§4. He proceeds again to discuss the impassibility of the Lord’s generation; and the folly of Eunomius, who says that the generated essence involves the appellation of Son, and again, forgetting this, denies the relation of the Son to the Father: and herein he speaks of Circe and of the mandrake poison.

We must, however, return to those who connect passion with the Divine generation, and on this account deny that the Lord is truly begotten, in order to avoid the conception of passion. To say that passion is absolutely linked with generation, and that on this account, in order that the Divine nature may continue in purity beyond the reach of passion, we ought to consider that the Son is alien to the idea of generation, may perhaps appear reasonable in the eyes of those who are easily deceived, but those who are instructed in the Divine mysteries586    That is, in the sacramental doctrine with regard to Holy Baptism.    This statement would seem to imply that, at some time after the Incarnation, the Humanity of Christ was transformed to the Divine Nature, and made identical with It. From other passages in what has preceded, it would seem that this change in the mutual relation of the two Natures might, according to the words of S. Gregory, be conceived as taking place after the Passion. Thus it might be said that S. Gregory conceived the union of the two Natures to be, since the Passion (or, more strictly, since the “exaltation”), what the Monophysites conceived it to be from the moment of the Incarnation. But other phrases, again, seem to show that he conceived the two Natures still to remain distinct (see note 4 inf.). There is, however, ample justification in S. Gregory’s language for the remark of Bp. Hefele, that S. Gregory “cannot entirely free himself from the notion of a transmutation of the Human Nature into the Divine.” (Hefele, Hist. of the Councils, Eng. Trans. vol. iii. p. 4.) have an answer ready to hand, based upon admitted facts. For who knows not that it is generation that leads us back to the true and blessed life, not being the same with that which takes place “of blood and of the will of the flesh587    S. John i. 13    ἑνωσέως.,” in which are flux and change, and gradual growth to perfection, and all else that we observe in our earthly generation: but the other kind is believed to be from God, and heavenly, and, as the Gospel says, “from above588    S. John iii. 3, where ἄνωθεν may be interpreted either “from above” or as in A.V.    ἀνακραθεῖσα πρὸς τὸ θεῖον.,” which excludes the passions of flesh and blood? I presume that they both admit the existence of this generation, and find no passion in it. Therefore not all generation is naturally connected with passion, but the material generation is subject to passion, the immaterial pure from passion. What constrains him then to attribute to the incorruptible generation of the Son what properly belongs to the flesh, and, by ridiculing the lower form of generation with his unseemly physiology, to exclude the Son from affinity with the Father? For if, even in our own case, it is generation that is the beginning of either life,—that generation which is through the flesh of a life of passion, that which is spiritual of a life of purity, (and no one who is in any sense numbered among Christians would contradict this statement,)—how is it allowable to entertain the idea of passion in thinking of generation as it concerns the incorruptible Nature? Let us moreover examine this point in addition to those we have mentioned. If they disbelieve the passionless character of the Divine generation on the ground of the passion that affects the flesh, let them also, from the same tokens, (those, I mean, to be found in ourselves,) refuse to believe that God acts as a Maker without passion. For if they judge of the Godhead by comparison of our own conditions, they must not confess that God either begets or creates; for neither of these operations is exercised by ourselves without passion. Let them therefore either separate from the Divine nature both creation and generation, that they may guard the impassibility of God on either side, and let them, that the Father may be kept safely beyond the range of passion, neither growing weary by creation, nor being defiled by generation, entirely reject from their doctrine the belief in the Only-begotten, or, if they agree589    Reading εἰ for εἰς, according to Oehler’s suggestion.    Here S. Gregory seems to state accurately the differentiation of the two Natures, while he recognizes the possibility of the communicatio idiomatum: but it is not clear that he would acknowledge that the two Natures still remain distinct. Even this, however, seems to be implied in his citation of Phil. ii. 11, at a later point. that the one activity is exercised by the Divine power without passion, let them not quarrel about the other: for if He creates without labour or matter, He surely also begets without labour or flux.

