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simply mine: “No one is good except one, God, the only just one, the only wise one, the blessed and only potentate, who alone has immortality, dwelling in unapproachable light: therefore none of the things that follow God could be more so than He, and each of them is unique, and whatever might be predicated of these, is not universal.” For the super-essential and super-good and super-wise and super-luminous, of what else could they be than of the super-divine essence and wisdom and goodness and of that light? How then could a syllogism be formed from unique things, without the universal? And if a syllogism could not be dialectical, O best of men, how could it be formed? It will be sophistic, however, having only the form and appearance, but not being one. And so your dialectic has grown out like fluff, and all your syllogisms, if indeed they are not even deprived of the name of syllogisms (p. 474), are sophistic, not being, but appearing, or rather not even this, but let it be granted nonetheless: and the propositions added from the principles existing in us, not being causes of the conclusion, how could they be causes of belief in it? But if he concedes, what is the reason for which, wishing to call his syllogism dialectical, he both takes non-universals as universals and posits that the concepts within us provide faith in the sacred sayings and considers the syllogism a cause of faith, but not of knowledge, and simply concedes everything that does not agree with the principles of the art, but thinks nothing should be conceded to those who call it demonstrative?

Furthermore, since in the things in which you seem to refute us, you say that the unique is twofold and homonymous for no other reason than that it is one way in the case of each of the sensible things among us and another way in the case of God, learn that all things said of God are in this way twofold and homonymous: for none of the things said of Him is in the same way as it is in the case of each of the things among us, not only of the sensible but not even of the intelligible, so that in all your syllogisms you attempt to mislead your hearers by this twofold meaning; therefore all your syllogisms are sophistic, but not dialectical. Furthermore, if God is unique, and such a unique that is not one out of many, and if in the case of this one it is not possible for there to be a “this something” and a subject, and without these there is no proposition; and if there is no proposition, there will be no syllogism, not to mention dialectical, but not even a sophistic one. Your dialectical syllogisms, therefore, as you yourself call them, having been shown to be neither dialectical nor sophistic, what then shall we call them? Unspeakable, or even unthinkable.

For instance, the syllogism which you say is most precise for you, “The Father and the Son have one energy; those who have one energy, have one power; those who have one power, have the same essence and nature, (p. 476) therefore the Father and the Son have the same essence and nature”: this is the response for those who propose it when they ask; for someone else setting this forth in this way would not be held accountable by us; but as it is yours, we shall examine it from your own principles. For “those who,” of whom do you speak? For if of all, is it not exceedingly faulty? For you group together with this multitude things that are removed from all multitude, and you presume to teach about the uncreated nature from created things. Furthermore, also through the twofold manner of energy you attempt to mislead us sophistically; for not even you yourself would say that the power and energy of the Son and the Father are one in the same way as my and your energy and power are one. But if not of all, how is your most precise syllogism itself not non-syllogistic, being deprived of the universal? And in addition to this, it begs the question, being brought forward in effect through tautology.

Do you wish that we further scrutinize this syllogism that is so exceptionally precise for you? But know well that I hesitate to speak at length, being least of all willing to do so for no profit:

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ἁπλῶς ἐμόν˙ «Οὐδείς ἀγαθός, εἰ μή εἷς ὁ Θεός, ὁ μόνος δίκαιος, ὁ μόνος σοφός, ὁ μακάριος καί μόνος δυνάστης, ὁ μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν, φῶς οἰκῶν ἀπρόσιτον˙ οὐδέν οὖν τῶν ἑπομένων τῷ Θεῷ ἐπί πλέον εἴη ἄν αὐτοῦ, καί αὐτῶν δ᾿ ἕκαστον μοναδικόν, καί ὅ,τι ἄν κατηγοροῖτο τούτων, οὐ καθόλου». Τό γάρ ὑπερούσιον καί ὑπεράγαθον καί ὑπέρσοφον καί ὑπέρφωτον τίνος γε ἄλλου ἤ τῆς ὑπερθέου οὐσίας καί σοφίας καί ἀγαθότητος καί τοῦ φωτός ἐκείνου; Πῶς οὖν ἐκ μοναδικῶν γένοιτ᾿ ἄν συλλογισμός, ἄνευ τοῦ καθόλου; Εἰ δέ συλλογισμός οὐκ ἄν γένοιτ᾿ διαλεκτικός, ὦ βέλτιστε, πῶς ἄν γένοιτο; Σοφιστικός δ᾿ ὅμως ἔσται, σχῆμα μόνον ἔχων καί φαινόμενος, ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ὤν. Καί ἡ διαλεκτική σοι τοίνυν, ὡς χνοώδης διεκπεφύσηται, καί οἱ σοί ἅπαντες συλλογισμοί, εἰ ἄρα καί μή ἀφίενται τοῦ τῶν συλλογισμῶν (σελ. 474) ὀνόματος, σοφιστικοί εἰσιν, οὐκ ὄντες, ἀλλά φαινόμενοι, μᾶλλον δέ οὐδέ τοῦτο, δεδόσθω δ᾿ ὅμως˙ αἱ δ᾿ ἐκ τῶν ἡμῖν ἐνυπαρχόντων λόγων προστιθέμεναι προτάσεις, μή οὖσαι αἴτιοι τοῦ συμπεράσματος, πῶς ἄν εἶεν αἴτιοι τῆς πίστεως αὐτοῦ; Εἰ δέ συγχωρεῖ, τίς ὁ λόγος καθ᾿ ὅν διαλεκτικόν μέν θέλων ὀνομάζειν τόν αὐτοῦ συλλογισμόν, τά τε μή καθόλου λαμβάνει ὡς καθόλου καί τάς ἐν ἡμῖν ἐννοίας πίστιν παρέχειν τοῖς λογίοις τίθεται καί τόν συλλογισμόν πίστεως, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχί γνώσεως, αἴτιον ἡγεῖται καί ἁπλῶς πάντα συγχωρεῖ τά καί τῷ λόγῳ τῆς τέχνης μή συμβαίνοντα, τοῖς δέ ἀποδεικτικόν καλοῦσιν, οὐδέν οἴεται συγχωρητέον;

