Chapter XX.

Let us see how he continues after this:  “These events,” he says, “he predicted as being a God, and the prediction must by all means come to pass.  God, therefore, who above all others ought to do good to men, and especially to those of his own household, led on his own disciples and prophets, with whom he was in the habit of eating and drinking, to such a degree of wickedness, that they became impious and unholy men.  Now, of a truth, he who shared a man’s table would not be guilty of conspiring against him; but after banqueting with God, he became a conspirator.  And, what is still more absurd, God himself plotted against the members of his own table, by converting them into traitors and villains!”  Now, since you wish me to answer even those charges of Celsus which seem to me frivolous,203    εὐτελέσι. the following is our reply to such statements.  Celsus imagines that an event, predicted through foreknowledge, comes to pass because it was predicted; but we do not grant this, maintaining that he who foretold it was not the cause of its happening, because he foretold it would happen; but the future event itself, which would have taken place though not predicted, afforded the occasion to him, who was endowed with foreknowledge, of foretelling its occurrence.  Now, certainly this result is present to the foreknowledge of him who predicts an event, when it is possible that it may or may not happen, viz., that one or other of these things will take place.  For we do not assert that he who foreknows an event, by secretly taking away the possibility of its happening or not, makes any such declaration as this:  “This shall infallibly happen, and it is impossible that it can be otherwise.”  And this remark applies to all the foreknowledge of events dependent upon ourselves, whether contained in the sacred Scriptures or in the histories of the Greeks.  Now, what is called by logicians an “idle argument,”204    ἀργὸς λόγος. which is a sophism, will be no sophism as far as Celsus can help, but according to sound reasoning it is a sophism.  And that this may be seen, I shall take from the Scriptures the predictions regarding Judas, or the foreknowledge of our Saviour regarding him as the traitor; and from the Greek histories the oracle that was given to Laius, conceding for the present its truth, since it does not affect the argument.  Now, in Ps. cviii., Judas is spoken of by the mouth of the Saviour, in words beginning thus:  “Hold not Thy peace, O God of my praise; for the mouth of the wicked and the mouth of the deceitful are opened against me.”  Now, if you carefully observe the contents of the psalm, you will find that, as it was foreknown that he would betray the Saviour, so also was he considered to be himself the cause of the betrayal, and deserving, on account of his wickedness, of the imprecations contained in the prophecy.  For let him suffer these things, “because,” says the psalmist, “he remembered not to show mercy, but persecuted the poor and needy man.”  Wherefore it was possible for him to show mercy, and not to persecute him whom he did persecute.  But although he might have done these things, he did not do them, but carried out the act of treason, so as to merit the curses pronounced against him in the prophecy.

And in answer to the Greeks we shall quote the following oracular response to Laius, as recorded by the tragic poet, either in the exact words of the oracle or in equivalent terms.  Future events are thus made known to him by the oracle:  “Do not try to beget children against the will of the gods.  For if you beget a son, your son shall murder you; and all your household shall wade in blood.”205    Euripid., Phœnissæ, 18–20.  Now from this it is clear that it was within the power of Laius not to try to beget children, for the oracle would not have commanded an impossibility; and it was also in his power to do the opposite, so that neither of these courses was compulsory.  And the consequence of his not guarding against the begetting of children was, that he suffered from so doing the calamities described in the tragedies relating to Œdipus and Jocasta and their sons.  Now that which is called the “idle argument,” being a quibble, is such as might be applied, say in the case of a sick man, with the view of sophistically preventing him from employing a physician to promote his recovery; and it is something like this:  “If it is decreed that you should recover from your disease, you will recover whether you call in a physician or not; but if it is decreed that you should not recover, you will not recover whether you call in a physician or no.  But it is certainly decreed either that you should recover, or that you should not recover; and therefore it is in vain that you call in a physician.”  Now with this argument the following may be wittily compared:  “If it is decreed that you should beget children, you will beget them, whether you have intercourse with a woman or not.  But if it is decreed that you should not beget children, you will not do so, whether you have intercourse with a woman or no.  Now, certainly, it is decreed either that you should beget children or not; therefore it is in vain that you have intercourse with a woman.”  For, as in the latter instance, intercourse with a woman is not employed in vain, seeing it is an utter impossibility for him who does not use it to beget children; so, in the former, if recovery from disease is to be accomplished by means of the healing art, of necessity the physician is summoned, and it is therefore false to say that “in vain do you call in a physician.”  We have brought forward all these illustrations on account of the assertion of this learned Celsus, that “being a God He predicted these things, and the predictions must by all means come to pass.”  Now, if by “by all means” he means “necessarily,” we cannot admit this.  For it was quite possible, also, that they might not come to pass.  But if he uses “by all means” in the sense of “simple futurity,”206    ἀντὶ τοῦ ἕσται. which nothing hinders from being true (although it was possible that they might not happen), he does not at all touch my argument; nor did it follow, from Jesus having predicted the acts of the traitor or the perjurer, that it was the same thing with His being the cause of such impious and unholy proceedings.  For He who was amongst us, and knew what was in man, seeing his evil disposition, and foreseeing what he would attempt from his spirit of covetousness, and from his want of stable ideas of duty towards his Master, along with many other declarations, gave utterance to this also:  “He that dippeth his hand with Me in the dish, the same shall betray Me.”207    Matt. xxvi. 23.

