ARTICLE VII

In the Seventh Article We Ask: DOES ONE ANGEL KNOW ANOTHER?

Difficulties (First Series):

It seems not, for

1. As Dionysius says, even the angels themselves do not know their mutual relationships. Now, if one angel knew another, angels would know these. Consequently, one angel does not know another.

2. As is said in The Causes: "An intelligence knows what is above it in so far as that is its cause, and it knows what is below it in so far as that is its effect." But our faith does not teach that one angel is the cause of another. Consequently, one angel does not know another.

3. As Boethius says: "The universal is had in intellection, the singular in sensation." Now, since an angel is a person, he is, in a way, a singular. Consequently, it seems that one angel does not know another angel, because he knows merely through intellection.

Difficulties (Second Series):

1. It seems that an angel does not know another angel by means of the latter's essence, because that by which the intellect understands must be within the intellect. But the essence of one angel cannot come into the intellect of another; only God can be substantially present in the mind of an angel. Consequently, an angel cannot know another angel by means of the latter's essence.

2. It is possible for one angel to be known by all angels. Now, that by which a thing is known is joined to the one who knows. So if one angel were to know another angel by means of the latter's essence, then the angel known could be in many places, because the angels who could know him might be in many places.

3. The essence of an angel is a substance; his intellect, being a power, is an accident. Now, a substance is not the form of an accident. Consequently, the essence of one angel cannot be for the intellect of another angel the form by which he knows.

4. A thing cannot be known to the intellect by its presence if it is separated from it. But the essence of one angel is separated from the intellect of another. Consequently, one angel is not known by another through the presence of his essence.

Difficulties (Third Series):

1. It seems that one angel cannot know another by knowing through his own essence, because the lower angels lie below the higher, as sentient creatures also do. Consequently, if a higher angel could know other angels by knowing his own essence, he could also know all sentient things in the same way, and not, as is said in The Causes, by means of forms.

2. One thing leads to the knowledge of another only in so far as it resembles that other. But the essence of one angel is only in generic agreement with that of another angel. Consequently, if one angel were to know another merely by knowing his own essence, then he would know that other only generically, and this would be imperfect knowledge.

3. That through which a thing is known is an intelligible representation of it. Now, if one angel knew all others by means of his own essence, then his own essence would be an intelligible representation of what is proper to all angels. But this property seems to belong to the divine essence alone.

Difficulties (Fourth Series):

1. It seems that one angel does not know another by means of a likeness or species existing within himself, because, as Dionysius says, angels are lofty intelligible lights. Now, a light is not known by means of a species, but only by means of itself. Therefore, an angel cannot be known by means of a species.

2. Every creature is a shadow. This is evident from Origen's commentary on that verse in the Gospel of St. John (1:5): "And the darkness [shadows] did not comprehend it." Now, a likeness of a shadow must itself be a shadow; a shadow, however, is not a principle that manifests but one that conceals. Hence, since an angel is a creature and is therefore a shadow, he cannot be known by means of a likeness. If he is known, he must be known by means of a God-given light existing within him.

3. An angel is closer to God than the rational soul is. Now, according to Augustine, the soul knows all things and judges about all things, not by means of any arts which the soul may have brought with it to the body, but by means of the connection it has with the eternal intelligible representations. Much more so, then, will one angel know another, not indeed by means of a likeness, but by means of an eternal intelligible representation.

Difficulties (Fifth Series):

1. It seems that one angel cannot know another even through an innate likeness. For an innate likeness is similarly related to what is present and to what is absent. Consequently, were one angel to know another by means of an innate likeness, he would not know when that angel was present and when he was absent.

2. God could make another angel. But an angel would not have within him the form of an angel that does not yet exist. Consequently, if, by his natural cognition, an angel knows other angels only by means of innate forms, the angels that exist now would not know by natural cognition an angel that would come into existence later.

Difficulties (Sixth Series):

1. It seems that one angel cannot know another through forms impressed by immaterial beings, as the sense knows through forms received from sensible things, because, if this were true, then the lower angels would not be known by the higher, since higher angels do not receive any influence from the lower.

Difficulties (Seventh Series):

1. It seems that one angel cannot know another even through abstracted forms, such as the agent intellect abstracts from phantasms, because then the lower angels would not know the higher.

From all this it seems that one angel does not know another.

To the Contrary (First Series):

1'. In The Causes we read: "Every intelligence knows the things that do not undergo corruption and are not measured by time." Now, angels are incorruptible and outside of time. Consequently, one angel is known by another.

2'. Likeness is a cause of knowledge. But one angel has more in common with the intellect of another than material things have. Consequently, since angels know material things, it is even truer to say they know other angels.

3'. The essence of one angel is more proportionate to the intellect of another than the divine essence is. But, since angels see God through His essence, it is even truer to say that they can know the essences of other angels.

4'. As is said in The Intelligences: "Any substance that is immaterial and free from composition can know all things"; and this is proved in The Soul, where it is shown that the intellect is free from composition "and so can know all things." Now, to be free from matter and composition belongs especially to angels. Consequently, they know all things, and one knows another.

