Book I Chapter I.—Preface—The Author’s Object—The Utility of Written Compositions.
Chapter III.—Against the Sophists.
Chapter IV.—Human Arts as Well as Divine Knowledge Proceed from God.
Chapter V.—Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology.
Chapter VI.—The Benefit of Culture.
Chapter VII.—The Eclectic Philosophy Paves the Way for Divine Virtue.
Chapter VIII.—The Sophistical Arts Useless.
Chapter IX.—Human Knowledge Necessary for the Understanding of the Scriptures.
Chapter X.—To Act Well of Greater Consequence Than to Speak Well.
Chapter XI.—What is the Philosophy Which the Apostle Bids Us Shun?
Chapter XII.—The Mysteries of the Faith Not to Be Divulged to All.
Chapter XIII.—All Sects of Philosophy Contain a Germ of Truth.
Chapter XIV.—Succession of Philosophers in Greece.
Chapter XV.—The Greek Philosophy in Great Part Derived from the Barbarians.
Chapter XVI.—That the Inventors of Other Arts Were Mostly Barbarians.
Chapter XVII.—On the Saying of the Saviour, “All that Came Before Me Were Thieves and Robbers.”
Chapter XVIII.—He Illustrates the Apostle’s Saying, “I Will Destroy the Wisdom of the Wise.”
Chapter XIX.—That the Philosophers Have Attained to Some Portion of Truth.
Chapter XX.—In What Respect Philosophy Contributes to the Comprehension of Divine Truth.
Chapter XXII.—On the Greek Translation of the Old Testament.
Chapter XXIII.—The Age, Birth, and Life of Moses.
Chapter XXIV.—How Moses Discharged the Part of a Military Leader.
Chapter XXV.—Plato an Imitator of Moses in Framing Laws.
Chapter XXVII.—The Law, Even in Correcting and Punishing, Aims at the Good of Men.
Chapter XXVIII.—The Fourfold Division of the Mosaic Law.
Chapter XXIX.—The Greeks But Children Compared with the Hebrews.
Book II. Chapter I.—Introductory.
Chapter II.—The Knowledge of God Can Be Attained Only Through Faith.
Chapter III.—Faith Not a Product of Nature.
Chapter IV.—Faith the Foundation of All Knowledge.
Chapter V.—He Proves by Several Examples that the Greeks Drew from the Sacred Writers.
Chapter VI.—The Excellence and Utility of Faith.
Chapter VII.—The Utility of Fear. Objections Answered.
Chapter VIII.—The Vagaries of Basilides and Valentinus as to Fear Being the Cause of Things.
Chapter IX.—The Connection of the Christian Virtues.
Chapter X.—To What the Philosopher Applies Himself.
Chapter XI.—The Knowledge Which Comes Through Faith the Surest of All.
Chapter XIII.—On First and Second Repentance.
Chapter XIV.—How a Thing May Be Involuntary.
Chapter XV.—On the Different Kinds of Voluntary Actions, and the Sins Thence Proceeding.
Chapter XVI.—How We are to Explain the Passages of Scripture Which Ascribe to God Human Affections.
Chapter XVII.—On the Various Kinds of Knowledge.
Chapter XIX.—The True Gnostic is an Imitator of God, Especially in Beneficence.
Chapter XX.—The True Gnostic Exercises Patience and Self-Restraint.
Chapter XXI.—Opinions of Various Philosophers on the Chief Good.
Book III. Caput I.—Basilidis Sententiam de Continentia Et Nuptiis Refutat.
Caput II.—Carpocratis Et Epiphanis Sententiam de Feminarum Communitate Refutat.
Caput IV.—Quibus Prætextibus Utantur Hæretici ad Omnis Genetis Licentiam Et Libidinem Exercendam.
Caput VII.—Qua in Re Christianorum Continentia Eam Quam Sibi Vindicant Philosophi Antecellat.
Caput X.—Verba Christi Matt. xviii. 20, Mystice Exponit.
Caput XI.—Legis Et Christi Mandatum de Non Concupiscendo Exponit.
Caput XIV.—2 Cor. xi. 3, Et Eph. iv. 24, Exponit.
Caput XV.—1 Cor. vii. 1 Luc. xiv. 26 Isa. lvi. 2, 3, Explicat.
Caput XVI.—Jer. xx. 14 Job xiv. 3 Ps. l. 5 1 Cor. ix. 27, Exponit.
