The first part of my contentions against Eunomius has with God’s help been sufficiently established in the preceding work, as all who will may see fro
And let no one suppose that it is through pride or desire of human reputation that I go down to this truceless and implacable warfare to engage with t
First of all, however, I think it advisable to run briefly over our own doctrinal views and our opponent’s disagreement with them, so that our review
But to the best of my ability I will raise my voice to rebut our enemies’ argument. They say that God is declared to be without generation, that the G
Now if the term ungenerate did not signify the being without origin, but the idea of simplicity entered into the meaning of such a term, and He were c
But, saith he, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Granted: for the Son also is unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet is He the Son. But
But this thing he leaves untold, and only says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is so spoken, saith he,
But before we examine what he has written, it may be better to enquire with what purpose it is that he refuses to admit that ungenerate can be predica
For after saying that the Only-begotten God is not the same in essence with the true Father, and after sophistically inferring this from the oppositio
Accordingly, enveloping his former special-pleading in the mazy evolutions of his sophistries, and dealing subtly with the term ungenerate, he steals
Seeing, then, the mischief resulting to the dupes of this fallacious reasoning—that to assent to His not being very God is a departure from our confes
It will presently be time to bring to their own recollection the method of this argument. Suffice it first to say this. There is no faculty in human n
If, then, the lower creation which comes under our organs of sense transcends human knowledge, how can He, Who by His mere will made the worlds, be wi
How pitiable are they for their cleverness! how wretched, how fatal is their over-wise philosophy! Who is there who goes of his own accord to the pit
This, then, was the meaning of his safe guidance on the way to what he sought—that he was not blindly led by any of the means ready to hand for his in
He shows, I think, by the relation of these elements to each other, or rather by their distance, how far the divine nature is above the speculations o
Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits. For it is both safer and more revere
And on other accounts also it may be called safe to let alone the Divine essence, as unspeakable, and beyond the scope of human reasoning. For the des
Wherefore Holy Scripture omits all idle inquiry into substance as superfluous and unnecessary. And methinks it was for this that John, the Son of Thun
But, nevertheless, with only such a nature for their base of operations, they open their mouths wide against the unspeakable Power, and encompass by o
I have said, then (for I make my master’s words my own), that reason supplies us with but a dim and imperfect comprehension of the Divine nature neve
But although our great master has thus cleared away all unworthy notions respecting the Divine nature, and has urged and taught all that may be revere
And yet it is plain to every one who has given any attention to the uses of words, that the word incorruption denotes by the privative particle that n
While, however, we strenuously avoid all concurrence with absurd notions in our thoughts of God, we allow ourselves in the use of many diverse appella
And if any one would distinguish such notions by words, he would find it absolutely necessary to call that which admits of no changing to the worse un
I say, then, that men have a right to such word-building, adapting their appellations to their subject, each man according to his judgment and that t
For God is not an expression, neither hath He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is of Himself what also He is believed to be, but He is named
But in applying such appellations to the Divine essence, “which passeth all understanding,” we do not seek to glory in it by the names we employ, but
But let us hear how, “in the way most needed, and the form that preceded” (for with such rhymes he again gives us a taste of the flowers of style), le
If, then, the creation is of later date than its Creator, and man is the latest in the scale of creation, and if speech is a distinctive characteristi
He says that God was what He is, before the creation of man. Nor do we deny it. For whatsoever we conceive of God existed before the creation of the w
But that we might gain some sort of comprehension of what with reverence may be thought respecting Him, we have stamped our different ideas with certa
They say that God is ungenerate, and in this we agree. But that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine essence, here we take exception. For we maint
With such gibes at the term “conception,” he shows, to the best of his ability, that it is useless and unprofitable for the life of man. What, then, w
But why enumerate the greater and more splendid results of this faculty? For every one who is not unfriendly to truth can see for himself that all els
Now that He did not teach us such things by some visible operation, Himself presiding over the work, as we may see in matters of bodily teaching, no o
For that one who proposes to himself to terrify or charm an audience should have plenty of conception to effect such a purpose, and should display to
