§1. Preface.—It is useless to attempt to benefit those who will not accept help.
§4. Eunomius displays much folly and fine writing, but very little seriousness about vital points.
§7. Eunomius himself proves that the confession of faith which He made was not impeached.
§10. All his insulting epithets are shewn by facts to be false.
§13. Résumé of his dogmatic teaching. Objections to it in detail.
§19. His acknowledgment that the Divine Being is ‘single’ is only verbal.
§21. The blasphemy of these heretics is worse than the Jewish unbelief.
§23. These doctrines of our Faith witnessed to and confirmed by Scripture passages .
§34. The Passage where he attacks the ‘ Ομοούσιον , and the contention in answer to it.
§35. Proof that the Anomœan teaching tends to Manichæism.
§36. A passing repetition of the teaching of the Church.
§38. Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms .
§39. Answer to the question he is always asking, “Can He who is be begotten?”
§40. His unsuccessful attempt to be consistent with his own statements after Basil has confuted him.
§41. The thing that follows is not the same as the thing that it follows.
§42. Explanation of ‘Ungenerate,’ and a ‘study’ of Eternity.
§7. Then he ends the book with an exposition of the Divine and Human names of the Only-Begotten, and a discussion of the terms “generate” and “ungenerate.”
But as, I know not how or why, they hate and abhor the truth, they give Him indeed the name of “Son,” but in order to avoid the testimony which this word would give to the community of essence, they separate the word from the sense included in the name, and concede to the Only-begotten the name of “Son” as an empty thing, vouchsafing to Him only the mere sound of the word. That what I say is true, and that I am not taking a false aim at the adversaries’ mark, may be clearly learnt from the actual attacks they make upon the truth. Such are those arguments which are brought forward by them to establish their blasphemy, that we are taught by the divine Scriptures many names of the Only-begotten—a stone, an axe, a rock, a foundation, bread, a vine, a door, a way, a shepherd, a fountain, a tree, resurrection, a teacher, light, and many such names. But we may not piously use any of these names of the Lord, understanding it according to its immediate sense. For surely it would be a most absurd thing to think that what is incorporeal and immaterial, simple, and without figure, should be fashioned according to the apparent senses of these names, whatever they may be, so that when we hear of an axe we should think of a particular figure of iron, or when we hear of light, of the light in the sky, or of a vine, of that which grows by the planting of shoots, or of any one of the other names, as its ordinary use suggests to us to think; but we transfer the sense of these names to what better becomes the Divine nature, and form some other conception, and if we do designate Him thus, it is not as being any of these things, according to the definition of His nature, but as being called these things while He is conceived by means of the names employed as something else than the things themselves. But if such names are indeed truly predicated of the Only-begotten God, without including the declaration of His nature, they say that, as a consequence, neither should we admit the signification of “Son,” as it is understood according to the prevailing use, as expressive of nature, but should find some sense of this word also, different from that which is ordinary and obvious. These, and others like these, are their philosophical arguments to establish that the Son is not what He is and is called. Our argument was hastening to a different goal, namely to show that Eunomius’ new discourse is false and inconsistent, and argues neither with the truth nor with itself. Since, however, the arguments which we employ to attack their doctrine are brought into the discussion as a sort of support for their blasphemy548 The meaning of this seems to be that the Anomœan party make the same charge of “inconsistency” against the orthodox, which Gregory makes against Eunomius, basing that charge on the fact that the title “Son” is not interpreted in the same figurative way as the other titles recited. Gregory accordingly proceeds to show why the name of “Son” stands on a different level from those titles, and is to be treated in a different way., it may be well first briefly to discuss his point, and then to proceed to the orderly examination of his writings.
