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pre-eminence and seats of honor and preference of position and glory and enjoyment and delight, is to see God; but those who see Him are freed from all curiosity. For they have been unable to look and turn back to anything of this life or to any other of men, or to think at all of anything inappropriate, but they have been freed from the mind being directed towards something; for this reason they also remain for ages unchangeable and are unable to turn back towards evil.

(214) But indeed I will ask you, and you answer me with understanding. From where do those who wrote these things know them, and now from where does the one writing know? You say, so that I may not seem to you to speak vaingloriously again; whose are these words? Reason it out logically and you will surely be persuaded and you will deliver me from discussions. Of a man, surely, he says. Woe is me that sight does not come even through your hearing, but you remain hearing and not seeing at all. Do you say that these words are of a man? If they are of a man, you can surely say of what kind, since a man is not able to know or to express not only the reasonings and dispositions of a man, but not even the impulses or postures or inner state of soul of an animal; "For no one knows the things of a man, except the spirit of the man which dwells in him". But if it is difficult for a man to know well the dispositions and impulses of a man and of irrational animals, the things of God, that is, the alteration and state that comes to be in the saints from the vision of Him, not to mention for now the activity, from where or how can anyone know? Besides, if the words are of a man, obviously so are the thoughts. But the thoughts in these things ought not to be called thoughts, but a vision of the things that truly are; for we speak from the vision of those things; and what is said should rather be called a narrative of the things seen, but that is worthy to be called a thought which is the conception born from the mind concerning a matter or intention that has no subsistence, such as to do something good or evil which has not yet been done by us, which is also brought forth from thought into action, so that the thought is the beginning of the thing that is going to be done by us according to this: "First He conceives the angelic and heavenly powers, and the conception was a work."

(215) Consider that not concerning certain unsubstantial and unknown things, but concerning things already happening and about to happen, are all our words and all the explanation about them comes rather from the sight and the vision of them. For it is altogether necessary for anyone explaining about some matter, for instance a house or a city, or some palace and the order and state within it, or again about some theater and the things performed in it, to first see and learn the things in these, and then thus to speak thoughtfully and logically about what he wishes to speak. Since, if he does not see first, what could he even say of his own accord? What sort of thought will he supply from elsewhere as he narrates about a matter never yet seen? What, tell me, conception or ingenuity or learning, what prudence, reflection and device and reasoning will he find opportunely to speak about what he does not know? For to say something about things one does not know or has not seen is altogether irrational and uneducated. If, therefore, no one can say or narrate anything about visible and earthly things, unless he becomes an eyewitness of the matter, how could anyone be strong enough to speak or narrate, brothers, about God and divine matters and the very saints and servants of God, what a complete relation they have had with God and what the vision of God is which comes to be in them ineffably? Which produces an unutterable activity intellectually in their hearts, even if human reason does not grant to say anything more, not having first been enlightened with the light of knowledge, according to the commanding precept.

But when you hear "light of knowledge," so that we may enlighten you through all things, do not suppose it to be only a knowledge of what is said without light. For he did not say a narration or a word of knowledge, but light of knowledge and knowledge of light, as of the (216) light

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προεδρία καί καθέδρας καί προτίμησις στάσεως καί δόξα καί ἀπόλαυσις καί τρυφή, τό ὁρᾶν τόν Θεόν· οἱ δέ ὁρῶντες αὐτόν περιεργίας πάσης ἀπηλλαγμένοι ὑπάρχουσιν. Οὐδέ γάρ πρός τι τοῦ βίου ἤ πρός ἕτερόν τινα τῶν ἀνθρώπων βλέπειν καί ἐπιστρέφεσθαι ἤ ὅλως ἐννοεῖν τι τῶν ἀνοικείων δεδύνηνται, ἀλλά τοῦ πρός τι γενέσθαι τόν νοῦν ἠλευθέρωνται· διά τοῦτο καί μένουσιν εἰς αἰῶνας ἄτρεπτοι καί πρός τό κακόν εἰσιν ἀνεπίστροφοι.