Μετὰ ταῦτα ἴδωμεν, πῶς λέγει· Ταῦτα θεός, φησίν, ὢν προεῖπε, καὶ πάντως ἐχρῆν γενέσθαι τὸ προειρημένον. Θεὸς οὖν τοὺς αὑτοῦ μαθητὰς καὶ προφήτας, μεθ' ὧν συνεδείπνει καὶ συνέπινεν, εἰς τοῦτο περιήγαγεν, ὥστε ἀσεβεῖς καὶ ἀνοσίους γενέσθαι, ὃν ἐχρῆν μάλιστα πάντας ἀνθρώπους εὐεργετεῖν, διαφερόντως δὲ τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ συνεσ τίους. Ἢ ἀνθρώπῳ μὲν ὁ κοινωνήσας τραπέζης οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ἐπεβούλευσε, θεῷ δὲ [ὁ] συνευωχηθεὶς ἐπίβουλος ἐγίνετο; Καὶ ὅπερ ἔτι ἀτοπώτερον, αὐτὸς ὁ θεὸς τοῖς συντραπέζοις ἐπεβούλευσε, προδότας καὶ δυσσεβεῖς ποιῶν. Καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα δέ, ἐπεὶ βούλει καὶ τοῖς ἐμοὶ φαινομένοις εὐτελέσι τοῦ Κέλσου ἐπιχειρήμασιν ἀπαντᾶν, τοιαῦτα φήσομεν. Ὁ μὲν Κέλσος οἴεται διὰ τοῦτο γίνεσθαι τὸ ὑπό τινος προγνώσεως θεσπισθέν, ἐπεὶ ἐθεσπίσθη· ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦτο οὐ διδόντες φαμὲν οὐχὶ τὸν θεσπίσαντα αἴτιον εἶναι τοῦ ἐσομένου, ἐπεὶ προεῖπεν αὐτὸ γενησόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐσόμενον, ἐσόμενον ἂν καὶ μὴ θεσπισθέν, τὴν αἰτίαν τῷ προγινώσκοντι παρεσχη κέναι τοῦ αὐτὸ προειπεῖν. Καὶ ὅλον γε τοῦτο ἐν τῇ προγνώσει τοῦ θεσπίζοντος αὐτὸ τυγχάνει· δυνατοῦ δὲ ὄντος τοῦδέ τινος γενέσθαι δυνατοῦ δὲ καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι, ἔσται τὸ ἕτερον αὐτῶν τόδε τι. Καὶ οὔ φαμεν ὅτι ὁ προγινώσκων, ὑφελὼν τὸ δυνατὸν εἶναι γενέσθαι καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι, οἱονεὶ τοιοῦτόν τι λέγει· τόδε πάντως ἔσται, καὶ ἀδύνατον ἑτέρως γενέσθαι. Καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο φθάνει ἐπὶ πᾶσαν τὴν περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τινος πρόγνωσιν, εἴτε κατὰ τὰς θείας γραφὰς εἴτε κατὰ τὰς Ἑλλήνων ἱστορίας. Καὶ ὁ καλούμενός γε παρὰ τοῖς διαλεκ τικοῖς ἀργὸς λόγος, σόφισμα τυγχάνων, οὐκ ἔσται μὲν σόφισμα ὅσον ἐπὶ τῷ Κέλσῳ κατὰ δὲ τὸν ὑγιῆ λόγον σόφισμά ἐστιν. Ἵνα δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτο νοηθῇ, ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς γραφῆς χρήσομαι ταῖς περὶ τοῦ Ἰούδα προφητείαις ἢ τῇ τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς προδώσοντος προγνώσει· ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ἑλλη νικῶν ἱστοριῶν τῷ πρὸς τὸν Λάϊον χρησμῷ, συγχωρῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ παρόντος εἶναι αὐτὸν ἀληθῆ, ἐπεὶ μὴ λυπεῖ τὸν λόγον. Περὶ τοῦ Ἰούδα τοίνυν ἐν ἑκατοστῷ καὶ ὀγδόῳ λέγεται ἐκ προσώπου τοῦ σωτῆρος ψαλμῷ, οὗ ἡ ἀρχή· "Ὁ θεός, τὴν αἴνεσίν μου μὴ παρασιωπήσῃς· ὅτι στόμα ἁμαρτωλοῦ καὶ στόμα δολίου ἐπ' ἐμὲ ἠνοίχθη." Καὶ τηρήσας γε τὰ ἐν τῷ ψαλμῷ γεγραμμένα εὑρήσεις ὅτι, ὡς προέγνωσται προδώσων τὸν σωτῆρα, οὕτως καὶ αἴτιος ὢν τῆς προδοσίας καὶ ἄξιος τῶν ἐν τῇ προφητείᾳ λεγομένων διὰ τὴν κακίαν αὐτοῦ ἀρῶν. Τάδε γὰρ παθέτω "Ἀνθ' ὧν, φησίν, οὐκ ἐμνήσθη τοῦ ποιῆσαι ἔλεος καὶ κατεδίωξεν ἄνθρωπον πένητα καὶ πτωχόν." Οὐκοῦν ἐδύνατο μνησθῆναι "τοῦ ποιῆσαι ἔλεος" καὶ μὴ καταδιῶξαι ὃν κατεδίωξε· δυνάμενος δὲ οὐ πεποίηκεν ἀλλὰ προέδωκεν, ὥστε ἄξιος εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῇ προφητείᾳ κατ' αὐτοῦ ἀρῶν. Καὶ πρὸς Ἕλληνας δὲ χρησόμεθα τῷ εἰρημένῳ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον πρὸς τὸν Λάϊον, εἴτε αὐταῖς λέξεσιν εἴτε τὸ ἰσοδυναμοῦν αὐταῖς ἀναγράψαντος τοῦ τραγικοῦ. Λέγεται τοίνυν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ προε γνωκότος δὴ τὰ ἐσόμενα· Μὴ σπεῖρε παίδων ἄλοκα δαιμόνων βίᾳ· εἰ γὰρ τεκνώσεις παῖδ' ἀποκτενεῖ σ' ὁ φύς, καὶ πᾶς σὸς οἶκος βήσεται δι' αἱμάτων. Καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τοίνυν δηλοῦται ὅτι δυνατὸν μὲν ἦν τῷ Λαΐῳ μὴ σπείρειν "παίδων ἄλοκα"· οὐκ ἂν γὰρ τὸ μὴ δυνατὸν προσέταξεν αὐτῷ ὁ χρησμός· δυνατὸν δὲ ἦν καὶ τὸ σπείρειν, καὶ οὐδέτερον αὐτῶν κατηνάγκαστο. Ἠκολούθησε δὲ τῷ μὴ φυλαξαμένῳ σπεῖραι "παίδων ἄλοκα" παθεῖν ἐκ τοῦ ἐσπαρκέναι τὰ τῆς κατὰ Οἰδίποδα καὶ Ἰοκάστην καὶ τοὺς υἱοὺς τραγῳδίας. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁ ἀργὸς καλούμενος λόγος, σόφισμα ὤν, τοιοῦτός ἐστι λεγόμενος ἐπὶ ὑποθέσεως πρὸς τὸν νοσοῦντα καὶ ὡς σόφισμα ἀποτρέπων αὐτὸν χρῆσθαι τῷ ἰατρῷ πρὸς ὑγίειαν, καὶ ἔχει γε οὕτως ὁ λόγος· εἰ εἵμαρταί σοι ἀναστῆναι ἐκ τῆς νόσου, ἐάν τε εἰσαγάγῃς τὸν ἰατρὸν ἐάν τε μὴ εἰσα γάγῃς, ἀναστήσῃ· ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ εἵμαρταί σοι μὴ ἀναστῆναι ἐκ τῆς νόσου, ἐάν τε εἰσαγάγῃς τὸν ἰατρὸν ἐάν τε μὴ εἰσα γάγῃς, οὐκ ἀναστήσῃ· ἤτοι δὲ εἵμαρταί σοι ἀναστῆναι ἐκ τῆς νόσου ἢ εἵμαρταί σοι μὴ ἀναστῆναι· μάτην ἄρα εἰσάγεις τὸν ἰατρόν. Ἀλλὰ χαριέντως τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ τοιοῦτόν τι ἀντιπαραβάλλεται· εἰ εἵμαρταί σοι τεκνοποιῆσαι, ἐάν τε συνέλθῃς γυναικὶ ἐάν τε μὴ συνέλθῃς, τεκνοποιήσεις· ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰ εἵμαρταί σοι μὴ τεκνοποιῆσαι, ἐάν τε συνέλθῃς γυναικὶ ἢ μὴ συνέλθῃς, οὐ τεκνοποιήσεις· ἤτοι δὲ εἵμαρταί σοι τεκνοποιῆσαι ἢ μὴ τεκνοποιῆσαι· μάτην ἄρα συνέρχῃ γυναικί. Ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτου, ἐπεὶ ἀμήχανον καὶ ἀδύνατον τεκνοποιῆσαι μὴ συνελθόντα γυναικί, οὐ μάτην παραλαμ βάνεται τὸ συνελθεῖν γυναικί· οὕτως εἰ τὸ ἀναστῆναι ἐκ τῆς νόσου ὁδῷ τῇ ἀπὸ ἰατρικῆς γίνεται, ἀναγκαίως παρα λαμβάνεται ὁ ἰατρός, καὶ ψεῦδος τὸ "μάτην εἰσάγεις τὸν ἰατρόν." Ὅλα δὲ ταῦτα παρειλήφαμεν δι' ἃ παρέθετο ὁ σοφώτατος Κέλσος εἰπών· Θεὸς ὢν προεῖπε, καὶ πάντως ἐχρῆν γενέσθαι τὸ προειρημένον. Εἰ γὰρ τοῦ πάντως ἀκούει ἀντὶ τοῦ κατηναγκασμένως, οὐ δώσομεν αὐτῷ· δυνατὸν γὰρ ἦν καὶ μὴ γενέσθαι. Εἰ δὲ τὸ πάντως λέγει ἀντὶ τοῦ ἔσται, ὅπερ οὐ κωλύεται εἶναι ἀληθές, κἂν δυνατὸν ᾖ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι, οὐδὲν λυπεῖ τὸν λόγον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἠκολούθει τῷ προειρηκέναι τὸν Ἰησοῦν ἀληθῶς τὰ περὶ τοῦ προδότου ἢ τὰ περὶ τοῦ ἀρνησαμένου τὸ αὐτὸν αὐτοῖς αἴτιον γενέσθαι ἀσεβείας καὶ ἀνοσίου πράξεως. Ἰδὼν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τὸ μοχθηρὸν ἦθος ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς γινώσκων "τί ἦν ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ", καὶ ὁρῶν ἃ τολμήσει ἔκ τε τοῦ φιλάργυρος εἶναι καὶ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ βεβαίως περὶ τοῦ διδασκάλου φρονεῖν ἃ ἐχρῆν εἶπε μετὰ πολλῶν καὶ τό· "Ὁ ἐμβάψας μετ' ἐμοῦ τὴν χεῖρα εἰς τὸ τρυβλίον, ἐκεῖνός με παραδώσει."