§6. He then exposes argument about the “Generate,” and the “product of making,” and “product of creation,” and shows the impious nature of the language of Eunomius and Theognostus on the “immediate” and “undivided” character of the essence, and its “relation to its creator and maker.”

Let us listen, then, to what he says. “One might reasonably say that the most proper and primary essence, and that which alone exists by the operation of the Father, admits for itself the appellations of ‘product of generation,’ ‘product of making,’ and ‘product of creation.’” Who knows not that what separates the Church from heresy is this term, “product of creation,” applied to the Son? Accordingly, the doctrinal difference being universally acknowledged, what would be the reasonable course for a man to take who endeavours to show that his opinions are more true than ours? Clearly, to establish his own statement, by showing, by such proofs as he could, that we ought to consider that the Lord is created. Or omitting this, should he rather lay down a law for his readers that they should speak of matters of controversy as if they were acknowledged facts? For my own part, I think he should take the former course, and perhaps all who possess any share of intelligence demand this of their opponents, that they should, to begin with, establish upon some incontrovertible basis the first principle of their argument, and so proceed to press their theory by inferences. Now our writer leaves alone the task of establishing the view that we should think He is created, and goes on to the next steps, fitting on the inferential process of his argument to this unproved assumption, being just in the condition of those men whose minds are deep in foolish desires, with their thoughts wandering upon a kingdom, or upon some other object of pursuit. They do not think how any of the things on which they set their hearts could possibly be, but they arrange and order their good fortune for themselves at their pleasure, as if it were theirs already, straying with a kind of pleasure among non-existent things. So, too, our clever author somehow or other lulls his own renowned dialectic to sleep, and before giving a demonstration of the point at issue, he tells, as if to children, the tale of this deceitful and inconsequent folly of his own doctrine, setting it forth like a story told at a drinking-party. For he says that the essence which “exists by the operation of the Father” admits the appellation of “product of generation,” and of “product of making,” and of “product of creation.” What reasoning showed us that the Son exists by any constructive operation, and that the nature of the Father remains inoperative with regard to the Personal existence595    ὑπόστασιν of the Son? This was the very point at issue in the controversy, whether the essence of the Father begat the Son, or whether it made Him as one of the external things which accompany His nature596    At a later stage Gregory points out that the idea of creation is involved, if the thing produced is external to the nature of the Maker.. Now seeing that the Church, according to the Divine teaching, believes the Only-begotten to be verily God, and abhors the superstition of polytheism, and for this cause does not admit the difference of essences, in order that the Godheads may not, by divergence of essence, fall under the conception of number (for this is nothing else than to introduce polytheism into our life)—seeing, I say, that the Church teaches this in plain language, that the Only-begotten is essentially God, very God of the essence of the very God, how ought one who opposes her decisions to overthrow the preconceived opinion? Should he not do so by establishing the opposing statement, demonstrating the disputed point from some acknowledged principle? I think no sensible man would look for anything else than this. But our author starts from the disputed points, and takes, as though it were admitted, matter which is in controversy as a principle for the succeeding argument. If it had first been shown that the Son had His existence through some operation, what quarrel should we have with what follows, that he should say that the essence which exists through an operation admits for itself the name of “product of making”? But let the advocates of error tell us how the consequence has any force, so long as the antecedent remains unestablished. For supposing one were to grant by way of hypothesis that man is winged, there will be no question of concession about what comes next: for he who becomes winged will fly in some way or other, and lift himself up on high above the earth, soaring through the air on his wings. But we have to see how he whose nature is not aerial could become winged, and if this condition does not exist, it is vain to discuss the next point. Let our author, then, show this to begin with, that it is in vain that the Church has believed that the Only-begotten Son truly exists, not adopted by a Father falsely so called, but existing according to nature, by generation from Him Who is, not alienated from the essence of Him that begat Him. But so long as his primary proposition remains unproved, it is idle to dwell on those which are secondary. And let no one interrupt me, by saying that what we confess should also be confirmed by constructive reasoning: for it is enough for proof of our statement, that the tradition has come down to us from our fathers, handed on, like some inheritance, by succession from the apostles and the saints who came after them. They, on the other hand, who change their doctrines to this novelty, would need the support of arguments in abundance, if they were about to bring over to their views, not men light as dust, and unstable, but men of weight and steadiness: but so long as their statement is advanced without being established, and without being proved, who is so foolish and so brutish as to account the teaching of the evangelists and apostles, and of those who have successively shone like lights in the churches, of less force than this undemonstrated nonsense?

Let us further look at the most remarkable instance of our author’s cleverness; how, by the abundance of his dialectic skill, he ingeniously draws over to the contrary view the more simple sort. He throws in, as an addition to the title of “product of making,” and that of “product of creation,” the further phrase, “product of generation,” saying that the essence of the Son “admits these names for itself”; and thinks that, so long as he harangues as if he were in some gathering of topers, his knavery in dealing with doctrine will not be detected by any one. For in joining “product of generation” with “product of making,” and “product of creation,” he thinks that he stealthily makes away with the difference in significance between the names, by putting together what have nothing in common. These are his clever tricks of dialectic; but we mere laymen in argument597    This phrase seems to be quoted from Eunomius. The reference to the “prophet” may possibly be suggested by Is. vi. 9–10: but it is more probably only concerned with the words ὠτία and ἀκοὴν, as applied to convey the idea of mental alertness. do not deny that, so far as voice and tongue are concerned, we are what his speech sets forth about us, but we allow also that our ears, as the prophet says, are made ready for intelligent hearing. Accordingly, we are not moved, by the conjunction of names that have nothing in common, to make a confusion between the things they signify: but even if the great Apostle names together wood, hay, stubble, gold, silver, and precious stones598    Cf. 1 Cor. iii. 12., we reckon up summarily the number of things he mentions, and yet do not fail to recognize separately the nature of each of the substances named. So here, too, when “product of generation” and “product of making” are named together, we pass from the sounds to the sense, and do not behold the same meaning in each of the names; for “product of creation” means one thing, and “product of generation” another: so that even if he tries to mingle what will not blend, the intelligent hearer will listen with discrimination, and will point out that it is an impossibility for any one nature to “admit for itself” the appellation of “product of generation,” and that of “product of creation.” For, if one of these were true, the other would necessarily be false, so that, if the thing were a product of creation, it would not be a product of generation, and conversely, if it were called a product of generation, it would be alienated from the title of “product of creation.” Yet Eunomius tells us that the essence of the Son “admits for itself the appellations of ‘product of generation,’ ‘product of making,’ and ‘product of creation’”!

