ARTICLE XIV

In the Fourteenth Article We Ask: CAN ANGELS KNOW MANY THINGS AT THE SAME TIME?

Difficulties:

It seems that they can, for

1. Augustine says: "In heaven we shall behold all our knowledge at the same time by one glance." But angels see now in the manner in which we will see in heaven. Therefore, angels now actually understand many things at the same time.

2. An angel understands that a man is not a stone. Now, whoever understands this understands man and stone at the same time. Angels, therefore, understand many things at the same time.

3. An angel's intellect is stronger than the common sense. But the common sense apprehends many things at the same time, because its object is number, whose parts are many unities. Consequently, it is even truer to say that an angel can know many things simultaneously.

4. That which belongs to an angel by reason of his natural power belongs to him no matter by what medium he understands. Now, in virtue of his nature it belongs to an angel to understand many things. For this reason, Augustine says: "The spiritual power of an angelic mind can with ease intellectually comprehend at the same time all that it wills." Therefore, no matter whether an angel knows things in the Word or through individual species, he still can know many things at one time.

5. The intellect and the intelligible are mutually related. Now, one intelligible can be grasped simultaneously by distinct intellects. Therefore, one intellect can focus on distinct intelligibles simultaneously.

6. Augustine says: "Our mind always remembers, understands, and wills itself." The same is true of an angelic mind. Now, an angel sometimes understands things other than himself. Therefore, when this happens, he understands many things at the same time.

7. The relation of the intellect to the intelligible is the same as that of knowledge to the knowable. But one who knows can know many things at the same time. Consequently, the intellect can understand many things at the same time.

8. An angel's mind is much more spiritual than air. But because of air's spirituality, many distinct forms, such as black and white, can exist in it simultaneously. For example, a black thing and a white thing can be so situated that lines drawn from the eyes of different people to these things will intersect at one point, through which the species of black and of white will pass simultaneously. Therefore, it is even truer to say that an angelic intellect can be simultaneously actuated by distinct forms. Hence, it can know many things at once.

9. The intellect is reduced to the act of understanding by means of species which it has within itself. Now, many species exist simultaneously in an angelic intellect, for, as is said in The Causes: "an intelligence is filled with forms." Consequently, an angel understands many things at the same time.

10. Many things can be understood at the same time in so far as they are one. But all intelligibles are one in so far as they are intelligible. Therefore, all intelligibles can be understood at the same time by an angel.

11. More distance lies between the divine essence and created forms than between one created form and another. Now, angels understand simultaneously through the divine essence and through a created form, because they always see things in the Word, and, unless they knew things at the same time through innate species, they would never understand them by means of these species. Much more possible is it, then, for an angel to understand by means of different created innate forms at the same time and in this way understand many things simultaneously.

12. If an angel did not understand many things at the same time, before and after would be found in the action by which he understands this and that thing. But every action in which before and after are found involves time; and, therefore, the characteristic action of an angel would be circumscribed by time. This is contrary, however, to The Causes, where we read: "An intelligence is a thing whose substance and operation are above time."

13. The reason for our intellect's not being able to know many things simultaneously seems to be this, that it understands things dependently on time and space. Neither of these, however, belongs to an angelic intellect, because it does not receive from the senses. Consequently, it can understand many things at the same time.

14. Since forms in the intellect are second perfections, they are accidental forms. Now, many accidental forms can exist in the same subject if they are not contraries, as whiteness and blackness are. Therefore, an angel's intellect can also be informed by many different forms at the same time, as long as they are not contraries. Thus, it can know many things at the same time.

15. Music and grammar are forms belonging to one genus; and they can simultaneously inform the soul of a person who has both habits. It is possible, therefore, for an intellect to be informed simultaneously by different forms. Hence, the conclusion is the same as before.

16. By understanding that it understands, an angelic intellect is aware that it understands something other than itself. Therefore, it simultaneously understands itself and something else. Thus, it can understand many things at the same time.

17. An angelic intellect is of itself indifferently related to all the forms existing within it. Therefore, it understands either through all of them at the same time or through none of them at all. The latter alternative is impossible; hence, it understands through all of them at one time. Thus, it understands many things simultaneously.

To the Contrary:

1'. The Philosopher says: "It may happen that we have habitual knowledge of many things, but we have actual understanding of only one."

2'. As Augustine says, an intention is required before a thing can be considered actually. But, since intention is a motion, it cannot be directed to different objects, because one motion can have only one end-term. Consequently, an angel cannot know many things at the same time.

3'. As a body receives its shape from figure, so does the intellect receive its shape from the species of that which it actually understands, as Algazel says. Now, one body cannot be shaped by different figures simultaneously. Consequently, an intellect, too, cannot be shaped simultaneously by different species. Therefore, it cannot know many things at the same time.