What can we say, then, to such things without relevance? That while, as they say, the names which Scripture applies to the Only-begotten are many, we assert that none of the other names is closely connected with the reference to Him that begat Him. For we do not employ the name “Stone,” or “Resurrection,” or “Shepherd,” or “Light,” or any of the rest, as we do the name “Son of the Father,” with a reference to the God of all. It is possible to make a twofold division of the signification of the Divine names, as it were by a scientific rule: for to one class belongs the indication of His lofty and unspeakable glory; the other class indicates the variety of the providential dispensation: so that, as we suppose, if that which received His benefits did not exist, neither would those words be applied with respect to them549 ἐπ᾽ ἀυτῶν: perhaps “with reference to man,” the plural being employed here to denote the race of men, spoken of in the preceding clause collectively as τὸ εὐεργετόυμενον which indicate His bounty. All those on the other hand, that express the attributes of God, are applied suitably and properly to the Only-begotten God, apart from the objects of the dispensation. But that we may set forth this doctrine clearly, we will examine the names themselves. The Lord would not have been called a vine, save for the planting of those who are rooted in Him, nor a shepherd, had not the sheep of the house of Israel been lost, nor a physician, save for the sake of them that were sick, nor would He have received for Himself the rest of these names, had He not made the titles appropriate, in a manner advantageous with regard to those who were benefited by Him, by some action of His providence. What need is there to mention individual instances, and to lengthen our argument upon points that are acknowledged? On the other hand, He is certainly called “Son,” and “Right Hand,” and “Only-begotten,” and “Word,” and “Wisdom,” and “Power,” and all other such relative names, as being named together with the Father in a certain relative conjunction. For He is called the “Power of God,” and the “Right Hand of God,” and the “Wisdom of God,” and the “Son and Only-begotten of the Father,” and the “Word with God,” and so of the rest. Thus, it follows from what we have stated, that in each of the names we are to contemplate some suitable sense appropriate to the subject, so that we may not miss the right understanding of them, and go astray from the doctrine of godliness. As, then, we transfer each of the other terms to that sense in which they may be applied to God, and reject in their case the immediate sense, so as not to understand material light, or a trodden way, or the bread which is produced by husbandry, or the word that is expressed by speech, but, instead of these, all those thoughts which present to us the magnitude of the power of the Word of God,—so, if one were to reject the ordinary and natural sense of the word “Son,” by which we learn that He is of the same essence as Him that begat Him, he will of course transfer the name to some more divine interpretation. For since the change to the more glorious meaning which has been made in each of the other terms has adapted them to set forth the Divine power, it surely follows that the significance of this name also should be transferred to what is loftier. But what more Divine sense could we find in the appellation of “Son,” if we were to reject, according to our adversaries’ view, the natural relation to Him that begat Him? I presume no one is so daring in impiety as to think that, in speech concerning the Divine nature, what is humble and mean is more appropriate than what is lofty and great. If they can discover, therefore, any sense of more exalted character than this, so that to be of the nature of the Father seems a thing unworthy to conceive of the Only-begotten, let them tell us whether they know, in their secret wisdom, anything more exalted than the nature of the Father, that, in raising the Only-begotten God to this level, they should lift Him also above His relation to the Father. But if the majesty of the Divine nature transcends all height, and excels every power that calls forth our wonder, what idea remains that can carry the meaning of the name “Son” to something greater still? Since it is acknowledged, therefore, that every significant phrase employed of the Only-begotten, even if the name be derived from the ordinary use of our lower life, is properly applied to Him with a difference of sense in the direction of greater majesty, and if it is shown that we can find no more noble conception of the title “Son” than that which presents to us the reality of His relationship to Him that begat Him, I think that we need spend no more time on this topic, as our argument has sufficiently shown that it is not proper to interpret the title of “Son” in like manner with the other names.
But we must bring back our enquiry once more to the book. It does not become the same persons “not to refuse” (for I will use their own words) “to call Him that is generated a ‘product of generation,’ since both the generated essence itself and the appellation of Son make such a relation of words appropriate,” and again to change the names which naturally belong to Him into metaphorical interpretations: so that one of two things has befallen them,—either their first attack has failed, and it is in vain that they fly to “natural order” to establish the necessity of calling Him that is generated a “product of generation”; or, if this argument holds good, they will find their second argument brought to nought by what they have already established. For the person who is called a “product of generation” because He is generated, cannot, for the very same reason, be possibly called a “product of making,” or a “product of creation.” For the sense of the several terms differs very widely, and one who uses his phrases advisedly ought to employ words with due regard to the subject, that we may not, by improperly interchanging the sense of our phrases, fall into any confusion of ideas. Hence we call that which is wrought out by a craft the work of the craftsman, and call him who is begotten by a man that man’s son; and no sane person would call the work a son, or the son a work; for that is the language of one who confuses and obscures the true sense by an erroneous use of names. It follows that we must truly affirm of the Only-begotten one of these two things,—if He is a Son, that He is not to be called a “product of creation,” and if He is created, that He is alien from the appellation of “Son550 Oehler’s punctuation here seems faulty, and is accordingly not followed.,” just as heaven and sea and earth, and all individual things, being things created, do not assume the name of “Son.” But since Eunomius bears witness that the Only-begotten God is begotten (and the evidence of enemies is of additional value for establishing the truth), he surely testifies also, by saying that He is begotten, to the fact that He is not created. Enough, however, on these points: for though many arguments crowd upon us, we will be content, lest their number lead to disproportion, with those we have already adduced on the subject before us.
Ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἢ διότι μισοῦντες τε καὶ ἀποστρεφόμενοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν υἱὸν μὲν αὐτὸν ὀνομάζουσιν, ὡς δ' ἂν μὴ τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν κοινὸν διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης μαρτυρηθείη, τῆς ἐγκειμένης τῷ ὀνόματι σημασίας τὴν φωνὴν χωρίσαντες κενὸν τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ ἀσήμαντον τῷ μονογενεῖ καταλείπουσι, μόνον αὐτῷ τὸν ψόφον τῆς φωνῆς χαριζόμενοι. καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ οὐ παραστοχάζομαι τοῦ σκοποῦ τῶν ὑπεναντίων, φανερῶς ἔστιν ἐξ αὐτῶν ὧν κατεπιχειροῦσι τῆς ἀληθείας μαθεῖν. τοιαῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἃ παρ' αὐτῶν ἐπὶ κατασκευῇ τῆς βλασφημίας προφέρεται, « ὅτι πολλὰ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ὀνόματα παρὰ τῆς θείας γραφῆς ἐδιδάχθημεν, λίθον ἀξίνην πέτραν θεμέλιον ἄρτον ἄμπελον θύραν ὁδὸν ποιμένα πηγὴν ξύλον ἀνάστασιν διδάσκαλον φῶς καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα πολλά, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν τούτων κατὰ τὴν πρόχειρον σημασίαν εὐσεβές ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοῦ κυρίου νοοῦντας λέγειν. ἦ γὰρ ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀτοπωτάτων τὸ ἀσώματόν τε καὶ ἄϋλον ἁπλοῦν τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον ταῖς ἐμφαινομέναις τισὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων σημασίαις διαμορφοῦσθαι νομίζειν, ὥστε ἀξίνην ἀκούσαντας τὸ τοιόνδε σχῆμα τοῦ σιδήρου νοεῖν ἢ φῶς τὸ ἐναέριον ἢ ἄμπελον τὴν ἐκ φυτείας κλημάτων ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον, καθὼς ἡ συνήθεια νοεῖν ὑποτίθεται: ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ θεοπρεπέστερον τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων μετενεγκόντες ἐμφάσεις ἄλλο τι νοοῦμεν, κἂν οὕτω κατονομάζωμεν, οὐχ ὡς ὄντα τι τούτων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ' ὡς ταῦτα μὲν λεγόμενον, ἄλλο δέ τι παρὰ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν λεγομένων νοούμενον. εἰ δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐπιλέγεται τῷ μονογενεῖ θεῷ καὶ τῆς φύσεως οὐ περιέχει τὴν ἔνδειξιν, ἀκόλουθον εἶναι » λέγουσι « μηδὲ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ σημαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν ἐπικρατοῦσαν συνήθειαν εἰς τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἐρμηνείαν παραλαμβάνειν, ἀλλ' ἐξευρίσκειν τινὰ σημασίαν καὶ ταύτης τῆς φωνῆς ἑτέραν παρὰ τὴν κοινήν τε καὶ πρόχειρον ». ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φιλοσοφοῦσι πρὸς κατασκευὴν τοῦ μὴ εἶναι τὸν υἱὸν ὅπερ ἐστί τε καὶ λέγεται. ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς ἕτερον μὲν ἦν σπεύδων ὁ λόγος, τὴν πρόσφατον τοῦ Εὐνομίου λογογραφίαν δεῖξαι ψευδῆ καὶ ἀσύστατον καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὔτε πρὸς ἑαυτὴν συμφωνοῦσαν. ἐπεὶ δὲ δι' ὧν κατηγοροῦμεν τοῦ δόγματος αὐτῶν οἷόν τις συνηγορία τῆς βλασφημίας ἐπεισήχθη τῷ λόγῳ, καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι περὶ τούτου πρότερον ἐν ὀλίγῳ διαλαβεῖν, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀκολουθίαν τῶν γεγραμμένων ἐπανελθεῖν.