And here once more I have in this argument the support of Eunomius. I will state his nonsense concisely and briefly, epitomizing his whole meaning. That men do not make materials for us, but only by their art add form to matter,—this is the drift of what he says in the course of a great quantity of nonsensical language. If, then, understanding conception and formation to be included in the lower generation, he forbids on this ground the pure notion of generation, by consequence, on the same reasoning, since earthly creation is busied with the form, but cannot furnish matter together with the form, let him forbid us also, on this ground, to suppose that the Father is a Creator. If, on the other hand, he refuses to conceive creation in the case of God according to man’s measure of power, let him also cease to slander Divine generation by human imperfections. But, that his accuracy and circumspection in argument may be more clearly established, I will again return to a small point in his statements. He asserts that “things which are respectively active and passive share one another’s nature,” and mentions, after bodily generation, “the work of the craftsman as displayed in materials.” Now let the acute hearer mark how he here fails in his proper aim, and wanders about among whatever statements he happens to invent. He sees in things that come into being by way of the flesh the “active and passive conceived, with the same essence, the one imparting the essence, the other receiving it.” Thus he knows how to discern the truth with accuracy as regards the nature of existing things, so as to separate the imparter and the receiver from the essence, and to say that each of these is distinct in himself apart from the essence. For he that receives or imparts is surely another besides that which is given or received, so that we must first conceive some one by himself, viewed in his own separate existence, and then speak of him as giving that which he has, or receiving that which he has not590    It is not quite clear whether any of this passage, or, if so, how much of it, is a direct quotation from Eunomius. Probably only the phrase about the imparting and receiving of the essence is taken from him, the rest of the passage being Gregory’s expansion of the phrase into a distinction between the essence and the thing of which it is the essence, so that the thing can be viewed apart from its own essence.    Here is truly stated the ground of the communicatio idiomatum: while the illustrations following seem to show that S. Gregory recognized this communicatio as existing at the time of our Lord’s humiliation, and as continuing to exist after His “exaltation”; that he acknowledged, that is, the union of the two Natures before the “exaltation,” and the distinction of the two Natures after that event.. And when he has sputtered out this argument in such a ridiculous fashion, our sage friend does not perceive that by the next step he overthrows himself once more. For he who by his art forms at his will the material before him, surely in this operation acts; and the material, in receiving its form at the hand of him who exercises the art, is passively affected: for it is not by remaining unaffected and unimpressionable that the material receives its form. If then, even in the case of things wrought by art, nothing can come into being without passivity and action concurring to produce it, how can our author think that he here abides by his own words? seeing that, in declaring community of essence to be involved in the relation of action and passion, he seems not only to attest in some sense community of essence in Him that is begotten with Him that begat Him, but also to make the whole creation of one essence591    ὁμοούσιον    1 Cor. ii. 8. with its Maker, if, as he says, the active and the passive are to be defined as mutually akin in respect of nature. Thus, by the very arguments by which he establishes what he wishes, he overthrows the main object of his effort, and makes the glory of the coessential Son more secure by his own contention. For if the fact of origination from anything shows the essence of the generator to be in the generated, and if artificial fabrication (being accomplished by means of action and passion) reduces both that which makes and that which is produced to community of essence, according to his account, our author in many places of his own writings maintains that the Lord has been begotten. Thus by the very arguments whereby he seeks to prove the Lord alien from the essence of the Father, he asserts for Him intimate connexion. For if, according to his account, separation in essence is not observed either in generation or in fabrication, then, whatever he allows the Lord to be, whether “created” or a “product of generation,” he asserts, by both names alike, the affinity of essence, seeing that he makes community of nature in active and passive, in generator and generated, a part of his system.

Let us turn however to the next point of the argument. I beg my readers not to be impatient at the minuteness of examination which extends our argument to a length beyond what we would desire. For it is not any ordinary matters on which we stand in danger, so that our loss would be slight if we should hurry past any point that required more careful attention, but it is the very sum of our hope that we have at stake. For the alternative before us is, whether we should be Christians, not led astray by the destructive wiles of heresy, or whether we should be completely swept away into the conceptions of Jews or heathen. To the end, then, that we may not suffer either of these things forbidden, that we may neither agree with the doctrine of the Jews by a denial of the verily begotten Son, nor be involved in the downfall of the idolaters by the adoration of the creature, let us perforce spend some time in the discussion of these matters, and set forth the very words of Eunomius, which run thus:—

“Now as these things are thus divided, one might reasonably say that the most proper and primary essence, and that which alone exists by the operation of the Father, admits for itself the appellations of ‘product of generation,’ ‘product of making,’ and ‘product of creation’:” and a little further on he says, “But the Son alone, existing by the operation of the Father, possesses His nature and His relation to Him that begat Him, without community592    This seems to be the force of ἀκοινώνητον: it is clear from what follows that it is to be understood as denying community of essence between the Father and the Son, not as asserting only the unique character alike of the Son and of His relation to the Father.    Phil. ii. 11..” Such are his words. But let us, like men who look on at their enemies engaged in a factious struggle among themselves, consider first our adversaries’ contention against themselves, and so proceed to set forth on the other side the true doctrine of godliness. “The Son alone,” he says, “existing by the operation of the Father, possesses His nature and His relation to Him that begat Him, without community.” But in his previous statements, he says that he “does not refuse to call Him, that is begotten a ‘product of generation,’ as the generated essence itself, and the appellation of Son, make such a relation of words appropriate.”