Does he, by what still remains, make at all more secure this headless and rootless statement of his, in which, in its earliest stage, nothing was laid down that had any force with regard to the point he is trying to establish? or does the rest also cling to the same folly, not deriving its strength from any support it gets from argument, but setting out its exposition of blasphemy with vague details like the recital of dreams? He says (and this he subjoins to what I have already quoted)—“Having its generation without intervention, and preserving indivisible its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator.” Well, if we were to leave alone the absence of intervention and of division, and look at the meaning of the words as it stands by itself, we shall find that everywhere his absurd teaching is cast upon the ears of those whom he deceives, without corroboration from a single argument. “Its Generator, and Maker, and Creator,” he says. These names, though they seem to be three, include the sense of but two concepts, since two of the words are equivalent in meaning. For to make is the same as to create, but generation is another thing distinct from those spoken of. Now, seeing that the result of the signification of the words is to divide the ordinary apprehension of men into different ideas, what argument demonstrates to us that making is the same thing with generation, to the end that we may accommodate the one essence to this difference of terms? For so long as the ordinary significance of the words holds, and no argument is found to transfer the sense of the terms to an opposite meaning, it is not possible that any one nature should be divided between the conception of “product of making,” and that of “product of generation.” Since each of these terms, used by itself, has a meaning of its own, we must also suppose the relative conjunction in which they stand to be appropriate and germane to the terms. For all other relative terms have their connection, not with what is foreign and heterogeneous, but, even if the correlative term be suppressed, we hear spontaneously, together with the primary word, that which is linked with it, as in the case of “maker,” “slave,” “friend,” “son,” and so forth. For all names that are considered as relative to another, present to us, by the mention of them, each its proper and closely connected relationship with that which it declares, while they avoid all mixture of that which is heterogeneous599    E.g.“A thing made” suggests to us the thought of a “maker,” “a maker” the thought of the thing made; and they suggest also a close connection as existing between the two correlative terms of one of which the name is uttered; but neither suggests in the same way any term which is not correlative, or with which it is not, in some manner, in pari materia.. For neither is the name of “maker” linked with the word “son,” nor the term “slave” referred to the term “maker,” nor does “friend” present to us a “slave,” nor “son” a “master,” but we recognize clearly and distinctly the connection of each of these with its correlative, conceiving by the word “friend” another friend; by “slave,” a master; by “maker,” work; by “son,” a father. In the same way, then, “product of generation” has its proper relative sense; with the “product of generation,” surely, is linked the generator, and with the “product of creation” the creator; and we must certainly, if we are not prepared by a substitution of names to introduce a confusion of things, preserve for each of the relative terms that which it properly connotes.

Now, seeing that the tendency of the meaning of these words is manifest, how comes it that one who advances his doctrine by the aid of logical system failed to perceive in these names their proper relative sense? But he thinks that he is linking on the “product of generation” to “maker,” and the “product of making” to “generator,” by saying that the essence of the Son “admits for itself the appellations of ‘product of generation,’ ‘product of making,’ and ‘product of creation,’” and “preserves indivisible its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator.” For it is contrary to nature, that a single thing should be split up into different relations. But the Son is properly related to the Father, and that which is begotten to him that begat it, while the “product of making” has its relation to its “maker”; save if one might consider some inexact use, in some undistinguishing way of common parlance, to overrule the strict signification.

By what reasoning then is it, and by what arguments, according to that invincible logic of his, that he wins back the opinion of the mass of men, and follows out at his pleasure this line of thought, that as the God Who is over all is conceived and spoken of both as “Creator” and as “Father,” the Son has a close connection with both titles, being equally called both “product of creation” and “product of generation”? For as customary accuracy of speech distinguishes between names of this kind, and applies the name of “generation” in the case of things generated from the essence itself, and understands that of “creation” of those things which are external to the nature of their maker, and as on this account the Divine doctrines, in handing down the knowledge of God, have delivered to us the names of “Father” and “Son,” not those of “Creator” and “work,” that there might arise no error tending to blasphemy (as might happen if an appellation of the latter kind repelled the Son to the position of an alien and a stranger), and that the impious doctrines which sever the Only-begotten from essential affinity with the Father might find no entrance—seeing all this, I say, he who declares that the appellation of “product of making” is one befitting the Son, will safely say by consequence that the name of “Son” is properly applicable to that which is the product of making; so that, if the Son is a “product of making,” the heaven is called “Son,” and the individual things that have been made are, according to our author, properly named by the appellation of “Son.” For if He has this name, not because He shares in nature with Him that begat Him, but is called Son for this reason, that He is created, the same argument will permit that a lamb, a dog, a frog, and all things that exist by the will of their maker, should be named by the title of “Son.” If, on the other hand, each of these is not a Son and is not called God, by reason of its being external to the nature of the Son, it follows, surely, that He Who is truly Son is Son, and is confessed to be God by reason of His being of the very nature of Him that begat Him. But Eunomius abhors the idea of generation, and excludes it from the Divine doctrine, slandering the term by his fleshly speculations. Well, our discourse, in what precedes, showed sufficiently on this point that, as the Psalmist says, “they are afraid where no fear is600    Cf. Ps. liii. 6.” For if it was shown in the case of men that not all generation exists by way of passion, but that that which is material is by passion, while that which is spiritual is pure and incorruptible, (for that which is begotten of the Spirit is spirit and not flesh, and in spirit we see no condition that is subject to passion,) since our author thought it necessary to estimate the Divine power by means of examples among ourselves, let him persuade himself to conceive from the other mode of generation the passionless character of the Divine generation. Moreover, by mixing up together these three names, of which two are equivalent, he thinks that his readers, by reason of the community of sense in the two phrases, will jump to the conclusion that the third is equivalent also. For since the appellation of “product of making,” and “product of creation,” indicate that the thing made is external to the nature of the maker, he couples with these the phrase, “product of generation,” that this too may be interpreted along with those above mentioned. But argument of this sort is termed fraud and falsehood and imposition, not a thoughtful and skilful demonstration. For that only is called demonstration which shows what is unknown from what is acknowledged; but to reason fraudulently and fallaciously, to conceal your own reproach, and to confound by superficial deceits the understanding of men, as the Apostle says, “of corrupt minds601    2 Tim. iii. 8.,” this no sane man would call a skilful demonstration.