4'. Just as [an angel], when understanding things in their own nature, understands them through distinct forms, so also, when understanding them in the Word, he understands them through distinct intelligible representations. Therefore, he cannot understand many things simultaneously either in their own nature or in the Word.

5'. A thing's power cannot be greater than its substance. Now, an angel's substance cannot be in many places at the same time. Hence, his intellectual power cannot understand many things at the same time.

6'. A thing which extends to many things contains some composition. But an angel's intellect is simple. Therefore, it cannot extend to the simultaneous understanding of many things.

REPLY:

All that an intellect understands it understands by means of some form. Consequently, keeping in mind the kinds of forms by which an angel understands, we must now consider whether or not he can understand many things at one time.

It should be observed, therefore, that some forms belong to one genus, others belong to different genera, and the forms belonging to different genera are related to different potencies. Now, as the Philosopher says, the unity of a genus is determined by the unity of matter or of potency. Consequently, it is possible for the same subject to be perfected simultaneously by forms belonging to different genera, because then the one potency would not be terminating in different acts but differently. For example, if a body is both white and sweet at the same time, it has whiteness in it in so far as it shares the nature of the transparent medium, and sweetness in so far as it shares the nature of the moist. But forms belonging to one genus are related to one potency, whether they be contraries (as blackness and whiteness) or not contraries (as triangle and square).

Now, these forms are said to be in a subject in three ways. In the first, they exist only potentially and, consequently, simultaneously, because one potency has for its object different forms of one genus and their contraries. In the second, they exist in imperfect act, so that they are coming into being. In this manner, they can also exist simultaneously. This is evident in the case of one who becomes white; for, during the whole period of alteration, whiteness inheres in him as something coming into being, and blackness as something going out of being. In the third, they exist in perfect act, as whiteness does when the whitening process is finished. In this manner, it is impossible for two forms belonging to the same genus to be present simultaneously in the same subject, because the same potency would have to terminate in different acts; and this is just as impossible as it is for one line, beginning from one point, to be terminated at different points.

We should understand, therefore, that all intelligible forms belong to one genus, even if the things, whose forms they are, belong to different genera, because all intelligible forms are related to an intellectual potency. Consequently, in the intellect they can all simultaneously exist in potency, as well as in incomplete act--a mean between potency and perfect act. This latter condition is that had by a species which is present habitually, for habit is a mean between potency and act.

But many species cannot exist simultaneously in perfect act in an intellect, because, in order to understand actually, an intellect must be in perfect act with respect to that species by which it understands. Hence, it is impossible for the intellect to understand actually according to different forms taken together at one time. Therefore, all the different things which it understands by different forms cannot be understood at one time, but all that is understood by the same form will be understood at one time. Consequently, an angelic intellect can understand simultaneously all that it understands through the one essence of the Word, but the things it understands through innate forms (which are numerous) it cannot understand simultaneously if its understanding is through different forms. Any angel, however, through the same form, can understand many things, at least all the singulars of a species by means of one form of that species. Indeed, the higher angels can understand more through one species than the lower angels can. Hence, they are more able to understand many things at one time.

We should remember, however, that a thing can be one in one respect and many in another. For example, a continuum is actually one but potentially many. Now, if the intellect or sense is directed to a thing of this sort in so far as it is one, it is seen at one time, but if the same powers are directed to it in so far as it is many (and this would be to consider each part by itself), then the whole could not be seen simultaneously. Similarly, when our intellect considers a proposition, it considers many things as one. Hence, in so far as the things are one, many things are understood at one time when the one proposition made up of them is understood; but, in so far as they are many, they cannot be understood at one time, because this would mean that the intellect can simultaneously turn itself to understanding the intelligible characters of each one of them taken in itself. Consequently, the Philosopher says: "I mean, however, by understanding things 'together' or 'apart' in an affirmation or negation that they are not understood in succession but as one thing." For they cannot be understood simultaneously in so far as a relation of distinctness exists between them, but they can be understood simultaneously in so far as they are united in one proposition.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Augustine is speaking of knowledge had by the blessed. In this they know all things in the Word.

2. As is clear from what has been said,* when an angel, knowing a man, knows that he is not a stone, he knows many things as one.

3. The same answer should be given here as was given to the second difficulty.

4. The nature of an angelic mind is such that it can know many things through one form. Thus, by turning to that species, it can, when it wishes, understand at one time all that it knows through that species.

5. No part of the intellect itself is in the intelligible, but something of what is understood is in the intellect. Consequently, the argument for many things being understood simultaneously by one intellect is not the same as that for one thing being understood by many intellects.

