Opuscula psychologica, theologica, daemonologica
After the judgment of the thoughts, an exact discernment of how the thoughts happen to be, whether they are good or otherwise but imagination is the
to divide for us, by the established terms, the sesquitertian ratios into both the sesquioctave ratios and the leimmata, we would have stopped at thes
having split it, he bent each one into a circle, bringing them together middle to middle with each other like a chi, having joined 7 them both to them
left, or rather the one is an image of mind, the other of soul. And in the soul itself, the right is that which is turned toward the intelligible thin
regarding the explanation of the Platonic psychogony, this we now discharge for you as a kind of debt. For Plato's statement that the division of thes
and of exegesis. And there is a letter of mine placed among my books that has traced out and carefully examined the meaning in the sayings. But it is
a ruler drives a team of two then of the 14 horses, one of them is noble and good and of such stock, but the other is from opposite stock and is oppo
a body from one of the seeing things, such that it is able to be extended as far as the stars. But it was better, he says, than to say that the extern
through which it is not swept into material disorder, but is joined to the divine light, holds it in its own place and makes it unmixed with matter, l
of knowledge. For there is something intelligible, which you must understand with the flower of the intellect. And he says that the one in us is twofo
agrees, but among them the salty is more than the drinkable. They say, for example, that every soul is either divine or changing from intellect to min
to be deemed worthy of pardon in repenting. If the soul is a body according to some of the ancients, what is it that contains it? every body is three-
distinction. Two kinds of air according to Aristotle, the vaporous from the exhalation of water and the smoky from the extinguishing of fire. The latt
Plato. Pleasure is not a coming-to-be for coming-to-be is of things that are not, while pleasure is of things that are. And coming-to-be is swift and
is natural, while habit is acquired and taught. Providence is the care for existing things that comes from God. Epicurus says: the blessed and incorr
but such powers are simply and imperceptibly desired. What then? Do we have three souls? Solution: just as the soul, when united to the body, seems to
When this is dimmed they also are dimmed the soul flourishes when this 34 withers. Further, everything desires to preserve its own substrate. If the
actuality, as physicians, others in relation to something, others a double or one-and-a-half ratio. Potentiality is found in substance, as a man in th
concerning form, matter and cause, for example the matter of the celestial bodies is not the four elements, but a certain fifth, spherical one, as be
as knowledge (for knowledge is a transition from defined things to defined things for this reason it is also knowledge, as leading the mind to a stat
this, for indeed the flesh also moves downwards and is none of the elements. Aporia: but matter, that is the element, is not soul, but the form that c
definitions have as their beginning the most general things, as their end the most specific things. If, then, these are finite, so are the definitions
and it acts according to one part and another. It seems to act in these ways as being one. For if it is divided, it is necessary for the parts to be e
the rest, but this is about hot and soft, heavy and light, rare and dense, and many opposites. In humans, the cause of local motion is intellect, in i
is nourished {which} is twofold: either as Matter or as an instrument. And the instrument is twofold: either moving and being moved, like the innate h
is equal in distance to the zodiac signs. Light is not a body. for if it were a body, how would it be possible for it to have instantaneous movement,
we see the introduction of the forms of things seen entering the sight, but how do we see the interval of the air in between? Solution: It is not that
with a violent collision. In soft things no sound is produced, because the air is broken up in their pores and dispersed as in sponges. In things that
a buzzing which is conveyed back to the sense of hearing. Others say that the sound occurring in the ears after the blockage is of the external air th
For instance, fish, not having this, are cooled through their gills. Those that have a windpipe also have a lung. Fish have neither these nor a heart.