Let us proceed, however, to what follows in order. He says that the generation of the essence is “without intervention,” and that it “preserves indivisible its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator.” Well, if he had spoken of the immediate and indivisible character of the essence, and stopped his discourse there, it would not have swerved from the orthodox view, since we too confess the close connection and relation of the Son with the Father, so that there is nothing inserted between them which is found to intervene in the connection of the Son with the Father, no conception of interval, not even that minute and indivisible one, which, when time is divided into past, present, and future, is conceived indivisibly by itself as the present, as it cannot be considered as a part either of the past or of the future, by reason of its being quite without dimensions and incapable of division, and unobservable, to whichever side it might be added. That, then, which is perfectly immediate, admits we say, of no such intervention; for that which is separated by any interval would cease to be immediate. If, therefore, our author, likewise, in saying that the generation of the Son is “without intervention,” excluded all these ideas, then he laid down the orthodox doctrine of the conjunction of Him Who is with the Father. When, however, as though in a fit of repentance, he straightway proceeded to add to what he had said that the essence “preserves its relation to its Generator, Maker, and Creator,” he polluted his first statement by his second, vomiting forth his blasphemous utterance upon the pure doctrine. For it is clear that there too his “without intervention” has no orthodox intention, but, as one might say that the hammer is mediate between the smith and the nail, but its own making is “without intervention,” because, when tools had not yet been found out by the craft, the hammer came first from the craftsman’s hands by some inventive process, not602    It seems necessary for the sense to read οὐ δι᾽ ἑτέρου τινὸς ὀργάνου, since the force of the comparison consists in the hammer being produced immediately by the smith: otherwise we must understand δι᾽ ἑτέρου τινὸς ὀργάνου to refer to the employment of some tool not properly belonging to the τέχνη of the smith: but even so the parallel would be destroyed. by means of any other tool, and so by it the others were made; so the phrase, “without intervention,” indicates that this is also our author’s conception touching the Only-begotten. And here Eunomius is not alone in his error as regards the enormity of his doctrine, but you may find a parallel also in the works of Theognostus603    Theognostus, a writer of the third century, is said to have been the head of the Catechetical School at Alexandria, and is quoted by S. Athanasius as an authority against the Arians. An account of his work is to be found in Photius, and this is extracted and printed with the few remaining fragments of his actual writings in the 3rd volume of Routh’s Reliquiæ Sacræ., who says that God, wishing to make this universe, first brought the Son into existence as a sort of standard of the creation; not perceiving that in his statement there is involved this absurdity, that what exists, not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else, is surely of less value than that for the sake of which it exists: as we provide an implement of husbandry for the sake of life, yet the plough is surely not reckoned as equally valuable with life. So, if the Lord also exists on account of the world, and not all things on account of Him, the whole of the things for the sake of which they say He exists, would be more valuable than the Lord. And this is what they are here establishing by their argument, where they insist that the Son has His relation to His Creator and Maker “without intervention.”

ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν λέξιν ἀκολουθήσωμεν, ὡς ἂν φανερὸν γένοιτο πᾶσιν ὅτι πλὴν τοῦ βούλεσθαι κακουργεῖν οὐδεμίαν ἰσχὺν πρὸς τὴν κακίαν ὁ παρ' αὐτῶν λόγος ἔχει.
