from some beginning, certainly also derives from something the beginning of its being, whatever it is: but He in Whose case being had no beginning, has not His beginning from anything, even although we contemplate in Him some other attribute than simple existence. Well, God is a Father. It follows that He is what He is from eternity: for He did not become, but is a Father: for in God that which was, both is and will be. On the other hand, if He once was not anything, then He neither is nor will be that thing: for He is not believed to be the Father of a Being such that it may be piously asserted that God once existed by Himself without that Being. For the Father is the Father of Life, and Truth, and Wisdom, and Light, and Sanctification, and Power, and all else of a like kind that the Only-begotten is or is called. Thus when the adversaries allege that the Light “once was not,” I know not to which the greater injury is done, whether to the Light, in that the Light is not, or to Him that has the Light, in that He has not the Light. So also with Life and Truth and Power, and all the other characters in which the Only-begotten fills the Father’s bosom, being all things in His own fulness. For the absurdity will be equal either way, and the impiety against the Father will equal the blasphemy against the Son: for in saying that the Lord “once was not,” you will not merely assert the non-existence of Power, but you will be saying that the Power of God, Who is the Father of the Power, “was not.” Thus the assertion made by your doctrine that the Son “once was not,” establishes nothing else than a destitution of all good in the case of the Father. See to what an end these wise men’s acuteness leads, how by them the word of the Lord is made good, which says, “He that despiseth Me despiseth Him that sent Me524 S. Luke x. 16 Cf. Ps. cii. 25, 26. εὐαγγελισάμενος:” for by the very arguments by which they despise the existence at any time of the Only-begotten, they also dishonour the Father, stripping off by their doctrine from the Father’s glory every good name and conception.
Φανερᾶς τοίνυν τῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μάχης τοῦ Εὐνομίου γεγενημένης, ἐν οἷς ἐναντία λέγων ἑαυτῷ ἀπελήλεγκται, νῦν μὲν διὰ τὸ γεννηθῆναι κατὰ φύσιν λέγων δεῖν αὐτὸν υἱὸν ὀνομάζεσθαι, πάλιν δὲ διὰ τὸ κτισθῆναι μηκέτι υἱόν, ἀλλὰ ποίημα λέγεσθαι, προσήκειν οἶμαι τὸν νουνεχῶς καὶ ἐπιστατικῶς ἐπαΐοντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δύο μαχομένων ἀλλήλοις λόγων κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τὸ ἀληθὲς εὑρεθῆναι, ἀποβάλλειν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ ἀσεβές τε καὶ βλάσφημον, τὸ κατὰ τὸ « κτίσμα » λέγω καὶ « ποίημα », θέσθαι δὲ μόνῳ τῷ πρὸς εὐσέβειαν βλέποντι, τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ὁμολογοῦντι προσεῖναι τῷ μονογενεῖ θεῷ τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίαν, ὡς ἂν καὶ διὰ τῆς τῶν ἐχθρῶν φωνῆς ὁ τῆς εὐσεβείας λόγος ἔχοι τὴν σύστασιν. λέγω δὲ πάλιν ἀναλαβὼν ὃν ἐξ ἀρχῆς αὐτοῦ παρεθέμην λόγον. « γεννητὸν ὄντα », φησί, « τὸν υἱὸν καὶ γέννημα λέγειν οὐ παραιτούμεθα, τῆς γεννηθείσης αὐτῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας τὴν τοιαύτην τῶν ὀνομάτων οἰκειουμένης σχέσιν ». τέως μὲν οὖν ὁ κριτικῶς τῶν λεγομένων ἀκούων τούτου μεμνήσθω, ὅτι τὴν « γεννηθεῖσαν οὐσίαν » ἐπὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς εἰπὼν ἔδωκεν ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολούθου καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν μὴ γεννηθεῖσαν λέγειν, ὡς μηκέτι μήτε τὴν