Book IV. Chapter I.—Order of Contents.
Chapter II.—The Meaning of the Name Stromata or Miscellanies.
Chapter III.—The True Excellence of Man.
Chapter IV.—The Praises of Martyrdom.
Chapter V.—On Contempt for Pain, Poverty, and Other External Things.
Chapter VI.—Some Points in the Beatitudes.
Chapter VII.—The Blessedness of the Martyr.
Chapter VIII.—Women as Well as Men, Slaves as Well as Freemen, Candidates for the Martyr’s Crown.
Chapter IX.—Christ’s Sayings Respecting Martyrdom.
Chapter X.—Those Who Offered Themselves for Martyrdom Reproved.
Chapter XI.—The Objection, Why Do You Suffer If God Cares for You, Answered.
Chapter XII.—Basilides’ Idea of Martyrdom Refuted.
Chapter XIII.—Valentinian’s Vagaries About the Abolition of Death Refuted.
Chapter XIV.—The Love of All, Even of Our Enemies.
Chapter XV.—On Avoiding Offence.
Chapter XVI.—Passages of Scripture Respecting the Constancy, Patience, and Love of the Martyrs.
Chapter XVII.—Passages from Clement’s Epistle to the Corinthians on Martyrdom.
Chapter XVIII.—On Love, and the Repressing of Our Desires.
Chap. XIX.—Women as well as Men Capable of Perfection.
Chapter XXI.—Description of the Perfect Man, or Gnostic.
Chapter XXIII.—The Same Subject Continued.
Chapter XXIV.—The Reason and End of Divine Punishments.
Chapter XXV.—True Perfection Consists in the Knowledge and Love of God.
Chapter XXVI.—How the Perfect Man Treats the Body and the Things of the World.
Chapter III.—The Objects of Faith and Hope Perceived by the Mind Alone.
Chapter IV.—Divine Things Wrapped Up in Figures Both in the Sacred and in Heathen Writers.
Chapter V.—On the Symbols of Pythagoras.
Chapter VI.—The Mystic Meaning of the Tabernacle and Its Furniture.
Chapter VII.—The Egyptian Symbols and Enigmas of Sacred Things.
Chapter VIII.—The Use of the Symbolic Style by Poets and Philosophers.
Chapter IX.—Reasons for Veiling the Truth in Symbols.
Chapter X.—The Opinion of the Apostles on Veiling the Mysteries of the Faith.
Chapter XII.—God Cannot Be Embraced in Words or by the Mind.
Chapter XIII.—The Knowledge of God a Divine Gift, According to the Philosophers.
Chapter XIV.—Greek Plagiarism from the Hebrews.
Chapter II.—The Subject of Plagiarisms Resumed. The Greeks Plagiarized from One Another.
Chapter III.—Plagiarism by the Greeks of the Miracles Related in the Sacred Books of the Hebrews.
Chapter V.—The Greeks Had Some Knowledge of the True God.
Chapter VI.—The Gospel Was Preached to Jews and Gentiles in Hades.
Chapter VII.—What True Philosophy Is, and Whence So Called.
Chapter VIII.—Philosophy is Knowledge Given by God.
Chapter IX.—The Gnostic Free of All Perturbations of the Soul.
Chapter X.—The Gnostic Avails Himself of the Help of All Human Knowledge.
Chapter XI.—The Mystical Meanings in the Proportions of Numbers, Geometrical Ratios, and Music.
Chapter XII.—Human Nature Possesses an Adaptation for Perfection The Gnostic Alone Attains It.
Chapter XIII.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven Corresponding with the Dignities of the Church Below.
Chapter XIV.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven.
Chapter XV.—Different Degrees of Knowledge.
Chapter XVI.—Gnostic Exposition of the Decalogue.
Chapter XVII.—Philosophy Conveys Only an Imperfect Knowledge of God.
Chapter XVIII.—The Use of Philosophy to the Gnostic.
Chapter II.—The Son the Ruler and Saviour of All.
Chapter III.—The Gnostic Aims at the Nearest Likeness Possible to God and His Son.
Chapter IV.—The Heathens Made Gods Like Themselves, Whence Springs All Superstition.
Chapter V.—The Holy Soul a More Excellent Temple Than Any Edifice Built by Man.
Chapter VI.—Prayers and Praise from a Pure Mind, Ceaselessly Offered, Far Better Than Sacrifices.