Ἔτι, ἐπείπερ ἐν οἷς δοκεῖς ἡμᾶς ἐλέγχειν, τό μοναδικόν φῄς διττόν καί ὁμώνυμον παρ᾿ οὐδέν ἄλλο ἤ ὅτι ἄλλως ἐφ᾿ ἑκάστου τῶν παρ᾿ ἡμῖν αἰσθητῶν ἔχει καί ἄλλως ἐπί τοῦ Θεοῦ, μάθε ὡς πάντα τά ἐπί Θεοῦ λεγόμενα τοῦτον τόν τρόπον διττά καί ὁμώνυμα˙ οὐδέν γάρ τῶν ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῦ λεγομένων οὕτως ἔχει ὥσπερ ἐφ᾿ ἑκάστου τῶν παρ᾿ ἡμῖν, οὐχ ὅπως τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ τῶν νοητῶν, ὥστ᾿ ἐν ἅπασί σου τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς παρά τό διττόν τοῦτο τούς ἀκροωμένους ἐπιχειρεῖς παρακρούεσθαι˙ σοφιστικοί σοι ἄρ᾿ εἰσίν ἅπαντες, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ διαλεκτικοί. Ἔτι, εἰ μοναδικόν ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, καί τοιοῦτο μοναδικόν ὡς μή ἐκ πολλῶν ἕν, ἐπί δέ τούτου τοῦ ἑνός οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι εἶναι καί ὑποκείμενον, τούτων δ᾿ ἄνευ πρότασις οὐκ ἔστι˙ προτάσεως μή οὔσης, οὐδέ συλλογισμός ἔσται, μή ὅτι διαλεκτικός, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ σοφιστικός. Τούς σούς τοίνυν διαλεκτικούς, οὕς αὐτός φῄς, συλλογισμούς, μήτε διαλεκτικούς, μήτε σοφιστικούς ἀναφανέντας, τί γε ὀνομάσωμεν; Ἀρρήτους, ἤ καί ἀδιανοήτους.

Αὐτίκα ὅν φῄς ἀκριβῆ σοι ἐς τά μάλιστα συλλογισμόν, «Πατρός καί Υἱοῦ μία ἐνέργεια, ὧν μία ἐνέργεια, μία δύναμις, ὧν μία δύναμις, οὐσία καί φύσης ἡ αὐτή, (σελ. 476) Πατρός ἄρα καί Υἱοῦ, οὐσία καί φύσις ἡ αὐτή»˙ τοῦτον δή προβαλλομένοις ἀπόκρισις πυνθανομένοις˙ ἄλλος μέν γάρ τις τοῦτον οὕτως ἐκτιθέμενος, οὐκ ἄν εὐθύνοιτο παρ᾿ ἡμῶν˙ ὡς δέ σόν, ἀπό τῶν σῶν ἐτάσομεν. Ὧν γάρ, τίνων λέγεις; Εἰ μέν γάρ ἁπάντων, μή καί λίαν πλημμελές; Τά γάρ ὑπεξῃρημένα πάσης πληθύος ταύτῃ δι᾿ αὐτοῦ συντάττεις καί ἀπό τῶν κτιστῶν περί τῆς ἀκτίστου φύσεως διδάσκειν ἀξιοῖς. Ἔτι δέ καί διά τοῦ διττοῦ τῆς ἐνεργείας τρόπου σοφιστικῶς ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖς παρακρούεσθαι˙ καί γάρ οὐδ᾿ αὐτός ἄν φαίης οὕτως εἶναι μίαν δύναμίν τε καί ἐνέργειαν Υἱοῦ τε καί Πατρός, ὡς ἐμοῦ τε καί σοῦ μία ἐστίν ἐνέργειά τε καί δύναμις. Εἰ δ᾿ οὐ πάντων, πῶς οὐκ ἀσυλλόγστος ὁ ἀκριβέστατος αὐτός σου συλλογισμός, ἐστερημένος τοῦ καθόλου; Πρός δέ τούτῳ καί τό ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖται διά ταὐτολογίας δυνάμει προαγόμενος.

Θέλεις ἔτι διαβασανίσωμεν τόν διαφερόντως τοῦτον ἠκριβωμένον σοι συλλογισμόν; Ἀλλ᾿ ὀκνῶ εὖ ἴσθι μακρηγορεῖν πρός οὐδέν κέρδος ἥκιστα ἐθέλων˙