Thus in no way is one naturally disposed to harm the other. But that it is not for you to speak of God as “what light is, but rather a source of light, both noetic and immaterial,” this you have said truly;

but how will you hear, how will you understand, how will you believe, you who name the pagan wise men wondrous and God-seers and enlightened in your discourse against us, and those who believe in them wondrous and enviable and revered, wherefore you call them not pagan, but ancient sages, honoring them, but those among us whose hearts have been blessedly purified through the keeping of the divine commandments and the precise practice of hesychia you slander, arbitrarily and on your own authority classifying them with me, whom you immoderately accuse? And not only the living, but also those who long ago departed to heaven and are living with God, whom the great Dionysius exalts, as having transcended even the noetic energies while still on earth, you both classify and mock along with me, who am, according to you, a sinner and a fool and one who does not rightly divide the word of truth.

“For the great Dionysius,” you say, “teaches me this and that about you contemplatives.” At whom are you being ironic, o man? Would you say at me? But the great Dionysius’s discourse is not about me, but about those who are the best in their own right. Besides, if I myself were classifying myself with them, the pretext would perhaps be plausible; but as it is, you could not find, nor could you ever truly show this, not even if you were to write books against us with as many words as there are lines (p. 470) in this long discourse of yours. What, then, could be a fitting defense for one who, along with us who are slandered, slanders the most praiseworthy? What has happened to you, brother? Over what cliffs have you willingly thrown yourself? And how, having been thrown headlong and thus shaken from the divine heads, as far as your words go, do you not feel the intense pain, nor grieve greatly? For how else would you have handled the argument, if the great Dionysius had thought not to exalt them, but to tear them down?

“But in matters of proof we are in danger, my friend, both of us, of speaking rightly”; this is your statement. Therefore, since both of us speak rightly according to you, you are in danger of showing yourself again to be speaking not rightly; whenever, then, you slander this right argument of ours, and simply the whole torrential and furious rain mixed with those typhonic winds, which you have already let loose from your tongue against us, has inundated no less, if not more, you yourself, the source of the tempest. But to me (for it seemed you had not the least idea whom you were following when saying these things, whom you yourself have now later revealed), for me, then, not to criticize your statements to the Latins concerning both discussion and proof, there are many testimonies in many of our other writings, and especially to those from Thessaloniki who asked this very thing last year, to whom we declared in writing that we agree with both, and we said this was a sign of our agreement, that piety is present in the arguments of both, but that the matter of whether it is proper or not proper, if indeed it is debatable, should be set aside; but now you have struggled through no small contest to show that in this we are lying.

What then, if we too, for each of these dialectical syllogisms of yours, which you boast of having constructed most beautifully and most correctly (p. 472), having tested them, should show that they give forth a certain dissonant sound, full of bad artifice, or rather, instead of the art you boast of, have been revealed to be full of artlessness, and are so far from being dialectical as not even to be syllogisms, not even sophistic ones, nor preserving the form of a syllogism at all? But since they have been made by you concerning divine matters, for the sake of the reverence owed to these things, not shamelessly and immoderately, as you yourself have done against us, although previously to us

γοῦν κατ᾿ οὐδέν ἄτερος θατέρῳ τρόπῳ λυμαίνεσθαι πέφυκεν. Ὅτι δ᾿ οὐ σόν ἐστι περί Θεοῦ λέγειν ὡς «οἷον φῶς ἐστι, μᾶλλον δέ πηγή φωτός

νοεροῦ τε καί ἀΰλου», τοῦτο ἀληθές εἴρηκας˙ ἀκούσεις δέ πῶς, συνήσεις δέ πῶς, πιστεύσεις δέ πῶς, ὅς γε τούς μέν ἔξω σοφούς θαυμασίους καί θεόπτας καί πεφωτισμένους ὀνομάζεις ἐν τῷ πρός ἡμᾶς σου λόγῳ καί τούς αὐτοῖς πιστεύοντας θαυμαστούς καί ζηλωτούς καί αἰδήμονας, διό οὐδ᾿ ἔξω, ἀλλά παλαιούς σοφούς ἀποκαλεῖς σεμνύνων, τούς δ᾿ ἐν ἡμῖν διά τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν θείων ἐντολῶν καί τῆς καθ᾿ ἡσυχίαν ἀκριβοῦς σχολῆς μακαριστῶς κεκαθαρμένους τήν καρδίαν διασύρεις, ἐμοί κατ᾿ ἐξουσίαν οἴκοθεν αὐτούς συντάττων, οὗπερ ἀκρατῶς κατηγορεῖς; Καί οὐ τούς περιόντας μόνον, ἀλλά καί τούς πρός οὐρανόν ἐκ παλαιοῦ μεταχωρήσαντας καί ζῶντας τῷ Θεῷ, οὕς ὁ μέγας ἀγάλλει ∆ιονύσιος, ὡς καί τάς νοεράς ἐπί γῆς ἔτ᾿ ὄντας ὑπεραναβεβηκότας ἐνεργείας, μετ᾿ ἐμοῦ σύ καί τάττεις καί σκώπτεις, τοῦ κατά σέ πλημμελοῦς καί ἄφρονος καί τόν ἀληθῆ λόγον οὐκ ὀρθοτομοῦντος.