Ἀκούσωμεν τοίνυν τῶν εἰρημένων: « εἰκότως φαίη τις ἂν τὴν κυριωτάτην καὶ πρώτην καὶ μόνην ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστᾶσαν οὐσίαν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας ». τίς οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι τὸ χωρίζον ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἡ τοῦ κτίσματός ἐστι φωνὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ λεγομένη; οὐκοῦν ὁμολογουμένης παρὰ πᾶσι τῆς κατὰ τὸ δόγμα διαφορᾶς, τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα δεικνύειν τῶν ἡμετέρων τὰς ἰδίας ὑπολήψεις ἀληθεστέρας τί πράττειν εὐλογώτερον ἦν, κατασκευάζειν δηλονότι τὸν ἴδιον λόγον, δι' ὧν οἷόν τε ἦν, ἀποδεικνύντα κτιστὸν τὸν κύριον εἶναι δεῖν οἴεσθαι, ἢ τοῦτον παρέντα νομοθετεῖν τοῖς ἀκούουσιν ὡς ὁμολογούμενα τὰ ἀμφιβαλλόμενα λέγειν; ἐγὼ μὲν ἐκεῖνό φημι: τάχα δὲ καὶ πάντες, οἷς μέτεστι διανοίας, τοῦτο παρὰ τῶν ἀντιλεγόντων ἐπιζητήσουσι, τὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ λόγου πρῶτον ἐπί τινος ἀναντιρρήτου βάσεως στήσαντας οὕτω τοῖς ἀκολούθοις ἐναγωνίζεσθαι. οὑτοσὶ τοίνυν ἀφεὶς τὴν περὶ τοῦ χρῆναι κτιστὸν αὐτὸν οἴεσθαι κατασκευὴν τὰ ἐφεξῆς διεξέρχεται, τῷ ἀνυποστάτῳ λήμματι τὴν τῶν λογισμῶν ἀκολουθίαν ἁρμόζων, οἷόν τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ταῖς ματαίαις ἐπιθυμίαις κατὰ ψυχὴν ἐμβαθύνοντες, ἢ πρὸς βασιλείαν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν σπουδαζομένων ταῖς ἐννοίαις διαχεόμενοι: οὐχ ὅπως ἂν γένοιτό τι τῶν σπουδαζομένων αὐτοῖς ἐπινοοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ὡς τούτου παρόντος διατιθέασιν ἑαυτοῖς καὶ οἰκονομοῦσι πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν τὸ εὐτύχημα, διά τινος ἡδονῆς τοῖς ἀνυπάρκτοις ἐπιπλανώμενοι. οὕτως ἡμῖν καὶ ὁ σοφὸς λογογράφος τὴν πολυθρύλητον ἑαυτοῦ διαλεκτικὴν οὐκ οἶδα ὅπου κατακοιμίσας, πρὶν ἀποδεῖξαι περὶ τοῦ ζητουμένου, καθάπερ τισὶ παιδίοις διαμυθολογεῖται τὴν ἀπατηλὴν ταύτην καὶ ἀκατάσκευον τοῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸν δόγματος φλυαρίαν οἷον διήγημά τι παροίνιον ἐκτιθέμενος.
Λέγει γὰρ « τὴν ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστᾶσαν οὐσίαν δέχεσθαι τὴν τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίαν ». τίς ἀπέδειξε λόγος ἐνεργείᾳ τινὶ κατασκευαστικῇ τὸν υἱὸν ὑποστῆναι, τὴν δὲ φύσιν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀνενέργητον ὡς πρὸς τὴν ὑπόστασιν τοῦ υἱοῦ μεῖναι; τὸ γὰρ ἀμφιβαλλόμενόν τε καὶ ζητούμενον τοῦτο ἦν, εἴτε ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πατρὸς ἐγέννησε τὸν υἱὸν εἴτε τι τῶν ἔξωθεν παρεπομένων τῇ φύσει τοῦτον εἰργάσατο. τῆς τοίνυν ἐκκλησίας κατὰ τὴν θείαν διδασκαλίαν ἀληθῶς θεὸν εἶναι τὸν μονογενῆ πιστευούσης, τὴν δὲ « τῆς » πολυθεΐας δεισιδαιμονίαν βδελυσσομένης καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τῶν φύσεων διαφορὰν οὐ προσδεχομένης, ὡς ἂν μὴ τῇ παραλλαγῇ τῶν οὐσιῶν ὑπὸ ἀριθμὸν αἱ θεότητες πίπτοιεν, ὅπερ οὐδέν ἐστιν ἕτερον ἢ τὴν πολυθεΐαν πάλιν ἐπεισάγειν τῷ βίῳ, ταῦτα τοίνυν τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἰδιωτικῶς διδασκούσης, ὅτι ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ θεοῦ ἀληθινὸς θεὸς κατ' οὐσίαν ὁ μονογενής ἐστι θεός, τὸν ἀντιβαίνοντα τοῖς ἐγνωσμένοις πῶς ἀνατρέπειν ἔδει τὴν προειλημμένην ὑπόληψιν; οὐχὶ τῷ κατασκευάζειν τὸν ἀντικείμενον λόγον, διά τινος ὁμολογουμένης ἀρχῆς συναποδεικνύοντα τὸ ἀμφίβολον; οὐκ ἂν οἶμαί τινα τῶν νοῦν ἐχόντων ἕτερόν τι παρὰ ταῦτα ζητῆσαι. ἀλλ' οὗτος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων ἄρχεται καὶ ὡς ἀποδεδειγμένον τὸ ἀμφιβαλλόμενον ἀρχὴν τῷ ἐφεξῆς δίδωσι λόγῳ. ἀποδειχθέντος γὰρ πρότερον ὅτι διά τινος ἐνεργείας ὁ υἱὸς ὑπέστη, τίς ἂν ἦν μάχη πρὸς τὸ ἑπόμενον, τὸ εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὴν τοῦ ποιήματος προσηγορίαν λέγειν τὴν δι' ἐνεργείας τινὸς ὑποστᾶσαν οὐσίαν; ἕως δ' ἂν ἀκατάσκευον ᾖ τὸ προηγούμενον, πῶς ἰσχὺν ἔχει τὸ ἐφεπόμενον, εἰπάτωσαν οἱ τῆς ἀπάτης συνήγοροι. καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις πτηνὸν γενέσθαι καθ' ὑπόθεσιν δοίη τὸν ἄνθρωπον, περὶ τῶν ἐφεξῆς οὐκέτι μαχήσεται. καὶ πτήσεται γάρ πως ὁ πτηνὸς γενόμενος καὶ ἄνω τῆς γῆς ἑαυτὸν ἀνάξει, μετάρσιος ἐπὶ πτερύγων δι' ἀέρος φερόμενος. ἀλλὰ σκεπτέον πῶς ἂν γένοιτο πτηνὸς ὁ τὴν φύσιν οὐ λαχὼν ἐναέριον, τούτου δὲ μὴ ὄντος, μάταιον τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διεξιέναι. κἀκεῖνος τοίνυν τουτὶ πρῶτον ἐπιδειξάτω, τὸ μάτην πεπιστευκέναι τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἀληθῶς εἶναι τὸν μονογενῆ υἱόν, οὐ κατὰ θέσιν εἰσποιηθέντα ψευδωνύμῳ πατρί, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν γεννητῶς ἐκ τοῦ ὄντος ὄντα, μὴ ἀπεξενωμένον τῆς τοῦ γεννήσαντος φύσεως. ταῦτα πρῶτον ὡς ψευδῆ διελεγξάτω, καὶ τότε περὶ τῶν ἀκολούθων διεξιὼν πιθανὸς ἔσται. ἕως δ' ἂν τὸ πρῶτον ἀναπόδεικτον ᾖ, φλυαρίας ἐστὶν ἐμφιλοχωρεῖν τοῖς δευτέροις. καί μοι μηδεὶς ὑποκρουέτω καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν διομολογούμενον διὰ κατασκευῆς κυρωθῆναι: ἀρκεῖ γὰρ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ἡμετέρου λόγου τὸ πατρόθεν ἥκειν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὴν παράδοσιν, οἷόν τινα κλῆρον δι' ἀκολουθίας ἐκ τῶν ἀποστόλων διὰ τῶν ἐφεξῆς ἁγίων παραπεμφθέντα. οἱ δὲ πρὸς τὴν καινότητα ταύτην μετατιθέντες τὰ δόγματα πολλῆς ἂν δέοιντο τῆς ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμαχίας, εἰ μέλλοιεν μὴ τοὺς κονιορτώδεις τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ εὐριπίστους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐμβριθεῖς τε καὶ βεβηκότας ταῖς διανοίαις προσάγεσθαι: ἕως δ' ἂν ἀκατάσκευος αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναπόδεικτος ὁ λόγος προφέρηται, τίς οὕτως ἠλίθιος καὶ κτηνώδης, ὡς τῶν εὐαγγελιστῶν τε καὶ ἀποστόλων καὶ τῶν καθεξῆς ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις διαλαμψάντων ἀσθενεστέραν τὴν διδασκαλίαν τῆς ἀναποδείκτου φλυαρίας ποιήσασθαι;
Ἴδωμεν δὲ καὶ τὸ δυσφωρατότατον τῆς ἀγχινοίας τοῦ λογογράφου, ὅπως τῇ περιουσίᾳ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐμπειρίας πρὸς τοὐναντίον εὐμηχάνως τοὺς ἀκεραιοτέρους ἐφέλκεται. προσέρριψε τῇ τοῦ « ποιήματος » καὶ « κτίσματος » προσηγορίᾳ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ « γεννήματος », εἰπὼν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὰ ὀνόματα ταῦτα τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν μεθυόντων συνεδρίῳ δημηγορῶν οἴεται μηδενὶ κατάφωρον ἑαυτοῦ τὴν περὶ τὸ δόγμα κακουργίαν γενήσεσθαι. τῷ γὰρ συνάψαι τὸ γέννημα τῷ κτίσματί τε καὶ τῷ ποιήματι ἐκκλέπτειν ἡγεῖται τὴν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον τῶν ὀνομάτων διαφορὰν διὰ τῆς τῶν ἀκοινωνήτων συντάξεως. ταῦτα τὰ σοφὰ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς μηχανήματα. ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς οἱ ἰδιῶται τῷ λόγῳ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τοῦτο κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν καὶ τὴν γλῶσσαν, ὅπερ ὁ λόγος περὶ ἡμῶν δείκνυσιν, οὐκ ἀρνούμεθα, ὠτία δέ, καθώς φησιν ὁ προφήτης, κατηρτίσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν πρὸς ἀκοὴν εὐσύνετον ὁμολογοῦμεν. διόπερ οὐδὲν διὰ τῆς συναφείας τῶν ἀκοινωνήτων ὀνομάτων εἰς τὴν τῶν σημαινομένων σύγχυσιν ὑπαγόμεθα: ἀλλὰ κἂν ὁ μέγας ἀπόστολος κατὰ ταὐτὸν ὀνομάσῃ ξύλα καὶ χόρτον καὶ καλάμην χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον καὶ λίθους τιμίους, καὶ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν μνημονευθέντων ἐπὶ κεφαλαίου συλλογιζόμεθα, καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἑκάστου τῶν κατωνομασμένων ἰδιαζόντως οὐκ ἀγνοήσομεν. οὕτω καὶ νῦν « γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος » κατὰ ταὐτὸν μνημονευθέντων, ἐκ τῶν φωνῶν ἐπὶ τὰ σημαινόμενα μεταβάντες οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐνθεωροῦμεν διάνοιαν: ἄλλο γάρ τι τὸ κτίσμα καὶ ἕτερον σημαίνει τὸ γέννημα, ὥστε κἂν ἐκεῖνος μιγνύῃ τὰ ἄμικτα, ὁ συνετὸς ἀκροατὴς διακεκριμένως ἀκούσεται καὶ δείξει τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἶναι τὴν τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ τὴν τοῦ κτίσματος προσηγορίαν μίαν τινὰ φύσιν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον ἀληθεύοιτο τούτων, ψεῦδος ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔσται τὸ ἕτερον, ὥστε εἰ κτίσμα εἴη, μὴ εἶναι γέννημα, καὶ τὸ ἔμπαλιν, εἰ γέννημα λέγοιτο, ἀλλοτριοῦσθαι τῆς ἐπωνυμίας τοῦ κτίσματος.
