The first part of my contentions against Eunomius has with God’s help been sufficiently established in the preceding work, as all who will may see fro

 And let no one suppose that it is through pride or desire of human reputation that I go down to this truceless and implacable warfare to engage with t

 First of all, however, I think it advisable to run briefly over our own doctrinal views and our opponent’s disagreement with them, so that our review

 But to the best of my ability I will raise my voice to rebut our enemies’ argument. They say that God is declared to be without generation, that the G

 Now if the term ungenerate did not signify the being without origin, but the idea of simplicity entered into the meaning of such a term, and He were c

 But, saith he, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Granted: for the Son also is unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet is He the Son. But

 But this thing he leaves untold, and only says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is so spoken, saith he,

 But before we examine what he has written, it may be better to enquire with what purpose it is that he refuses to admit that ungenerate can be predica

 For after saying that the Only-begotten God is not the same in essence with the true Father, and after sophistically inferring this from the oppositio

 Accordingly, enveloping his former special-pleading in the mazy evolutions of his sophistries, and dealing subtly with the term ungenerate, he steals

 Seeing, then, the mischief resulting to the dupes of this fallacious reasoning—that to assent to His not being very God is a departure from our confes

 It will presently be time to bring to their own recollection the method of this argument. Suffice it first to say this. There is no faculty in human n

 If, then, the lower creation which comes under our organs of sense transcends human knowledge, how can He, Who by His mere will made the worlds, be wi

 How pitiable are they for their cleverness! how wretched, how fatal is their over-wise philosophy! Who is there who goes of his own accord to the pit

 This, then, was the meaning of his safe guidance on the way to what he sought—that he was not blindly led by any of the means ready to hand for his in

 He shows, I think, by the relation of these elements to each other, or rather by their distance, how far the divine nature is above the speculations o

 Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits. For it is both safer and more revere

 And on other accounts also it may be called safe to let alone the Divine essence, as unspeakable, and beyond the scope of human reasoning. For the des

 Wherefore Holy Scripture omits all idle inquiry into substance as superfluous and unnecessary. And methinks it was for this that John, the Son of Thun

 But, nevertheless, with only such a nature for their base of operations, they open their mouths wide against the unspeakable Power, and encompass by o

 I have said, then (for I make my master’s words my own), that reason supplies us with but a dim and imperfect comprehension of the Divine nature neve

 But although our great master has thus cleared away all unworthy notions respecting the Divine nature, and has urged and taught all that may be revere

 And yet it is plain to every one who has given any attention to the uses of words, that the word incorruption denotes by the privative particle that n

 While, however, we strenuously avoid all concurrence with absurd notions in our thoughts of God, we allow ourselves in the use of many diverse appella

 And if any one would distinguish such notions by words, he would find it absolutely necessary to call that which admits of no changing to the worse un

 I say, then, that men have a right to such word-building, adapting their appellations to their subject, each man according to his judgment and that t

 For God is not an expression, neither hath He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is of Himself what also He is believed to be, but He is named

 But in applying such appellations to the Divine essence, “which passeth all understanding,” we do not seek to glory in it by the names we employ, but

 But let us hear how, “in the way most needed, and the form that preceded” (for with such rhymes he again gives us a taste of the flowers of style), le

 If, then, the creation is of later date than its Creator, and man is the latest in the scale of creation, and if speech is a distinctive characteristi

 He says that God was what He is, before the creation of man. Nor do we deny it. For whatsoever we conceive of God existed before the creation of the w

 But that we might gain some sort of comprehension of what with reverence may be thought respecting Him, we have stamped our different ideas with certa

 They say that God is ungenerate, and in this we agree. But that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine essence, here we take exception. For we maint

 With such gibes at the term “conception,” he shows, to the best of his ability, that it is useless and unprofitable for the life of man. What, then, w

 But why enumerate the greater and more splendid results of this faculty? For every one who is not unfriendly to truth can see for himself that all els

 Now that He did not teach us such things by some visible operation, Himself presiding over the work, as we may see in matters of bodily teaching, no o

 For that one who proposes to himself to terrify or charm an audience should have plenty of conception to effect such a purpose, and should display to

 For it is not the case that, while the intelligence implanted in us by the Giver is fully competent to conjure up non-realities, it is endowed with no

 But as far as possible to elucidate the idea, I will endeavour to illustrate it by a still plainer example. Let us suppose the inquiry to be about som

 This example being understood, it is time to go on to the thing which it illustrates. This much we comprehend, that the First Cause has His existence