the sense organs of touch, it is clear for every sense organ is both separated and known. Aristotle speaks of the senses both as one each and as many
Aristotle in On the Soul : if sensation ceased, the sense-organ would also cease. But if the second is not, neither is the first. Sensation and sense-
Some add also a sixth, the attentive [faculty], as when a man says, I perceived, I thought, I opined. To this part they also add the activities of t
We can say ten, but not indeed opine it, so that opinion is not up to us. But neither do we imagine what we wish for we see at night what we do not w
in the case of children, the one according to state, and the one in act, as the one governing all things or the one entering from without. Plato says
theoretical versus the practical. The theoretical corresponds to a vision discerning of forms, while the practical corresponds to a vision not only kn
organs. Moreover, at night the nutritive faculty is more active, but the locomotive faculty is not at all. A difficulty: the vegetative faculty produc
simpler, or rather the things inherent in the matter, into which the matter is also divided, which are also prop[erly] called its elements. I say then
he hints that it is not completed from both of the things mixed, but is produced in the union of the soul and the body, not by the soul itself giving
closing the senses, so as to know unknowingly the transcendent substance of that which is. For according to their own opinions, the philosopher who ha
he himself will also pardon his own student for the apparent 78 opposition to him and others will come here again to bear witness for us, the philoso
it grows and is naturally constituted to decay, must in every way grow along with and decay along with the other in a connate manner for that by whic
a demonstration, so also the soul in an infant's body and a more imperfect one, if it were in another, perfect body, would immediately have shown its
I shall use the argument. In what do you say virtue is inherent? or again, is it superimposed on the formless and incorporeal and uncompounded nature,
Porphyry has philosophized in harmony with this. For in discussing the soul, he says: “Just as insomniacs, by the very act of wanting to sleep and wat
have they cast off? Perhaps those who hold the contrary opinion will vex us with these things. But their objection is like a spider's web, which will
to have received watchwords from the first father, nor that they possess the fullness of many bosoms, nor would I accept that they stand before the bo
both the Sibylline and the Orphic ones, and those according to which the Berytian Bulls came to be and Amous the Egyptian, and Socrates and Plato (for
of the bonds by which they were bound, and after this, turning their minds upward, they will approach God. And if the account told about the Sibyl wer
has the front part? What then do you think? a mind scattered in so great a size is from this cause for him both slack and weak, and the soul is simply
would remember any of the things here. But as many of the souls as were allotted to more humble portions and their whole mind has not been snatched aw
Let us not altogether reject the analogy of the eye in the case of the soul, let it be and be called a more precise substance of the soul but if some
The manner of the entry of souls, and likewise of their release or separation from hence, both are most difficult or hard to explain for of the first
but by such powers the soul is led like some kind of thing moved by another, being drawn towards whatever the leaders happen to lead it, but then rath
For that which is according to reason, knowledge is readily at hand, but that which is contrary to reason, is so because it has received such a nature
of beasts, but perhaps the matter which reason has shown not to exist. Therefore our bodies will be resurrected, and there will be nothing to prevent
fitting and gluing it to that by means of a suitable analogy, not placing the rational and intellectual substance into any of the animals for this is
are generated from these powers alone, for this reason, having abandoned the others, they divided the substance of the soul into these alone. But if y
it is in fourths, when one might contemplate these both in the third order of the intellectual virtues and in the fourth of the paradigmatic virtues,
and so interpreting the Platonic opinion, but they do not seem to me to have grasped the precise meaning of his doctrine. But if I shall clarify for y
and with nothing separating them, it is necessary for the one to be ordered, and the other to order and the one which is ordered has its form divided
what is hard and resistant in them has been smoothed out by me. But what follows from this must be attributed to them alone for, proposing to speak a
proceeds from it and returns to it.” Then indeed he works out the point by division. For if it only remained, it would in no way differ from its cause
in our sacred writings, neither a whole soul nor any whole nature, apart from the partial ones, has been dogmatically established1. I for my part reje
by the energy, then also the substance is perfected according to it, and these things stand in each other according to one energy. For he who does not
having a life activated according to intellect and reason the psychic is defined according to reason 124 and takes care of divisible souls the physi