To the Contrary (Second Series):

1'. It seems that one angel can know another by means of the latter's essence. For Augustine says that angels show what they have seen "by one spirit mingling with another." But such a mingling is possible only if one spirit can be joined to another by means of his essence. Consequently, one angel can be joined to another by means of his essence, and thus, through his essence, be known by that other.

2'. Knowledge is an act. Now, contact is sufficient for action. Since there can be spiritual contact between one angel and another, one angel can know another by means of the latter's essence.

3'. The intellect of one angel has more in common with the essence of another angel than with the likeness of a material thing. But the intellect of an angel can be informed by the likeness of a material thing so that it knows it. Consequently, the essence of one angel can be the form whereby the intellect of another can know him.

4'. According to Augustine, intellectual vision is had of those things whose likenesses are the same as their essences. Now, one angel knows another only by means of intellectual vision. Consequently, he does not know that angel by means of a likeness other than that angel's essence. Hence, the same must be said as was said previously.

REPLY:

There can be no doubt that one angel knows another, because every angel is an actually intelligible substance, since he is entirely free from matter. Now, an angelic intellect does not receive from sensible things. Consequently, it understands these immaterial intelligible forms by directing itself immediately to them. If we consider what various writers have said, however, there seem to have been different opinions about the mode of angelic knowledge.

According to the Commentator, in substances separated from matter the form in the intellect does not differ from the form outside of it. Now, in the case of men the form of a house existing in the mind of an architect is other than the form of the house existing outside his mind; however, this is because the exterior form is in matter, while the form of the artistic conception is without matter. But, since angels are substances and immaterial forms, as Dionysius says, it seems to follow that the form by which one angel is known by another is the same as the essence by which the former substantially exists. This mode of knowledge, however, does not seem to be possible in all cases. For the form by which an intellect understands is more noble than that intellect, since it is its perfection. With this in mind, the Philosopher proves that God does not know anything outside Himself, since its form would perfect His intellect and consequently be more noble than God Himself. Therefore, if higher angels were to know lower angels by means of the essences of the latter, it would follow that these essences were more perfect and more noble than the intellects of the higher angels. This, however, is impossible.

One might say, perhaps, that such a way would present no difficulties as far as the knowledge of higher angels by the lower is concerned, that is, a lower angel could know a higher by means of the latter's essence; and this seems to be in agreement with Dionysius, who taught that angels seem to be divided into "intelligible and intellectual substances," the higher called intelligible, the lower, intellectual. For he also taught that the higher angels are "like food" to the lower, and this statement can be understood as meaning that the essences of the higher angels are forms by which the lower angels understand.

This opinion, too, might be supported by those philosophers who say that the higher intelligences create the lower; for thus they could assert that a higher angel is in some way intimately linked with the lower, being, as it were, the cause that keeps the lower in existence. We, however, can ascribe such action only to God, who is substantially present in the minds of men and of angels. Moreover, the form by which an intellect understands should be within an intellect that is in act. Consequently, we cannot say that any spiritual substance, except God, is seen by another by means of his essence.

That other philosophers did not think one angel could be seen by another by means of his essence is clear to anyone reading their works. For example, the Commentator says that that which the mover of Saturn understands about the mover of the first sphere is different from that which the mover of Jupiter understands about him. Now, this could be true only if that by which each of them understands [is different]. And this would not be possible if each of them knew the mover of the higher sphere by means of the latter's essence. Moreover, we read in The Causes that "a lower intelligence knows what is above it according to the manner of its own substance," not according to the manner of the higher substance; and Avicenna says that "the presence of the intelligences within us" means merely the effects they have caused within us, not that they are in the intellect through their own essence.

Now, the words of the Commentator, cited above, are to be taken in the following way. When a substance separated from matter knows itself, it is not necessary that the form in its intellect be other than the form by which it substantially subsists, since the form by which such a thing substantially subsists is actually intelligible because of its complete freedom from matter.

The words of Dionysius are likewise not to be taken in the sense assigned to them above. Rather, he calls the same angels intelligible and intellectual, or he calls the higher angels intelligible and the food of the lower because the lower angels understand by means of the light given by the higher.

From what others have written, however, it seems that one angel sees another by means of his essence, that is, by means of his own essence. This is what Augustine seems to have intended when he wrote: "As the mind collects notions of physical things through the physical senses, so also does it collect notions of spiritual things through itself." This seems to be true of an angelic mind, for, by knowing itself, it knows other angels. In support of this, one could cite The Causes where it is said: "An intelligence understands what is above and below itself by means of the mode of its own substance."

This explanation does not seem to be sufficient, however; for, since all knowledge takes place through assimilation, by knowing his own essence one angel would know only as much about another angel as his essence resembled the latter's. Now, one angel resembles another only according to their common nature. Hence, it would follow that the knowledge one angel would have about another would not be complete; and it would be very incomplete according to the opinion of those who hold that there are many angels in one species. This view, however, might be supported to some extent by those who hold that each angel is specifically different; for, by knowing his own essence, each angel would know perfectly what an intellectual nature is, and, having known this perfectly, he would know all the grades an intellectual nature could have. Now, the different species of angels are distinguished only according to grades of perfection found in intellectual natures; consequently, by seeing his own essence, one angel could conceive of the individual grades of perfection found in intellectual natures, and, by means of these conceptions, have complete knowledge of all other angels.