The contradiction existing in these passages being thus evident, I am inclined to admire for their acuteness those who praise this doctrine. For it would be hard to say to which of his statements they could turn without finding themselves at variance with the remainder. His earlier statement represented that the generated essence, and the appellation of “Son,” made such a relation of words appropriate. His present system says the contrary:—that “the Son possesses His relation to Him that begat Him without community.” If they believe the first statement, they will surely not accept the second: if they incline to the latter, they will find themselves opposed to the earlier conception. Who will stay the combat? Who will mediate in this civil war? Who will bring this discord into agreement, when the very soul is divided against itself by the opposing statements, and drawn in different ways to contrary doctrines? Perhaps we may see here that dark saying of prophecy which David speaks of the Jews—“They were divided but were not pricked at heart593    This is the LXX. version of the last part of Ps. xxxv. 15, a rendering with which the Vulgate version practically agrees.    ἀνακρασεως.” For lo, not even when they are divided among contrariety of doctrines have they a sense of their discordancy, but they are carried about by their ears like wine-jars, borne around at the will of him who shifts them. It pleased him to say that the generated essence was closely connected with the appellation of “Son”: straightway, like men asleep, they nodded assent to his remarks. He changed his statement again to the contrary one, and denies the relation of the Son to Him that begat Him: again his well-beloved friends join in assent to this also, shifting in whatever direction he chooses, as the shadows of bodies change their form by spontaneous mimicry with the motion of the advancing figure, and even if he contradicts himself, accepting that also. This is another form of the drought that Homer tells us of, not changing the bodies of those who drink its poison into the forms of brutes, but acting on their souls to produce in them a change to a state void of reason. For of those men, the tale tells that their mind was sound, while their form was changed to that of beasts, but here, while their bodies remain in their natural state, their souls are transformed to the condition of brutes. And as there the poet’s tale of wonder says that those who drank the drug were changed into the forms of various beasts, at the pleasure of her who beguiled their nature, the same thing happens now also from this Circe’s cup. For they who drink the deceit of sorcery from the same writing are changed to different forms of doctrine, transformed now to one, now to another. And meanwhile these very ridiculous people, according to the revised edition of the fable, are still well pleased with him who leads them to such absurdity, and stoop to gather the words he scatters about, as if they were cornel fruit or acorns, running greedily like swine to the doctrines that are shed on the ground, not being naturally capable of fixing their gaze on those which are lofty and heavenly. For this reason it is that they do not see the tendency of his argument to contrary positions, but snatch without examination what comes in their way: and as they say that the bodies of men stupefied with mandrake are held in a sort of slumber and inability to move, so are the senses of these men’s souls affected, being made torpid as regards the apprehension of deceit. It is certainly a terrible thing to be held in unconsciousness by hidden guile, as the result of some fallacious argument: yet where it is involuntary the misfortune is excusable: but to be brought to make trial of evil as the result of a kind of forethought and zealous desire, not in ignorance of what will befall, surpasses every extreme of misery. Surely we may well complain, when we hear that even greedy fish avoid the steel when it comes near them unbaited, and take down the hook only when hope of food decoys them to a bait: but where the evil is apparent, to go over of their own accord to this destruction is a more wretched thing than the folly of the fish: for these are led by their greediness to a destruction that is concealed from them, but the others swallow with open mouth the hook of impiety in its bareness, satisfied with destruction under the influence of some unreasoning passion. For what could be clearer than this contradiction—than to say that the same Person was begotten and is a thing created, and that something is closely connected with the name of “Son,” and, again, is alien from the sense of “Son”? But enough of these matters.

