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is in saying that He is both just and does not admit of corruption. So also we say that the rest of the names, by some change of meaning, are suitable for either emphasis, such as 'good' and 'immortal' and all things uttered in a similar fashion. For each of them, being understood in different ways, can indicate both what is present and what is not present in the divine nature, so that while the form of the names is altered, the pious thought concerning the subject remains unchanged. For it is the same thing to say that God is unsusceptible of evil and to call him good, and to confess him immortal and to say he is ever-living; for in these we conceive no difference in what is signified, but we designate one thing through both expressions, even if one seems to have an affirmation and the other a negation of something. Likewise, in calling God the beginning of all things and again naming him without beginning, we are not in conflict in our thoughts, declaring through each expression that he is the originator and cause of the universe; so whether we say he is without beginning or the originator of the universe, by the one we have represented what is not present, and by the second what is present, it being possible, as has been said, through the alternation of the meanings, to change the emphases of the names to the opposite, and for what is present to be made known by the name that now signifies absence through some transformation, and the other by the other. For it is possible, instead of saying that he has no beginning, to define that he is the beginning of the universe, and instead of this, again to confess that he alone exists unbegottenly; so that the words seem, by the change of their form, to be different from one another, but the meaning in what is said remains one and the same. For what is earnestly sought in discourses about God is not to contrive a euphony of words that is well-sounding and harmonious, but to discover a pious thought through which what is fitting to the conception of God will be preserved. Since, therefore, it is pious to reason that the cause of the universe does not himself have a superior cause, while this thought remains firmly fixed for us, what battle over words is still left for those who have understanding, since every utterance by which such a concept is announced represents the same thing? For whether you say He is the beginning and cause of the universe, or name Him without beginning, or unbegotten, or existing from eternity, or the cause of the universe, or alone from no cause, all such things are somehow equivalent to one another in the power of their meanings, and the words have equal value, and vain is the one who disputes about such a sound of a word, as if piety lay not in the thought, but in the syllables and sounds. This concept, therefore, having been articulated by the teacher, through which it is possible for those not covered by the heretical veil to see clearly that the divine, whatever its nature may be, is both intangible and incomprehensible and higher than any apprehension that comes from reasoning, but the human mind, being busy and searching through whatever reasonings it can, reaches for and touches the unapproachable and lofty nature, neither being so sharp-sighted as to see the invisible clearly, nor being altogether cut off from the approach so as to be unable to grasp any conjecture of what is sought. But it has aimed at something of what is sought through the contact of its reasonings, and by the very fact of not being able to see, it has in a