For it is not the case that, while the intelligence implanted in us by the Giver is fully competent to conjure up non-realities, it is endowed with no
But as far as possible to elucidate the idea, I will endeavour to illustrate it by a still plainer example. Let us suppose the inquiry to be about som
This example being understood, it is time to go on to the thing which it illustrates. This much we comprehend, that the First Cause has His existence
Such are his charges against us not indeed his notions as expressed in his own phraseology, for we have made such alterations as were required to cor
If, then, God gives things their names as our new expositor of the Divine record assures us, naming germ, and grass, and tree, and fruit, He must of n
Such is the nature of this new-fangled Deity, as deducible from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures, and maintain
But it may be said that the voice of the Father was addressed to the Holy Spirit. But neither does the Holy Spirit require instruction by speech, for
But, says he, the record of Moses does not lie, and from it we learn that God spake. No! nor is great David of the number of those who lie, and he exp
What, then, do we think of this passage? For it may be that, if we understand it, we shall also understand the meaning of Moses. It often happens that
But to return to the matter in question. We assert that the words “He said” do not imply voice and words on the part of God but the writer, in showin
For the case is different from that of men endowed by nature with practical ability, where you may look at capability and execution apart from each ot
But if any one would give a more sensuous interpretation to the words “God said,” as proving that articulate speech was His creation, by a parity of r
And the futility of such assertions may be seen also by this. For as the natures of the elements, which are the work of the Creator, appear alike to a
And if any one cites the confusion of tongues that took place at the building of the tower, as contradicting what I have said, not even there is God s
But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us that the Hebrew tongue is not even ancient like the others, but that along with other mirac
For to suppose that God used the Hebrew tongue, when there was no one to hear and understand such a language, methinks no reasonable being will consen
But this is denied by Eunomius, the author of all this contumely with which we are assailed, and the companion and adviser of this impious band. For,
On these passages it is probable that our opponents will take their stand. And I will agree for them with what is said, and will myself take advantage
But since the nature of most things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all that they connote being comprehended in one word, a
In like manner before him Jacob, having taken hold of his brother’s heel, was called a supplanter , from the attitude in which he came to the birth. F
But I will pass over his other babblings against the truth, possessing as they do no force against our doctrines, for I deem it superfluous to linger
To pass on, then, to what remains. He brings forward once more some of the Master’s words, to this effect: “And it is in precisely the same manner tha
But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired Scriptures can deny the fact. What then? Does Eunomius affirm th
But, like a mighty wrestler, he will not relinquish his irresistible hold on us, and affirms in so many words, that “these names are the work of human
“But God,” he says, “gave the weakest of terrestrial things a share in the most honourable names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, an
This it is that our strong-minded opponent, who accuses us of dishonesty, and charges us with being irrational in judgment,—this it is that he pretend
But what is our author’s meaning, and what is the object of this argument of his? For no one need imagine that, for lack of something to say, in order
He does not, in fact, partake of that dignity which the meaning of those names indicates and whereas wise Daniel, in setting right the Babylonians’ e
But in dwelling on such nonsense I fear that I am secretly gratifying our adversaries. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I
But I fear that all we shall find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere tumours and sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessa
Basil, he says, asserts that after we have obtained our first idea of a thing, the more minute and accurate investigation of the thing under considera
And Moses, seeing God in the light, and John calling Him the true Light , and in the same way Paul, when our Lord first appeared to him, and a Light s
I have deluged my discourse with much nonsense of his, but I trust my hearers will pardon me for not leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his in
Then going farther, as if his object were thus far attained, he takes up other charges against us, more difficult, as he thinks, to deal with than the
But all this is beside our purpose. Would that our charges against him were limited to this, and that he could be thought to err only in his delivery,
But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself, it is logically connected with his whole discours
But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable attribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son,
Now that the idea of ungeneracy and the belief in the Divine essence are quite different things may be seen by what he himself has put forward. God, h