Τί τοίνυν ἔστιν εἰπόντας πρὸς τὰ τοιαῦτα μὴ διαμαρτεῖν τοῦ προσήκοντος; ὅτι πολλῶν ὄντων, καθὼς κἀκεῖνοί φασι, τῶν ὀνομάτων, ἃ τῷ μονογενεῖ παρὰ τῆς γραφῆς ἐπιλέγεται, οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων τῇ πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα φαμὲν ἀναφορᾷ τὸ προσφυὲς ἔχειν. οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ υἱὸν τοῦ πατρός, οὕτως ἢ λίθον ἢ ἀνάστασιν ἢ ποιμένα ἢ φῶς ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπὶ τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων ἐπαναφέροντες λέγομεν, ἀλλ' ἔστιν οἷον τέχνῃ τινὶ καὶ κανόνι διχῇ διελέσθαι τῶν θείων ὀνομάτων τὴν σημασίαν. τὰ μὲν γὰρ τῆς ὑψηλῆς τε καὶ ἀφράστου δόξης τὴν ἔνδειξιν ἔχει, τὰ δὲ τὸ ποικίλον τῆς προνοητικῆς οἰκονομίας ἐνδείκνυται: ὥστε καθ' ὑπόθεσιν εἰ μὴ τὸ εὐεργετούμενον εἴη, μηδὲ τὰς φωνὰς ταύτας ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τετάχθαι αἳ τὴν εὐεργεσίαν ἐνδείκνυνται. ὅσαι δὲ τὸ θεοπρεπὲς ἑρμηνεύουσι, καὶ δίχα τῶν οἰκονομουμένων προσφυῶς καὶ κυρίως ἐφαρμόζονται τῷ μονογενεῖ θεῷ. ὡς δ' ἂν ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐκκαλυφθείη τὸ τοιοῦτον δόγμα, ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἔσται τῶν ὀνομάτων ἡ θεωρία. οὐκ ἂν ἄμπελος ὠνομάσθη ὁ κύριος, εἰ μὴ τῆς φυτείας χάριν τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ῥιζουμένων, οὐδ' ἂν ποιμήν, εἰ μὴ τὰ πρόβατα τοῦ οἴκου Ἰσραὴλ ἀπολώλει, οὐδ' ἰατρός, εἰ μὴ τῶν νοσούντων χάριν, οὐδὲ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ κατεδέχετο, μὴ διά τινος προνοητικῆς ἐνεργείας προσφόρως ἐπὶ τῶν εὐεργετουμένων τὰς φωνὰς οἰκειούμενος. τί γὰρ δεῖ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγοντα μηκύνειν ἐν τοῖς ὁμολογουμένοις τὸν λόγον; υἱὸς δὲ καὶ δεξιὰ καὶ μονογενὴς καὶ λόγος καὶ σοφία καὶ δύναμις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα, ὅσα πρός τι λέγεται, καθάπερ ἐν συζυγίᾳ τινὶ σχετικῇ τῷ πατρὶ πάντως συνονομαζόμενος λέγεται. θεοῦ γὰρ δύναμις ὀνομάζεται καὶ θεοῦ δεξιὰ καὶ θεοῦ σοφία καὶ πατρὸς υἱὸς καὶ μονογενὴς καὶ λόγος πρὸς τὸν θεὸν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα. οὐκοῦν ἀκόλουθον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἑκάστου τῶν ὀνομάτων κατάλληλόν τινα τῷ ὑποκειμένῳ καὶ πρέπουσαν ἐνθεωρεῖν σημασίαν, ὡς ἂν μὴ τῷ διαμαρτεῖν τῆς ὀρθῆς διανοίας περὶ τὸν τῆς εὐσεβείας πλημμελήσαιμεν λόγον.