ἀγεννησίαν μήτε τὴν γέννησιν ἀντ' οὐσίας παραλαμβάνεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἰδίᾳ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν παραλαμβάνεσθαι, ἰδίᾳ δὲ τὸ γεννηθῆναι αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ γεννηθῆναι διὰ τῶν ἐπιθεωρουμένων αὐτῇ ἰδιωμάτων κατανοεῖσθαι. φιλοπονώτερον δὲ τὸν περὶ τούτου λόγον κατανοήσωμεν. οὐσίαν γεγεννῆσθαι λέγει, υἱὸν δὲ εἶναι τῆς γεννηθείσης οὐσίας τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ' ἐν τούτοις ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν λόγος διὰ δύο τὸν ἐναντίον ἐλέγξει λόγον, ἑνὸς μὲν τῆς κακουργίας τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν, ἑτέρου δὲ τῆς καθ' ἡμῶν ἐπιχειρήσεως τὴν ἀτονίαν. κακουργεῖ μὲν γὰρ γέννησιν οὐσίας λέγων, ἵνα κατασκευάσῃ τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλας τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐναντίωσιν, τῷ γεννητῷ τε καὶ ἀγεννήτῳ πρὸς ἑτερότητα φύσεως διεσχισμένας. ἐλέγχεται δὲ τὸ τῆς ἐπιχειρήσεως ἄτονον δι' αὐτῶν ὧν ἡ κακουργία κατασκευάζεται. ὁ γὰρ γεγεννῆσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν εἰπὼν ἕτερόν τι τὴν γέννησιν εἶναι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν σαφῶς διορίζεται, ὡς μὴ ἂν τὸ σημαινόμενον τῆς γεννήσεως τῷ τῆς οὐσίας ἐφαρμοσθῆναι λόγῳ. οὐ γὰρ ὅπερ ἐν πολλοῖς κατεσκεύασε, τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ πεποίηκεν, ὥστε αὐτὴν εἰπεῖν οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν γέννησιν, ἀλλὰ γεννηθῆναι ὁμολογεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὡς διακεκριμένην ἐφ' ἑκατέρας φωνῆς τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ἐγγενέσθαι τὴν ἔννοιαν, ἄλλο γάρ τι νόημα γίνεται τῷ ὅτι ἐγεννήθη ἀκούσαντι καὶ ἄλλο διὰ τοῦ τῆς οὐσίας ὀνόματος. σαφέστερος δὲ γένοιτ' ἂν ἡμῖν διὰ τῶν ὑποδειγμάτων ὁ λόγος. εἶπεν ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ ὁ κύριος ὅτι προσεγγιζούσης τῆς ὠδῖνος ἐν λύπῃ γίνεται ἡ γυνή, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ χαρᾷ χαίρει, ὅτι ἐγεννήθη ἄνθρωπος εἰς τὸν κόσμον. ὡς τοίνυν ἐν τῷ μέρει τούτῳ δύο νοήματα διακεκριμένα παρὰ τοῦ εὐαγγελίου μανθάνομεν, ἓν μὲν τὸν τόκον ὃν διὰ τῆς γεννήσεως ἐνοήσαμεν, ἕτερον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ τόκου γινόμενον (οὐ γὰρ ὁ τόκος ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦ τόκου ὁ ἄνθρωπος), οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ Εὐνομίου γεννηθῆναι τὴν οὐσίαν ὁμολογήσαντος τῷ μὲν προάγοντι ῥήματι τὸ ἔκ τινος ἐδιδάχθημεν, τῷ δὲ ἐφεξῆς αὐτὸ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐνοήσαμεν, ᾧ ἐκ τοῦ τινός ἐστιν ἡ ὑπόστασις. εἰ οὖν ἄλλο μέν ἐστιν τῆς οὐσίας τὸ σημαινόμενον, ἕτερον δὲ ἡ τῆς γεννήσεως φωνὴ νοεῖν ὑποτίθεται, διαπέπτωκεν ἀθρόως αὐτοῖς τὰ σοφὰ μηχανήματα, ὥσπερ ὀστράκινα σκεύη ἀλλήλοις προσαραχθέντα καὶ δι' ἀλλήλων διατρυφθέντα. οὐκέτι γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐξέσται τὴν τοῦ γεννητοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον διαστολὴν ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας μεταφέρουσι συμμεταφέρειν ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν ὀνομάτων μάχην. ὁμολογηθέντος γὰρ παρὰ τοῦ Εὐνομίου ὅτι ἐγεννήθη ἡ οὐσία, καθὼς καὶ τὸ εὐαγγελικὸν ὑπόδειγμα τὴν τοιαύτην ἑρμηνεύει διάνοιαν, ἐν ᾧ τὸν ἄνθρωπον γεννηθῆναι μαθόντες οὐ ταὐτὸν ἐνοήσαμεν τῇ γεννήσει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλ' ἴδιον ἐφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐδεξάμεθα νόημα, οὐκέτι χώραν ἕξει πάντως ἡ αἵρεσις τὴν ἑτερότητα τῶν οὐσιῶν διὰ τῶν τοιούτων φωνῶν δογματίζουσα.