Ἀλλά φησιν ὁ Εὐνόμιος « εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας ». μή τι διὰ τῶν ὑπολοίπων κατησφαλίσατο τὸν ἀκέφαλον τοῦτον καὶ ἄρριζον λόγον (ὡς οὐδεμία διὰ τῶν πρώτων κατεβλήθη πρὸς τὸ κατασκευαζόμενον δύναμις) ἢ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἔχεται ματαιότητος, οὐκ ἀπό τινος τῆς ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν συμμαχίας τὴν ἰσχὺν προσλαβόντα, ἀλλὰ διεξοδικήν τε καὶ ἀκατάσκευον ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν ὀνείρων διηγήσεως τὴν τῆς βλασφημίας ἔκθεσιν ἔχοντα; λέγει γὰρ τοῖς εἰρημένοις ἐπισυνάψας ταῦτα ὅτι « ἀμεσίτευτον μὲν ἔχουσαν τὴν γέννησιν, ἀμερίστως δὲ σῴζουσαν τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα καὶ πεποιηκότα καὶ κτίσαντα σχέσιν ». εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἀμεσίτευτόν τε καὶ ἀμέριστον καταλιπόντες αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς θεωρήσαιμεν τὴν τῶν ῥημάτων διάνοιαν, εὑρήσομεν ὅτι πανταχοῦ τὸ ληρῶδες τῆς διδασκαλίας δι' οὐδενὸς ἰσχυροποιούμενον λόγου ταῖς ἀκοαῖς τῶν ἀπατωμένων προσρίπτεται. « τὸν γεγεννηκότα », φησί, « καὶ κτίσαντα καὶ ποιήσαντα ». ταῦτα κἂν τρία δοκῇ, δύο νοημάτων περιέχει τὴν σημασίαν, τῷ τὰς δύο φωνὰς ἰσοδυναμεῖν ἀλλήλαις κατὰ τὴν ἔννοιαν. τὸ γὰρ ποιῆσαι τῷ κτίσαι ταὐτόν ἐστιν, ἕτερον δὲ παρὰ τὰ εἰρημένα ἡ γέννησις. τῆς οὖν κοινῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπολήψεως πρὸς διαφόρους ἐννοίας ἐκ τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων σημασίας μεριζομένης, τίς ἡμῖν ἐπέδειξε λόγος ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῇ γεννήσει τὸ ποίημα, ἵνα τὴν μίαν οὐσίαν τῇ τῶν ῥημάτων διαφορᾷ προσαρμόσωμεν; ἕως γὰρ ἂν ἡ συνήθης κρατῇ σημασία τῶν λέξεων καὶ μηδεὶς εὑρίσκηται λόγος ὁ μετασκευάζων εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τὰς τῶν ῥημάτων ἐμφάσεις, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μίαν τινὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ποιήματος καὶ γεννήματος ἔννοιαν διασχισθῆναι. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ λεγόμενον τούτων ἑκάτερον ἰδιάζουσαν ἔχει τὴν ἑρμηνείαν, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα οἰκείαν τε καὶ συγγενῆ τοῖς ὀνόμασι συνεπινοεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν σχετικὴν συζυγίαν. καὶ γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων οὐ πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριόν τε καὶ ἀκατάλληλον ἔχει τὴν οἰκειότητα, ἀλλὰ κἂν σιωπηθῇ πρὸς ὃ λέγεται, αὐτομάτως μετὰ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου καὶ τὸ συνεζευγμένον ἀκούεται: οἷον δημιουργὸς δοῦλος φίλος υἱὸς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τῇ πρὸς ἕτερον ἀναφορᾷ θεωρεῖται, τὴν οἰκείαν ἕκαστον καὶ συνημμένην τοῦ δηλουμένου συγγένειαν διὰ τῆς προσηγορίας παρίστησιν, ἄμικτον ἔχοντα τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἑτερογενὲς κοινωνίαν. οὔτε γὰρ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τὸ ὄνομα τῷ υἱῷ συνέζευκται οὔτε ἡ τοῦ δούλου φωνὴ πρὸς τὸν δημιουργὸν ἀναφέρεται οὔτε ὁ φίλος τὸν δοῦλον ἐδήλωσεν οὔτε ὁ υἱὸς τὸν δεσπότην, ἀλλὰ φανερὰν καὶ διακεκριμένην τούτων ἑκάστου τὴν πρὸς τὸ κατάλληλον συζυγίαν ἐπιγινώσκομεν, νοοῦντες διὰ μὲν τοῦ φίλου ἕτερον φίλον, διὰ δὲ τοῦ δούλου τὸν κύριον, τὸ δὲ ἔργον διὰ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸν πατέρα. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὸ γέννημα καὶ τὸ ποίημα πρός τι τὴν κυρίαν ἔμφασιν ἔχει. οὐκοῦν συνέζευκται τῷ μὲν γεννήματι ὁ γεννήσας, ὁ δὲ κτίσας τῷ κτίσματι, καὶ δεῖ πάντως, εἴγε μὴ μέλλομεν σύγχυσίν τινα τῶν πραγμάτων διὰ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπαλλαγῆς ἐμποιεῖν, σῴζειν ἑκάστῳ τῶν πρός τι λεγομένων τὸ οἰκείως συσσημαινόμενον.
Φανερᾶς οὖν οὔσης τῆς τῶν λέξεων τούτων ἐννοίας πρὸς ὅ τι βλέπει, πῶς ὁ διὰ τῆς λογικῆς τεχνολογίας προάγων τὰ δόγματα τὴν οἰκείαν τῶν πρός τι διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων τούτων οὐ κατενόησεν, ἀλλ' ἁρμόζειν « δεῖν » οἴεται τῷ πεποιηκότι τὸ γέννημα καὶ τῷ γεγεννηκότι τὸ ποίημα, λέγων « τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν εἰς ἑαυτὴν δέχεσθαι τὰς τοῦ γεννήματος καὶ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορίας, ἀμέριστον δὲ σῴζειν τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα καὶ ποιήσαντα καὶ κτίσαντα σχέσιν »; τὸ γὰρ ἓν πρᾶγμα πρὸς διαφόρους σχέσεις καταμερισθῆναι φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν υἱὸς τῷ πατρὶ προσῳκείωται καὶ τὸ γεννηθὲν τῷ γεννήσαντι, τὸ δὲ ποίημα πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα τὴν ἀναφορὰν ἔχει: πλὴν εἰ μή τινα κατάχρησιν ἐν ἀδιαφόρῳ τινὶ συνηθείᾳ ῥημάτων κυριωτέραν ἡγοῖτό τις εἶναι τῆς προσφυοῦς σημασίας.
