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will a rational eagle, soaring high in intellect, care for the other of its offspring? For what if a rational vulture were not also present for you, a ready helper of the one despised, does this not even concern the eagles? Which, then, of the writings will you make your own? Surely the noble and great one, and especially the one able to look us in the eye with whom the worst things are associated. It is most necessary for you to judge this also, that since the best things have been attested for us by the one of the opponents who was cast aside, judging without envy, as you said, this thing that still stands for you is entirely arranged for envy.

But indeed, this again, being separated from its opponent in itself, needs a judge, as it is not consistent with itself, nor is it brought forward in a manner that follows itself, but fights against itself in many places and in many ways and over the greatest matters. For the one who says in it "that it would make no difference to him if someone called all his own arguments against the Latins nonsense," against the one who wished to bring forth into the open nothing else of the things that offered a handle and who had praised all the other things, but regarding one thing, and this almost the least of the parts, had not opposed but was perplexed and had asked a question (for we assigned the objections to other persons)—against the one, then, who was thus asking for the solution to the difficulty with all reasonableness, you brought forth long and bitter counter-arguments, and this, as you yourself happen to have confessed, having scraped off for yourself (σελ. 450) from your arguments what was debatable among us in them as being indisputably not good.

For if it makes no difference to you, O good sir, if someone calls your arguments nonsense and you are so terribly indifferent to the opinion of men, for what reason, as you yourself say, have you cast that out of your arguments, unless you yourself have also adopted the worse opinion about it? And what if it is also "a cause of scandal," as you yourself say it is? Is this a small thing? Is it not right, then, that it not only be cast out, but also "be hurled into a wave of the loud-roaring sea," or rather, that, to speak in the manner of Moses, "it might sink like lead in the mighty water," having first been tied to a large stone, and then given to the waves. But, O you who are preeminent in wisdom if anyone is, if you have in any way removed this from those arguments of yours, what need do you have then of such great long-windedness on its behalf, from which it has happened that you not only shoot wide of the mark, according to the proverb, but altogether without a mark? For that towards which they were tending has been completely removed from the midst, as you revealed at the end of your many-lined arguments after the jests about those who were scandalized and your own elaborate reflection, so that he who writes without a mark will thus speak idly, as he had formerly acted rashly.

But you turned not to vain things, for this is already a small thing for you, but even to their opposites, not only in the arguments against us, but also when discoursing about greater matters; and you suffered this from your untimely verbosity; for as if having given yourself over to some very turbulent wind, and being tossed about by it in many ways, willingly or unwillingly, you have suffered, alas, many stumbling-blocks and shipwrecks in vain. But lest I myself suffer this (for by answering each point sufficiently, there is no way I could escape verbosity (σελ. 452) and "from a multitude of words," according to what is written, "he will not escape sin") so that I may not myself rather risk suffering the very thing I accuse, leaving all these things, I will refute only the charges made by you against us, and this I will do as briefly as I can, being least willing to prolong it. Besides, since the one who causes the scandal has been removed from our midst, it would be superfluous to discuss this again; but if perhaps anything of what was not well said, as we at least would think, happens to be related to the things said against us

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λογικός ἀετός ὑψιπετής τήν διάνοιαν θάτερον περιποιήσῃ τῶν γεννημάτων; Τί γάρ, εἰ μή καί λογική σοι φήνη παρείη, τοῦ περιφρονηθέντος ἐπίκουρος ἕτοιμος, οὐδέ τοῖς ἀετοῖς τούτου μέλει; Ποῖον δ᾿ ἆρά σοι τῶν γραμμάτων οἰκειώσῃ σαυτῷ; Τό γενναῖον δήπουθεν καί μέγα καί μάλιστ᾿ ἔχον ἀντιβλέπειν ἡμῖν ᾧ τά κάκιστα σύνεστι. Τοῦτο δή σοι συνεπικρίνειν ἀναγκαιότατον, ὡς ἐπεί τῷ παρερριμένῳ τῶν ἐναντίων ἀνεπιφθόνως, ὡς ἔφης, κρίνοντι τά ἄριστα ἡμῖν μεμαρτύρηται, τό συνεστηκός ἔτι σοι τοῦτο πρός φθόνον ἅπαν συντεταγμένον ἐστίν.

Οὐ μήν ἀλλά καί τοῦ ἀντιταγμένου διεζευγμένον καθ᾿ ἑαυτό τοῦτ᾿ αὖθις τοῦ δικάζοντος δεῖται, μή συμβαῖνον ἑαυτῷ, μηδ᾿ ἀκολούθως ἑαυτῷ προσαγόμενον, ἀλλά πρός ἑαυτό παλλαχοῦ τε καί πολυτρόπως καί ὑπέρ τῶν μεγίστων μαχόμενον. Ὁ γάρ ἐν αὐτῷ λέγων «μηδέν ἄν ἑαυτῷ διαφέρειν εἴ τις ἀπεκάλει τούς ἐπί Λατίνους οἰκείους λόγους ἅπαντας λῆρον», πρός τόν μηδέν μέν ἕτερον τῶν λαβήν ἐχόντων προαγαγεῖν εἰς τοὐμφανές ἐθελήσαντα καί τ᾿ ἄλλ᾿ ἅπαντα προσεπῃνεκότα, πρός ἕν δέ καί τοῦτο μορίων σχεδόν τοὐλάχιστον οὐκ ἀντιτεταγμένον, ἀλλ᾿ ἠπορηκότα καί ἠρωτηκότα (τάς γάρ ἀντιθέσεις ἑτέροις ἀνεθέμεθα προσώποις) πρός τόν οὖν οὕτω μεθ᾿ ὅσης τῆς ἐπιεικείας αἰτοῦντα τήν λύσιν τῆς ἀπορίας, μακρούς καί πικρούς ἀντεπεξήγαγες λόγους, καί ταῦθ᾿ ὡς αὐτός ἀνωμολογηκώς τυγχάνεις, ἀποξέσας σοι (σελ. 450) τῶν λόγων τό παρ᾿ ἡμῖν ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀμφισβητήσιμον ὡς ἀναμφισβητήτως οὐκ ἀγαθόν.