Ἀλλ' ἐπανιτέον πρὸς τοὺς τῇ θείᾳ γεννήσει τὸ πάθος συνάπτοντας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπαρνουμένους τὸ ἀληθῶς γεννηθῆναι τὸν κύριον, ἵνα μὴ πάθος νοήσωσι. τὸ γὰρ λέγειν, ὅτι « συνέζευκται » πάντως « τῇ γεννήσει » τὸ « πάθος », καὶ διὰ τοῦτο χρῆναι τῆς κατὰ τὴν γέννησιν ὑπολήψεως ἀλλοτρίως ἔχειν τὸν υἱὸν οἴεσθαι, ὡς ἂν καθαρῶς ἔξω πάθους διαμένοι τὸ θεῖον, τοῖς μὲν εὐεξαπατήτοις ἴσως ἄν τινα λόγον ἔχειν δοκοίη, τοῖς δὲ πεπαιδευμένοις τὰ θεῖα μυστήρια πρόχειρος ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ὁ ἔλεγχος. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι ἡ γέννησις ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν ἀληθινήν τε καὶ μακαρίαν ἀνάγει ζωήν, οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα τῇ ἐξ αἱμάτων καὶ θελήματος σαρκὸς συνισταμένῃ, ἐν ᾗ καὶ ῥύσις καὶ μεταβολὴ καὶ ἡ κατ' ὀλίγον πρὸς τελείωσιν αὔξησις καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα περὶ ταύτην θεωρεῖται τὴν γέννησιν: ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ οὐράνιος καί, καθώς φησί που τὸ εὐαγγέλιον, ἄνωθεν εἶναι πεπιστευμένη, ἥτις τὰ σαρκὸς καὶ τὰ αἵματος οὐ παραδέχεται πάθη; ἢ τολμησάτωσαν οἱ ἐναντίοι τῶν δύο τὸ ἕτερον ἀποφήνασθαι, ἢ μὴ εἶναι τὴν ἄνωθεν γέννησιν ἢ διὰ πάθους εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἶναι συντίθενται καὶ τὸ πάθος ἐπ' αὐτῆς οὐχ εὑρίσκουσιν. οὐκοῦν οὐ πᾶσα γέννησις τῷ πάθει συμπέφυκεν, ἀλλ' ἐμπαθὴς μὲν ἡ ὑλική, καθαρὰ δὲ πάθους ἡ ἄϋλος. τίς οὖν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὰ τῆς σαρκὸς ἴδια τῇ ἀκηράτῳ τοῦ υἱοῦ γεννήσει προστρίβεσθαι καὶ διὰ τοῦ κωμῳδεῖν τὴν κάτω γέννησιν τῇ ἀσχήμονι φυσιολογίᾳ τῆς πατρικῆς οἰκειότητος τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκλείειν; εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν γέννησις μὲν ἑκατέρας καθηγεῖται ζωῆς, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν διὰ σαρκὸς ἐμπαθῶς, ἡ δὲ πνευματικὴ καθαρῶς, καὶ οὐκ ἄν τις ἀντείποι τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν ἐν Χριστιανοῖς ἀριθμουμένων, πῶς ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀκηράτου φύσεως γέννησιν ἐννοήσαντα πάθος ὑπολογίζεσθαι;
Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς εἰρημένοις προσεξετάσωμεν. εἰ διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν σάρκα πάθος ἀπιστοῦσι τῇ ἀπαθείᾳ τῆς θείας γεννήσεως, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ὑποδειγμάτων, τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν λέγω, μηδὲ δημιουργεῖν ἀπαθῶς τὸν θεὸν πιστευέτωσαν. εἰ γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἡμέτερα τὸ θεῖον κρίνουσιν, οὔτε γεννᾶν τὸν θεὸν οὔτε κτίζειν ὁμολογήσουσι: τούτων γὰρ οὐθέτερον ἐν ἡμῖν ἀπαθῶς ἐνεργεῖται. ἢ οὖν ἀμφότερα τῆς θείας φύσεως χωριζέτωσαν, τὴν κτίσιν τε καὶ τὴν γέννησιν, ἵνα δι' ἑκατέρων τῷ θεῷ τὴν ἀπάθειαν φυλάξωσι, καὶ καθόλου τὴν εἰς τὸν μονογενῆ πίστιν ἐκ τοῦ δόγματος αὐτῶν ἐκβαλλέτωσαν, ὡς ἂν ἔξω πάθους ὁ πατὴρ φυλάσσοιτο, μήτε κάμνων ἐν τῷ κτίζειν μήτε ἐν τῷ γεννᾶν μολυνόμενος: ἢ εἰ τὸ ἕτερον ἀπαθῶς ἐνεργεῖσθαι συγχωροῦσι παρὰ τῆς θείας δυνάμεως, μηδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ζυγομαχείτωσαν: εἰ γὰρ κτίζει δίχα πόνου καὶ ὕλης, καὶ γεννᾷ πάντως δίχα πόνου καὶ ῥύσεως. ἔχω δὲ πάλιν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον συνηγοροῦντά μοι τὸν Εὐνόμιον. λέξω δὲ συντεμὼν ἐν ὀλίγῳ τὴν