Chapter VII.—What Sort of Prayer the Gnostic Employs, and How It is Heard by God.
Chapter VIII.—The Gnostic So Addicted to Truth as Not to Need to Use an Oath.
Chapter IX.—Those Who Teach Others, Ought to Excel in Virtues.
Chapter X.—Steps to Perfection.
Chapter XI.—Description of the Gnostic’s Life.
Chapter XII.—The True Gnostic is Beneficent, Continent, and Despises Worldly Things.
Chapter XIII.—Description of the Gnostic Continued.
Chapter XIV.—Description of the Gnostic Furnished by an Exposition of 1 Cor. vi. 1, Etc.
Chapter XV.—The Objection to Join the Church on Account of the Diversity of Heresies Answered.
Chapter XVI.—Scripture the Criterion by Which Truth and Heresy are Distinguished.
Chapter XVII.—The Tradition of the Church Prior to that of the Heresies.
Book VIII. Chapter I.—The Object of Philosophical and Theological Inquiry—The Discovery of Truth.
Chapter II.—The Necessity of Perspicuous Definition.
Chapter III.—Demonstration Defined.
Chapter IV.—To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition.
Chapter V.—Application of Demonstration to Sceptical Suspense of Judgment.
Chapter VI.—Definitions, Genera, and Species.
Chapter VII.—On the Causes of Doubt or Assent.
Fit objects for admiration are the Stoics, who say that the soul is not affected by the body, either to vice by disease, or to virtue by health; but both these things, they say, are indifferent. And indeed Job, through exceeding continence, and excellence of faith, when from rich he became poor, from being held in honour dishonoured, from being comely unsightly, and sick from being healthy, is depicted as a good example, putting the Tempter to shame, blessing his Creator; bearing what came second, as the first, and most clearly teaching that it is possible for the gnostic to make an excellent use of all circumstances. And that ancient achievements are proposed as images for our correction, the apostle shows, when he says, “So that my bonds in Christ are become manifest in all the palace, and to all the rest; and several of the brethren in the Lord, waxing confident by my bonds, are much more bold to speak the word of God without fear,”883 Phil. i. 13, 14.—since martyrs’ testimonies are examples of conversion gloriously sanctified. “For what things the Scripture speaks were written for our instruction, that we, through patience and the consolation of the Scriptures, might have the hope of consolation.”884 Rom. xv. 4. When pain is present, the soul appears to decline from it, and to deem release from present pain a precious thing. At that moment it slackens from studies, when the other virtues also are neglected. And yet we do not say that it is virtue itself which suffers, for virtue is not affected by disease. But he who is partaker of both, of virtue and the disease, is afflicted by the pressure of the latter; and if he who has not yet attained the habit of self-command be not a high-souled man, he is distraught; and the inability to endure it is found equivalent to fleeing from it.
The same holds good also in the case of poverty. For it compels the soul to desist from necessary things, I mean contemplation and from pure sinlessness, forcing him, who has not wholly dedicated himself to God in love, to occupy himself about provisions; as, again, health and abundance of necessaries keep the soul free and unimpeded, and capable of making a good use of what is at hand. “For,” says the apostle, “such shall have trouble in the flesh. But I spare you. For I would have you without anxiety, in order to decorum and assiduity for the Lord, without distraction.”885 1 Cor. vii. 28, 32, 35.
These things, then, are to be abstained from, not for their own sakes, but for the sake of the body; and care for the body is exercised for the sake of the soul, to which it has reference. For on this account it is necessary for the man who lives as a gnostic to know what is suitable. Since the fact that pleasure is not a good thing is admitted from the fact that certain pleasures are evil, by this reason good appears evil, and evil good. And then, if we choose some pleasures and shun others, it is not every pleasure that is a good thing.
Similarly, also, the same rule holds with pains, some of which we endure, and others we shun. But choice and avoidance are exercised according to knowledge; so that it is not pleasure that is the good thing, but knowledge by which we shall choose a pleasure at a certain time, and of a certain kind. Now the martyr chooses the pleasure that exists in prospect through the present pain. If pain is conceived as existing in thirst, and pleasure in drinking, the pain that has preceded becomes the efficient cause of pleasure. But evil cannot be the efficient cause of good. Neither, then, is the one thing nor the other evil. Simonides accordingly (as also Aristotle) writes, “that to be in good health is the best thing, and the second best thing is to be handsome, and the third best thing is to be rich without cheating.”