 Such are his charges against us not indeed his notions as expressed in his own phraseology, for we have made such alterations as were required to cor

 If, then, God gives things their names as our new expositor of the Divine record assures us, naming germ, and grass, and tree, and fruit, He must of n

 Such is the nature of this new-fangled Deity, as deducible from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures, and maintain

 But it may be said that the voice of the Father was addressed to the Holy Spirit. But neither does the Holy Spirit require instruction by speech, for

 But, says he, the record of Moses does not lie, and from it we learn that God spake. No! nor is great David of the number of those who lie, and he exp

 What, then, do we think of this passage? For it may be that, if we understand it, we shall also understand the meaning of Moses. It often happens that

 But to return to the matter in question. We assert that the words “He said” do not imply voice and words on the part of God but the writer, in showin

 For the case is different from that of men endowed by nature with practical ability, where you may look at capability and execution apart from each ot

 But if any one would give a more sensuous interpretation to the words “God said,” as proving that articulate speech was His creation, by a parity of r

 And the futility of such assertions may be seen also by this. For as the natures of the elements, which are the work of the Creator, appear alike to a

 And if any one cites the confusion of tongues that took place at the building of the tower, as contradicting what I have said, not even there is God s

 But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us that the Hebrew tongue is not even ancient like the others, but that along with other mirac

 For to suppose that God used the Hebrew tongue, when there was no one to hear and understand such a language, methinks no reasonable being will consen

 But this is denied by Eunomius, the author of all this contumely with which we are assailed, and the companion and adviser of this impious band. For,

 On these passages it is probable that our opponents will take their stand. And I will agree for them with what is said, and will myself take advantage

 But since the nature of most things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all that they connote being comprehended in one word, a

 In like manner before him Jacob, having taken hold of his brother’s heel, was called a supplanter , from the attitude in which he came to the birth. F

 But I will pass over his other babblings against the truth, possessing as they do no force against our doctrines, for I deem it superfluous to linger

 To pass on, then, to what remains. He brings forward once more some of the Master’s words, to this effect: “And it is in precisely the same manner tha

 But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired Scriptures can deny the fact. What then? Does Eunomius affirm th

 But, like a mighty wrestler, he will not relinquish his irresistible hold on us, and affirms in so many words, that “these names are the work of human

 “But God,” he says, “gave the weakest of terrestrial things a share in the most honourable names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, an

 This it is that our strong-minded opponent, who accuses us of dishonesty, and charges us with being irrational in judgment,—this it is that he pretend

 But what is our author’s meaning, and what is the object of this argument of his? For no one need imagine that, for lack of something to say, in order

 He does not, in fact, partake of that dignity which the meaning of those names indicates and whereas wise Daniel, in setting right the Babylonians’ e

 But in dwelling on such nonsense I fear that I am secretly gratifying our adversaries. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I

 But I fear that all we shall find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere tumours and sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessa

 Basil, he says, asserts that after we have obtained our first idea of a thing, the more minute and accurate investigation of the thing under considera

 And Moses, seeing God in the light, and John calling Him the true Light , and in the same way Paul, when our Lord first appeared to him, and a Light s

 I have deluged my discourse with much nonsense of his, but I trust my hearers will pardon me for not leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his in

 Then going farther, as if his object were thus far attained, he takes up other charges against us, more difficult, as he thinks, to deal with than the

 But all this is beside our purpose. Would that our charges against him were limited to this, and that he could be thought to err only in his delivery,

 But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself, it is logically connected with his whole discours

 But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable attribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son,

 Now that the idea of ungeneracy and the belief in the Divine essence are quite different things may be seen by what he himself has put forward. God, h

 But it will be well, I think, to pass over his nauseating observations (for such we must term his senseless attacks on the method of conception), and

 But if it were in any way possible by some other means to lay bare the movements of thought, abandoning the formal instrumentality of words, we should

 All his argument, then, in opposition to the doctrine of conception I think it best to pass over, though he charge with madness those who think that t

 But, like some viscous and sticky clay, the nonsense he has concocted in contravention of our teaching of conception seems to hold us back, and preven

 But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus’ nature-system, which he says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctr

 But, says he, since God condescends to commune with His servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very beginning He enacted words appropriat

 But our pious opponent will not allow of God’s using our language, because of our proneness to evil, shutting his eyes (good man!) to the fact that fo

 But most people, perhaps, will think this too far removed from the scope of our present inquiry. This, however, no one will regard as out of keeping w

 Since, then, it is improper to regard God as the inventor of such names, lest the names even of these idol gods should seem to have had their origin f

 And if we set forth the opinion of most commentators on these words of the Psalmist, that of Eunomius regarding them will be still more convicted of f

 But the names which the Lord gives to such stars we may plainly learn from the prophecy of Esaias, which says, “I have called thee by thy name thou a

 I will pass over, then, the abuse with which he has prefaced his discussion of these matters, as when he uses such terms as “alteration of seed,” and

 I pass in silence his blasphemy in reducing God the Only-begotten to a level with all created things, and, in a word, allowing to the Son of God no hi

 For, proceeding with his discourse, he asks us what we mean by the ages. And yet we ourselves might more reasonably put such questions to him. For it

 But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses i

 Such is our position our adversary’s, with regard to the precise meaning of this term , is such as can derive no help from any reasonings he only sp

 He says, “The Life that is the same, and thoroughly single, must have one and the same outward expression for it, even though in mere names, and manne

 But why do we linger over these follies, when we ought rather to put Eunomius’ book itself into the hands of the studious, and so, apart from any exam

 But if he should still answer with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only the term Father, and the term Creator, that are ap

 But let us examine a still more vehement charge of his against us it is this: “If one must proceed to say something harsher still, he does not even k

 What, then, does Eunomius say to this? “If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbegin

 What, then, out of all that we have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly, in which he returns to the charge and repeats himself in

 Such are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. For what need is there to go through all his argument with trifling prolixity? For in e

 Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one,

 But that he himself also may be brought to the knowledge of his own trifling, we will convict him from his own statements. For in the course of his ar

 Thus far our argument goes with him. But the riddle with which he accompanies his words we must leave to those trained in the wisdom of Prunicus to in

 But let us leave this, and along with it the usual foul deluge of calumny in his words and let us go on to his subsequent quotations (of Basil). But

 But who, pray, is so simple as to be harmed by such arguments, and to imagine that if names are once believed to be an outcome of the reasoning facult

 But I do not think that we need linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows. To the more attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our

 But now I do not know which it is best to do to pursue step by step this subject, or to put an end here to our contest with such folly. Well, as in t

 When, then, he is on the point of introducing this treatment of terms of “privation,” he takes upon himself to show “the incurable absurdity,” as he c

 Every term—every term, that is, which is really such—is an utterance expressing some movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound th

 Well, then, if God did not exist formerly, or if there be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be called either unending or without beginning and

 Thus much, then, is known to us about the names uttered in any form whatever in reference to the Deity. We have given a simple explanation of them, un

 How it is possible, then, to assign one’s gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man, who claims to be using words and phrases in their natural fo

 Well, if the term imperishable or indestructible is not considered by this maker of an empty system to be privative of destruction, then by a stern ne

 “But I do not see,” he rejoins, “how God can be above His own works simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him .” And on the strength of

 He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indestructible, generated beings as ungenerate, just in the same degr

 Therefore let us again handle this dictum of his: “God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death.” How are we to accept this statement,

 Still I cannot see what profit there is in deigning to examine such nonsense. For a man like myself, who has lived to gray hairs , and whose eyes are

 But it is time now to expose that angry accusation which he brings against us at the close of his treatise, saying that we affirm the Father to be fro

 “The evangelist Luke, when giving the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and stepping up from the last to the first

 With what eyes will you now dare to gaze upon your guide? I speak to you, O flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man who

 Such, to use your own words, is the “evil,” as one might expect, not indeed “of valuing the character for being clever before one is really such” (for

