Two letters, therefore, from the same person about the same subject in the same way were delivered to me, having a contrary disposition to one another; for the one says that I have very excellently opposed those things which seemed not to be good, and as one might judge without envy, but the other, again, says I did so most wretchedly; for it slanders all my arguments against those things. Thus, therefore, since your letters to us are contradictory and cancel each other out, what sort of impression of his own character would he who wrote these things provide to the readers? But let this be, lest we again bring forward an indictment for blasphemy.

What do you say, then, about the things shattered by each other, that we should cast both away as useless (p. 448) vessels of a potter? And how could you declare this about your own works, sitting as judge beforehand, but not rather force the votes, desiring at least to save one of the two letters for yourself; or rather, lest we be caught again saying something not good about you, not by turning away from and reasoning fallaciously about what is just, but like some rational eagle, high-flying in thought, will you preserve one of your offspring? For what if a rational vulture is not also available to you, a ready helper of the one who was scorned? Do not even eagles care for this? Which of the letters, then, will you claim for yourself? The noble one, of course, and great, and especially able to look us in the face, with which the worst things are associated. It is most necessary for you to judge this along with me, that since in the rejected one of the opposites it has been testified for us that we did "the best things", judging without envy, as you said, this one still standing for you has been composed entirely with envy.

But indeed this [letter], separated from its opposite and taken by itself, again needs a judge, not being consistent with itself, nor proceeding in conformity with itself, but fighting against itself in many places and in many ways and about the greatest matters. For the one saying in it "that it would make no difference to him if someone called all his own treatises against the Latins nonsense", to the one who was willing to bring forth no other point of contention and who had approved all the other things, and to one, and this almost the smallest of points, not being opposed but being perplexed and asking a question (for we assigned the objections to other persons), to the one, then, who thus with all fairness was asking for the solution to the difficulty, you brought forth in response long and bitter arguments, and this, although you yourself happen to have confessed it, having scraped away for yourself (p. 450) from your arguments the point in them that was debatable among us as being indisputably not good.

For if it makes no difference to you, o good sir, if someone calls your arguments nonsense and you are so terribly heedless of the opinion of men, for what reason, as you yourself say, have you cast that out of your arguments, unless you yourself also have formed a worse opinion about it? And what if it is also, as you yourself say, a "cause of scandal"? Is this a small thing? It is not right, then, only to be cast out, but also "to be cast into a wave of the loud-roaring sea," or rather, so that, to speak in the manner of Moses, "it might sink like lead in the mighty water," having first been tied to a great stone, then given to the waves. But, O you who are, if anyone is, preeminent in wisdom, if you have in any way whatsoever removed this from those arguments of yours, what need had you then of such a long-winded speech in its defense, from which it has befallen you not only to shoot beside the mark, according to the proverb, but altogether without a mark? For that at which they were aiming has been removed from the midst completely, as you revealed when concluding your long-lined arguments after the jests of those who were scandalized and your own elaborate consideration, so that as he was heedless before, so the one writing without a mark will speak in vain.

But you not in vain, for this is already a small thing for you, but even to the contrary

∆ύο τοίνυν ἀπό τοῦ αὐτοῦ περί τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατά τό αὐτός δεικομίσθη μοι γράμματα, ἐναντίως ἔχοντα πρός ἄλληλα˙ τό μέν γάρ τοῖς μή καλῶς ἔχειν δόξασιν ἄριστά γέ φησιν ἀντιτετάχθαί με καί ὡς ἄν τις ἔχοι κρίνειν ἀνεπιφθόνως, τό δ᾿ ἕτερον τοῖς αὐτοῖς αὖθις κάκιστα˙ διαβάλλει γάρ ἅπαντας τούς πρός ἐκεῖνά μοι λόγους. Οὕτως οὖν τῶν πρός ἡμᾶς σου γραμμάτων ἀντικειμένων καί δι᾿ ἀλήλων ἀναιρουμένων, ὅ ταῦτα συγγεγραφώς τίνα δόξαν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τοῦ ἤθους ἑαυτοῦ παράσχοιτ᾿ ἄν χάριν; Ἀλλά τοῦτ᾿ ἐατέον μή καί βλασφημίας γραφήν αὖθις ἀποφερώμεθα.

Τά γοῦν ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων συντριβέντα τί φῄς, ὡς ἀχρεῖα (σελ. 448) σκεύη κεραμεοῦντα ρίψωμεν ἄμφω; Καί πῶς ἄν τοῦτο σύ γ᾿ ἀποφήναιο περί τῶν σῶν διαιτητής προκαθήμενος, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί βιάσῃ τάς ψήφους θάτερον γοῦν περισώσασθαί σοι τοῖν γραμμάτοιν ποθῶν, μᾶλλον δ᾿ ἵνα μή τι πάλιν τῶν οὐ καλῶν σοῦ πέρι φωραθῶμεν εἰπόντες, οὐ τό δίκαιον ἐκκλίνων καί παραλογιζόμενος, ἀλλ᾿ οἷά τις λογικός ἀετός ὑψιπετής τήν διάνοιαν θάτερον περιποιήσῃ τῶν γεννημάτων; Τί γάρ, εἰ μή καί λογική σοι φήνη παρείη, τοῦ περιφρονηθέντος ἐπίκουρος ἕτοιμος, οὐδέ τοῖς ἀετοῖς τούτου μέλει; Ποῖον δ᾿ ἆρά σοι τῶν γραμμάτων οἰκειώσῃ σαυτῷ; Τό γενναῖον δήπουθεν καί μέγα καί μάλιστ᾿ ἔχον ἀντιβλέπειν ἡμῖν ᾧ τά κάκιστα σύνεστι. Τοῦτο δή σοι συνεπικρίνειν ἀναγκαιότατον, ὡς ἐπεί τῷ παρερριμένῳ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀνεπιφθόνως, ὡς ἔφης, κρίνοντι τά ἄριστα ἡμῖν μεμαρτύρηται, τό συνεστηκός ἔτι σοι τοῦτο πρός φθόνον ἅπαν συντεταγμένον ἐστίν.

