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As a nursling of the highest education concerning letters and a gift of natural wisdom bestowed on us by God through it, a charming and pleasing mixture of knowledge and intellect, of taught and untaught light: we did not get ahead of you in calling you one of the heterodox, as you yourself claim, and our witness is our discourse in your possession, because of which you insist you have come to this opinion; for in it we say verbatim, "we accepted your refutations against those of evil doctrine" and that through reduction to absurdity you showed the Latins "healing evil with evil." And what of when, asking again, we added that "we will hear the matter sought, and with pleasure, of course, for what else could be expected by us from a man who, out of a desire for precise piety, has left his homeland," did we not show, with praises referring to your piety, that we would not even entertain in our hopes anything adverse concerning your wisdom? And the text written to the one who was to inquire from us, saying, "having asked with due forbearance and frankness, or rather love of learning, learn and teach us," shows the disposition of one wishing to learn rather than one finding fault. And yet, that no small occasion was available to me, had I wished to use denunciatory language, has by no means escaped your sagacity.
And in the matters concerning proof, it has allowed those who pay attention to what has been said to understand not only that my position is sound, but also yours, even if you yourself, I know not how, as though (p. 446) stopping your ears with wax, pass these things by unheard. So, then, such are my sentiments toward you; but you know with what and how many accusations you have been eager to surround me, not showing at all that you think we are able even moderately to defend ourselves against the charges brought against us—or abductions, it would be more fitting to say—and I have already become one who is warred against, and others with me on our account, without being able to defend even ourselves.
But I am ashamed to be victorious in such matters, and I would not have defended myself, being in no way accused, if I were not intending to alter the enmity appearing in your letter to us. But what am I to do? How shall I endure an irrational reconciliation with so very distinguished a man as you are, and how shall I not assist, to the best of my ability, the rational struggles of the fathers on behalf of God, which are being insulted along with me, and how shall I in silence betray a friend, you yourself who are in peril with me, to whom my argument is addressed, as the argument will show as it proceeds? Frank refutation is the arbiter of peace. Do you wish, then, that I should set you up as judge over your own letters? And what indeed could you say is more pleasant, of course, than for the one who produced them to also sit as master of the verdict?
Two letters, therefore, from the same person about the same subject at the same time were delivered to me, holding opposite views to one another: for the one says that I have opposed in the best way those things which seemed not to be right, and as one might judge without malice, but the other, again, that I have opposed the same things in the worst way; for it slanders all my arguments against those things. Thus, since your letters to us are contradictory and annulled by each other, what opinion of his own character might the one who wrote these things graciously grant to his readers? But this must be let go, lest we incur again a charge of slander.
What do you say, then, about the things crushed by one another, that we should cast them both away like useless (p. 448) vessels of a potter? And how could you declare this, sitting as arbiter over your own affairs, and not rather force the votes, desiring at least one of the two letters to be saved for you—or rather, so that we may not be caught again saying something unseemly about you, not by turning aside from what is just and reasoning fallaciously, but as one who
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Ὡς θρέμμα τῆς ἀνωτάτω περί λόγους παιδείας καί τῆς φύσει σοφίας δῶρον παρά Θεοῦ δι᾿ αὐτῆς κεχαρισμένον ἡμῖν, ἐπίχαρι καί θυμῆρες κρᾶμμα ἐπιστήμης καί νοῦ, διδακτοῦ καί ἀδιδάκτου φωτός˙ σέ τῶν ἑτεροδόξων ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔφθημεν εἰπόντες, ὡς αὐτός ἰσχυρίζῃ, καί μάρτυς ἡμῖν ὁ παρ᾿ ὑμῖν ἡμέτερος λόγος, δι᾿ ὅν εἰς ταύτην ἥκειν διατείνῃ τήν δόξαν˙ ἐν αὐτῷ γάρ φαμεν ἐπί λέξεως ὡς «ἀπεδεξάμεθά σου τάς πρός τούς κακοδόξους ἐκείνους ἀντιρρήσεις» καί ὡς διά τῆς εἰς ἄτοπον ἀπαγωγῆς «κακῷ τό κακόν ἰωμένους» τούς Λατίνους ἔδειξας. Τί δ᾿ ὅταν αὖθις ἐρωτῶντες προσεπάγωμεν ὅτι «τό ζητούμενον ἀκούσομεν καί μεθ᾿ ἡδονῆς δήπου, τί γάρ ποτ᾿ ἄν ἄλλο προσδόκιμον ἡμῖν εἴη παρ᾿ ἀνδρός ἀκριβοῦς εὐσεβείας πόθῳ τήν ἐνέγκουσαν ἀπολιπόντος», οὐ μετ᾿ ἐγκωμίων ἀναφερομένων εἰς τήν σήν εὐσέβειαν ἐδείξαμεν, μηδ᾿ ἐν ἐλπίσιν ἀποτρόπαιόν τι περί τῆς σῆς ἀνεχόμενοι σοφίας; Τό δέ πρός τόν παρά τοῦ πευσόμενον παρ᾿ ἡμῶν γραφόμενον ὡς «μετά τῆς γινομένης ἐπιεικείας τε καί παρρησίας, μᾶλλον δέ φιλομαθείας ἐρωτήσας, μάθε καί δίδαξον ἡμᾶς», μαθητιῶντος μᾶλλον ἐπιδείκνυται διάνοιαν ἤ μεμφομένου. Καίτοιγε ὡς ἐνῆν καταφορικῶς ἐθέλοντί μοι χρήσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ μή σμικρά τις ἀφορμή τήν σήν ἀγχίνοιαν ἥκιστα διαλέληθεν.