φλυαρίαν αὐτοῦ, πᾶσαν διὰ βραχέων ἐπιδραμὼν τὴν διάνοιαν ὅτι « οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐ τὰς ὕλας ἡμῖν κατασκευάζουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος μόνον ἐπιτεχνῶνται τῇ ὕλῃ »: αὕτη τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ ῥηθέντων διὰ πολλῆς φλυαρίας ἐστὶν ἡ διάνοια. εἰ οὖν ἐν τῇ κάτω γεννήσει σύλληψιν καὶ διάπλασιν ἐννοῶν ἀπαγορεύει διὰ τοῦτο τὴν καθαρὰν τῆς γεννήσεως ἔννοιαν, ἀκολούθως κατὰ τὸν αὑτοῦ λόγον τῆς ὧδε κτίσεως περὶ τὸ εἶδος πονούσης, ὕλην δὲ συνεκπορίζειν τῷ εἴδει μὴ δυναμένης, ἀπαγορευέτω διὰ τοῦτο καὶ δημιουργὸν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα οἴεσθαι. εἰ δὲ μὴ βούλεται κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τῆς δυνάμεως μέτρον ἐπὶ τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν κτίσιν νοεῖν, μηδὲ τὴν θείαν γέννησιν ἐκ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων διαβαλλέτω.
Ὡς δ' ἂν μᾶλλον αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀκριβές τε καὶ περιεσκεμμένον ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις φανερὸν κατασταίη, μικρόν τι τῶν παρ' αὐτοῦ ῥηθέντων πάλιν ἐπαναλήψομαι. φησὶ γὰρ « τὰ ποιοῦντα καὶ πάσχοντα κοινωνεῖν ἀλλήλοις τῆς φύσεως », καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐκ σωμάτων γέννησιν « τὰς τεχνικὰς ἐπὶ τῶν ὑλῶν δημιουργίας » ἐκτίθεται. σκεψάσθω τοίνυν ὁ ἀγχίνους ἀκροατὴς διὰ τούτων πῶς ἐκπίπτει τοῦ ἰδίου σκοποῦ, τοῖς ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ συμβὰν παρευρισκομένοις ἐπιπλανώμενος. τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ πάσχον ἐν τοῖς διὰ σαρκὸς γινομένοις ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ὁρᾷ, ὡς τοῦ μὲν μεταδιδόντος τῆς οὐσίας, τοῦ δὲ μετέχοντος. οὕτως οἶδε δι' ἀκριβείας ἐν τῇ τῶν ὄντων φύσει ὁρᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ὥστε χωρίζειν τῆς οὐσίας τὸν μεταδιδόντα καὶ τὸν μετέχοντα καὶ ἄλλον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ δίχα τῆς οὐσίας εἶναι λέγειν τούτων ἑκάτερον. ὁ γὰρ μεταλαμβάνων ἢ μεταδιδοὺς ἕτερος πάντως ἐστὶ παρὰ τὸ μετεχόμενον τε καὶ διδόμενον, ὡς δεῖν πρότερον ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ νοεῖσθαί τινα καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἰδίαν ὁρώμενον, εἶθ' οὕτω λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἢ διδόναι ὃ ἔχει ἢ ὃ μὴ ἔχει προσίεσθαι. καὶ τοῦτον οὕτως ἐπιγελάστως ἐκπτύσας τὸν λόγον τῷ ἐφεξῆς πάλιν ἑαυτὸν ἀνατρέπων ὁ σοφὸς οὐκ αἰσθάνεται. καὶ γὰρ ὁ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διὰ τῆς τέχνης πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν σχηματίζων ποιεῖ τι πάντως διὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας, καὶ ἡ ὕλη παρὰ τοῦ ἐνεργοῦντος τὴν τέχνην ἐν τῷ πάσχειν τὸν σχηματισμὸν ἀναδέχεται: οὐ γὰρ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀντίτυπος ἡ ὕλη μένουσα τὴν ἐκ τῆς τέχνης μορφὴν παραδέχεται. εἰ τοίνυν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κατὰ τέχνην ἐνεργουμένων οὐκ ἄν τι γένοιτο μὴ πάθους καὶ ἐνεργείας συνδεδραμηκότων ἀλλήλοις πρὸς τὸ γινόμενον, πῶς ἔστι διὰ τούτων ἐφεστάναι τοῖς παρ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγομένοις τὸν λογογράφον οἴεσθαι, ὃς ἐν πάθει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς οὐσίας ἀποφαινόμενος κινδυνεύει μὴ μόνον τῷ γεννηθέντι προσμαρτυρεῖν πως πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσαν τὴν κτίσιν τῷ πεποιηκότι ποιεῖν ὁμοούσιον, εἴπερ τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον ὁμογενῶς ἔχειν ἀλλήλοις κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ὁρίζεται. οὐκοῦν δι' ὧν κατασκευάζει ὃ βούλεται, διὰ τούτων ἀνατρέπει τὸ σπουδαζόμενον, ἰσχυροτέραν τῇ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ μάχῃ ποιῶν τὴν τοῦ „ὁμοουσίου” δόξαν. εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν ἔκ τινος γέννησις τὴν τοῦ γεγεννηκότος οὐσίαν ἐν τῷ γεννηθέντι δείκνυσιν, ἡ δὲ τεχνικὴ κατασκευὴ δι' ἐνεργείας τε καὶ πάθους ἀποτελουμένη κατὰ τὸν τούτου λόγον εἰς κοινωνίαν οὐσίας ἄγει τὸ ποιοῦν τε καὶ τὸ γινόμενον, γεγεννῆσθαι τὸν κύριον πολλαχῇ τῶν ἰδίων συγγραμμάτων ὁ λογογράφος κατασκευάζων, ἄρα δι' ὧν ἀλλοτριοῖ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς οὐσίας τὸν κύριον, διὰ τούτων αὐτῷ προσμαρτυρεῖ τὴν συνάφειαν. εἰ γὰρ μήτε διὰ γεννήσεως μήτε διὰ κατασκευῆς κατὰ τὸν τούτου λόγον ὁ τῆς οὐσίας χωρισμὸς καθορᾶται, ὅπερ ἂν δῷ εἶναι τὸν κύριον, εἴτε κτιστὸν εἴτε γέννημα, δι' ἀμφοῖν τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν οἰκεῖον προσεμαρτύρησεν ὁ ἐν τῷ ποιοῦντι καὶ πάσχοντι, γεννῶντι καὶ γεννωμένῳ τὴν τῆς φύσεως κοινωνίαν τεχνολογήσας.
Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἐφεξῆς τοῦ λόγου τραπώμεθα. παραιτοῦμαι δὲ τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας μὴ δυσχεραίνειν τῇ ἀκριβείᾳ τῆς ἐξετάσεως εἰς πλῆθος ἀκούσιον προαγούσῃ τὸν λόγον. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων ὁ κίνδυνος, ὥστε τι παραδραμόντας τῶν φιλοπονωτέρας δεομένων τῆς θεωρίας ἐν ὀλίγῳ τὴν ζημίαν παθεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ τῷ κεφαλαίῳ τῆς ἐλπίδος ἐγκινδυνεύομεν. πρόκειται γὰρ ἢ Χριστιανοὺς εἶναι, μὴ συμπαρενεχθέντας ὑπὸ τῆς αἱρετικῆς ἀπωλείας, ἢ πάντως πρὸς Ἰουδαϊκάς τε καὶ Ἑλληνικὰς ὑπολήψεις κατασυρῆναι. ὡς ἂν οὖν μηθέτερον πάθοιμεν τῶν ἀπειρημένων, μήτε διὰ τῆς ἀρνήσεως τοῦ ἀληθῶς γεννηθέντος υἱοῦ τοῖς Ἰουδαϊκοῖς δόγμασι συμφερόμενοι, μήτε διὰ τῆς τοῦ κτίσματος προσκυνήσεως τῷ πτώματι τῶν εἰδωλολατρούντων συγκαταπίπτοντες, ἀναγκαίως προσδιατρίψωμεν τῷ περὶ τούτων λόγῳ, θέντες αὐτὴν τοῦ Εὐνομίου τὴν ῥῆσιν ἔχουσαν οὕτως: « οὕτω δὲ τούτων διῃρημένων, εἰκότως φαίη τις ἂν τὴν κυριωτάτην καὶ πρώτην καὶ μόνην ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστᾶσαν οὐσίαν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας »: καὶ μετ' ὀλίγα: « μόνος δὲ ὁ υἱός », φησί, « τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐνεργείᾳ συστὰς ἀκοινώνητον ἔχει τήν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα σχέσιν ». τὰ μὲν οὖν εἰρημένα τοιαῦτα. ἡμεῖς δὲ πρῶτον μὲν τῶν ἐχθρῶν τὴν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς μάχην κατανοήσωμεν, οἷόν τινες θεαταὶ πολεμίων γενόμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους στασιαζόντων, εἶθ' οὕτως ἀντιπαραδείξωμεν τὴν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἀλήθειαν. μόνος, φησίν, ὁ υἱὸς τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐνεργείᾳ συστὰς ἀκοινώνητον ἔχει τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα σχέσιν. ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸ τούτου τὸν γεννητὸν γέννημα λέγειν μὴ παραιτεῖσθαί φησι, τῆς γεννηθείσης αὐτῆς οὐσίας καὶ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίας τὴν τοιαύτην τῶν ὀνομάτων οἰκειουμένης σχέσιν.
