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would he attain truth who, discoursing on what is truly truth, makes little account of truth? But indeed, having falsely put this forward against us ten times in one discourse, you have made it clear to all whence you speak, and you have furthermore witnessed in a new way to the incomprehensibility of our arguments. For if you had a true complaint, having once placed yourself among the accusers, what need then did you have of this false one and of the initial attack from it?

As for the fact that you then abuse me, saying that while the end of your whole discourse was manifest I myself took up the opposite opinion concerning you, you are clearly unjust in this. For if this were so, I would not have asked questions, I would not have been at a loss, but I would have condemned you as a heretic. But perplexity comes upon all when there is something in what is manifest and acknowledged that is not in harmony; to be perplexed, therefore, is a sign of being unwilling to hold any unsworn opinion about you. But that you clearly said "the one under the other" and "the twofoldness of the principle," this in addition to the other things compelled us to inquire and be perplexed as to what (p. 458) "the principle from a principle" means to you, which indeed you now again devise as a cure for the other. For I undertook to pass over the other things at the beginning.

What, therefore, you have just written next to what was proposed, that "even if I say the one and from the other and under the other, yet it is as believing that each thing, from whatever principle it may be, is also referred back under this," if you mean each of all things from any principle whatsoever, you are ranking what is above all with all things, and you think it right to persuade us concerning the uncreated from the created, which, flowing copiously against us before, you forbid altogether; but if it brings this "each" to the other creative principle from another, you signify to us more than two things from that one; for we know that "each of two" is said of things not exceeding a dyad, but we say "each" of at least three. Let loose, then, your copious tongue on this too, and also on something being referred "under" the principle. For that each of the two divine hypostases is referred "to" it and "towards" the principle, we have both received and hold; but this "under" makes the reference a "downward-reference," if I may so speak, and presents the opposite of what is intended. For you will not bring forward again for me the distinctions among the philosophers and the things said according to them, although even in these this has a certain meaning of subordination. But I do not say this only, but most of all that these things are far from that God-befitting reference and procession.

You will perhaps say of these things also, "the error appears to you only in the wording" and that there is least need of apology. But an error in wording in such matters, O wisest of men, leads the listeners away to an erroneous understanding. As therefore he who has understood but has not taught clearly is on a par with (p. 460) one who has not considered the listeners, so he who has understood correctly but has taught erroneously is on a par with one who has understood erroneously. But if for you the error here is in the wording, yet it is not so there, but in arguments, and many arguments, which you, having done well to remove them, have enumerated as erased, and you will understand how many. Nevertheless, if indeed the error was limited for you to the wording, as you yourself say, how much gratitude you ought to have felt toward us, who, on account of our reverence for you and our own piety, did not declare that you were in error, but by proposing a difficulty, we set you up as a teacher for ourselves, at least as far as it was up to us? But you, instead of teaching, attack, and owing gratitude for our reverence toward you, have paid us back with shamelessness and slander and abuse.

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ἀληθείας ἐφίκοιτο περί τῆς ὄντως ἀληθείας διαλεγόμενος ὁ μή τῆς ἀληθείας πολύν ποιούμενος λόγον; Ἀλλά γάρ δεκάκις τοῦτ᾿ ἐν ἑνί λόγῳ καθ᾿ ἡμῶν ψευδῶς προβαλόμενος, τοσαυτάκις δῆλος ἐγένου τοῖς πᾶσιν ὅθεν λαλεῖς, πρός δέ τό ἄληπτον τοῖς ἡμετέροις λόγοις καινῷ τρόπῳ προσεμαρτύρησας˙ εἰ γάρ εἶχες ἀληθῆ μέμψιν, ἅπαξ εἰς τούς κατηγόρους καταστήσας σαυτόν, τίς ἆρά σοι χρεία τῆς ψευδοῦς ταύτης ἦν καί τῆς ἀπό ταύτης ἐπιθέσεως πρώτης;

Ὅ δ᾿ μ᾿ ἔπειτα κακίζεις ὡς τῷ τέλει τοῦ παντός σοι λόγου φανερῷ τυγχάνοντι τήν ἐναντίαν αὐτός δόξαν περί σοῦ προσηκάμην, τοῦτο φανερῶς ἀδιεκεῖς˙ εἰ γάρ τοῦτ᾿ ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ἠρώτων, οὐκ ἄν ἠπόρουν, ἀλλά κατεψηφιζόμην ὡς ἑτερόφρονος. Ἀπορεῖν δέ τότ᾿ ἔπεισι πᾶσιν, ὅταν τοῖς φανεροῖς καί ἀνωμολογημένοις ᾖ τι τό μή συνᾷδον˙ τό τοίνυν ἀπορεῖν δεῖγμα τοῦ μηδέν σοῦ πέρι φρονεῖν ἐθέλειν ἀπώμοτον. Τό δέ «τήν ἑτέραν ὑπό τήν ἑτέραν» σε σαφῶς εἰπεῖν καί «ἡ διπλόη τῆς ἀρχῆς», τοῦθ᾿ ἡμᾶς πρός τοῖς ἄλλοις ἠνάγκασε πυνθάνεσθαι καί διαπορεῖν, τί ποτέ σοι βούλεται (σελ. 458) «ἡ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀρχή», ἥν δή καί νῦν αὖθις θατέρω θεραπείαν ἐπινοεῖς˙ τά γάρ ἄλλα παρατρέχειν ὑπέστην τήν ἀρχήν.