way understood, having made it a kind of clear knowledge that what is sought is beyond all knowledge. For it has understood the things that are denied of the divine nature, and it has not been ignorant of what it is proper to suppose about it, yet it has not been able to see that very thing, whatever it is, about which it reasons these things, but from the knowledge of what is present and what is not present it saw what alone can be seen: that that which is established far from all evil, and is conceived in every good, is altogether something of such a kind as to be both ineffable by word and inaccessible to reasoning. Thus, therefore, our teacher having purged away all unfitting concepts in the conception of the divine nature, and having advised and taught to think all that is auspicious and God-befitting concerning it, that the first cause is neither anything corruptible nor anything brought into being through generation, but is conceived outside of every such supposition, and that it is apprehended from the negation of what is not present and from the confession of the things piously conceived concerning it, the vehement champion against the truth fights against what has been said and wishes that such a sound of the word—I mean the utterance of 20unbegottenness20—should manifestly show the substance of God. And yet it is obvious to anyone who has moderately considered the uses of names, that incorruptibility and

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ἐστὶ τῷ λέγειν δίκαιόν τε εἶναι καὶ φθορὰν μὴ 2.1.133 προσδέχεσθαι. οὕτω καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων τῇ ποιᾷ μεταλήψει τῆς σημασίας πρὸς ἑκατέραν τὴν ἔμφασιν ἐπι τηδείως ἔχειν φαμέν, οἷον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὸν ὅμοιον ἐκφερόμενα τύπον. δύναται γὰρ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἄλλως καὶ ἄλλως μεταληφθὲν καὶ τὸ προσὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ προσὸν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας ἐνδείξασθαι φύσεως, ὥστε τοῦ σχήματος τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπαλλασσομένου τὴν εὐσεβῆ 2.1.134 περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον διάνοιαν μένειν ἀκίνητον. ταὐτὸν γάρ ἐστιν ἀνεπίδεκτόν τε πονηρίας τὸν θεὸν εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ὀνομάσαι, καὶ ἀθάνατον ὁμολογῆσαι καὶ ἀεὶ ζῶντα εἰπεῖν· οὐδεμίαν γὰρ ἐν τούτοις κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον διαφορὰν ἐννοοῦμεν, ἀλλ' ἓν δι' ἑκατέρων τῶν λόγων ἀποσημαίνομεν, 2.1.135 κἂν τὸ μὲν θέσιν τὸ δὲ ἀναίρεσίν τινος ἔχειν δοκῇ. ὡσ αύτως καὶ πάντων ἀρχὴν λέγοντες τὸν θεὸν καὶ πάλιν ἄν αρχον ὀνομάζοντες οὐδὲν κατὰ τὰς ἐννοίας μαχόμεθα, καθ' ἑκάτερον τῶν λεγομένων ἀρχηγὸν καὶ αἴτιον εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς ἀποφαίνοντες· ὥστε κἂν ἄναρχον εἴπωμεν κἂν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχηγέτην, τῷ μὲν τὸ μὴ προσόν, τῷ δευτέρῳ δὲ τὸ προσὸν παρεστήσαμεν, δυνατοῦ ὄντος καθὼς εἴρηται διὰ τῆς τῶν σημαινομένων ὑπαλλαγῆς μεταλλάξαι πρὸς τὸ ἐναν τίον τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐμφάσεις καὶ τῷ νῦν ἀπεμφαίνοντι τέως ὀνόματι διά τινος μετασχηματισμοῦ τὸ προσὸν γνωρι 2.1.136 σθῆναι καὶ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον. ἔξεστι γὰρ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν μὴ ἔχειν εἰπεῖν τὸ ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι ὁρίσασθαι, καὶ ἀντὶ τούτου πάλιν τὸ μόνον αὐτὸν ἀγεννή τως ὁμολογεῖν ὑφεστάναι· ὥστε τὰ μὲν ῥήματα δοκεῖν τῇ τοῦ σχήματος ἐξαλλαγῇ διαφόρως ἔχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα, τὸν δὲ νοῦν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἕνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν διαμένειν. τὸ γὰρ σπουδαζόμενον ἐν τοῖς περὶ θεοῦ λόγοις ἐστὶν οὐχὶ ῥημάτων εὐφωνίαν εὔκροτόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον ἐπινοῆσαι, ἀλλ' εὐσεβῆ διάνοιαν ἐξευρεῖν δι' ἧς τὸ πρέπον τῇ ὑπολήψει τῇ περὶ θεοῦ φυλαχθήσεται. 