Chapter 10.—How We are to Discern Whether a Phrase is Figurative.

14.  But in addition to the foregoing rule, which guards us against taking a metaphorical form of speech as if it were literal, we must also pay heed to that which tells us not to take a literal form of speech as if it were figurative.  In the first place, then, we must show the way to find out whether a phrase is literal or figurative.  And the way is certainly as follows:  Whatever there is in the word of God that cannot, when taken literally, be referred either to purity of life or soundness of doctrine, you may set down as figurative.  Purity of life has reference to the love of God and one’s neighbor; soundness of doctrine to the knowledge of God and one’s neighbor.  Every man, moreover, has hope in his own conscience, so far as he perceives that he has attained to the love and knowledge of God and his neighbor.  Now all these matters have been spoken of in the first book.

15.  But as men are prone to estimate sins, not by reference to their inherent sinfulness, but rather by reference to their own customs, it frequently happens that a man will think nothing blameable except what the men of his own country and time are accustomed to condemn, and nothing worthy of praise or approval except what is sanctioned by the custom of his companions; and thus it comes to pass, that if Scripture either enjoins what is opposed to the customs of the hearers, or condemns what is not so opposed, and if at the same time the authority of the word has a hold upon their minds, they think that the expression is figurative.  Now Scripture enjoins nothing except charity, and condemns nothing except lust, and in that way fashions the lives of men.  In the same way, if an erroneous opinion has taken possession of the mind, men think that whatever Scripture asserts contrary to this must be figurative.  Now Scripture asserts nothing but the catholic faith, in regard to things past, future, and present.  It is a narrative of the past, a prophecy of the future, and a description of the present.  But all these tend to nourish and strengthen charity, and to overcome and root out lust.

16.  I mean by charity that affection of the mind which aims at the enjoyment of God for His own sake, and the enjoyment of one’s self and one’s neighbor in subordination to God; by lust I mean that affection of the mind which aims at enjoying one’s self and one’s neighbor, and other corporeal things, without reference to God.  Again, what lust, when unsubdued, does towards corrupting one’s own soul and body, is called vice;152    Flagitium. but what it does to injure another is called crime.153    Facinus.  And these are the two classes into which all sins may be divided.  But the vices come first; for when these have exhausted the soul, and reduced it to a kind of poverty, it easily slides into crimes, in order to remove hindrances to, or to find assistance in, its vices.  In the same way, what charity does with a view to one’s own advantage is prudence; but what it does with a view to a neighbor’s advantage is called benevolence.  And here prudence comes first; because no one can confer an advantage on another which he does not himself possess.  Now in proportion as the dominion of lust is pulled down, in the same proportion is that of charity built up.

CAPUT X. Unde dignoscatur an figurata sit locutio. Regula generalis. Charitas. Cupiditas. Flagitium. Facinus. Utilitas. Beneficentia.

14. Huic autem observationi qua cavemus figuratam locutionem, id est, translatam quasi propriam sequi; adjungenda etiam illa est, ne propriam quasi figuratam velimus accipere. Demonstrandus est igitur prius modus inveniendae locutionis, propriane an figurata sit. Et iste omnino modus est, ut quidquid in sermone divino neque ad morum honestatem, neque ad fidei veritatem proprie referri potest, figuratum esse cognoscas. Morum honestas ad diligendum Deum et proximum, fidei veritas ad cognoscendum Deum et proximum pertinet. Spes autem sua cuique est in conscientia propria, quemadmodum se sentit ad dilectionem Dei et proximi, cognitionemque proficere. De quibus omnibus primo libro dictum est.

15. Sed quoniam proclive est humanum genus non ex momentis ipsius libidinis, sed potius suae consuetudinis aestimare peccata, fit plerumque ut quisque hominum ea tantum culpanda arbitretur, quae suae regionis et temporis homines vituperare atque damnare consueverunt; et ea tantum probanda atque laudanda, quae consuetudo eorum cum quibus vivit, admittit: eoque contingit ut si quid Scriptura vel praeceperit quod abhorret a consuetudine audientium, vel quod non abhorret culpaverit, si animum eorum jam verbi vinxit auctoritas, figuratam locutionem putent. Non autem praecipit Scriptura nisi charitatem, nec culpat nisi cupiditatem; et eo modo informat mores hominum. Item si animum praeoccupavit alicujus erroris opinio, quidquid aliter asseruerit Scriptura, figuratum homines arbitrantur. Non autem asserit nisi catholicam fidem, rebus praeteritis, et futuris, et praesentibus. Praeteritorum narratio est, futurorum praenuntiatio, praesentium demonstratio: sed omnia haec ad eamdem 0072 charitatem nutriendam atque corroborandam, et cupiditatem vincendam atque exstinguendam valent.

16. Charitatem voco motum animi ad fruendum Deo propter ipsum, et se atque proximo propter Deum: cupiditatem autem, motum animi ad fruendum se et proximo et quolibet corpore non propter Deum. Quod autem agit indomita cupiditas ad corrumpendum animum et corpus suum, flagitium vocatur: quod autem agit ut alteri noceat, facinus dicitur. Et haec sunt duo genera omnium peccatorum; sed flagitia priora sunt. Quae cum exinaniverint animum, et ad quamdam egestatem perduxerint, in facinora prosilitur, quo removeantur impedimenta flagitiorum, aut adjumenta quaerantur. Item quod agit charitas quo sibi prosit, utilitas est: quod autem agit ut prosit proximo, beneficentia nominatur. Et hic praecedit utilitas; quia nemo potest ex eo quod non habet, prodesse alteri. Quanto autem magis regnum cupiditatis destruitur, tanto charitatis augetur.