But if he should still answer with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only the term Father, and the term Creator, that are applied to God as expressing production, both words being so applied, as he says, because of an operation, then he will cut short our long discussion of this subject, by thus conceding what it would have required a laborious argument on our part to prove. For if the word Father and the word Creator have the same meaning (for both arise from an operation), one of the things signified is exactly equivalent to the other, since if the signification is the same, the subjects cannot be different. If, then, He is called both Father and Creator because of an operation, it is quite allowable to interchange the names, and to turn one into the other and say that God is Creator of the Son, and Father of a stone, seeing that the term Father is to be devoid of any meaning of essential relation131    τῆς κατα φύσιν σχετικῆς σημασίας.. Well, the monstrous conclusion that is hereby proved cannot remain doubtful to those who reflect. For as it is absurd to deem a stone, or anything else that exists by creation, Divine, it must be agreed that there is no Divinity to be recognized in the Only-begotten either, when that one identical meaning of an operation, by which God is called both Father and Creator, assigns, according to Eunomius, both these terms to Him. But let us hold to the question before us. He abuses our assertion that our knowledge of God is formed by contributions of terms applied to different ideas, and says that the proof of His simplicity is destroyed by us so, since He must partake of the elements signified by each term, and only by virtue of a share in them can completely fill out His essence. Here I write in my own language, curtailing his wearisome prolixity; and in answer to his foolish and nerveless redundancy no sensible person, I think, would make any reply, except as regards his charging us with “senselessness.” Now if anything of that description had been said by us, we ought of course to retract it if it was foolishly worded, or, if there was any doubt as to its meaning, to put an irreproachable interpretation upon it. But we have not said anything of the kind, any more than the consequences of our words lead the mind to any such necessity. Why, then, linger on that to which all assent, and weary the reader by prolonging the argument? Who is really so devoid of reflection as to imagine, when he hears that our orthodox conceptions of the Deity are gathered from various ways of thinking of Him, that the Deity is composed of these various elements, or completes His actual fulness by participating in anything at all? A man, say, has made discoveries in geometry, and this same man, let us suppose, has made discoveries also in astronomy, and in medicine as well, and grammar, and agriculture, and sciences of that kind. Will it follow, because there are these various names of sciences viewed in connection with one single soul, that that single soul is to be considered a composite soul? Yet there is a very great difference in meaning between medicine and astronomy; and grammar means nothing in common with geometry, or seamanship with agriculture. Nevertheless it is within the bounds of possibility that the idea of each of these sciences should be associated with one soul, without that soul thereby becoming composite, or, on the other hand, without all those terms for sciences blending into one meaning. If, then, the human mind, with all such terms applied to it, is not injured as regards its simplicity, how can any one imagine that the Deity, when He is called wise, and just, and good, and eternal, and all the other Divine names, must, unless all these names are made to mean one thing, become of many parts, or take a share of all these to make up the perfection of His nature?

