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For 'one and three' and 'from that one alone' and 'to that one alone' does not show the nature, but are things shown concerning it. Therefore, neither is there any necessity for anything through which these things are shown to pre-exist, just as the things shown concerning God do not themselves pre-exist. For that too, whatever it may be, is contemplated concerning that inconceivable nature, both the commonalities and the particularities, such as procession or generation, and these not by convention, but by nature, and richness or motion or perfection, just as one of the supreme theologians says, “the monad having been moved because of its richness, and the dyad having been surpassed because of matter and form, from which are bodies, and the Triad having been defined because of its perfection.” “This is not an etiology of divinity, but a demonstration of the pious opinion concerning it.”

Then how, my good sir, do you seek for the prior in the case of demonstration? If in time, then you will never accept any demonstration of heaven and the bodies and wonders in it, nor of earth and sea and the things in them, nor of air and the things that travel the air, nor of aether and the things on high. For after all these things come common notions and axioms and definitions, propositions and demonstrations and syllogisms, and all divisions and analyses; for these belong to the intellect of the one created last. If, then, you seek the prior in this way, you will have removed this knowledge from the midst of beings; but if you take 'the prior' in another way, I do not think you will be at a loss for an argument even in the things demonstrated concerning God, (p. 422) considering this in addition, that the means by which things are demonstrated are in the things demonstrated about them, and that the cause is not in every case superior to or older than that of which it is the cause. So that even if the causes themselves are equal to their effects, or even if they do not pre-exist, this will not impede the demonstration. From common notions and axioms, therefore, it is thus possible for demonstrations of divine things to be constructed. And what of the things handed down by the One of the divine-ruling Trinity Himself, who spoke to us in a theandric manner? And what of the things revealed to us by the Holy Spirit Himself through those who speak by Him? Shall we not receive them as self-evident and indemonstrable principles, and shall we not call everything that follows from and is concluded from them divine demonstrations?

For instance, when Dionysius, the most brilliant theophant, theologizes that “the Father is the sole source of the super-essential divinity,” and that “the Father is the fountaining divinity, but the Son and the Spirit are, as it were, flowers and super-essential lights of the God-begetting divinity,” if someone should say that the super-essential Spirit is by nature from God, and that which is by nature from God springs forth from God, that is, it has its being from the fountaining divinity, and the fountaining divinity is the Father alone, and then concludes that the Spirit is from the Father alone, what reason is there not to think that this syllogism is at once pious, demonstrative, and indisputable? Are not these premises true? Are not their contradictories false? Do they not always hold in the same way? Are they not primary and immediate and more knowable? Are they not proper to the subject at hand? Do they not have the cause of the conclusion in themselves? Do they not end in a self-evident, indemonstrable, and most principal principle? And what of when we make inferential demonstrations of the fact from things posterior, but prior for us? How could we be persuaded by one who says that not even in this way is it possible to demonstrate any of the divine things? (p. 424) “For,” he says, “signs must be of the same kind as the things of which they are signs, but nothing is of the same kind as God.” How then is the moon's not shining by itself of the same kind as the Pleiades' shining, by which we infer that the one wanders nearer to us, while the others are fixed further away? For these are matters of place, but they are substances; and the means by which those things are shown for these are in turn an activity or a passion, and not of the

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γάρ 'εἷς καί τρία' καί τό 'ἐξ ἐκείνου μόνου', καί τό 'εἰς ἐκεῖνον μόνον', οὐ τήν φύσιν δείκνυσιν, ἀλλά περί αὐτήν ἐστι δεικνύμενα. Οὐκοῦν οὐδέ τι τῶν δι᾿ ἅ ταῦτα προϋπάρχειν ἀνάγκη τις τοῦ δεικνυμένου, καθάπερ οὐδ᾿ αὐτά προϋπάρχει τά περί Θεόν δεικνύμενα. Κἀκεῖνο γάρ, ὅ,τι ποτ᾿ ἄν ᾖ, περί τήν ἀπερινόητον ἐκείνη θεωρεῖται φύσιν, αἵ τε κοινότητες, αἵ τε ἰδιότητες, οἷον ἐκπόρευσις ἤ γέννησις, καί ταῦτ᾿ οὐ θέσει, ἀλλά φύσει, πλοῦτός τε ἤ κίνησις ἤ τελειότης, ὥσπερ καί τῶν ἄκρων θεολόγων τίς φησι, «μονάδος μέν κινηθείσης διά τό πλούσιον, δυάδος δέ ὑπερβαθείσης διά τήν ὕλην καί τό εἶδος, ἐξ ὧν τά σώματα, Τριάδος δέ ὁρισθείσης διά τό τέλειον». «Οὐκ αἰτιολογία τε τοῦτο ἐστι θεότητος, ἀλλ᾿ ἀπόδειξις τῆς περί αὐτῆς δόξης εὐσεβοῦς».