But it will be well, I think, to pass over his nauseating observations (for such we must term his senseless attacks on the method of conception), and
But if it were in any way possible by some other means to lay bare the movements of thought, abandoning the formal instrumentality of words, we should
All his argument, then, in opposition to the doctrine of conception I think it best to pass over, though he charge with madness those who think that t
But, like some viscous and sticky clay, the nonsense he has concocted in contravention of our teaching of conception seems to hold us back, and preven
But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus’ nature-system, which he says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctr
But, says he, since God condescends to commune with His servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very beginning He enacted words appropriat
But our pious opponent will not allow of God’s using our language, because of our proneness to evil, shutting his eyes (good man!) to the fact that fo
But most people, perhaps, will think this too far removed from the scope of our present inquiry. This, however, no one will regard as out of keeping w
Since, then, it is improper to regard God as the inventor of such names, lest the names even of these idol gods should seem to have had their origin f
And if we set forth the opinion of most commentators on these words of the Psalmist, that of Eunomius regarding them will be still more convicted of f
But the names which the Lord gives to such stars we may plainly learn from the prophecy of Esaias, which says, “I have called thee by thy name thou a
I will pass over, then, the abuse with which he has prefaced his discussion of these matters, as when he uses such terms as “alteration of seed,” and
I pass in silence his blasphemy in reducing God the Only-begotten to a level with all created things, and, in a word, allowing to the Son of God no hi
For, proceeding with his discourse, he asks us what we mean by the ages. And yet we ourselves might more reasonably put such questions to him. For it
But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses i
Such is our position our adversary’s, with regard to the precise meaning of this term , is such as can derive no help from any reasonings he only sp
He says, “The Life that is the same, and thoroughly single, must have one and the same outward expression for it, even though in mere names, and manne
But why do we linger over these follies, when we ought rather to put Eunomius’ book itself into the hands of the studious, and so, apart from any exam
But if he should still answer with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only the term Father, and the term Creator, that are ap
But let us examine a still more vehement charge of his against us it is this: “If one must proceed to say something harsher still, he does not even k
What, then, does Eunomius say to this? “If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbegin
What, then, out of all that we have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly, in which he returns to the charge and repeats himself in
Such are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. For what need is there to go through all his argument with trifling prolixity? For in e
Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one,
But that he himself also may be brought to the knowledge of his own trifling, we will convict him from his own statements. For in the course of his ar
Thus far our argument goes with him. But the riddle with which he accompanies his words we must leave to those trained in the wisdom of Prunicus to in
But let us leave this, and along with it the usual foul deluge of calumny in his words and let us go on to his subsequent quotations (of Basil). But
But who, pray, is so simple as to be harmed by such arguments, and to imagine that if names are once believed to be an outcome of the reasoning facult
But I do not think that we need linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows. To the more attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our
But now I do not know which it is best to do to pursue step by step this subject, or to put an end here to our contest with such folly. Well, as in t
When, then, he is on the point of introducing this treatment of terms of “privation,” he takes upon himself to show “the incurable absurdity,” as he c
Every term—every term, that is, which is really such—is an utterance expressing some movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound th
Well, then, if God did not exist formerly, or if there be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be called either unending or without beginning and
Thus much, then, is known to us about the names uttered in any form whatever in reference to the Deity. We have given a simple explanation of them, un
How it is possible, then, to assign one’s gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man, who claims to be using words and phrases in their natural fo
Well, if the term imperishable or indestructible is not considered by this maker of an empty system to be privative of destruction, then by a stern ne
“But I do not see,” he rejoins, “how God can be above His own works simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him .” And on the strength of
He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indestructible, generated beings as ungenerate, just in the same degr