«∆ιδάσκει γάρ με» φῄς, «ὁ μέγας ∆ιονύσιος περί ὑμῶν τῶν θεωρητικῶν τά καί τά». Τίνος κατειρωνεύῃ, ὦ ἄνθρωπε; Φαίης ἄν ἐμοῦ; Ἀλλ᾿ οὐ περί ἐμοῦ ∆ιονυσίῳ τῷ μεγάλῳ λόγος, ἀλλά περί τῶν καθ᾿ ἑαυτῶν ἀρίστων. Ἄλλως τε, εἰ μέν αὐτός ἐμαυτόν ἐκείνοις συνέταττον, ἦν ἄν ἴσως εὐπρόσωπος ἡ σκῆψις˙ νῦν δ᾿ οὐκ ἄν εὕροις, οὐδ᾿ ἄν τοῦτο πώποτ᾿ ἀληθῶς δείξαις, οὐδ᾿ ἄν ἰσαρίθμους τοῖς (σελ. 470) στίχοις τοῦ πολυστίχου σοι τοῦδε λόγους συγγράψῃς καθ᾿ ἡμῶν βίβλους. Τίς οὖν γένοιτ᾿ ἄν εὐπρεπής ἀπολογίᾳ τῷ τοῖς διαβαλλομένοις ἡμῖν τούς ἀξιεπαινενωτάτους συνδιαβάλλοντι; Τί τοῦτο πέπονθας, ἀδελφέ; Ποῦ κρημνῶν ἑκών ἀφῆκας σαυτόν; Πῶς δ᾿ ἐκτραχηλισθείς καί τῶν θείων οὕτω κεφαλῶν ἀποσεσαλευμένος ὅσον ἥκει πρός τούς σούς λόγους, οὐκ αἰσθάνῃ τῆς περιωδυνίας, οὐδέ μέγα θρηνεῖς; Πῶς δ᾿ ἄν ἄλλως μετεχειρίσω τόν λόγον, εἰ ∆ιονύσιος ὁ μέγας οὐκ ἐξαίρειν, ἀλλά καθαιρεῖν αὐτούς ἐνόμιζεν;

«Ἐν δέ τοῖς περί ἀποδείξεως κινδυνεύομεν, ὦ φιλότης, καί ἀμφότεροι ὀρθῶς λέγειν»˙ οὗτος σός ἐστιν ὁ λόγος. Ἀμφοτέρων οὖν ἡμῶν ὀρθῶς λεγόντων κατά σέ, κινδυνεύεις σύ σαυτόν αὖθις ἀποφαίνεσθαι λέγειν οὐκ ὀρθῶς˙ ἡνίκ᾿ ἄν ἔπειτα τόν ὀρθόν τοῦτον λόγον διαβάλλῃς ἡμῶν, καί ἁπλῶς ὁ τοῖς τυφωνικοῖς ἐκείνοις πνεύμασι ἀναμίξ ραγδαῖος καί λαῦρος ὑετός ἅπας, ὅν ἔφθης καθ᾿ ἡμῶν ἀπό τῆς γλώττης ἀφείς, οὐδέν ἧττον ὅτι μή καί μᾶλλον σέ, τήν πηγήν τῆς καταιγίδος, κατέκλυσεν. Ἐμοί δέ (καί γάρ ἥκιστ᾿ ἐπί νοῦν ἔδοξε θέσθαι τίσιν ἑπόμενον ταῦτα λέγεις, οὕς νῦν αὐτός ἐξέφηνας ὕστερον), ἐμοί τοίνυν τοῦ μή τά σά διαλέξεώς τε πέρι καί ἀποδείξεως εἰρημένα πρός Λατίνους κακίζειν, πολλά τά μαρτύρια κἀν πολλοῖς ἐστιν ἑτέροις ἡμετέροις συγγράμμασι, καί μάλιστα πρός τούς ἀπό Θεσσαλονίκης πέρυσι τοῦτ᾿ ἠρωτηκότας αὐτό, πρός οὕς ἀντιγράφοντες ὁμολογεῖν ἀμφοτέροις ἀπεφηνάμεθα, καί δεῖγμα τοῦτ᾿ ἔφημεν εἶναι τῆς ὁμολογίας, τό προσεῖναι τοῖς παρ᾿ ἀμφοτέρων λόγοις τό εὐσεβές, τό κυρίως δ᾿ ἤ μή κυρίως, εἴπερ ἄρ᾿ ἀμφισβητήσιμον, ἔχειν˙ ἀλλά σύν νῦν ἀγωνίαν οὔ τοι σμικράν ἠγωνισμένος διετέλεσας δεῖξαι κατά τοῦτο ψευδομένους ἡμᾶς.

Τί τοίνυν, ἄν καί ἡμεῖς ἕκαστον τῶν διαλεκτικῶν σοι τουτωνί συλλογισμῶν, οὕς εὔχῃ κάλλιστά τε καί ὀρθότατα (σελ. 472) πεποιηκέναι, διακωδωνίσαντες, ἀπηχῆ τινα ἠχήν ἀναδιδόντας δείξωμεν, κακοτεχνίας ἔμπλεως, μᾶλλον δ᾿ ἀντί τέχνης ἥν αὐχεῖς, ἀτεχνίας ἀναπεφηνότας πλήρεις, καί τοσοῦτο δέοντας εἶναι διαλεκτικούς, ὡς μηδέ συλλογισμούς εἶναι, μηδέ γοῦν σοφιστικούς, μηδέ σχῆμα ὅλως σώζοντας συλλογισμοῦ; Ἀλλά γάρ, ἐπεί περί τῶν θείων σοι πεποίηνται, τῆς πρός ταῦτ᾿ ὀφειλομένης εὐλαβείας ἕνεκεν, οὐκ ἀναιδῶς καί ἀκρατῶς, ὡς αὐτός καθ᾿ ἡμῶν πεποίηκας, καίτοι πρότερον ἡμῖν