tormenting them. But there are, they say, both on earth divine daimons and in the air, guardians of the animals there, and <in> the water, extending t
make it superior to the confusion of life, but, if possible, may you not even leave behind in the terrestrial world the very body which you have put o
cast under your mind: for there is no plant of truth on earth» that is: do not busy your mind with the great measures of the earth, as the geographer
Gregory by reason and contemplation leads the soul up to the more divine things by reason that is according to us, the more intellectual and better,
such a lion-bearing fount of heaven and the stars, but the ruling part of its own existence conceals the vision of them. Chaldaean Oracle. From all si
often appearing, they feign the semblance of some goodness towards the one being initiated. Chaldean Oracle. The soul of mortals will draw God into it
they can. Whence everything they say and show is false and insubstantial for they know existing things through forms but that which knows future thi
and fear is the holding back of his goodness towards us for the sake of the economy. Chaldean Oracle. The Father snatched himself away, not even enclo
they are possessed by passions. Therefore, it is necessary for these also to receive their part of the whole judgment and, having been filled up with
for it is higher than being venerated, than being uttered, and than being conceived. A Chaldean Oracle. The Iynges, being conceived by the Father, the
an unknown password, spoken and unspoken. And they often bring the soul down 148 into the world for many reasons, either through the shedding of its w
of truth and of love. After which are the demiurgic fountains, such as that of the ideas, according to which the cosmos and the things in it have shap
enclosing the triad towards itself and they call these also intelligible. After these, another order of the intelligible and at the same time intelle
to the setting [sun], and the pit to the one just at mid-heaven. And thus, gently separating the membrane of the liver, [which is placed] upon the org
parts of philosophy is necessary. For according to moral philosophy it is necessary to assume that not all things are and come to be by necessity, but
knowledge and sees not only the essences themselves, but also their powers and their activities, both those according to nature and those contrary to
he acquired. For even before the birth of both, God knew that the one would be good, and the other would turn out bad and this knowledge is an unchan
from the one who knows, and it revolves around the thing known and is made like the one who knows. I mean something like this: the knowledge of the so
they fabricate. For I too had a certain little man, ignoble in soul, but by no means the least of storytellers to him, at any rate, such phantoms pre
he acquired. For even before the birth of both, God knew that the one would be good, and the other would turn out bad; and this knowledge is an unchangeable boundary for each of the opposite states. But, O best of men, God indeed knows all things, but according to what is better and the conception proper to himself; yet not because he knows existing things and future things in a better way, do those things depart from their own nature. For it is not because some existing things are body, and others bodiless, and some temporal, and others eternal, and some at rest, and others in motion, that he knows bodies corporeally, or temporal things temporally, or flowing things movably, but rather incorporeally and eternally and immovably, because knowledge is like not the thing known but the one who knows. According to this principle, then, God has necessary knowledge only of things that happen both by necessity and contingently; and just as knowing body incorporeally and the temporal atemporally and the changing unchangeably, he neither makes the body bodiless, nor the temporal atemporal, but while he knows all things according to what is better, these things stand in their own nature, so also what will be this way or that way, while the Better One knows it necessarily, remains in turn contingent and is not changed towards the necessary foreknowledge of God. Whence he knows that I will be 160 wicked or good, and he knows it necessarily; but I have not lost my own nature, but I am tested according to my choice and the activity of virtues or of vices depends on my own judgment. By the same. A reply to a monk who asked about the definition of death You did not ask, most eloquent father, in the way that the question proposed by you is difficult; for as I indeed propose, the solution to what was asked is at hand. For nothing is indefinite to God, neither life nor death, not generation, not essence, neither anything of things that are nor of things that come to be. For if indeed the divine is the boundary of the all, how could any of all things be indefinite to him? And if the all has comprehended time, or rather, even before time and before the age it stands by itself, how could he know the present, but be ignorant of something of the future? For these things concern us, for whom time has been divided, who know the present as much as comes into our knowledge, but are entirely ignorant of the future, because we do not even live with what is coming, but we are entirely separated from what will be by living in the present. Therefore, the answer to what you asked is very easy.