2.1.137 Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν εὐσεβές ἐστι λογίζεσθαι τὸν τοῦ παντὸς αἴτιον αὐτὸν αἰτίαν ὑπερκειμένην μὴ ἔχειν, ταύτης ἡμῖν ἐρηρεισμένως τῆς διανοίας μενούσης τίς ἔτι περὶ τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς νοῦν ἔχουσιν καταλείπεται μάχη, πάσης φωνῆς, καθ' ἣν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐξαγγέλλεται νόημα, τὸ αὐτὸ παριστώσης; εἴτε γὰρ ἀρχὴν αὐτὸν καὶ αἴτιον τοῦ παντὸς εἶναι λέγοις εἴτε ἄναρχον αὐτὸν ὀνομάζοις εἴτε ἀγεννήτως εἶναι εἴτε ἐξ ἀϊδίου ὑφεστάναι εἴτε τοῦ παντὸς αἴτιον εἴτε ἐξ οὐδενὸς αἰτίου μόνον, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἰσοστάσιά πως ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν σημαινομένων καὶ ὁμοτίμως ἔχει τὰ ῥήματα, καὶ μάταιος ὁ ζυγομαχῶν περὶ τὸν τοιόνδε τῆς φωνῆς ἦχον, ὡς οὐχὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ, ταῖς δὲ συλλαβαῖς καὶ 2.1.138 τοῖς φθόγγοις ἐγκειμένης τῆς εὐσεβείας. ταύτης τοίνυν τῆς ἐννοίας παρὰ τοῦ διδασκάλου διηρθρωμένης, δι' ἧς ἔνεστι τοὺς μὴ κεκαλυμμένους τῷ αἱρετικῷ προκαλύμματι σαφῶς διϊδεῖν ὅτι τὸ θεῖον, ὅπως ἂν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἔχῃ, ἀνέπαφόν τέ ἐστι καὶ ἀκατανόητον καὶ πάσης ἀντιλήψεως τῆς ἐκ τῶν λογισμῶν ὑψηλότερον, ἡ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη διάνοια πολυπραγμονοῦσα καὶ διερευνωμένη δι' ὧν ἂν ᾖ δυνατὸν λογισμῶν ἐπορέγεται καὶ θιγγάνει τῆς ἀπροσπελάστου καὶ ὑψηλῆς φύσεως, οὔτε τοσοῦτον ὀξυωποῦσα ὡς ἐναργῶς ἰδεῖν τὸ ἀόρατον οὔτε καθάπαξ ἀπεσχοινισμένη τῆς προσ εγγίσεως ὡς μηδεμίαν δύνασθαι τοῦ ζητουμένου λαβεῖν 2.1.139 εἰκασίαν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μέν τι τοῦ ζητουμένου διὰ τῆς τῶν λογισμῶν ἐπαφῆς ἐστοχάσατο, τὸ δὲ αὐτῷ τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι κατιδεῖν τρόπον τινὰ κατενόησεν, οἷόν τινα γνῶσιν ἐναργῆ 2.1.140 τὸ ὑπὲρ πᾶσαν γνῶσιν τὸ ζητούμενον εἶναι ποιησαμένη. τά τε γὰρ ἀπεμφαίνοντα περὶ τὴν θείαν φύσιν ἐνόησε καὶ ὅσα πρέπει περὶ αὐτὴν ὑπονοεῖν οὐκ ἠγνόησεν, οὐ μὴν αὐτὴν ἐκείνην ἥτις ἐστὶ περὶ ἣν ταῦτα λογίζεται κατιδεῖν ἠδυ νήθη, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς τῶν προσόντων τε καὶ μὴ προσόντων γνώσεως εἶδεν, ὃ μόνον ὀφθῆναι δυνατόν ἐστιν, ὅτι τὸ παντὸς μὲν κακοῦ πόρρωθεν ἱδρυμένον, ἐν παντὶ δὲ νοού μενον ἀγαθῷ πάντως τι τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οἷον λόγῳ τε ἄρ 2.1.141 ρητον εἶναι καὶ λογισμοῖς ἀνεπίβατον. οὕτω τοίνυν πάσας μὲν τὰς ἀπρεπεῖς ἐννοίας ἐν τῇ περὶ τῆς θείας φύσεως ὑπολήψει τοῦ διδασκάλου ἡμῶν ἀποκαθήραντος, πᾶν δὲ ὅσον εὔφημόν τε καὶ θεοπρεπὲς νοεῖν περὶ αὐτὴν συμβου λεύσαντος καὶ διδάξαντος, ὡς οὔτε τι τῶν φθαρτῶν οὔτε τῶν διὰ γενέσεως εἰς τὸ εἶναι παρηγμένων τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πάσης τοιαύτης ὑπονοίας ἔξω νοεῖται, ἐκ δὲ τῆς ἀρνήσεως τῶν μὴ προσόντων καὶ ἐκ τῆς ὁμολογίας τῶν εὐσεβῶς περὶ αὐτοῦ νοουμένων ὅτι ἔστι καταλαμβάνεται, μάχεται τοῖς εἰρημένοις ὁ σφοδρὸς κατὰ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀγωνιστὴς καὶ βούλεται τὸν τοιόνδε τοῦ ῥήματος ἦχον, τὴν τῆς 20ἀγεννησίας20 λέγω φωνήν, ἐμφανῶς δεικνύναι τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν οὐσίαν. 2.1.142 Καίτοι παντὶ πρόδηλον τῷ γε μετρίως ἐπεσκεμμένῳ τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων χρήσεις, ὅτι ἡ ἀφθαρσία καὶ ἡ