thinking? So much for these things in this way. But we were taught by the fathers to reason in deed concerning such matters

and one would not even write to the Latins for this reason. And that they reason neither demonstratively, as you yourself say, because they do not use the self-evident oracles as principles and axioms and do not follow the God-wise fathers well, nor dialectically, because they do not make their syllogisms from the premises accepted among us, I would indeed strongly affirm. But that there is no demonstration for any of the divine things and those things sought in the highest Trinity, but that one should think and call every syllogism about them dialectical, and never demonstrative, I am far from positing. For the titles of the patristic sayings do not allow us to accept this, and even if someone more contentiously objects and rejects the titles as spurious, we will show him the sayings themselves testifying to this, "one Father, one Son, one Holy Spirit", so that this is united to them to the extent that a monad has affinity with a monad; "and not from this," he says, "alone is the demonstration of the communion"; and where, after concluding, it cries out "it has been demonstrated," and where lies in between, the word "we demonstrate," and where even promising (p. 416) "you seek," he says, "the demonstrations, I am ready to provide them." And what is brought forward after this promise? Some oracle from those handed down by God or inspired by God, and all that would follow from these and be concluded from them. For what God is, no one of sound mind has ever said or sought or conceived. But that He is, and that He is one, and that He is not one thing, and that He has not surpassed the Trinity, and many other things contemplated concerning Him, it is possible both to seek and to demonstrate. For if not these things, it is not possible to learn about God at all. But if we learn and seek, and this from those who know well and understand, then some things of God are known, and others are sought, and there are some which are also demonstrated, but other things are altogether inconceivable and inscrutable: the manner of begetting, of procession, of a coming-forth at once perfect and without departing, of a division at once indivisible and perfect, and the other things of which we have knowledge through faith. "For just as sense-perception in things perceptible by the senses does not require logical proof, so neither does faith in such matters require demonstration. But it is an almost equal and no lesser evil, both to think one knows things that are beyond the mind and not to declare "what can be known of God" to be such, and likewise what can be sought or demonstrated. For it is possible to lack not a few common notions and axioms which, being better than demonstration and providing knowledge, become demonstrative principles for one who knows how to use them.

For it is known and confessed by all that God is perfect and not irrational, from which it is demonstrated that He is one, and not one thing. When we say, then, that God is perfect, the perfect is one, and intend to add the rest in harmony with the fathers, how the perfect is one, if one of these unlearned demonstrators should approach, saying that there is no demonstration concerning singulars, he will immediately hear from us that universally, there is not; for how could there be concerning things that are not universal? (p. 418) But it is no less a true demonstration, for this demonstration is both necessary even concerning singulars and more unerring. For concerning universals, deception could more easily arise, since such a demonstration is pursued through imagination, and all the subjects are difficult to compare and to comprehend. Nevertheless, also in cases where the common term is nameless, a demonstration could occur in the same way, and concerning a certain species of the universal, and concerning each one of the particulars, demonstrations occur, not universal ones, to be sure—for how could they be?—but true and necessary ones. For the Greeks, then, theology is plausible reasoning, which is why every theological syllogism that seems so to them is dialectical, from

φρονοῦντες; Ταῦτα μέν δή ταύτῃ. Συλλογίζεσθαι δέ ἐπί τοῖς τοιούτοις ἔργῳ ὑπό τῶν πατέρων