Therefore let us again handle this dictum of his: “God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death.” How are we to accept this statement,
Still I cannot see what profit there is in deigning to examine such nonsense. For a man like myself, who has lived to gray hairs , and whose eyes are
But it is time now to expose that angry accusation which he brings against us at the close of his treatise, saying that we affirm the Father to be fro
“The evangelist Luke, when giving the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and stepping up from the last to the first
With what eyes will you now dare to gaze upon your guide? I speak to you, O flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man who
Such, to use your own words, is the “evil,” as one might expect, not indeed “of valuing the character for being clever before one is really such” (for
Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one, he will be supporting our argument. But if he say that the meaning of the imperishable is one thing, and that that of being unending is another, then of necessity, in the case of things differing from each other, the force of the one cannot be equivalent to the force of the other. If, then, the idea of the imperishable is one, and that of being endless is another, and each of these is what the other is not, neither will he grant that the imperishable is unending, nor that the unending is imperishable, but the unending will be perishable, and the imperishable will be terminable. But I must beg my readers not to turn a ridiculous method of condemnation against us. We have been compelled to adopt such a sportive vein against the mockeries of our opponent, that we might thereby break through the puerile toil of his sophistries. But if it would not be too wearisome to my readers, it would not be out of place again to set forth what Eunomius says in his own words. “If,” says he, “God is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbeginning, then wherein He is not imperishable He is perishable, and wherein He is not ungenerate He is generated.” Then returning to the charge, he repeats, “He will then be, as unbeginning, at once ungenerate and perishable: and, as unending, at once imperishable and generated;” for I pass over the superfluous and unseasonable remarks which he has interspersed here, as in no way contributing to the proving of his point. Now I think it is easy for any one to see, by his own words, that the drift of our argument has no connection whatever with the accusation which he lays against us. “For we call the God of the universe imperishable and ungenerate,” says the Master, “using these words with different applications.” “His transcending,” he continues, “every limit of the ages, and every distance in temporal extension, whether we consider the previous or the subsequent, this absence of limit or circumscription on either hand in the Eternal Life we mark in the one case with the name of imperishability, and in the other case with the name of ungeneracy.” But Eunomius would make out that we say that the being without beginning is His essence, and again that the being without end is His essence, as though we brought forward two contradictory segments of essence; and in this way he establishes an absurdity, and while laying down, and then fighting against, positions of his own, and reducing notions of his own concoction to an absurdity, he lays no hold on our argument in any single point. For that God is imperishable only wherein His Life is unending, is his statement, not ours. In like manner, that the imperishable is not without beginning, is an invention of that same subtle cleverness which would constitute a negative attribute an essence; whereas we do not define any such negative attribute as an essence. Now it is a negative attribute of God, that neither does the Life cease in dissolution, nor did It have a commencement in generation; and this we express by these two words, imperishability and ungeneracy. But Eunomius, mixing up his own folly with our teaching, does not seem to understand that he is publishing his own disgrace by his calumnious accusations. For, in defining ungeneracy as an essence, he will logically arrive at the same pitch of absurdity which he ascribes to our teaching. For as beginning means133 The Latin is wrong here, “secundum rerum intellectarum distinctricem significationem;” for νοουμένων without the article must be the gen. absol. Besides this the mss. read παράτασιν (not παράστασιν). one thing, and end means another, by virtue of an intervening extension, if any one allow the privation of the first of these to be essence, he must suppose His Life to be only half subsisting in this being without beginning, and not to extend further, by virtue of His nature, to the being without end, if ungeneracy be regarded as itself His nature. But if any one insist that both are essence, then, according to the definition put forward by Eunomius, each of these terms must necessarily, by virtue of its inherent meaning, be counted as essence, being just as much as, and no more than, is indicated by the meaning of the term; and thus the argument of Eunomius will not be without force, inasmuch as that which is without beginning does not involve the notion of being without end, and vice versa, since according to his account each of the things mentioned is an essence, and there is no confusion between the two in their relation to each other, the notion of beginning being different to that of ending, while the words which express privation of these also differ in their significations.