But this much-talked-of question, so that I may put the whole thing together for you summarily and in the form of a letter, the more clever men thus propose, bringing forth their argument not only concerning the limit of life, but also concerning every other thing that comes to be. For they ask if God knows the future; then when the interlocutor agrees (for it was not possible to speak against a common notion) they add: Is his knowledge of the future 161 determined or is it indefinite as it is for us? And when we grant that his knowledge is determined (for the other alternative is absurd) they immediately bring forward some absurd consequence; for they say that if God knew in a determined way the one who will be just and the one who will be unjust and the one who will die in this way or that, neither is the just man just from himself nor did the unjust man obtain choice as the beginning of his injustice; but neither is the murderer unjust, for the time of life has been determined for the one who died, and the killing followed upon God's knowing that he would die in this way. For how was it possible for God to know in a determined way that that man would be killed, but for this man to escape that manner of killing? So that the murderer, having served the divine foreknowledge, will not only be considered entirely innocent, but also worthy of reward as having fulfilled the will of the master. Thus, then, those who are clever in these things construct the question; but the solution, in turn, is brought forth by the wiser men against the problem, that knowledge, being intermediate between the thing known and the one who knows, has its origin indeed
ἐκτήσατο. ᾔδει γὰρ καὶ πρὸ γεννήσεως ἀμφοῖν ὁ θεὸς ὡς ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ἔσοιτο, ὁ δὲ ἀποβαίη κακός· ἡ δὲ γνῶσις αὕτη ὅρος ἑκάστῳ
τῶν ἐναντίων ἕξεων ἀμετάθετος. Ἀλλ', ὦ βέλτιστε, οἶδε μὲν πάντα θεός, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττον καὶ τὴν ἑαυτῷ προσήκουσαν ἔννοιαν·
οὐ μὴν διότι κρειττόνως οἶδε τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα, ἐκεῖνα τῆς ἰδίας μεθίσταται φύσεως. οὐ γὰρ ἐπειδὴ τῶν ὄντων τὸ μέν ἐστι
σῶμα, τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἔγχρονον, τὸ δὲ αἰώνιον, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἑστώς, τὸ δὲ κινούμενον, σωματικῶς οἶδε τὰ σώματα ἢ χρονικῶς
τὰ ἔγχρονα ἢ κινουμένως τὰ ῥέοντα, ἀλλὰ ἀσωμάτως καὶ ἀιδίως καὶ ἀκινήτως, ὅτιπερ καὶ ἡ γνῶσις οὐ τῷ γινωσκομένῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ γινώσκοντι
προσόμοιος. κατὰ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν λόγον καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ ἐνδεχομένως γινομένων ἀναγκαίαν μόνον τὴν γνῶσιν ἔσχηκεν ὁ θεός·
καὶ ὥσπερ ἀσωμάτως τὸ σῶμα εἰδὼς καὶ ἀχρόνως τὸ ἔγχρονον καὶ ἀμεταθέτως τὸ μεθιστάμενον, οὔτε τὸ σῶμα ποιεῖ ἀσώματον, οὔτε
τὸ ἔγχρονον ἄχρονον, ἀλλ' ἐκείνου κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττον πάντα εἰδότος ταῦτα ἐπὶ τῆς οἰκείας ἵσταται φύσεως, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως
ἢ ἐκείνως ἐσόμενον ἀναγκαίως εἰδότος τοῦ κρείττονος μένει αὖθις ἀμφιρρεπὲς καὶ οὐ μεταβάλλεται πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν πρόγνωσιν
τοῦ θεοῦ. ὅθεν ἐκεῖνος μὲν οἶδεν ὅτι πονηρὸς 160 ἢ ἀγαθὸς ἔσομαι, καὶ οἶδεν ἀναγκαίως· ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἀπόλωλα τὴν ἐμὴν φύσιν,
ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν δοκιμάζομαι καὶ τῆς ἐμῆς ἤρτηται γνώμης τῶν ἀρετῶν ἢ τῶν κακιῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια. Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀντιγραφὴ πρὸς
μοναχὸν ἐρωτήσαντα περὶ ὁρισμοῦ τοῦ θανάτου Οὐχ ὡς ἠπόρηται τὸ προβληθὲν παρὰ σοῦ ζήτημα, λογιώτατε πάτερ, οὕτως ἠρώτησας·
ὡς γὰρ δὴ προετείνω, τοῦ ἐρωτηθέντος ἡ λύσις πρόχειρος. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀόριστον τῷ θεῷ, οὔτε ζωὴ οὔτε θάνατος, οὐ γένεσις, οὐκ
οὐσία, οὔτε τῶν ὄντων οὔτε τῶν γινομένων οὐδέν. εἰ γὰρ δὴ τὸ θεῖον ὅρος ἐστὶ τοῦ παντός, πῶς δή τι τῶν πάντων ἐκείνῳ ἀοριστήσειε;
καὶ εἰ τὸ πᾶν συνειλήφει τοῦ χρόνου, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πρὸ χρόνου καὶ πρὸ αἰῶνος ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἔστηκε, πῶς τὸ μὲν παρὸν εἰδείη, τῶν
δὲ μελλόντων τι ἀγνοήσειε; περὶ ἡμᾶς γὰρ ταῦτα, οἷς ὁ χρόνος καταμεμέρισται, οἳ τὸ μὲν ἐνεστὼς ἴσμεν ὁπόσον ἡμῖν εἰς γνῶσιν
ἔλθοι, τὸ δὲ μέλλον παντάπασιν ἠγνοήκαμεν, ὅτι μηδὲ συζῶμεν τῷ ἐπιόντι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐσομένου τῷ κατὰ τὸ ἐνεστὼς ζῆν παντάπασιν
ἀπῳκίσμεθα. ῥᾴστη τοιγαροῦν πρὸς ὅπερ ἠρώτησας ἡ ἀπόκρισις.