In this way, we could save the opinion of those who say that one angel knows another by means of a form he has acquired--if, indeed, the afore-mentioned conceptions could be called acquired forms. It would be as though whiteness understood itself, and, by knowing perfectly the nature of color, knew all species of color distinctly, according to their grades--even all individual colors, too, supposing that there were only one member to a species.

But this explanation does not seem sufficient either, because, even though there is only one angel in every species, nevertheless, in any particular angel there will be a difference between what belongs to him according to the intelligible constitution of his specific nature and what belongs to him as an individual, for example, his own particular operations. According to this theory, these special operations could in no way be known by another angel. Moreover, the words of Augustine do not mean that a mind can know other things through itself as through a medium, but merely as through a knowing power, as material things are known through the senses.

We must consequently take another explanation and say that one angel knows other angels by means of their likenesses existing within his intellect. These, however, are not abstracted or imprinted by the other angels, or acquired in any way, but are imprinted by God who creates them. Angels know material things also by means of these likenesses. This will become clearer in the following answers.

Answers to Difficulties (First Series):

1. Angels know their order one to another considered in itself, but they do not comprehend it as it stands under God's providence; for this would mean that they could comprehend providence itself.

2. The relation of cause and effect is a source of intelligibility only inasmuch as the effect bears some resemblance to its cause and vice versa. Consequently, if we admit the existence of an angel's likeness within another angel without admitting that one angel is the cause or effect of another, we will still have a sufficient basis for knowledge, since knowledge takes place through assimilation.

3. That statement of Boethius should be understood as referring to particular material things that fall under the senses. An angel, however, is not a particular of this type. Consequently, the argument proves nothing.

Answers to Difficulties (Second and Third Series):

We concede those arguments that prove one angel does not know another by means of either his own essence or that of the other angel. Still, one could make some kind of a reply to them.

Answers to Difficulties (Fourth Series):

We must reply, however, to those arguments that prove one angel does not know another by means of a likeness.

1. It is possible to have a likeness even of light. This can be weaker than light, like color, which in a certain sense is a similitude of light, or one more perfect than light, like the light in a substance that illumines. Moreover, since angels are called lights inasmuch as they are forms which are actually intelligible, it is not inconsistent to say that the likenesses they have of other angels exist in a more sublime manner in the higher angels and in a less sublime manner in the lower.

2. When one says that every creature, taken in itself, is a shadow or false or nothing, this is not because its essence is dark or false, but because whatever act of existence, light, or truth it has it has from another being. Consequently, only considered apart from what it has from another is it nothing, darkness, and falsity.

3. The soul is united with the eternal representations inasmuch as there are certain imprints of these on our mind, such as the principles we know naturally and by which we judge all things. In angels these imprints are the likenesses by which they know things.

Answers to Difficulties (Fifth Series):

1. An angel knows another angel, not by means of a likeness that has been abstracted or imprinted upon his mind, but by means of one that is innate and leads him to the knowledge of the other angel--indeed, to a knowledge not only of the other's essence but also of all his accidental qualities. By means of this likeness, therefore, he knows when the other angel is present or absent.

[No answers are given for the next three difficulties.]

Answers to Contrary Difficulties (First Series):

We concede the arguments proving that one angel knows another.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties (Second Series):

We must reply, however, to the arguments proving that one angel is known by another by means of the essence of the angel known.

1'. That knowledge Augustine speaks about should be understood as referring not to essences but to operations by which a higher spirit enlightens a lower.

2'. From what we have said previously, it is clear that the knower and the known are related not as active and passive but as two things from which arises one principle of knowing. Consequently, for knowledge it is not enough that contact take place between the knower and the known. It is necessary, rather, that the intelligible be united to the knower like a form, either by means of its own essence or by means of a likeness.

3'. Even though the essence of one angel has more in common with the intellect of another angel than with the likeness of a material thing, because they both participate in one nature, nevertheless, they do not have more in common in regard to that relationship which must exist between a perfection and what is to be perfected. Similarly, a soul has more in common with another soul than it has with a body; yet one soul is not the form of another soul, though it is the form of a body.

4'. This statement of Augustine can be explained in two ways. It can mean that Augustine is talking about that intellectual vision by which a created spirit sees himself or God or other things which are within him through their essences. For it is evident that, even though a stone is known by the soul, it is not present in the soul by its essence.

Or this statement can be taken as referring to the thing known, not to the form by which it is known. Now, exterior accidents, which are the object of sense and of imagination, are merely likenesses of a thing, not the thing itself. The object of the intellect, however, is "the quiddity of a thing," that is, its essence, as is said in The Soul. Consequently, the likeness of the thing in the intellect is a direct likeness of the thing's essence, but the likeness which is in a sense or in the imagination is merely that of its accidents.