Οὕτω τοίνυν προδήλου τῆς ἐν τοῖς εἰρημένοις οὔσης ἐναντιότητος, θαυμάζειν ἔπεισί μοι τῆς ἀγχινοίας τοὺς ἐπαινέτας τούτου τοῦ δόγματος. ἄπορον γὰρ ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὅ τι τῶν εἰρημένων παρ' αὐτοῦ τραπέντες οὐκ ἂν πλημμελοῖεν εἰς τὸ λειπόμενον. ὁ πρότερος κατεσκεύαζε λόγος αὐτῷ τὴν γεννηθεῖσαν οὐσίαν καὶ τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίαν τὴν τοιαύτην τῶν ὀνομάτων οἰκειοῦσθαι σχέσιν. ἡ νῦν τεχνολογία τὸ ἐναντίον φησίν, ἀκοινώνητον ἔχειν τὸν υἱὸν τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα σχέσιν. ἐὰν τῷ πρώτῳ πιστεύσωσι, οὐ παραδέξονται πάντως τὸ δεύτερον: ἐὰν πρὸς τοῦτο ῥέψωσι, κατὰ τῆς προτέρας ὑπολήψεως στήσονται. τίς αὐτοῖς διαλύσει τὴν μάχην, τίς μεσιτεύσει τῷ ἐμφυλίῳ πολέμῳ, τίς συμβιβάσει πρὸς συμφωνίαν τὴν στάσιν, αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὴν ἐκ τῶν λεγομένων μεριζομένης καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐναντιότητα τῶν δογμάτων διελκομένης; ἢ τοῦτο τῆς προφητείας ἐστὶ τάχα τὸ αἴνιγμα, ὃ περὶ τῶν Ἰουδαίων φησὶν ὁ Δαβὶδ ὅτι Διεσχίσθησαν καὶ οὐ κατενύγησαν. ἰδοὺ γὰρ οὐδὲ πρὸς τὴν ἐναντίωσιν τῶν δογμάτων διασχιζόμενοι τὴν τοῦ πλημμελήματος αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ φέρονται διὰ τῶν ὤτων, ἀμφορέων δίκην πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν τῷ μετατιθέντι περιαγόμενοι. ἤρεσεν αὐτῷ τὴν γεννηθεῖσαν οὐσίαν προσφυῶς τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίαν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν: εὐθὺς καθάπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐπένευσαν. μετέθετο πάλιν πρὸς τοὐναντίον τὸν λόγον καὶ ἀρνεῖται τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα σχέσιν: πάλιν οἱ φίλτατοι καὶ τούτῳ συνανανεύουσιν, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν σωμάτων σκιαὶ τῇ αὐτομάτῳ μιμήσει πρὸς τὴν τοῦ προάγοντος συμμετασχηματίζονται κίνησιν, ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἐθέλῃ, πρὸς τοῦτο ῥέποντες, κἂν ἑαυτῷ μάχηται, καὶ τοῦτο καταδεχόμενοι. ἄλλος τις οὗτος Ὁμηρικὸς κυκεών, οὐ τὰ σώματα τῶν φαρμακευομένων ἀλλάσσων εἰς ἀλόγων μορφάς, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τῶν ψυχῶν ἐνεργῶν τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄλογον αὐτῶν μεταμόρφωσιν. περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐκείνων ὁ λόγος φησὶν ὅτι βέβαιος αὐτοῖς ὁ νοῦς ἦν, ἀλλοιωθέντος πρὸς τὸ θηριῶδες τοῦ εἴδους: ἐνταῦθα δὲ τῶν σωμάτων αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ κατὰ φύσιν διαμενόντων πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον αἱ ψυχαὶ μεταπλάσσονται. καὶ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ φησιν ἡ ποιητικὴ τερατεία εἰς