ἄλλο τι φήσει τῷ σημαινομένῳ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον εἶναι παρὰ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἢ ἓν τὰ δύο συνθήσεται. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἓν ἀμφότερα λέγοι, τῷ ἡμετέρῳ συναγορεύσει λόγῳ: εἰ δὲ ἄλλο φήσει τοῦ ἀφθάρτου εἶναι καὶ ἕτερον τοῦ ἀτελευτήτου τὸ σημαινόμενον, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα ἐπὶ τῶν ἀλλοτρίως ἐχόντων πρὸς ἄλληλα μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον. οὐκοῦν εἰ ἄλλη τοῦ ἀφθάρτου ἡ ἔννοια καὶ τοῦ ἀτελευτήτου πάλιν ἑτέρα, καί ἐστι τούτων ἑκάτερον ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον, οὔτε τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἀτελεύτητον εἶναι δώσει οὔτε τὸ ἀτελεύτητον ἄφθαρτον, ἀλλὰ φθαρτὸν μὲν ἔσται τὸ ἀτελεύτητον, τελευτητὸν δὲ τὸ ἄφθαρτον. ἀλλὰ παραιτοῦμαι τοὺς ἐντυγχάνοντας μὴ καθ' ἡμῶν τρέψαι τὴν ἐπὶ τῷ γελοίῳ κατάγνωσιν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἡμεῖς πρὸς τὸν γελοιαστὴν ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἐπαίξαμεν, ἵνα διὰ τῆς ὁμοίας παιδιᾶς τὴν μειρακιώδη τοῦ σοφίσματος αὐτοῦ πλοκὴν διαλύσωμεν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὴ βαρύ τε καὶ ὀχληρὸν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσι φαίνοιτο, οὐκ ἄκαιρον ἂν εἴη πάλιν ἐπὶ λέξεως ἐκθέσθαι τοῦ Εὐνομίου τὰ ῥήματα. « εἰ κατὰ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον », φησί, « τῆς ζωῆς μόνον ἐστὶν ἄφθαρτος καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἄναρχον μόνον ἀγέννητος, καθ' ὃ μή ἐστιν ἄφθαρτος, φθαρτὸς ἔσται, καὶ καθ' ὃ μή ἐστιν ἀγέννητος, γεννητὸς ἔσται ». καὶ ἐπαναλαβὼν τὸ αὐτὸ πάλιν φησὶν « ἔσται ἄρα κατὰ μὲν τὸ ἄναρχον ἀγέννητος ὁμοῦ καὶ φθαρτός, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον ἄφθαρτος ὁμοῦ καὶ γεννητός ». τὰς γὰρ ἀκαίρους ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τῶν περιττῶν παρενθήκας ὡς οὐδὲν πλέον εἰς τὴν τοῦ λόγου κατασκευὴν συντελούσας παρίημι. ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν διάνοιαν τῶν ἡμετέρων λόγων, ἀφ' ὧν αὐτὸς οὗτος παρέθετο, παντὶ ῥᾴδιον οἶμαι κατανοῆσαι ὡς οὐδεμίαν ἔχει κοινωνίαν πρὸς τὴν κατασκευασθεῖσαν αὐτῷ καθ' ἡμῶν κατηγορίαν. ἄφθαρτον γὰρ καὶ ἀγέννητον τὸν θεὸν τῶν ὅλων λέγομεν, φησὶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, κατὰ διαφόρους ἐπιβολὰς τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις χρώμενοι. τῷ γὰρ ὑπερεκπίπτειν αὐτόν, φησί, τῆς τῶν αἰώνων περιγραφῆς κατὰ πᾶν διάστημα τῆς χρονικῆς παρατάσεως, εἴτε τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴτε τὸ ἐφεξῆς λογιζοίμεθα, τὸ καθ' ἑκατέραν ἔννοιαν τῆς ἀϊδίου ζωῆς ἀόριστόν τε καὶ ἀπερίγραπτον τὸ μὲν