Τίσιν οὖν λογισμοῖς καὶ ποίαις κατασκευαῖς κατὰ τὴν ἄμαχον διαλεκτικὴν ἐκείνην εἰς τοὐναντίον τὰς δόξας τῶν πολλῶν μεταστήσας ταῦτα κατ' ἐξουσίαν διέξεισιν, ὅτι τοῦ ἐπὶ πάντων θεοῦ καὶ κτίστου καὶ πατρὸς νοουμένου τε καὶ λεγομένου ὁ υἱὸς πρὸς ἀμφοτέρας τὰς προσηγορίας ἐπιτηδείως ἔχει, καὶ κτίσμα καὶ γέννημα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον λεγόμενος; τῆς γὰρ τοῦ λόγου συνηθείας τε καὶ ἀκριβείας οἰκείως διακρινούσης τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ τὸ μὲν τῆς γεννήσεως ὄνομα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας γεννωμένων λεγούσης, τὸ δὲ τῆς κτίσεως ἐπὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν τῆς τοῦ κατασκευάζοντος φύσεως συνισταμένων, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῶν θείων δογμάτων ἐν τῇ παραδόσει τῆς θεογνωσίας πατέρα καὶ υἱὸν παραδεδωκότων, οὐ κτίστην καὶ ἔργον, ὡς ἂν μή τις γένοιτο παραφθορὰ πρὸς τὸ βλάσφημον, εἰς τὸ ἀλλότριόν τε καὶ ξένον τῆς τοιαύτης προσηγορίας τὸν υἱὸν ἀπωθούσης, μηδέ τινα πάροδον λάβοι τὰ ἄθεα δόγματα τὰ τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν οἰκειότητος τὸν μονογενῆ τοῦ πατρὸς ἀφορίζοντα, ὁ λέγων τῷ υἱῷ τὴν τοῦ ποιήματος ἁρμόζειν προσηγορίαν ἐρεῖ πάντως κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ποιήματος τὴν τοῦ υἱοῦ κλῆσιν προσφυῶς ἔχειν, ὥστε, εἰ ὁ υἱὸς κτίσμα καὶ ὁ οὐρανὸς υἱὸς καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν γεγονότων κυρίως κατὰ τὸν λογογράφον τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίᾳ κατονομάζεται. εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος οὐχὶ τῷ κοινωνεῖν τῷ γεγεννηκότι τῆς φύσεως ἔχει τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ καθὸ κτιστός ἐστι, κατὰ τοῦτο υἱὸς ὀνομάζεται, ὁ αὐτὸς δώσει λόγος καὶ ἀμνὸν καὶ κύνα καὶ βάτραχον καὶ πάντα, ὅσα θελήματι τοῦ πεποιηκότος ὑπέστη, τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ προσηγορίᾳ κατονομάζεσθαι. εἰ δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον διὰ τὸ ἔξω τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ φύσεως εἶναι υἱὸς οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ θεὸς λέγεται, κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον πάντως ὁ κυρίως υἱὸς διὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῆς εἶναι τοῦ γεγεννηκότος τῆς φύσεως υἱός ἐστι καὶ θεὸς εἶναι ὁμολογεῖται. ἀλλὰ μυσάττεται τὴν τῆς γεννήσεως ἔννοιαν καὶ ἀφορίζει τῶν θείων δογμάτων τῇ σαρκώδει φυσιολογίᾳ διαβάλλων τὸ ὄνομα. ἀλλ' ἱκανῶς ὑπὲρ τούτων ἐν τοῖς φθάσασιν ὁ λόγος ἀπέδειξεν ὅτι κατὰ τὸν προφήτην φοβοῦνται φόβον ὅπου οὐκ ἔστι φόβος. εἰ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐ πᾶσα γέννησις ἐδείχθη κατὰ πάθος συνισταμένη, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ὑλικὴ διὰ πάθους, ἡ δὲ πνευματικὴ καθαρὰ καὶ ἀκήρατος (τὸ γὰρ γεγεννημένον ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος πνεῦμα καὶ οὐχὶ σὰρξ γίνεται, τῷ δὲ πνεύματι οὐδεμία παθητικὴ συνθεωρεῖται διάθεσις), ἐπειδὴ διὰ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς ὑποδειγμάτων ἀναγκαῖον ἐφάνη τῷ λογογράφῳ τὴν θείαν ἐπιλογίζεσθαι δύναμιν, πεισάτω ἑαυτὸν ἐκ τοῦ ἑτέρου τῆς γεννήσεως τρόπου τὸ περὶ τὴν θείαν γέννησιν ἀπαθὲς ἐννοεῖν. ἀλλὰ τὰς τρεῖς ταύτας μετ' ἀλλήλων προσηγορίας συγχέας, ἐξ ὧν ἰσοδυναμοῦσιν αἱ δύο, συναρπάζειν οἴεται τοὺς ἀκούοντας διὰ τῆς τῶν δύο φωνῶν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον κοινωνίας τὸ καὶ τὴν τρίτην ὡσαύτως οἴεσθαι. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ποιήματος καὶ κτίσματος προσηγορία ἔξω τῆς τοῦ πεποιηκότος φύσεως εἶναι τὸ πεποιημένον ἐνδείκνυται, προσάπτει τούτοις τὴν φωνὴν τοῦ γεννήματος, ὡς ἂν καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς προειρημένοις συνερμηνεύοιτο. ἀλλὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος τοῦ λόγου κακουργία καὶ ἀπάτη καὶ φενακισμὸς ὀνομάζεται, οὐ πεφροντισμένη καὶ τεχνική τις ἀπόδειξις. μόνη γὰρ ἡ διὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων φανεροῦσα τὸ ἀγνοούμενον ἀπόδειξις λέγεται, τὸ δὲ παραλογίζεσθαι διὰ κακουργίας καὶ ὑπεκκλέπτειν τὸν ἔλεγχον καὶ συγχεῖν ἐν ταῖς ἐπιπολαίοις ἀπάταις τὴν διάνοιαν τῶν, καθώς φησιν ὁ ἀπόστολος, κατεφθαρμένων τὸν νοῦν οὐκ ἄν τις τῶν σωφρονούντων ἀπόδειξιν τεχνικὴν ὀνομάσειεν.
Ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀκολουθίαν μετέλθωμεν. « ἀμεσίτευτον » δέ φησιν εἶναι « τῆς οὐσίας τὴν γέννησιν καὶ ἀμερίστως σῴζειν τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα καὶ ποιήσαντα καὶ κτίσαντα σχέσιν ». εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀμέριστόν τε καὶ ἀμεσίτευτον εἰπὼν τῆς οὐσίας ἐν τούτῳ τὸν λόγον ἔστησεν, οὐκ ἂν τῆς εὐσεβοῦς ὑπολήψεως παρετράπη, ἐπεὶ καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν ὁμολογεῖται τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα συναφές τε καὶ ἀμεσίτευτον, ὡς μηδὲν εἶναι τὸ διὰ μέσου τούτων παρενειρόμενον, ὃ μεταξὺ τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα συναφείας εὑρίσκεται, μὴ διαστηματικόν τι νόημα, μὴ αὐτὸ τὸ ἀκαρές τε καὶ ἄτομον, ὃ διχῇ τεμνομένου τοῦ χρόνου τῷ παρῳχηκότι τε καὶ τῷ μέλλοντι κατὰ τὸ ἐνεστὼς ἀμερῶς ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ νοεῖται, οὔτε τοῦ παρῳχηκότος οὔτε τοῦ μέλλοντος μέρος γενέσθαι δυνάμενον διὰ τὸ εἶναι καθόλου ἀδιάστατόν τε καὶ ἄτομον καὶ ᾧπερ ἂν προστεθῇ ἀνεπίδηλον. τὸ οὖν καθαρῶς ἄμεσον οὐδενὶ τοιούτῳ μεσιτεύεσθαι λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ἄμεσον εἴη τὸ μέσῳ τινὶ διειργόμενον: εἰ τοίνυν κἀκεῖνος ἀμεσίτευτον εἶναι εἰπὼν τοῦ υἱοῦ τὴν γέννησιν μηδὲν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπήνεγκε, τὴν εὐσεβῶς νοουμένην τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα συνάφειαν ἐδογμάτιζεν. ἐπειδὴ δὲ καθάπερ μεταμεληθεὶς ἐφ' οἷς εἴρηκεν εὐθὺς ἐπήγαγεν ὅτι « σῴζει τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεγεννηκότα καὶ πεποιηκότα καὶ κτίσαντα σχέσιν », ἐμόλυνε τοῖς δευτέροις τὰ πρότερα, τῷ καθαρῷ λόγῳ τὴν βλάσφημον φωνὴν ἐπεμέσας. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι κἀκεῖ τὸ ἀμεσίτευτον οὐ πρὸς τὸ εὐσεβὲς βλέπει, ἀλλ' ὡς ἄν τις λέγοι μεταξὺ τοῦ ἥλου καὶ τοῦ χαλκέως μεσιτεύειν τὴν σφύραν, ταύτης δὲ εἶναι τὴν κατασκευὴν ἀμεσίτευτον, οὔπω γὰρ τῶν ὀργάνων ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης ἐξευρημένων, ἐπινοίᾳ τινὶ τὴν σφύραν, « οὐ » δι' ἑτέρου τινὸς ὀργάνου, παρὰ τοῦ τεχνίτου πρώτην γενέσθαι καὶ οὕτω διὰ ταύτης τὰ ἄλλα, ταῦτα καὶ περὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς νοεῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀμεσιτεύτου λέξις τὸν λογογράφον ἐνδείκνυται. καὶ οὐ μόνος ἐν τούτῳ πεπλάνηται κατὰ τὴν ἀτοπίαν τοῦ δόγματος ὁ Εὐνόμιος, ἀλλ' ἔστι καὶ ἐν τοῖς Θεογνώστῳ πεπονημένοις τὸ ἴσον εὑρεῖν, ὅς φησι τὸν θεὸν βουλόμενον τόδε τὸ πᾶν κατασκευάσαι πρῶτον τὸν υἱὸν οἷόν τινα κανόνα τῆς δημιουργίας προϋποστήσασθαι, οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνος συνιδὼν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἄτοπον, ὅτι τὸ μὴ ἑαυτοῦ χάριν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄλλο τι γινόμενον ἀτιμότερόν ἐστι πάντως τοῦ δι' ὃ γίνεται, ὡς τὸ γεωργικὸν ἐργαλεῖον τῆς ζωῆς χάριν ἐπιτηδεύομεν, οὐ μὴν ἐπίσης τιμᾶται τῇ ζωῇ καὶ τὸ ἄροτρον. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ εἰ διὰ τὸν κόσμον ὁ κύριος, καὶ οὐχὶ δι' ἐκεῖνον τὰ πάντα, προτιμότερα ἂν εἴη τοῦ κυρίου τὰ πάντα ὧν χάριν ἐκεῖνον γενέσθαι λέγουσι. τοῦτο καὶ νῦν διὰ τοῦ λόγου κατασκευάζουσι, δι' ὧν ἀμεσίτευτον ἔχειν τὸν υἱὸν τὴν πρὸς τὸν κτίσαντα καὶ πεποιηκότα σχέσιν διϊσχυρίζονται.