Οὐ μήν ἀλλά καί τοῦ ἀντιταγμένου διεζευγμένον καθ᾿ ἑαυτό τοῦτ᾿ αὖθις τοῦ δικάζοντος δεῖται, μή συμβαῖνον ἑαυτῷ, μηδ᾿ ἀκολούθως ἑαυτῷ προσαγόμενον, ἀλλά πρός ἑαυτό παλλαχοῦ τε καί πολυτρόπως καί ὑπέρ τῶν μεγίστων μαχόμενον. Ὁ γάρ ἐν αὐτῷ λέγων «μηδέν ἄν ἑαυτῷ διαφέρειν εἴ τις ἀπεκάλει τούς ἐπί Λατίνους οἰκείους λόγους ἅπαντας λῆρον», πρός τόν μηδέν μέν ἕτερον τῶν λαβήν ἐχόντων προαγαγεῖν εἰς τοὐμφανές ἐθελήσαντα καί τ᾿ ἄλλ᾿ ἅπαντα προσεπῃνεκότα, πρός ἕν δέ καί τοῦτο μορίων σχεδόν τοὐλάχιστον οὐκ ἀντιτεταγμένον, ἀλλ᾿ ἠπορηκότα καί ἠρωτηκότα (τάς γάρ ἀντιθέσεις ἑτέροις ἀνεθέμεθα προσώποις) πρός τόν οὖν οὕτω μεθ᾿ ὅσης τῆς ἐπιεικείας αἰτοῦντα τήν λύσιν τῆς ἀπορίας, μακρούς καί πικρούς ἀντεπεξήγαγες λόγους, καί ταῦθ᾿ ὡς αὐτός ἀνωμολογηκώς τυγχάνεις, ἀποξέσας σοι (σελ. 450) τῶν λόγων τό παρ᾿ ἡμῖν ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀμφισβητήσιμον ὡς ἀναμφισβητήτως οὐκ ἀγαθόν.

Εἰ γάρ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ὦ χρηστέ, εἴ τις λῆρον ἀποκαλεῖ σου τούς λόγους καί πρός τήν παρ᾿ ἀνθρώπων δόξαν δεινῶς οὕτως ἔχεις ἀνεπιστρόφως, τίνος ἕνεκεν, ὡς αὐτός φῄς, ἐκβέβληκάς σου τῶν λόγων ἐκεῖνο, εἰ μή τήν χείρω καί αὐτός περί αὐτοῦ δόξαν εἴληφας; Τί δ᾿ εἰ καί "σκανδάλου", καθάπερ αὐτός εἶναι φῄς, "αἴτιον"; Ἆρα τοῦτο μικρόν; Οὐκ ἄρ᾿ ἐκβεβλῆσθαι δίκαιον μόνον, ἀλλά καί «εἰς κῦμα ριφῆναι πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης», μᾶλλον δ᾿ ἵν᾿ ὡς «μόλυβδος καταδύση» μωσαϊκῶς εἰπεῖν «ἐν ὕδατι σφοδρῷ», εὐμεγέθει λίθῳ προσδεθέν πρότερον, ἔπειτα δοθῆναι τοῖς κύμασιν. Ἀλλ᾿ ὦ τήν σοφίαν εἶπερ τις περιττέ σύ, εἰ τοῦθ᾿ ὁπωσδηποτοῦν ἀφῄρηκάς σου τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων, τίς σοι χρεία τῆς ὑπέρ αὐτοῦ τοσαύτης ἔπειτα μακρηγορίας, ἀφ᾿ ἧς σοι συμβέβηκεν οὐκ ἔξω μόνον σκοποῦ κατά τήν παροιμίαν τοξεύειν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀσκόπως παντάπασιν; Ἤρθη γάρ, ὡς τούς πολυστίχους σοι λόγους τελευτῶν ἐξεκάλυψας μετά τά σκώμματα τῶν σκανδαλιζομένων καί τήν σήν διαπεπονημένην σκέψιν, πρός ὅ τείνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ μέσου παντάπασιν, ὡς ἀπερισκέπτως ἄρα πρότερον, οὕτως ὁ ἀσκόπως λογογραφῶν ματαιολογήσει.

Σύ δ᾿ οὐκ εἰς μάταια, μικρόν γάρ ἤδη σοι τοῦτο, ἀλλά καί πρός τἀναντία