Ὥσπερ τοίνυν τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον πρὸς τὸ θεοπρεπὲς μεταλαβόντες ἀθετοῦμεν τὴν πρόχειρον ἐπ' αὐτῶν ἔννοιαν, ὡς μήτε φῶς ὑλικὸν μήτε πατουμένην ὁδὸν μήτε ἄψυχον λίθον μήτε τὸν ἐκ γεωργίας ἄρτον μήτε τὸν διὰ ῥημάτων λόγον, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ τούτων ἐκεῖνα ὀνομάζειν ὅσα τὸ μεγαλεῖον τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου παρίστησιν, οὕτως εἴ τις ἀθετοίη τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν συνήθη καὶ κατὰ φύσιν σημασίαν, δι' ἧς τὸ ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας εἶναι τοῦ γεγεννηκότος μανθάνομεν, πρός τινα θεοπρεπεστέραν ἑρμηνείαν μεταλήψεται πάντως τὸ ὄνομα. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστου πρὸς τὸ ἐνδοξότερον ἡ μετάληψις γινομένη πρὸς τὴν τῆς θείας δυνάμεως ἔνδειξιν ἥρμοσεν, ἀκόλουθον πάντως ἐστὶ καὶ τούτου τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τὸ ὑψηλότερον μετενεχθῆναι τὸ σημαινόμενον. τίς ἂν οὖν γένοιτο θεοπρεπεστέρα διάνοια ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας, εἰ ἀθετοῖτο κατὰ τὸν λόγον τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἡ φυσικὴ πρὸς τὸν γεννήσαντα σχέσις; τάχα γὰρ οὕτως οὐδεὶς πρὸς ἀσέβειαν τολμηρός, ὡς ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως λόγοις τὸ ταπεινὸν καὶ χαμαίζηλον τῶν ὑψηλῶν τε καὶ μεγάλων ἁρμοδιώτερον οἴεσθαι. οὐκοῦν εἰ μέν τινα ταύτης μεγαλοφυεστέραν διάνοιαν ἐξευρίσκουσιν, ὡς ἀνάξιον εἶναι δοκεῖν περὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς νοεῖν τὸ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτὸν εἶναι, εἰπάτωσαν εἴ τι γινώσκουσι κατὰ τὴν ἀπόρρητον αὐτῶν σοφίαν τῆς πατρικῆς φύσεως ὑψηλότερον, ὥστε πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν ἐπάραντας τῆς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα σχέσεως αὐτὸν ὑπερᾶραι: εἰ δὲ παντὸς ὕψους ὑπέρκειται καὶ πᾶσαν δύναμιν θαυμαστικὴν ὑπερβαίνει τῆς θείας φύσεως τὸ μεγαλεῖον, τίς ὑπολείπεται λόγος ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον φέρων τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ κλήσεως τὴν ἑρμηνείαν; ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν ὁμολογεῖται πᾶσαν περὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς σημαντικὴν λέξιν, κἂν ἐκ τῆς κάτω συνηθείας ὀνομάζηται, πρὸς τὸ μεγαλειότερον ταῖς ἐννοίαις μετατεθεῖσαν κυρίως λέγεσθαι, δείκνυται δὲ μὴ δύνασθαί τινα μεγαλοφυεστέραν ἔννοιαν τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας εὑρεῖν ταύτης, ἣ τὸ γνήσιον πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα παρίστησι, οὐδὲν οἶμαι χρῆναι πλέον ἐπιδιατρίβειν τῷ τόπῳ, ἱκανῶς διὰ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀποδειχθέντος ὅτι οὐ προσήκει καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῶν λοιπῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίαν μεθερμηνεύεσθαι.
Ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ βιβλίον πάλιν ἐπανακτέον τὴν θεωρίαν. οὐκ ἔστι τῶν αὐτῶν τὸν γεννητὸν « γέννημα λέγειν μὴ παραιτεῖσθαι » (τοῖς γὰρ ἐκείνων χρήσομαι ῥήμασιν), « τῆς γεννηθείσης αὐτῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας τὴν τοιαύτην τῶν ὀνομάτων οἰκειουμένης σχέσιν », καὶ πάλιν μετατιθέναι τὰς προσφυεῖς ὀνομασίας εἰς τροπικὰς μεταλήψεις: ὥστε δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ τὸ πρότερον τῶν ἐπιχειρημάτων αὐτοῖς διαπέπτωκε καὶ μάτην καταφεύγουσι πρὸς τὴν ἐκ φύσεως τάξιν εἰς κατασκευὴν τοῦ δεῖν « γέννημα » τὸν γεννηθέντα προσαγορεύειν, ἢ εἰ τοῦτο κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον λέγεται, ὁ ἕτερος λόγος ὑπὸ τῶν προκατεσκευασμένων διαλυθήσεται. ὁ γὰρ διὰ τὸ γεννηθῆναι « γέννημα » κατ' ἐκείνους λεγόμενος δι' αὐτὸ τοῦτο « ποίημα » καὶ « κτίσμα » λέγεσθαι φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει. πλεῖστον γὰρ δήπου διενήνοχεν ἑκατέρου τῶν ὀνομάτων τὸ σημαινόμενον, καὶ προσήκει τὸν λελογισμένως ταῖς φωναῖς κεχρημένον πρὸς τὸ ὑποκείμενον βλέποντα κεχρῆσθαι τοῖς ῥήμασιν, ὡς ἂν μή τινα σύγχυσιν περὶ τὰς ἐννοίας πάθοιμεν, ἀνοικείως τοῖς σημαινομένοις τὰς φωνὰς ἐπαλλάσσοντες. διὰ τοῦτο τεχνίτου μὲν ἔργον τὸ διὰ τῆς τέχνης ἀπεργασθὲν ὀνομάζομεν, υἱὸν δὲ ἀνθρώπου τὸν ἐξ ἐκείνου φύντα προσαγορεύομεν, οὔτε δὲ τὸ ἔργον υἱὸν οὔτε τὸν υἱὸν ἔργον τῶν σωφρονούντων εἴποι τις ἄν: συγχέοντος γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἀναθολοῦντος ἐν τῇ πεπλανημένῃ τῶν ὀνομάτων χρήσει τὴν ἀληθῆ σημασίαν. ὥστε τῶν δύο τούτων τὸ ἕτερον ἐπὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἀληθεύειν ἐπάναγκες, εἰ μὲν υἱός ἐστιν, « κτίσμα » μὴ λέγεσθαι, εἰ δὲ κτιστός, τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ οὐρανὸς καὶ γῆ καὶ θάλασσα καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον πάντα κτίσματα ὄντα τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ κλῆσιν οὐχ ὑποδύεται. ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ μαρτυρεῖ γεννητὸν εἶναι τὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν ὁ Εὐνόμιος, ἰσχυροτέρα δὲ πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας σύστασιν ἡ τῶν ἐχθρῶν μαρτυρία, καὶ τὸ μὴ κτιστὸν εἶναι πάντως διὰ τοῦ τὸ γεννητὸν εἰπεῖν εἶναι συνεμαρτύρησεν. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων τοσαῦτα. πολλῶν γὰρ ἡμῖν λόγων ἐπιρρεόντων, ὡς ἂν μὴ τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἀμετρίαν ἐκπέσοι, τούτοις περὶ τῶν προτεθέντων ἀρκεσθησόμεθα.