And Theognis of Megara says:—
“You must, to escape poverty, throw Yourself, O Cyrnus, down from The steep rocks into the deep sea.” |
On the other hand, Antiphanes, the comic poet, says, “Plutus (Wealth), when it has taken hold of those who see better than others, makes them blind.” Now by the poets he is proclaimed as blind from his birth:—
“And brought him forth blind who saw not the sun.” |
Says the Chalcidian Euphorion:—
“Riches, then, and extravagant luxuries, Were for men the worst training for manliness.” |
Wrote Euripides in Alexander:—
“And it is said, Penury has attained wisdom through misfortune; But much wealth will capture not Sparta alone, but every city.” |
“It is not then the only coin that mortals have, that which is white silver or golden, but virtue too,” as Sophocles says.
Θαυμάζειν δὲ ἄξιον καὶ τῶν Στωϊκῶν οἵτινές φασι μηδὲν τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος διατίθεσθαι μήτε πρὸς κακίαν ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας· ἀλλ' ἀμφότερα ταῦτα λέγουσιν ἀδιάφορα εἶναι. καίτοι καὶ Ἰὼβ ἐγκρατείας ὑπερβολῇ καὶ πίστεως ὑπεροχῇ πένης μὲν ἐκ πλουσίου, ἄτιμος δὲ ἐξ ἐνδόξου, αἰσχρὸς δὲ ἐκ καλοῦ καὶ νοσερὸς ἐξ ὑγιεινοῦ γενόμενος ἡμῖν γέ ἐστι παράδειγμα ἀγαθὸν ἀναγεγραμμένος, δυσωπῶν τὸν πειράσαντα, εὐλογῶν τὸν πλάσαντα, φέρων οὕτω τὰ δεύτερα ὡς καὶ τὰ πρότερα, διδάσκων εὖ μάλα τοῖς περιστατικοῖς ἅπασιν οἷόν τε εἶναι καλῶς χρῆσθαι τὸν γνωστικόν. καὶ ὅτι γε εἰκόνες τὰ παλαιὰ κατορθώματα εἰς τὰ ἡμεδαπὰ ἐπανορθώματα ἔκκεινται, ἐμφαίνων ὁ ἀπόστολος ὥστε τοὺς δεσμούς μου φησὶ φανεροὺς ἐν Χριστῷ γενέσθαι ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πραιτωρίῳ καὶ τοῖς λοιποῖς πᾶσι, καὶ τοὺς πλείονας τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἐν κυρίῳ πεποιθότας τοῖς δεσμοῖς μου περισσοτέρως τολμᾶν ἀφόβως τὸν λόγον τοῦ θεοῦ λαλεῖν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ μαρτύρια ἐπιστροφῆς ἐστι παραδείγματα ἐνδόξως ἡγιασμένα. ὅσα γὰρ ἐγράφη, λέγει, εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν διδασκαλίαν ἐγράφη, ἵνα διὰ τῆς ὑπομονῆς καὶ τῆς παρακλήσεως τῶν γραφῶν τὴν ἐλπίδα ἔχωμεν τῆς παρακλήσεως. Ἔοικε δέ πως παρούσης ἀλγηδόνος ἡ ψυχὴ νεύειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ τίμιον ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν τῆς παρούσης ὀδύνης. ἀμέλει κατ' ἐκεῖνο καιροῦ καὶ μαθημάτων ῥᾳθυμεῖ, ὁπηνίκα καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀπημέληνται ἀρεταί. καὶ οὐ δήπου τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτὴν πάσχειν φαμέν (οὐδὲ γὰρ νοσεῖ ἡ ἀρετή), ὁ δὲ ἀμφοῖν μετεσχηκώς, ἀρετῆς καὶ νόσου, ὑπὸ τοῦ κατεπείγοντος θλίβεται· κἂν μὴ καταμεγαλοφρονῶν τύχῃ, ὁ μηδέπω τὴν ἕξιν τῆς ἐγκρατείας περιποιησάμενος ἐξίσταται, ἴσον τε εὑρίσκεται τῷ φεύγειν τὸ μὴ ὑπομεῖναι. ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ πενίας, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὕτη τῶν ἀναγκαίων, τῆς θεωρίας λέγω καὶ τῆς καθαρᾶς ἀναμαρτησίας, ἀπασχολεῖν βιάζεται τὴν ψυχήν, περὶ τοὺς πορισμοὺς διατρίβειν ἀναγκάζουσα τὸν μὴ ὅλον ἑαυτὸν δι' ἀγάπης ἀνατεθεικότα τῷ θεῷ, ὥσπερ ἔμπαλιν ἥ τε ὑγίεια καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀφθονία ἐλευθέραν καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστον φυλάσσει τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν εὖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι γινώσκουσαν· θλῖψιν, γάρ φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, τῇ σαρκὶ ἕξουσιν οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἐγὼ δὲ ὑμῶν φείδομαι. θέλω γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἀμερίμνους εἶναι πρὸς τὸ εὔσχημον καὶ εὐπάρεδρον τῷ κυρίῳ ἀπερισπάστως. τούτων οὖν ἀνθεκτέον οὐ δι' αὐτά, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἡ δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμέλεια διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται, ἐφ' ἣν ἡ ἀναφορά. ἐν ταύτῃ γὰρ μαθεῖν ἀνάγκη τὸν γνωστικῶς πολιτευόμενον τὰ προσήκοντα, ἐπεὶ τό γε μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγα θὸν ὡμολόγηται ἐκ τοῦ κακὰς εἶναί τινας ἡδονάς. τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἀναφαίνεται τὸ ἀγαθὸν κακὸν καὶ τὸ κακὸν ἀγαθόν. ἔπειτα δὲ εἴ τινας μὲν αἱρούμεθα τῶν ἡδονῶν, τινὰς δὲ φεύγομεν, οὐ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλγηδόνων ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, ὧν τὰς μὲν ὑπομένομεν, τὰς δὲ φεύγομεν, ἡ δὲ αἵρεσις καὶ φυγὴ κατ' ἐπιστήμην γίνεται· ὥστε τὴν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, οὐ τὴν ἡδονήν, δι' ἣν ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ τὴν ποιὰν ἡδονὴν αἱρησόμεθα. αὐτίκα ὁ μάρτυς ἡδονὴν τὴν δι' ἐλπίδος διὰ τῆς παρούσης ἀλγηδόνος αἱρεῖται. εἰ δὲ κατὰ μὲν δίψαν ἡ ἀλγηδὼν νοεῖται, κατὰ τὴν πόσιν δὲ ἡ ἡδονή, ποιητικὴ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡ ἀλγηδὼν ἡ προϋπάρξασα γίνεται· ἀγαθοῦ δὲ ποιητικὸν τὸ κακὸν οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, οὐθέτερον οὖν κακόν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Σιμωνίδης, καθάπερ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, ὑγιαίνειν μὲν ἄριστον ἀνδρί, γράφει, δεύτερον δὲ φυὰν καλὸν γενέσθαι, τρίτον δὲ πλουτεῖν ἀδόλως. καὶ ὁ Μεγαρεὺς Θέογνις· χρὴ πενίην φεύγοντα καὶ εἰς βαθυκήτεα πόντον ῥιπτεῖν καὶ πετρέων, Κύρνε, κατ' ἠλιβάτων. ἔμπαλιν δὲ Ἀντιφάνης ὁ κωμικὸς ὁ πλοῦτος φησί, πλέον θάτερον· βλέποντας παραλαβὼν τυφλοὺς ποιεῖ. αὐτίκα πρὸς τῶν ποιητῶν τυφλὸς ἐκ γενετῆς κηρύττεται· καί οἱ γείνατο κοῦρον, ὃς οὐκ ἠλέκτορα εἶδεν, φησὶν ὁ Χαλκιδεὺς Εὐφορίων. κακὸν οὖν ἦν τι παίδευμα εἰς εὐανδρίαν ὁ πλοῦτος ἀνθρώποισιν αἵ τ' ἄγαν τρυφαί, ἐν τῷ Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ὁ Εὐριπίδης πεποίηκεν. εἴρηταί γε· ἡ πενία σοφίαν ἔλαχε διὰ τὸ συγγενές. ἁ φιλοχρηματία δὲ οὐ Σπάρταν μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσαν πόλιν ἕλοι ἄν. οὔκουν μόνον τοῦτο νόμισμα λευκὸς ἄργυρος ἢ χρυσός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ βροτοῖς, ὥς φησιν ὁ Σοφοκλῆς.