Εἰ γάρ οὐδέν σοι διαφέρει, ὦ χρηστέ, εἴ τις λῆρον ἀποκαλεῖ σου τούς λόγους καί πρός τήν παρ᾿ ἀνθρώπων δόξαν δεινῶς οὕτως ἔχεις ἀνεπιστρόφως, τίνος ἕνεκεν, ὡς αὐτός φῄς, ἐκβέβληκάς σου τῶν λόγων ἐκεῖνο, εἰ μή τήν χείρω καί αὐτός περί αὐτοῦ δόξαν εἴληφας; Τί δ᾿ εἰ καί "σκανδάλου", καθάπερ αὐτός εἶναι φῄς, "αἴτιον"; Ἆρα τοῦτο μικρόν; Οὐκ ἄρ᾿ ἐκβεβλῆσθαι δίκαιον μόνον, ἀλλά καί «εἰς κῦμα ριφῆναι πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης», μᾶλλον δ᾿ ἵν᾿ ὡς «μόλυβδος καταδύση» μωσαϊκῶς εἰπεῖν «ἐν ὕδατι σφοδρῷ», εὐμεγέθει λίθῳ προσδεθέν πρότερον, ἔπειτα δοθῆναι τοῖς κύμασιν. Ἀλλ᾿ ὦ τήν σοφίαν εἶπερ τις περιττέ σύ, εἰ τοῦθ᾿ ὁπωσδηποτοῦν ἀφῄρηκάς σου τῶν λόγων ἐκείνων, τίς σοι χρεία τῆς ὑπέρ αὐτοῦ τοσαύτης ἔπειτα μακρηγορίας, ἀφ᾿ ἧς σοι συμβέβηκεν οὐκ ἔξω μόνον σκοποῦ κατά τήν παροιμίαν τοξεύειν, ἀλλ᾿ ἀσκόπως παντάπασιν; Ἤρθη γάρ, ὡς τούς πολυστίχους σοι λόγους τελευτῶν ἐξεκάλυψας μετά τά σκώμματα τῶν σκανδαλιζομένων καί τήν σήν διαπεπονημένην σκέψιν, πρός ὅ τείνουσιν ἐκ τοῦ μέσου παντάπασιν, ὡς ἀπερισκέπτως ἄρα πρότερον, οὕτως ὁ ἀσκόπως λογογραφῶν ματαιολογήσει.

Σύ δ᾿ οὐκ εἰς μάταια, μικρόν γάρ ἤδη σοι τοῦτο, ἀλλά καί πρός τἀναντία περιετράπης, οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς καθ᾿ ἡμῶν λόγοις, ἀλλά καί περί τῶν κρειττόνων διαλεγόμενος˙ τοῦτο δ᾿ ἔπαθες ἐκ τῆς ἀκαίρου πολυρρημοσύνης˙ οἱονεί γάρ τινι πολυταράχῳ πνεύματι ταύτῃ σεαυτόν παραδούς καί πολυκινήτως ὑπ᾿ αὐτῆς ἑκών ἄκων σαλευόμενος, πολλά φεῦ προσκόμματα καί συντρίμματα διακενῆς ἔπαθες. Ἀλλ᾿ ἵνα μή καί αὐτός τοῦτο πάθω (πρός γάρ ἕκαστα διαρκῶς ἀποκρινόμενος, οὐκ ἔσθ᾿ ὅπως τό πολύρρημον ἐκφύγοιμ᾿ ἄν (σελ. 452) «ἐκ δέ πολυλογίας» κατά τό γεγραμμένον «οὐκ ἐκφεύξεται ἁμαρτία) ἵν᾿ οὖν μή τοῦθ᾿ ὅπερ ἐγκαλῶ μᾶλλον αὐτός κινδυνεύσω παθεῖν, ταῦτα πάντα ἀφείς, τάς πεποιημένας σοι καθ᾿ ἡμῶν αἰτίας ἀπολύσομαι μόνον, καί τοῦθ᾿ ὡς ἄν οἷός τε ὦ διά βραχέων ποιήσομαι μηκύνειν ἥκιστα ἐθέλων. Ἄλλωστε, καί τοῦ ποιοῦντος τό σκάνδαλον ἐκ τοῦ μέσου γεγενημένου, περιττόν ἄν εἴη περί τούτου διαλέγεσθαι πάλιν˙ εἰ δ᾿ ἄρα τι συμπεσεῖται τοῖς καθ᾿ ἡμῶν εἰρημένοις τῶν μή καλῶς, ὥς γε ἡμεῖς ἄν νομίσαιμεν