Ἔπειτα πῶς τό πρότερον, ᾦ οὗτος, ἐπί τῆς ἀποδείξεως ζητεῖς; Εἰ μέν χρόνῳ, λοιπόν οὐδέ οὐρανοῦ καί τῶν κατ᾿ αὐτόν σωμάτων καί θαυμάτων, οὐδέ γῆς καί θαλάττης καί τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς, οὐδ᾿ ἀέρος καί τῶν ἀεροπόρων, οὐδ᾿ αἰθέρος καί τῶν μετεώρων περιδέξῃ τινά ποτε ἀπόδειξιν. Μετά γάρ ταῦτα πάντα κοιναί τε ἔννοιαι καί ἀξιώματα καί ὅροι, προτάσεις τε καί ἀποδείξεις καί συλλογισμοί, διαιρέσεις τε καί ἀναλύσεις πᾶσαι˙ διανοίας γάρ ἐστι ταῦτα τοῦ ὕστατα κτισθέντος. Εἰ μέν οὖν οὕτω ζητεῖς τό πρότερον, λύσεις ἐκ μέσου τῶν ὄντων τήν ἐπιστήμην ταύτην ποιησάμενος˙ εἰ δ᾿ ἑτέρως τό πρότερον ἐκλήψῃ, οὐκ οἶμαί σε λόγου κἀν τοῖς περί θεοῦ δεικνυμένοις ἀπόρήσειν, (σελ. 422) ἐκεῖνο προσδιανοούμενον, ὅτι καί δι᾿ ὧν εἰσι δεικνύμενα ἐν τοῖς περί αὐτῶν εἰσιν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ τό αἴτιον πάντως ἐπιπλέον ἤ πρεσβύτερον οὗ ἐστιν αἴτιον.Ὥστε κἄν ἐξισάζῃ τοῖς αἰτιατοῖς αὐτά τά αἴτια, κἄν μή προϋφεστηκότα ᾖ, οὐκ ἐμποδίσει τήν ἀπόδειξιν. Ἐκ μέν οὖν τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν τε καί ἀξιωμάτων οὕτως ἔστιν οὗ τῶν θείων ἔνι συνίστασθαι τάς ἀποδείξεις. Τί δέ τά παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνός τῆς θεαρχικῆς Τριάδος θεανδρικῶς ἡμῖν ὡμιληκότος παραδεδομένα; Τί δέ τά παρ᾿ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἁγίου Πνεύματος διά τῶν αὐτῷ λαλούντων ἡμῖν ἀποκεκαλυμμένα; Ἆρ᾿ οὐχ ὡς αὐτοπίστους καί ἀναποδείκτους δεξόμεθα ἀρχάς, καί πᾶν ὅ,τι ἄν τούτοις ἔποιτο καί ἐκ τούτων συμπεραίνοιτο οὐκ ἀποδείξεις θείας προσεροῦμεν;

Αὐτίκα ∆ιονυσίου τοῦ μεγαλοφυεστάτου θεοφάντος θεολογοῦντος ὅτι «μόνη πηγή τῆς ὑπερουσίου θεότητος ὁ Πατήρ», καί ἔστι «πηγαία θεότης ὁ Πατήρ, ὁ δέ Υἱός καί τό Πνεῦμα τῆς θεογόνου θεότητος οἷον ἄνθη καί ὑπερούσια φῶτα», εἴ τις τό ὑπερούσιον Πνεῦμα φύσει ἐρεῖ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, τό δέ φύσει ὄν ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ πηγάζεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, τουτέστιν ἐκ τῆς πηγαίας θεότητος τό εἶναι ἔχειν, πηγαία δέ θεότης μόνος ὁ Πατήρ, εἶτα συμπεραίνει ὡς ἐκ μόνου τοῦ Πατρός ἐστι τό Πνεῦμα, τίς λόγος μή οὐκ εὐσεβῶς ἅμα καί ἀποδεικτικῶς καί ἀναμφιλέκτως ἔχειν οἴεσθαι τοῦτον τόν συλλογισμόν; Οὐκ ἀληθείς εῖσιν αὗται αἱ προτάσσεις; Οὐ τά ἀντικείμενα αὐταῖς εἰσι ψευδῆ; Οὐκ ἀεί ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν; Οὐ πρῶται καί ἄμεσοι καί γνωριμώτεραι; Οὐκ οἰκεῖαί εἰσι τῷ προκειμένῳ; Οὐ τήν αἰτίαν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἔχουσι τοῦ συμπεράσματος; Οὐκ εἰς αὐτόπιστον καί ἀναπόδεικτον καί ἀρχοειδεστάτην καταλήγουσιν ἀρχήν; Τί δέ ὅταν τεκμηριώδεις ἐκ τῶν ὑστέρων, ἡμῖν δέ προτέρων, τοῦ ὅτι ποιώμεθα τάς ἀποδείξεις; Πῶς ἄν πεισθείημεν τῷ λέγοντι ὡς οὐδέ οὕτως ἔνι τι τῶν θείων ἀποδεῖξαι; (σελ. 424) «∆εῖ γάρ» φησίν «εἶναι ὁμογενῆ καί τεκμήρια ὧν ἐστι τεκμήρια, Θεῷ δέ οὐδέν ὁμογενές». Πῶς οὖν τό μή στίλβειν τῇ σελήνῃ ἐστίν ὁμογενές ἤ τό στίλβειν ταῖς πλειάσι, δι᾿ ὧν τήν μέν ἐγγύτερον ἡμῖν πλανᾶσθαι, τάς δέ πορρωτέρω ἐστηρίχθαι τεκμαιρόμεθα; Τόπου μέν γάρ ταῦτα, αἱ δέ εἰσιν οὐσίαι˙ δι᾿ ὧν ἐκεῖνα ταύταις δείκνυται, ταῦτ δ᾿ αὖθίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ἤ πάθος, καί οὐ τοῦ