Ὡς δ' ἂν μάλιστα σαφέστερον ἡμῖν ὁ περὶ τούτων λόγος ἐκκαλυφθείη, οὑτωσὶ τὸ προκείμενον πάλιν διαληψόμεθα. ἐποίησε τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν κατ' ἀρχὰς μετὰ πάντων ὁ τὸ πᾶν συστησάμενος, καὶ μετὰ τὸ γενέσθαι τὸν Ἀδὰμ τότε τὴν ἐξ ἀλλήλων γέννησιν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐνομοθέτησεν εἰπὼν Αὐξάνεσθε καὶ πληθύνεσθε. τοῦ τοίνυν Ἄβελ γεννητῶς ὑποστάντος, τίς οὐκ ἂν εἴποι τῶν εὖ φρονούντων κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης γεννήσεως σημαινόμενον ἀγεννήτως τὸν Ἀδὰμ ὑποστῆναι; ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος ὅλον ἔσχεν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης οὐσίας τὸν ὅρον, καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐκείνου γεννηθεὶς ὡσαύτως ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τῆς οὐσίας ὑπογράφεται λόγῳ. εἰ δὲ ἄλλη τις ἡ γεννηθεῖσα οὐσία παρὰ τὴν μὴ γεννηθεῖσαν κατεσκευάζετο, οὐκ ἂν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς οὐσίας ἥρμοσε λόγος. ὧν γὰρ ἡ οὐσία διάφορος, τούτων οὐδὲ ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ αὐτὸς τῆς οὐσίας. ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαρακτηρίζεται ἰδιώμασιν ἥ τε τοῦ Ἀδὰμ καὶ ἡ τοῦ Ἄβελ οὐσία, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη μίαν μὲν οὐσίαν ἐπ' ἀμφοτέροις εἶναι συντίθεσθαι, ἄλλον δὲ καὶ ἄλλον τὸν ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ φύσει δεικνύμενον. ὁ γὰρ Ἀδὰμ καὶ ὁ Ἄβελ ἐν μὲν τῷ λόγῳ τῆς φύσεως εἷς οἱ δύο εἰσίν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπιθεωρουμένοις ἑκατέρῳ αὐτῶν ἰδιώμασιν ἀσύγχυτον ἔχουσι τὴν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διάκρισιν. οὐκοῦν οὐκ ἔστι κυρίως εἰπεῖν ὅτι ὁ Ἀδὰμ οὐσίαν παρ' αὐτὸν ἄλλην ἐγέννησεν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅτι ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ ἐγέννησεν ἄλλον ἑαυτόν, ᾧ πᾶς ὁ τῆς τοῦ γεννήσαντος οὐσίας συναπετέχθη λόγος. ὅπερ οὖν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μεμαθήκαμεν φύσεως διὰ τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προδειχθείσης ἡμῖν ὁδηγίας, τοῦτο οἶμαι δεῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκήρατον τῶν θείων δογμάτων κατανόησιν εἰς ὁδηγίαν λαβεῖν. πᾶσαν γὰρ σαρκώδη καὶ ὑλικὴν ἔννοιαν τῶν θείων τε καὶ ὑψηλῶν δογμάτων ἀποσεισάμενοι ἀσφαλεστάτην ἕξομεν διὰ τοῦ καταλειπομένου νοήματος, ὅταν ἐκκαθαρθῇ τῶν τοιούτων, τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ ὑψηλά τε καὶ ἀπρόσιτα χειραγωγίαν.