Ὅ τοίνυν ἐφεξῆς ἄρτι τῷ προτεθειμένῳ γέγραφας, ὅτι «κἄν τήν ἑτέραν καί ἐκ τῆς ἑτέρας καί ὑπό τήν ἑτέραν λέγω, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἡγούμενος ἕκαστον ἐξ ἧς ἐστιν ὅπως ποτέ ἀρχῆς, ὑπό ταύτην καί ἀναφέρεσθαι», εἰ μέν ἕκαστον ἁπάντων λέγεις τῶν ἀφ᾿ ἡστινοσοῦν ἀρχῆς, τοῖς πᾶσι συντάττεις τά ὑπέρ ἅπαντα καί ἀπό τῶν κτιστῶν περί τῶν ἀκτίστων ἀξιοῖς ἡμᾶς πείθειν, ὅ πολύς ρέων καθ᾿ ἡμῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀπαγορεύεις παντάπασιν˙ εἰ δέ τό ἕκαστον τοῦτο πρός τήν ἐξ ἑτέρας ἑτέραν δημιουργικήν ἀρχήν ἐπιφέρει, πλεῖν ἤ δύο τά ἐξ ἐκείνης ἡμῖν σημαίνεις˙ τό γάρ "ἑκάτερον" ἐπί τῶν μή ὑπερβαινόντων τήν δυάδα λεγόμενον ἴσμεν, τριῶν δ᾿ "ἕκαστον" τοὐλάχιστον λέγομεν. Ἐπάφες δή σοι καί τούτῳ τήν πολυχεύμονα γλῶτταν, ἀλλά καί τό "ὑπό" τήν ἀρχήν ἀναφέρεσθαί τι˙ τό γάρ "εἰς" αὐτήν καί "πρός" αὐτήν τήν ἀρχήν ἑκατέραν τῶν θεαρχικῶν ὑποστάσεων ἀναφέρεσθαι καί παρελάβομεν καί κατέχομεν, τό δέ "ὑπό" τοῦτο τήν ἀναφοράν, ἵν᾿ οὕτως, εἴπω, καταφοράν ἀπεργάζεται καί τοὐναντίον παρίστησι τοῦ βουλήματος˙ οὐδέ γάρ τάς ἐν φιλοσόφοις μοι πάλιν διαιρέσεις προάξεις καί τά κατ᾿ ἐκείνας λεγόμενα, καίτοι κἀν ταύταις ἔχει τινά τοῦτο σημασίαν ὑφέσεως. Ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τοῦτο λέγω μόνον, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι μάλισθ᾿ ὅτι πόρρω ταῦτα τῆς θεοπρεποῦς ἐκείνης ἀναφορᾶς τε καί προελεύσεως.

Ἐρεῖς κἀπί τούτων ἴσως «εἰς μόνην σοι τήν λέξειν τό ἁμαρτημα παρίστασθαι» καί παραιτήσεως ἥκιστα δεῖν. Ἀλλά τό τῆς λέξεως ἡμαρτημένον ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ὦ σοφώτατ᾿ ἀνδρῶν, εἰς ἡμαρτημένην ἀπάγει τούς ἀκροωμένους διάνοιαν˙ ὡς οὖν ὁ γνούς καί μή σαφῶς διδάξας ἐν ἴσῳ καί (σελ. 460) εἰ μή ἐνεθυμήθη τοῖς ἀκούουσιν, οὕτως ὁ γνοῦς ὀρθῶς καί διημαρτημένως διδάξας ἐν ἴσῳ καί εἰ διημαρτημένως ἔγνωκεν. Εἰ δέ κἀνταῦθά σοι τό ἁμάρτημα περί τήν λέξιν ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ κἀκεῖ περί λέξιν, περί δέ λόγους καί λόγους πολλούς, οὕς σύ καλῶς ποιήσας ἐξελών κατέλεξον τούς ἀπαληλειμμένους, καί συνήσεις ὁπόσους. Οὐ μήν ἀλλ᾿ εἴπερ ἄρα καί εἰς λέξιν σοι περιίστατο, καθάπερ αὐτός φής, τό ἁμάρτημα, πόσην εἰδέναι σε χάριν ἡμῖν ἐχρῆν, οἵ διά τό πρός σέ σέβας καί τήν γιγνομένην ἡμῖν εὐλάβειαν οὐχί σέ ἁμαρτάνειν ἀπεφηνάμεθα, προβαλλόμενοι δέ ἀπορίαν σέ διδάσκαλον ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐπεστήσαμεν, τό γε εἰς ἡμᾶς ἧκον; Σύ δ᾿ ἀντί τοῦ διδάσκειν ἐπεξέρχῃ καί χάριν ὀφείλων τῆς πρός σέ εὐλαβείας, ἀναίδειαν καί διαβολήν καί λοιδορίαν ἡμῖν ἀνταπέδωκας.