84

of thoughts, just as molted birds do not fly up), I for one would advise them to change their doctrines to the contrary, so as to reckon the endless in the essence, but to disregard the beginningless more than the endless, assigning the primacy to the future and the hoped for, more than to the past and the stale. 1.1.673 For since (I say these things on account of those small in soul, willingly bringing my discourse down to the understanding of infants) since, then, the past of life is as nothing to the one who has lived, and all the effort of the living is for the future and the expected, the endless would be more honorable than the beginningless, because the 1.1.674 immortal is directed toward the future and the expected. So either let the thoughts concerning the divine nature be god-befitting and lofty, or if indeed they judge such things with human reasonings, let the future be more honorable to them than the past, and let them circumscribe the essence of God by this, since all the past of time already vanishes with its passing, but the expected has its existence through hope. 1.1.675 But I present these things as ridiculous and childish things to children sitting in the marketplace and playing; for it is not possible for one examining the groveling and earthy doctrines of the heresy not to be brought down in every way into some 1.1.676 boyish game. But I say it is good to add this to the argument, that since the meaning of 'eternal' is completed through both, according to the argument stated, both from the of the beginning and from that of the end, if they should circumscribe the essence of God in the one, their account of the essence will appear incomplete and cut in half, being conceived only in the beginningless, and not possessing the endless in itself 1.1.677 according to essence. But if, by putting both together, they complete the account of the essence through both, let us again examine the absurdity revealed along with the argument; for it will be found by them to be estranged not only from the only-begotten, but also from itself. And the argument is clear and does not require much attention. For the concept of beginning and the concept of end are opposed to one another, and the meaning in both cases is different, just as in the case of the rest of things diametrically opposed to each other, 1.1.678 between which there is no middle ground. For one who is asked for the concept of beginning will not give the same definition as for the end, but will bring forward the defined concept of beginning to the opposite of that. Therefore, the things opposed to each of these will also differ from each other by an equal measure of opposition, and 'beginningless' will be acknowledged to be one thing, which is opposed to what is indicated by 'beginning', and 'endless' another thing, which is destructive of 'end' 1.1.679. If, therefore, they bring these two things and attribute them to the essence of God, I mean both the endless and the beginningless, they will show their God to be a concurrence of two contrary and discordant things. For the concept opposed to each of these also demonstrates in itself the opposition of the end to the beginning. For things that are contrary to contraries are 1.1.680 also in every way contrary to each other. And the argument is true that all things that are naturally opposed to contraries, these also have opposition to one another, as can be seen in examples. Water is opposed to fire; therefore the powers destructive of these will also be contrary to each other. For if wetness is what extinguishes fire, and dryness is what destroys water, the qualities opposed to these have also preserved in themselves the opposition of water to fire, so that it is agreed that wetness is opposed 1.1.681 to dryness. So, therefore, since beginning and end are completely opposed, the names opposed to these also fight each other in concept, I mean the beginningless and the endless. If, then, they define that only one of these is indicative of the essence (for I will repeat the same argument again), they will thus testify to God's being by half,