(214) Ἀλλά γάρ ἐρωτήσω σε, σύ δέ μοι συνετῶς ἀποκρίθητι. Ταῦτα πόθεν οἱ γράψαντες ἴσασι, καί νῦν ὁ γράφων πόθεν ἐπίσταται; Εἰπέ σύ, ἵνα μή πάλιν ἐγώ δόξω σοι κενοδόξως λαλεῖν· τίνος ταῦτα τά ῥήματα; Λελογισμένως συλλογίσθητι καί πάντως πεισθήσῃ καί συζητήσεων ἀπαλλάξεις με. Ἀνθρώπου πάντως, φησίν. Οἴμοι ὅτι οὐδέ διά τῆς ἀκοῆς σου ἡ ὅρασις ἐπιγίνεται, ἀλλά μένεις ἀκούων καί μηδόλως ὁρῶν. Ἀνθρώπου λέγεις εἶναι ταῦτα τά ῥήματα; Εἰ ἀνθρώπου εἰσίν, εἰπεῖν ἔχεις πάντως καί ποταποῦ, ἐπειδή ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπου συλλογισμούς τε καί διαθέσεις, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ κτήνους ὁρμάς ἤ στάσεις ἤ ἐνδιάθετον κατάστασιν ψυχῆς δύναται γνῶναι ἤ ἐξειπεῖν· "Οὐδείς γάρ οἶδε τά τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ μή τό πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τό ἐνοικοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ". Εἰ δέ ἀνθρώπου καί κτηνῶν ἀλόγων διαθέσεις καί ὁρμάς χαλεπόν ἄνθρωπον εἰδέναι καλῶς, τά τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἤγουν τήν ἐκ τῆς θεωρίας αὐτοῦ ἐγγινομένην τοῖς ἁγίοις ἀλλοίωσιν καί κατάστασιν, ἵνα μή τό γε νῦν ἔχον εἴπω ἐνέργειαν, πόθεν ἤ πῶς εἰδέναι τις δύναται; Ἄλλως τε δέ εἰ ἀνθρώπου τά ῥήματα, δηλονότι καί τά νοήματα. Τά δέ ἐν τούτοις νοήματα οὐ χρή καλεῖσθαι νοήματα, ἀλλά θεωρίαν τῶν ὄντως ὄντων· ἀπό γάρ τῆς ἐκείνων θεωρίας λαλοῦμεν· καί λέγεσθαι μᾶλλον χρή τῶν ὁραθέντων διήγησιν τά λεγόμενα, νόημα δέ ἐκεῖνο λέγεσθαι ἄξιον τό περί ἀνυποστάτου πράγματος ἤ βουλήματος γεννώμενον ἐνθύμημα ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ, οἷον τοῦ ποιῆσαί τι ἀγαθόν ἤ πονηρόν ὅ οὔπω ἐπράχθη παρ᾿ ἡμῶν, ὅ καί ἀπό τοῦ νοήματος εἰς ἔργον ἐξάγεται, ὥστε τό νόημα ἀρχή ἐστι τοῦ μέλλοντος γίνεσθαι πράγματος παρ᾿ ἡμῶν κατά το· "Πρῶτον μέν ἐννοεῖ τάς ἀγγελικάς δυνάμεις καί οὐρανίους καί τό ἐννόημα ἔργον ἦν".

(215) Σκόπει δέ ὅτι οὐ περί ἀνυποστάτων τινῶν καί ἀδήλων πραγμάτων, ἀλλά περί τῶν ἤδη γινομένων καί γενέσθαι μελλόντων, οἱ λόγοι πάντες ἡμῖν καί πᾶσα ἡ περί τούτων ἐξήγησις ἐκ τῆς ὁράσεως μᾶλλον γίνεται καί τῆς θεωρίας αὐτῶν. Πᾶσα γάρ ἀνάγκη παντί τῷ ἐξηγουμένῳ περί τινος πράγματος, οἴκου φέρε εἰπεῖν ἤ πόλεως, ἤ παλατίου τινός καί τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ τάξεώς τε καί καταστάσεως, ἤ περί θεάτρου πάλιν τινός καί τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ τελουμένων, ἰδεῖν μέν πρότερον καί καταμαθεῖν τά ἐν τούτοις, εἶθ᾿ οὕτως περί οὗ εἰπεῖν βούλεται ἐστοχασμένως καί λελογισμένως εἰπεῖν. Ἐπεί, ἐάν μή πρότερον ἴδῃ, τί ἄν καί οἴκοθεν εἴποι; Ποίαν δέ νόησιν πρός τήν τοῦ μήπω μηδαμῶς ὁραθέντος πράγματος ἄλλοθεν πορίσεται διηγούμενος; Ποίαν, εἰπέ μοι, ἐνθύμησιν ἤ εὐφυΐαν ἤ μάθησιν, ποίαν δέ φρόνησιν, σκέψιν τε καί ἐπίνοιαν καί συλλογισμόν εὑρήσει καιρίως περί οὗ οὐκ οἶδεν εἰπεῖν; Τό γάρ εἰπεῖν τι περί ὧν οὐκ οἶδεν ἤ οὐκ ἐθέασατο πάντως ἄλογον καί ἀπαίδευτον. Εἰ τοίνυν περί ὁρωμένων καί ἐπιγείων οὐδείς εἰπεῖν τι ἤ διηγήσασθαι δύναται, εἰ μή αὐτόπτης τοῦ πράγματος γένηται, πῶς εἰπεῖν τις ἰσχύσειεν ἤ διηγήσασθαι, ἀδελφοί, περί Θεοῦ καί θείων πραγμάτων καί αὐτῶν τῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἁγίων καί δούλων, οἵαν ἐκεῖνοι τήν ὁλικήν πρός τόν Θεόν ἐσχήκασι σχέσιν καί οἵαν ἐστίν ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ ὅρασις ἡ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀρρήτως ἐγγινομένη; Ἥτις ἐνέργειαν ἄφθεγκτον ἐμποιεῖ νοερῶς ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις αὐτῶν, εἰ καί μή πλέον εἰπεῖν τι ὁ ἀνθρώπινος δίδωσι λόγος, μή πρότερον φωτισθείς φῶς γνώσεως, κατά τήν κελεύουσαν ἐντολήν.

Φῶς δέ γνώσεως ὅταν ἀκούσῃς, ἵνα σε διά πάντων φωταγωγήσωμεν, μή ὑπολάβῃς γνῶσιν εἶναι μόνην τῶν λεγομένων δίχα φωτός. Οὐ γάρ εἶπε διήγησιν ἤ λόγον γνώσεως, ἀλλά φῶς γνώσεως καί γνώσεως φῶς, ὡς τοῦ (216) φωτός