Τὸ δὲ θρυλλούμενον τουτὶ ζήτημα, ἵνα δή σοι κεφαλαιωδῶς καὶ ἐν ἐπιστολῆς σχήματι συνείρω τὸ πᾶν, οὕτω δὴ προβάλλονται οἱ δεινότεροι,
οὐ περὶ ὅρου ζωῆς μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ παντὸς ἑτέρου τῶν γινομένων τὸν λόγον προάγοντες. ἐρωτῶσι γὰρ εἰ οἶδε τὸ μέλλον ὁ θεός·
εἶτα δὴ συνομολογήσαντος τοῦ προσδιαλεγομένου (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν ἀντιλέγειν πρὸς κοινὴν ἔννοιαν) ἐπάγουσι· πότερον δὲ ὥρισται αὐτῷ
ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ μέλλον161 τος ἢ ἀορισταίνει ὥσπερ ἡμῖν; δόντων δὲ ἡμῶν ὡρίσθαι αὐτῷ τὴν γνῶσιν (θάτερον γὰρ ἄτοπον) εὐθὺς ὡς
ἑπόμενόν τι ἄτοπον ἐπιφέρουσι· φασὶ γὰρ ὡς, εἰ ὡρισμένως εἰδείη τόν τε ἐσόμενον δίκαιον ὁ θεὸς καὶ τὸν ἐσόμενον ἄδικον τόν
τε οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως τεθνηξόμενον, οὔθ' ὁ δίκαιος παρ' ἑαυτοῦ δίκαιος οὔθ' ὁ ἄδικος ἀρχὴν ἀδικίας τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐκληρώσατο·
ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ φονεὺς ἄδικος, περιώρισται γὰρ τῷ τεθνηκότι ὁ τῆς ζωῆς χρόνος, καὶ εἰδότι θεῷ ὡς οὕτως τεθνήξαιτο ἐπηκολούθησεν
ἡ ἀναίρεσις. πῶς γὰρ ἦν εἰδέναι μὲν ὡρισμένως τὸν θεὸν ἐκεῖνον ἀναιρεθήσεσθαι, ἐκφυγεῖν δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἀναιρέσεως;
ὥστε καὶ ὁ φονεὺς προγνώσει θείᾳ ὑπουργηκὼς οὐ μόνον ἀθῷος παντάπασι λογισθήσεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀμοιβῆς ἄξιος ὡς τὸ τοῦ δεσπότου
θέλημα ἐκτετελεκώς. Τὸ μὲν οὖν ζήτημα οὕτω δὴ συντιθέασιν οἱ περὶ ταῦτα δεινοί· ἡ δέ γε λύσις οὕτως αὖθις παρὰ τῶν σοφωτέρων
ἐπάγεται πρὸς τὸ πρόβλημα, ὡς ἡ γνῶσις μέση οὖσα τοῦ γινωσκομένου καὶ τοῦ γινώσκοντος ὥρμηται μὲν