84

νοημάτων ὥσπερ τὰ πτερορρυήσαντα τῶν ὀρνέων οὐκ ἀνιπτάμενοι), συμβουλεύσαιμι ἂν αὐτοῖς ἔγωγε μετα λαβεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐναντίον τὰ δόγματα, ὡς τὸ μὲν ἀτελεύ τητον ἐν οὐσίᾳ λογίζεσθαι, περιορᾶν δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἀτελευ τήτου τὸ ἄναρχον, τῷ μέλλοντι καὶ τῷ κατ' ἐλπίδας πλέον ἢ τῷ παρῳχηκότι καὶ ἑώλῳ τὰ πρωτεῖα προσνέμοντας. 1.1.673 ἐπειδὴ γάρ (λέγω δὲ ταῦτα διὰ τοὺς μικροὺς τὰ ψυχάρια ἑκουσίως τῇ τῶν νηπίων ὑπολήψει συγκατάγων τὸν λόγον) ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν τὸ παρελθὸν τῆς ζωῆς ἀντ' οὐδενός ἐστι τῷ ζήσαντι, πᾶσα δὲ ἡ σπουδὴ τοῖς ζῶσι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον καὶ προσδοκώμενον γίνεται, τιμιώτερον ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀνάρχου τὸ ἀτελεύτητον, ὅτι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον καὶ προσδοκώμενον τὸ 1.1.674 ἀθάνατον φέρεται. ὥστε ἢ θεοπρεπῆ καὶ ὑψηλὰ <τὰ> περὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως ἔστω νοήματα, ἢ εἴπερ ἀνθρωπίνοις λογισμοῖς κρίνουσι τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ μέλλον ἔστω τοῦ παρῳ χηκότος αὐτοῖς τιμιώτερον, καὶ τούτῳ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν περιγραφέτωσαν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν τὸ παρελθὸν ἤδη τοῦ χρόνου τῇ παρόδῳ συναφανίζεται, τὸ δὲ προσδοκώμενον διὰ τῆς ἐλπίδος τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχει. 1.1.675 Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὡς παιδίοις τοῖς ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ καθ ημένοις καὶ παίζουσι γελοῖα καὶ παιδαριώδη προφέρω· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ χαμαιρριφές τε καὶ γήϊνον τῶν τῆς αἱρέ σεως δογμάτων ἐπισκεπτόμενον μὴ οὐχὶ πάντως εἰς μειρα 1.1.676 κιώδη τινὰ παιδιὰν ὑποφέρεσθαι. ἐκεῖνο δὲ προσθεῖναι τῷ λόγῳ καλῶς ἔχειν φημί, ὅτι τῆς τοῦ ἀϊδίου σημασίας δι' ἀμφοτέρων κατὰ τὸν ῥηθέντα λόγον συμπληρουμένης, ἔκ τε τῆς <τῆς> ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐκ τῆς τοῦ τέλους ἀλλοτριώσεως, εἰ μὲν ἐν τῷ ἑνὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ περιγράφοιεν, ἡμιτελὴς αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡμίτομος ὁ τῆς οὐσίας λόγος ἀναφανήσεται, ἐν μόνῳ τῷ ἀνάρχῳ νοούμενος, τὸ δὲ ἀτελεύτητον ἐν ἑαυτῷ 1.1.677 κατ' οὐσίαν μὴ κεκτημένος. εἰ δὲ ἀμφότερα συνθέντες τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον δι' ἑκατέρων συναπαρτίσουσι, πάλιν σκο πήσωμεν τὴν συναναδεικνυμένην ἀτοπίαν τῷ λόγῳ· εὑρε θήσεται γὰρ αὐτοῖς οὐκέτι πρὸς τὸν μονογενῆ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀλλοτρίως ἔχων. σαφὴς δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐδὲ πολλῆς τῆς ἐπιστασίας δεόμενος. ὁ γὰρ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ὁ τοῦ τέλους λόγος ἐναντίως ἑκάτερος πρὸς τὸν ἕτερον ἔχει, καὶ διάφορον ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων τὸ σημαινόμενον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τῶν κατὰ διάμετρον ἀλλήλοις ἀντικει 1.1.678 μένων, οἷς οὐδὲν ὕπεστι μέσον. ὁ γὰρ ἐρωτηθεὶς τὸν περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς λόγον οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποδώσει τῷ περὶ τοῦ τέ λους ὅρῳ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῳ προάξει τὸν ὡρι σμένον τῆς ἀρχῆς λόγον. οὐκοῦν καὶ τὰ ἑκατέρῳ τούτων ἀντικείμενα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον μέτρον τῆς ἀντιθέσεως καὶ ἀπ' ἀλλήλων διενεχθήσεται, καὶ ἄλλο τι ὁμολογηθήσεται εἶναι τὸ ἄναρχον, ὅπερ ἀντίκειται τῷ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς δηλουμένῳ, ἄλλο δέ τι τὸ ἀτελεύτητον, ὅπερ ἀναιρετικὸν τοῦ τέλους 1.1.679 ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν ταῦτα τὰ δύο εἰς τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ θεοῦ φέ ροντες ἀναθήσουσι, τό τε ἀτελεύτητόν φημι καὶ τὸ ἄναρχον, δύο τινῶν ἐναντίων καὶ ἀσυμφώνων συνδρομὴν τὸν θεὸν ἑαυτῶν ἀποδείξουσι. τὴν γὰρ τοῦ τέλους πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐναν τίωσιν ἡ ἑκατέρῳ τούτων ἀντικειμένη διάνοια καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυ τῆς ἐπιδείκνυται. τὰ γὰρ τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις ἐναντία καὶ 1.1.680 ἀλλήλοις ἐναντία πάντως ἐστίν. ἀληθὴς δὲ ὁ λόγος ὅτι πάντα, ὅσα τοῖς ἐναντίως ἔχουσι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἀντι καθίσταται, ταῦτα καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὸ ἐναντίον ἔχει, ὡς ἐπὶ τῶν ὑποδειγμάτων ἔστιν ἰδεῖν. τῷ πυρὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἀνθ έστηκεν· οὐκοῦν καὶ αἱ ἀναιρετικαὶ τούτων δυνάμεις ἀλ λήλαις ἐναντιώσονται. εἰ γὰρ σβεστικὴ τοῦ πυρός ἐστιν ἡ ὑγρότης, ἀναιρετικὴ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατός ἐστιν ἡ ξηρότης, τὴν τοῦ ὕδατος πρὸς τὸ πῦρ ἐναντίωσιν καὶ αἱ ἀντικείμεναι τούτοις ποιότητες καὶ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν διεσώσαντο, ὡς ἐναντίως 1.1.681 ἔχειν ὁμολογεῖσθαι τῷ ξηρῷ τὴν ὑγρότητα. οὕτως οὖν καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ τέλους ὑπεναντίως διακειμένων, τὰ ἀντικείμενα τούτοις ὀνόματα καὶ ἀλλήλοις μάχεται κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν, τὸ ἄναρχον λέγω καὶ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον. εἰ τοίνυν τὸ ἕτερον τούτων μόνον τῆς οὐσίας ἐνδεικτικὸν εἶναι ὁρίζονται (πάλιν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐπαναλήψομαι λόγον), ἐξ ἡμισείας προσμαρτυρήσουσιν οὕτω τῷ θεῷ τὸ εἶναι,