διαφόρων θηρίων εἴδη τοὺς φαρμακευθέντας ἀλλάσσεσθαι κατὰ τὸ ἀρέσκον τῇ παρασοφιζομένῃ τὴν φύσιν, τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ νῦν γίνεται παρὰ τοῦ Κιρκαίου τούτου κρατῆρος. οἱ γὰρ ἐμπίνοντες τῆς γεγοητευμένης ἀπάτης ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ συγγράμματος εἰς διαφόρους δογμάτων μορφὰς ἀλλοιοῦνται, νῦν μὲν τούτῳ, πάλιν δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ μορφούμενοι. καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις οἱ γλυκύτατοι κατὰ τὴν τοῦ μύθου διασκευὴν ἀγαπῶσιν ἔτι τὸν τῆς τοιαύτης ἀλογίας αὐτοῖς ἐξηγούμενον καὶ οἷόν τινα καρπὸν κρανείας ἢ βάλανον τοὺς διαρριπτουμένους παρ' αὐτοῦ λόγους ὑποκεκυφότες ἐκλέγουσιν, συῶν δίκην πρὸς τὰ χαμαιρριφῆ τῶν δογμάτων λαιμάργως ἐπιτρέχοντες, τοῖς δὲ ὑψηλοῖς τε καὶ οὐρανίοις ἐνατενίζειν φύσιν οὐκ ἔχοντες. διὰ τοῦτο τὴν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐναντία τοῦ λόγου παρατροπὴν οὐχ ὁρῶσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπ' αὐτοὺς ἐλθὸν ἀνεξετάστως ἁρπάζουσιν, οἷον δὴ ἂν ᾖ: καὶ καθάπερ φασὶ τῶν διὰ μανδραγόρου κεκαρωμένων κώματί τινι καὶ δυσκινησίᾳ κρατεῖσθαι τὰ σώματα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τούτοις διάκειται τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς αἰσθητήρια, πρὸς τὴν σύνεσιν τῆς ἀπάτης ἀποναρκήσαντα. δεινὸν μὲν οὖν καὶ τοῖς κεκρυμμένοις δόλοις ἔκ τινος παραλογισμοῦ κατὰ τὸ λεληθὸς ἐνσχεθῆναι, πλὴν ἀλλὰ συγγνωστὸν τὸ ἀτύχημα, ὅταν ἀκούσιον ᾖ: τὸ δ' ἐκ προνοίας τινὸς καὶ σπουδῆς τοῦ κακοῦ τὴν πεῖραν ἐφέλκεσθαι, μὴ ἀγνοοῦντα τὴν συμφοράν, πᾶσαν ὑπερβολὴν δυστυχημάτων παρέρχεται. πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἄξιον σχετλιάζειν, ὅταν ἀκούωμεν ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἰχθύων οἱ λίχνοι γυμνὸν μὲν προσεγγίζοντα τὸν σίδηρον φεύγουσι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ δέλεαρ ἀπατώμενοι τροφῆς ἐλπίδι κατασπῶσι τὸ ἄγκιστρον, ἐν οἷς δὲ πρόδηλόν ἐστι τὸ κακὸν αὐτομολεῖν ἑκουσίως ἐπὶ τὸν ὄλεθρον τοῦτον καὶ τῆς τῶν ἰχθύων ἀλογίας ἐστὶν ἀθλιώτερον. οἱ μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸν κεκαλυμμένον διὰ γαστριμαργίας ὑπήχθησαν ὄλεθρον, οἱ δὲ γυμνὸν περιχαίνουσι τῆς ἀσεβείας τὸ ἄγκιστρον, διά τινος ἀλόγου προσπαθείας ἀγαπῶντες τὸν ὄλεθρον. τί γὰρ ἂν ταύτης τῆς ἐναντιότητος γένοιτο προδηλότερον ἢ τὸ λέγειν, ὅτι ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ ἐγεννήθη καὶ κτίσμα ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ προσφυὲς ἔχει τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ κλήσεως καὶ πάλιν ἀλλοτριοῦται τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ σημασίας; ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς τοσοῦτον.