τῷ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ὀνόματι, τὸ δὲ τῷ τῆς ἀγεννησίας διασημαίνομεν. οὑτοσὶ δέ φησι λέγειν ἡμᾶς ὅτι τὸ ἄναρχον οὐσία ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον οὐσία πάλιν ἐστίν, ὡς δύο τμήματα οὐσιῶν κατὰ τὸ ἐναντίον λεγόμενα παρ' ἡμῶν συμβάλλεσθαι: καὶ οὕτω κατασκευάζει τὸ ἄτοπον, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ τιθεὶς καὶ τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ συμπλεκόμενος, καὶ τὰς παρ' ἑαυτοῦ συντεθείσας διανοίας ἐξωθῶν εἰς τὸ ἄτοπον κατ' οὐδὲν τῶν ἡμετέρων προσάπτεται. τὸ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον τῆς ζωῆς μόνον τὸν θεὸν ἄφθαρτον εἶναι τούτου ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ἡμέτερον. ὡσαύτως καὶ τὸ ἄφθαρτον ἄναρχον μὴ εἶναι τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστιν ἀγχινοίας [τὸ] εὕρημα τῆς τὸ μὴ προσὸν εἰς τὸν τῆς οὐσίας λόγον κατατασσούσης. ἡμεῖς γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν μὴ προσόντων οὐσίαν εἶναι διοριζόμεθα. οὐ πρόσεστι δὲ τῷ θεῷ οὔτε τὸ εἰς φθορὰν τὴν ζωὴν καταλῆξαι οὔτε τὸ ἀπὸ γεννήσεως τοῦ εἶναι ἄρξασθαι: ὅπερ διὰ τῶν δύο τούτων ὀνομάτων, τῆς τε ἀφθαρσίας καὶ τῆς ἀγεννησίας, παρίσταται. ὁ δὲ τὸν ἴδιον λῆρον τοῖς ἡμετέροις δόγμασιν ἐπιθρυλήσας ἑαυτὸν στηλιτεύων διὰ τῆς κατηγορίας τῆς καθ' ἡμῶν οὐ συνίησιν. ὁ γὰρ οὐσίαν τὴν « ἀγεννησίαν » εἶναι διοριζόμενος εἰς αὐτὴν κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον τὴν ἀτοπίαν ἐκβήσεται ἣν τοῖς ἡμετέροις δόγμασιν ἐπιφέρει. ἄλλο γὰρ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ ἄλλο τοῦ τέλους κατὰ τὴν διαστηματικὴν παράτασιν νοουμένων, εἰ μὲν τὴν ἑνὸς τούτων στέρησιν οὐσίαν τις εἶναι δοίη, ἐξ ἡμισείας αὐτοῦ τὴν ζωὴν ὑποστήσει μόνῳ τῷ ἀνάρχῳ ὑφεστῶσαν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἀτελεύτητον οὐκέτι διὰ τῆς φύσεως ἐπεκτείνουσαν, εἴπερ φύσις ἡ ἀγεννησία νομίζοιτο: εἰ δὲ ἀμφότερά τις οὐσίαν εἶναι βιάζοιτο, ἀνάγκη πᾶσα κατὰ τὸν ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ Εὐνομίου λόγον ἑκάτερον τῶν ὀνομάτων κατὰ τὴν ἐγκειμένην ἔμφασιν καὶ ἐν τῷ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὸ εἶναι ἔχειν τοσοῦτον ὑπάρχον μόνον, ὅσον ἡ σημασία τῆς προσηγορίας ἐνδείκνυται: καὶ οὕτως ἰσχυρὸς ὁ τοῦ Εὐνομίου λόγος γενήσεται οὔτε τοῦ ἀνάρχου τὸ ἀτελεύτητον ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀτελευτήτου τὸ ἄναρχον, ἐπειδὴ κατὰ τὸν λόγον αὐτοῦ καὶ οὐσία τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστὶν ἑκάτερον καὶ ἀμίκτως τὰ δύο ταῖς ἐννοίαις ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα, καὶ οὔτε ἡ ἀρχὴ πρὸς τὸ τέλος τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγον οὔτε τὰ ἀναιρετικὰ τούτων ὀνόματα πρὸς ἄλληλα ταῖς σημασίαις συμφέρεται.