ἐδιδάχθημεν καί οὐδέ τούς Λατίνους γράψαιτ᾿ ἄν τις τούτου χάριν. Μήτε δ᾿ ἀποδεικτικῶς τούτους συλλογίζεσθαι, καθάπερ φῄς αὐτός, παρά τό μή τοῖς αὐτοπίστοις λογίοις ὡς ἀρχαῖς καί ἀξιώμασι χρῆσθαι καί τοῖς θεοσόφοις καλῶς ἕπεσθαι πατράσι, μήτε διαλεκτικῶς, διά τό μή ἐκ τῶν παρ᾿ ἡμῖν λημμάτων ποιεῖσθαι τούς συλλογισμούς, καί πάνυ γ᾿ ἄν φαίην. Μηδεμίαν δέ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἐπ᾿ οὐδενός τῶν θείων καί τῶν ἐν τῇ ἀνωτάτω Τριάδι ζητουμένων, ἀλλά πάντα τόν περί αὐτῶν συλλογισμόν διαλεκτικόν οἴεσθαί τε καί καλεῖν, ἀποδεικτικόν δέ οὐδέποτε, πολλοῦ δέω τίθεσθαι. Αἵ τε γάρ ἐπιγραφαί τῶν πατρικῶν φωνῶν οὐκ ἐῶσι τοῦτο παραδέξασθαι, κἄν τις φιλονεικότερον ἐνιστῆται καί τάς ἐπιγραφάς ὡς παρεγγράπτους παραγράφηται, ἡμεῖς καί αὐτάς δείξομεν αὐτῷ τοῦτο μαρτυρούσας τάς φωνάς, «εἷς Πατήρ, εἷς Υἱός, ἕν Πνεῦμα ἅγιον», ὥστε κατά τοσοῦτον τοῦτο ἐκείνοις ἥνωται, καθόσον ἔχει μονάς πρός μονάδα τήν οἰκειότητα˙ «καί οὐκ ἐντεῦθεν» φησί «μόνον ἡ τῆς κοινωνίας ἀπόδειξις»˙ καί ποῦ μέν, μετά τό συναγαγεῖν, ἀποδέδεικται βοώσας, ποῦ δέ μεταξύ κείμενον, τό ἀποδείκνυμεν, ποῦ δέ καί ἐπαγγελλομένας (σελ. 416) ζητεῖς φησί τάς ἀποδείξεις, ἕτοιμος παρασχεῖν. Καί τί τό μετά τήν ἐπαγγελίαν ταύτην ἐπαγόμενον; Λόγιόν τι τῶν θεοπαραδότων ἤ καί θεοπνεύστων καί πᾶν ὅ,τι ἄν τούτοις ἔποιτο καί ἐκ τούτων συμπεραίνοιτο. Τί μέν γάρ ἐστι Θεός, οὐδείς πώποτε τῶν εὖ φρονούντων οὔτ᾿ εἶπεν οὔτ᾿ ἐζήτησεν, οὔτ᾿ ἐνενόησεν. Ὅτι δέ ἔστι καί ὅτι εἷς ἐστι καί ὅτι οὐχ ἕν ἐστι καί ὅτι τήν Τριάδα οὐχ ὑπερβέβηκε καί πολλ᾿ ἕτερα τῶν περί αὐτόν θεωρουμένων, ἔστι ζητῆσαί τε καί ἀποδεῖξαι. Εἰ γάρ μή ταῦτα, οὐδέ μαθεῖν ὅλως ἔστι τό περί Θεοῦ. Εἰ δέ μανθάνομεν καί ζητοῦμεν καί τοῦτο παρά τῶν εὖ εἰδότων καί ἐπισταμένων, τά μέν ἄρα τοῦ Θεοῦ γινώσκεται, τά δέ ζητεῖται, ἔστι δ᾿ ἅ καί ἀποδείκνυται, ἕτερα δέ εἰσιν ἀπερινόητα πάντῃ καί ἀνεξερεύνητα˙ τρόπος γεννήσεως, ἐκπορεύσεως, τελείας ἅμα καί ἀνεκφοιτήτου προελεύσεως, ἀδιαιρέτου τε ἅμα καί τελείας διαιρέσεως, καί τ᾿ ἄλλ᾿ ὧν διά πίστεως ἐπιστημόνως ἔχομεν. «Ὥς γάρ αἴσθησις ἐν τοῖς ὑπ᾿αἴσθησιν λογικῆς οὐ δεῖται δείξεως, οὕτως οὐδέ πίστις ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀποδείξεως. Μικροῦ δ᾿ ἴσον καί οὐδέν ἔλαττόν ἐστι κακόν, τά τε ὑπέρ νοῦν οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι καί «τό τοῦ Θεοῦ γνωστόν» μή τοιοῦτον ἀποφαίνεσθαι, ὡσαύτως καί τό ζητητόν ἤ ἀποδεκτόν. Ἔστι γάρ κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν καί ἀξιωμάτων ἀπορῆσαι οὐκ ὀλίγων, ἅ κρείττω ἤ κατά ἀπόδειξιν παρεχόμενα τήν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικαί τῷ ἐπισταμένῳ χρήσασθαι γίνονται ἀρχαί.

Πᾶσι γάρ ἐστιν ἐγνωσμένον τε καί ἀνωμολογημένον ὅτι ὁ Θεός τέλειός ἐστι καί οὐκ ἄλογος, ἐξ ὧν εἷς καί οὐχ ἕν ἀποδείκνυται. Λεγόντων οὖν ἡμῶν ὅτι ὁ Θεός τέλειος, ὁ τέλειος εἷς, καί τ᾿ ἄλλα συνείρειν διανοουμένων συμφώνως τοῖς πατράσιν, ὅπως εἷς ὁ τέλειος, εἴ τις τῶν ἀνεπιστημόνων τούτων ἀποδεικτικῶν προσίσταιτο λέγων ἐπί τῶν μοναδικῶν ἀπόδειξιν μή εἶναι, παρ᾿ ἡμῶν εὐθύς ἀκούσεται ὡς καθόλου μέν οὐκ ἔστι˙ πῶς γάρ ἐπί τῶν μή καθόλου; (σελ. 418) Ἀψευδής δέ οὐδέν ἧττον ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι, καί γάρ ἀναγκαία καί ἐπί τῶν μοναδικῶν καί ἀνεξαπάτητος μᾶλλον αὕτη ἡ ἀπόδειξις. Ἐπί γάρ τῶν καθόλου γένοιτ᾿ ἄν μᾶλλον ἡ ἀπάτη, διά τῆς φαντασίας θηρωμένης τῆς τοιαύτης ἀποδείξεως, δυσξυμβλήτων τε καί δυσπεριλήπτων ὄντων πάντων τῶν ὑποκειμένων. Οὐ μήν ἀλλά καί ἐφ᾿ ὧν τό κοινόν ἀνώνυμον, τόν αὐτόν τρόπον γένοιτ᾿ ἄν ἀπόδειξις καί ἐπί τινος εἴδους τοῦ καθόλου καί ἐφ᾿ ἑνός ἑκάστου γε τῶν μερικῶν ἀποδείξεις γίνονται, καθόλου μέν οὔ, πῶς γάρ; ἀψευδεῖς δέ καί ἀναγκαῖαι. Ἕλλησι μέν οὖν πιθανολογία ἡ θεολογία, διό καί διαλεκτικός ἅπας ὁ δοκῶν αὐτοῖς θεολογικός συλλογισμός, ἐξ