6. Augustine himself later explains that his statement, "Our mind always remembers, understands, and wills itself," refers to internal memory. Consequently, our soul does not always actually understand itself. An angelic mind, however, always understands itself actually. This is due to the fact that an angelic mind understands itself through its essence, which always informs it. Our act of understanding, however, might be said to depend in a certain sense on the intention of our will. Nevertheless, even though an angel's mind in some way understands itself and some other thing, it does not simultaneously understand many things except as they are one. This will be clear from the following.

If any two things are so related that one of them is the reason why the other can be understood, one of them will be, as it were, formal, the other, as it were, material. Thus, those two constitute one intelligible, because matter and form constitute one thing. Consequently, when the intellect understands one thing through another, it understands only one intelligible. This is evidently the case with sight. For light is that by which color is seen, and so is related to color, in a manner of speaking, as its formal element. Thus, color and light constitute only one visible thing and are seen simultaneously by sight. Now, an angel's essence is his means for knowing all that he knows, even though it is not a perfect means and, for this reason, needs forms to be given it. For he knows all things according to the mode of his substance, as The Causes states, and according to his power and nature, as Dionysius says. Consequently, when he understands himself and other things, he cannot understand many things except as they are one.

7. Knowledge is a habit, knowing is an act. Now, many forms can exist in the intellect at the same time habitually, but not in perfect act, as is clear from what has been said.* Hence, one can know many things together, but he cannot understand many things at one time.

8. Those forms are not in the air except in the stage of coming-to-be, for they are in it as in a medium of transmission.

9. Many species exist simultaneously in an angel's intellect, but they are not in perfect act.

10. All things are one in so far as they are intelligible, and so they can be understood at the same time in so far as they are intelligibles. This takes place when their intelligibility is understood.

11. The divine essence is the cause of the intelligibility of all the angel's innate forms, because they are, as it were, modeled upon it. One innate form, however, is not the cause of the intelligibility of another. Hence, there is no parallel.

12. Any operation essentially involves time if it needs some future thing to complete its species. This is evidently the case with motion, which does not have a complete species until it is carried through to a term, because the motion which would end at mid-point would be specifically different from that which would terminate at the extreme. On the other hand, operations which have their complete species immediately are not measured by time except for another reason. Examples of such are understanding, sensing, and the like. For this reason, the Philosopher says that delight is not in time. By exception, however, these operations can be in time, in so far as they are joined to motion by existing in natures subject to time, namely, physical natures which come into and go out of existence. Our sensitive powers use organs, which are of this nature, and our intellect receives from them. But it is clear that an angel's act of understanding involves time neither intrinsically nor extrinsically. Therefore, there is no before and after in an act by which he understands one intelligible. Nevertheless, this does not prevent a number of operations from being ordered according to before and after.

13. The reason given in the objection is not the entire reason for our possible intellect's not being able to understand many things at one time. The entire reason has been given above.*

14. Accidental forms, if not contrary, can exist simultaneously in the same subject if they are related to different powers, but not if they belong to one genus and are related to the same power. This is clear if we consider triangles and squares.

15. Since music and grammar are habits, they are not complete acts, but, as it were, forms standing halfway between potency and act.

16. The knower and the actually known are in some way one. Hence, when anyone understands that he understands something, he understands many things as one.

17. The angelic intellect is not similarly related to all the forms it has within itself, because sometimes it is in perfect act with regard to one form but not with regard to the others. This takes place by means of the will, which reduces the intellect from this potency to act. Consequently, Augustine says in the statement quoted earlier that an angel understands when he wills.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties:

1'. It may happen that only one thing can be understood as one at one time and through one form, but this does not prevent many things from being understood as one at one time or through one form.

2'. Virtual quantity is ascertained by comparing the power with its objects. Consequently, just as a body can, by its different parts, touch different things by means of its dimensional quantity, so can a power be applied to different things according to its different relation to them, as long as it has been perfected in act, just as fire can warm different things on all sides at the same time. Similarly, an intellect perfected by a form can be simultaneously directed to the different things to which that form's representative power extends. There may be many intelligible characters in the thing to which the intellect is directed, but there will be only one species in the intellect because of the intellect's unity with the form.

3'. The intellect does not understand many things at one time if, to understand them, it must be shaped by many different forms.

4'. The intelligible characters in the divine ideas differ only in so far as things have different relations to them. Hence, they are one through the divine essence. This is not true of the innate forms possessed by the angels.

5'. When one says that a thing's power cannot be greater than its substance, this statement should not be understood as meaning that nothing belongs to its power that does not belong to its substance, but rather that the strength of a power is determined by the mode of the substance. For example, if a substance is material, its power will act in a material way.

6'. The more simple a thing's virtual quantity, the greater is the number of objects to which it extends; but the more simple its dimensional quantity, the smaller the number of objects to which it extends. Consequently, extension to many things by reason of dimensional quantity is a sign of composition, but extension by reason of virtual quantity is a sign of simplicity.