Ἐν δέ τοῖς περί ἀποδείξεως οὐ τό ἐμόν μόνον, ἀλλά καί τό σόν ὑγιῶς ἔχειν ἔδωκε νοεῖν τοῖς προσέχουσι τοῖς εἰρημένοις τόν νοῦν, εἰ καί αὐτός οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅπως, καθάπερ (σελ. 446) κηρῷ τά ὦτα φραττόμενος, ἀνήκοος ταῦτα παραλλάττεις. Ἐγώ μέν οὖν οὕτω τά πρός σέ˙ σύ δέ με τίσι τε καί ὅσοις ἐγκλήμασι περιβαλεῖν ἐσπούδακας οἶσθα, μηδέ δείξας ὄλως οἰόμενος μετρίως γοῦν ἡμᾶς πρός τάς καθ᾿ ἡμῶν ἐπαγωγάς, ἀπαγωγάς δ᾿ εἰπεῖν οἰκειότερον, ἀπολογήσασθαι δύνασθαι, καί πολεμουμένοις ἀνέβην ἤδη, καί σύν ἡμῖν ἑτέροις ἡμῶν γε ἕνεκα, μηδ᾿ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπαμύνειν ἔχειν.
Ἐγώ δέ νικᾶν ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις αἰσχύνομαι καί οὐκ ἄν ἀπελογησάμην, οὐδαμῶς γέ πως κατηγορούμενος, εἰ μή τήν ἐμφαινομένην ἐν τῷ πρός ἡμᾶς σοῦ γράμματι μεταποιῆσαι διενοούμην ἀπέχθειαν. Ἀλλά γάρ τί πάθω; Ἄλογον καταλλαγήν πρός οὕτως ἐλλογιμώτατον, οἷος εἶ σύ, πῶς ἀνέξομαι, καί συνεπηρεαζομένοις μοι τοῖς ὑπέρ Θεοῦ λογικοῖς τῶν πατέρων ἀγῶσι πῶς οὐχ ᾗ δυνάμεως ἔχω συλλήψομαι, καί σέ γε αὐτόν συγκινδυνεύοντά μοι, πρός ὅν ὁ λόγος, ὡς ὁ λόγος δείξει προϊών, πῶς σιωπῇ τόν φίλον καταπροήσομαι; Πεπαρρησιασμένος ἔλεγχος εἰρήνης βραβευτής. Θέλεις οὐκοῦν σέ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιστήσω γράμμασι κριτήν; Καί τί ποτ᾿ ἆρ᾿ ἥδιον φαίης ἄν δήπου, τόν ἐξενηνοχότα καί τῆς ψήφου καθῆσθαι κύριον;
∆ύο τοίνυν ἀπό τοῦ αὐτοῦ περί τοῦ αὐτοῦ κατά τό αὐτός δεικομίσθη μοι γράμματα, ἐναντίως ἔχοντα πρός ἄλληλα˙ τό μέν γάρ τοῖς μή καλῶς ἔχειν δόξασιν ἄριστά γέ φησιν ἀντιτετάχθαί με καί ὡς ἄν τις ἔχοι κρίνειν ἀνεπιφθόνως, τό δ᾿ ἕτερον τοῖς αὐτοῖς αὖθις κάκιστα˙ διαβάλλει γάρ ἅπαντας τούς πρός ἐκεῖνά μοι λόγους. Οὕτως οὖν τῶν πρός ἡμᾶς σου γραμμάτων ἀντικειμένων καί δι᾿ ἀλήλων ἀναιρουμένων, ὅ ταῦτα συγγεγραφώς τίνα δόξαν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι τοῦ ἤθους ἑαυτοῦ παράσχοιτ᾿ ἄν χάριν; Ἀλλά τοῦτ᾿ ἐατέον μή καί βλασφημίας γραφήν αὖθις ἀποφερώμεθα.
Τά γοῦν ὑπ᾿ ἀλλήλων συντριβέντα τί φῄς, ὡς ἀχρεῖα (σελ. 448) σκεύη κεραμεοῦντα ρίψωμεν ἄμφω; Καί πῶς ἄν τοῦτο σύ γ᾿ ἀποφήναιο περί τῶν σῶν διαιτητής προκαθήμενος, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί βιάσῃ τάς ψήφους θάτερον γοῦν περισώσασθαί σοι τοῖν γραμμάτοιν ποθῶν, μᾶλλον δ᾿ ἵνα μή τι πάλιν τῶν οὐ καλῶν σοῦ πέρι φωραθῶμεν εἰπόντες, οὐ τό δίκαιον ἐκκλίνων καί παραλογιζόμενος, ἀλλ᾿ οἷά τις