Ὁμολογεῖται γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἐναντίων τὸν ἐπὶ πάντων ὄντα θεὸν πατέρα τοῦ μονογενοῦς καὶ εἶναι καὶ λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν τὸν ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ὄντα « γεννητὸν » διὰ τὸ γεννηθῆναι κατονομάζουσιν. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν ἀνθρώποις τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὄνομα συνεζευγμένας ἔχει τινὰς ἐμφάσεις, ὧν ἡ ἀκήρατος ἠλλοτρίωται φύσις, πάντα προσήκει ὅσα περὶ τὴν σαρκώδη τοῦ πατρὸς σημασίαν ὑλικὰ νοήματα συνεισέρχεται καταλιπόντα θεοπρεπῆ τινα διάνοιαν ἐμφαντικὴν μόνης τῆς γνησιότητος ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πατρὸς ἐντυπώσασθαι. ἐπεὶ οὖν οὐ μόνον ὅσα ἡ σὰρξ νοεῖν ὑποτίθεται τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου πατρὸς ἐννοίᾳ συγκαταλαμβάνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαστηματική τις ἔννοια συνεπινοεῖται πάντως τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ πατρότητι, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι τῷ σωματικῷ ῥύπῳ καὶ τὴν διαστηματικὴν ἔννοιαν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας συναποβαλεῖν γεννήσεως, ὡς ἂν πανταχόθεν ἐκπλυθείσης τῆς ὑλικῆς ἰδιότητος καθαρεύοι παντὸς οὐ μόνον ἐμπαθοῦς, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαστηματικοῦ νοήματος ἡ ὑπερέχουσα γέννησις. οὐκοῦν ὁ πατέρα τὸν θεὸν λέγων τῇ τοῦ εἶναι τὸν θεὸν ἐννοίᾳ καὶ τὸ τὶ εἶναι συμπεριλήψεται. ᾧ γὰρ ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς ἐστι τὸ εἶναι, τούτῳ καὶ τὸ τὶ εἶναι πάντως ἀπό τινος ἄρχεται: ἐφ' οὗ δὲ τὸ εἶναι οὐκ ἤρξατο, οὐδὲ εἴ τι ἄλλο περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρεῖται ἀπό τινος τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχει. ἀλλὰ μὴν πατὴρ ὁ θεός. οὐκοῦν ἐξ ἀϊδίου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστίν: οὐ γὰρ ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' ἐστὶ πατήρ: ἐπὶ θεοῦ γὰρ ὃ ἦν, καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ἔσται. εἰ δέ τί ποτε μὴ ἦν, οὔτε ἐστὶν οὔτε ἔσται: οὐ γὰρ τοιούτου τινὸς πεπίστευται εἶναι πατήρ, οὗ χωρὶς εὐσεβές ἐστιν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ποτε τὸν θεὸν εἶναι λέγειν. ζωῆς γάρ ἐστι πατὴρ ὁ πατὴρ ἀληθείας τε καὶ σοφίας καὶ φωτὸς καὶ ἁγιασμοῦ καὶ δυνάμεως καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων, ὅσα ὁ μονογενής ἐστί τε καὶ ὀνομάζεται. ὅταν τοίνυν παρὰ τῶν ἐχθρῶν κατασκευάζηται τὸ μὴ εἶναί ποτε φῶς, οὐκ οἶδα τίνος πλείων ἐστὶν ἡ ζημία, πότερον αὐτοῦ τοῦ φωτός, ὅταν μὴ τὸ φῶς ᾖ, ἢ τοῦ ἔχοντος, ὅταν μὴ ἔχῃ τὸ φῶς. οὕτω καὶ περὶ τῆς ζωῆς καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, ὅσα τὸν πατρικὸν πληροῖ κόλπον, *** ὁ μονογενὴς θεὸς ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ πληρώματι τὰ πάντα ὤν. ἴση γὰρ καθ' ἑκάτερόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀτοπία καὶ τῆς κατὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ βλασφημίας ἀντίρροπος ἡ κατὰ τοῦ πατρός ἐστιν ἀσέβεια. ἐν γὰρ τῷ εἰπεῖν ποτε μὴ εἶναι τὸν κύριον οὐχ ἁπλῶς δώσεις τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὴν δύναμιν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μὴ εἶναι λέξεις τὴν δύναμιν, τοῦ πατρὸς τῆς δυνάμεως. οὐκοῦν ἡ τοῦ μὴ εἶναί ποτε τὸν υἱὸν διὰ τοῦ σοῦ λόγου κατασκευὴ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἐρημίαν περὶ τὸν πατέρα κατασκευάζει. ὁρᾶτε πρὸς ὅ τι καταστρέφει τῶν σοφῶν ἡ ἀγχίνοια. πῶς ἀληθεύει καὶ διὰ τούτων ἡ τοῦ κυρίου φωνή, ἥ φησιν ὅτι ὁ ἀθετῶν ἐμὲ ἀθετεῖ τὸν ἀποστείλαντά με; δι' ὧν γὰρ τὸ εἶναί ποτε τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἀθετοῦσι, διὰ τούτων ἀτιμάζουσι τὸν πατέρα, πᾶν ἀγαθὸν ὄνομά τε καὶ νόημα τῆς πατρικῆς δόξης τῷ λόγῳ περισυλήσαντες.