εἰ δὲ ἀπολογοῖτο περὶ τῆς ἐναντιότητος ὡς μόνης τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς τοῦ δημιουργοῦ προσηγορίας ἐπιγεννηματικῶς τῷ θεῷ προσγενομένης, « διὰ τὸ ἐξ ἐνεργείας », ὡς αὐτὸς λέγει, « ἑκατέρας ἐπιλέγεσθαι τῷ θεῷ τὰς φωνάς », περιγράψει τὴν πολλὴν ἡμῶν περὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἀσχολίαν, ταῦτα ὁμολογῶν ἃ πολλοῖς ἔδει πόνοις παρ' ἡμῶν διελέγχεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ μία τῆς τε τοῦ δημιουργοῦ καὶ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς φωνῆς ἡ σημασία (« ἐξ ἐνεργείας » γὰρ ἑκατέρα), ἰσοδυναμεῖ πάντως ἀλλήλοις καὶ τὰ διὰ τῶν φωνῶν σημαινόμενα: ὧν γὰρ τὸ σημαινόμενον τὸ αὐτό, τούτων οὐδὲ τὸ ὑποκείμενον πάντως διάφορον. « εἰ οὖν ἐξ ἐνεργείας » καὶ πατὴρ καὶ δημιουργὸς ὀνομάζεται, ἔξεστι πάντως καὶ ὑπαλλάξαντι κατὰ τὸ ἀντιστρέφον τοῖς ὀνόμασι χρήσασθαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι καὶ δημιουργὸς τοῦ υἱοῦ καὶ πατὴρ τοῦ λίθου ἐστὶν ὁ θεός, εἴπερ ἄμοιρόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὄνομα τῆς κατὰ φύσιν σχετικῆς σημασίας. τὸ δὲ διὰ τούτου κατασκευαζόμενον οὐκέτ' ἀμφίβολον ἔχει τὴν ἀτοπίαν τοῖς γε νοῦν ἔχουσιν. ὡς γὰρ ἄτοπόν ἐστι λίθον ἡγεῖσθαι θεὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν διὰ κτίσεως ὑποστάντων, οὕτως ὁμολογηθήσεται μηδὲ τῷ μονογενεῖ θεῷ δεῖν προσμαρτυρεῖν τὴν θεότητα, μιᾶς καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν σημασίας ἀμφοτέρας τῷ θεῷ τὰς κλήσεις κατὰ τὸν Εὐνομίου λόγον προσμαρτυρούσης, καθ' ἣν καὶ πατὴρ καὶ δημιουργὸς ὀνομάζεται. Ἀλλὰ τῶν προκειμένων ἐχώμεθα. διαβάλλων γὰρ τὸν ἡμέτερον λόγον τὸν κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς λέγοντα τὴν περὶ θεοῦ γνῶσιν ἡμῖν συναγείρεσθαι φησὶ « μηκέτ' αὐτὸν παρ' ἡμῶν ἁπλοῦν εἶναι κατασκευάζεσθαι ὡς μεταλαμβάνοντα τῶν νοημάτων τῶν δι' ἑκάστης προσηγορίας σημαινομένων καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐκείνων μετουσίας συμπληροῦντα ἑαυτῷ τὴν κατὰ τὸ εἶναι τελείωσιν ». ταῦτα διὰ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ λέξεως γράφω συντέμνων αὐτοῦ τὴν μακρὰν ἀδολεσχίαν. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν ματαίαν ταύτην οἶμαι καὶ ἄτονον περιττολογίαν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀντίρρησιν ἄν τινα τῶν εὖ φρονούντων ἔξω τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄνοιαν κατηγορίας ποιήσασθαι. εἰ μὲν γάρ τι τοιοῦτον ἐν τοῖς παρ' ἡμῶν εἰρημένοις ἦν, ἔδει πάντως ἡμᾶς ἢ ἀνατίθεσθαι τὰ κακῶς εἰρημένα ἢ τὸ ἀμφίβολον τῆς διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἀνεύθυνον τῆς ἑρμηνείας ἄγειν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὔτε εἴρηται παρ' ἡμῶν τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν οὔτε ἡ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀκολουθία πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἀνάγκην ἐξωθεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν, τί δεῖ τοῖς ὁμολογουμένοις ἐνδιατρίβοντα ἀποκναίειν τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας τῇ παρατάσει τοῦ λόγου; τίς γὰρ οὕτως ἔξω διανοίας ἐστίν, ὡς ἀκούσας διὰ πολλῶν ἡμῖν νοημάτων τὰς εὐσεβεῖς περὶ θεοῦ ὑπολήψεις ἀθροίζεσθαι σύνθετον ἐκ διαφόρων τὸ θεῖον οἴεσθαι ἢ ἐκ μεταλήψεώς τινων ἑαυτῷ συναγείρειν τὴν τελειότητα; εὕρατό τις καθ' ὑπόθεσιν γεωμετρίαν, ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς οὗτος ὑπειλήφθω καὶ ἀστρονομίας εὑρετὴς εἶναι ἰατρικῆς τε πάλιν καὶ γραμματικῆς καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἄλλων τοιούτων ἐπιτηδευμάτων τινῶν: ἆρ' ἐπειδὴ πολλὰ καὶ διάφορα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων περὶ τὴν μίαν θεωρεῖται ψυχήν, σύνθετος διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχὴ νομισθήσεται; καίτοιγε πλεῖστον διαφέρει τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σημαινόμενον τῆς ἀστρονομικῆς ἐπιστήμης καὶ ἡ γραμματικὴ πρὸς τὴν γεωμετρίαν οὐδεμίαν κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον τὴν κοινωνίαν ἔχει, οὐδ' αὖ πάλιν ἡ ναυτιλία καὶ ἡ γεωπονία: ἀλλὰ μὴν περὶ τὴν μίαν ψυχὴν ἑκάστου τούτων τὸν λόγον δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀθροισθῆναι, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο πολυσύνθετος ἡ ψυχὴ γίνεται οὐδὲ πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων πρὸς ἓν σημαινόμενον ἀνακίρναται. εἰ τοίνυν ὁ ἀνθρώπινος νοῦς διὰ τοσούτων ὀνομάτων τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν λεγομένων οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν ἁπλότητα βλάπτεται, πῶς ἄν τις οἰηθείη τὸν θεόν, εἰ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἀΐδιος καὶ πάντα τὰ θεοπρεπῆ καλοῖτο ὀνόματα, εἰ μὴ μία πᾶσι νομισθείη τοῖς ὀνόμασι σημασία, ἢ πολυμερῆ γίνεσθαι ἢ ἐκ μετουσίας τούτων τὸ τέλειον ἑαυτῷ συναγείρειν τῆς φύσεως;