Chapter V.—Questions Concerning the Origin of Evil in Regard to God, Who, Since He is the Chief Good, Cannot Be the Cause of Evil.

7. And I sought “whence is evil?” And sought in an evil way; nor saw I the evil in my very search. And I set in order before the view of my spirit the whole creation, and whatever we can discern in it, such as earth, sea, air, stars, trees, living creatures; yea, and whatever in it we do not see, as the firmament of heaven, all the angels, too, and all the spiritual inhabitants thereof. But these very beings, as though they were bodies, did my fancy dispose in such and such places, and I made one huge mass of all Thy creatures, distinguished according to the kinds of bodies,—some of them being real bodies, some what I myself had feigned for spirits. And this mass I made huge,—not as it was, which I could not know, but as large as I thought well, yet every way finite. But Thee, O Lord, I imagined on every part environing and penetrating it, though every way infinite; as if there were a sea everywhere, and on every side through immensity nothing but an infinite sea; and it contained within itself some sponge, huge, though finite, so that the sponge would in all its parts be filled from the immeasurable sea. So conceived I Thy Creation to be itself finite, and filled by Thee, the Infinite. And I said, Behold God, and behold what God hath created; and God is good, yea, most mightily and incomparably better than all these; but yet He, who is good, hath created them good, and behold how He encircleth and filleth them. Where, then, is evil, and whence, and how crept it in hither? What is its root, and what its seed? Or hath it no being at all? Why, then, do we fear and shun that which hath no being? Or if we fear it needlessly, then surely is that fear evil whereby the heart is unnecessarily pricked and tormented,—and so much a greater evil, as we have naught to fear, and yet do fear. Therefore either that is evil which we fear, or the act of fearing is in itself evil. Whence, therefore, is it, seeing that God, who is good, hath made all these things good? He, indeed, the greatest and chiefest Good, hath created these lesser goods; but both Creator and created are all good. Whence is evil? Or was there some evil matter of which He made and formed and ordered it, but left something in it which He did not convert into good? But why was this? Was He powerless to change the whole lump, so that no evil should remain in it, seeing that He is omnipotent? Lastly, why would He make anything at all of it, and not rather by the same omnipotency cause it not to be at all? Or could it indeed exist contrary to His will? Or if it were from eternity, why did He permit it so to be for infinite spaces of times in the past, and was pleased so long after to make something out of it? Or if He wished now all of a sudden to do something, this rather should the Omnipotent have accomplished, that this evil matter should not be at all, and that He only should be the whole, true, chief, and infinite Good. Or if it were not good that He, who was good, should not also be the framer and creator of what was good, then that matter which was evil being removed, and brought to nothing, He might form good matter, whereof He might create all things. For He would not be omnipotent were He not able to create something good without being assisted by that matter which had not been created by Himself.368    2 Cor. iii. 6. The spiritual or allegorical meaning here referred to is one that Augustin constantly sought, as did many of the early Fathers, both Greek and Latin. He only employs this method of interpretation, however, in a qualified way—never going to the lengths of Origen or Clement of Alexandria. He does not depreciate the letter of Scripture, though, as we have shown above (iii. sec. 14, note), he went as far as he well could in interpreting the history spiritually. He does not seem, however, quite consistent in his statements as to the relative prominence to be given to the literal and spiritual meanings, as may be seen by a comparison of the latter portions of secs. 1 and 3 of book xvii. of the City of God. His general idea may be gathered from the following passage in the 21st sec. of book xiii.:—“Some allegorize all that concerns paradise itself, where the first men, the parents of the human race, are, according to the truth of Holy Scripture, recorded to have been; and they understand all its trees and fruit-bearing plants as virtues and habits of life, as if they had no existence in the external world, but were only so spoken of or related for the sake of spiritual meanings. As if there could not be a real terrestrial paradise! As if there never existed these two women, Sarah and Hagar, nor the two sons who were born to Abraham, the one of the bond-woman, the other of the free, because the apostle says that in them the two covenants were prefigured! or as if water never flowed from the rock when Moses struck it, because therein Christ can be seen in a figure, as the same apostle says: ‘Now that rock was Christ’ (1 Cor. x. 4).…These and similar allegorical interpretations may be suitably put upon paradise without giving offence to any one, while yet we believe the strict truth of the history, confirmed by its circumstantial narrative of facts.” The allusion in the above passage to Sarah and Hagar invites the remark, that in Galatians iv. 24, the words in our version rendered, “which things are an allegory,” should be, “which things are such as may be allegorized.” [Ἁτινά ἐστιν ἀλληγορούμενα. See Jelf, 398, sec. 2.] It is important to note this, as the passage has been quoted in support of the more extreme method of allegorizing, though it could clearly go no further than to sanction allegorizing by way of spiritual meditation upon Scripture, and not in the interpretation of it—which first, as Waterland thinks (Works, vol. v. p. 311), was the end contemplated by most of the Fathers. Thoughtful students of Scripture will feel that we have no right to make historical facts typical or allegorical, unless (as in the case of the manna, the brazen serpent, Jacob’s ladder, etc.) we have divine authority for so doing; and few such will dissent from the opinion of Bishop Marsh (Lecture vi.) that the type must not only resemble the antitype, but must have been designed to resemble it, and further, that we must have the authority of Scripture for the existence of such design. The text, “The letter killeth, but the Spirit giveth life,” as a perusal of the context will show, has nothing whatever to do with either “literal” or “spiritual” meanings. Augustin himself interprets it in one place (De Spir. et Lit. cc. 4, 5) as meaning the killing letter of the law, as compared with the quickening power of the gospel. “An opinion,” to conclude with the thoughtful words of Alfred Morris on this   Chapter ( Words for the Heart and Life, p. 203), “once common must therefore be rejected. Some still talk of ‘letter’ and ‘spirit’ in a way which has no sanction here. The ‘letter’ with them is the literal meaning of the text, the ‘spirit’ is its symbolic meaning. And, as the ‘spirit’ possesses an evident superiority to the ‘letter,’ they fly away into the region of secret senses and hidden doctrines, find types where there is nothing typical, and allegories where there is nothing allegorical; make Genesis more evangelical than the Epistle to the Romans, and Leviticus than the Epistle to the Hebrews; mistaking lawful criticism for legal Christianity, they look upon the exercise of a sober judgment as a proof of a depraved taste, and forget that diseased as well as very powerful eyes may see more than others. It is not the obvious meaning and the secret meaning that are intended by ‘letter’ and ‘spirit,’ nor any two meanings of Christianity, nor two meanings of any thing or things, but the two systems of Moses and of Christ.” Reference may be made on this whole subject of allegorical interpretation in the writings of the Fathers to Blunt’s Right Use of the Early Fathers, series i. lecture 9.    See xi. sec. 7, note, below. Such like things did I revolve in my miserable breast, overwhelmed with most gnawing cares lest I should die ere I discovered the truth; yet was the faith of Thy Christ, our Lord and Saviour, as held in the Catholic Church, fixed firmly in my heart, unformed, indeed, as yet upon many points, and diverging from doctrinal rules, but yet my mind did not utterly leave it, but every day rather drank in more and more of it.

CAPUT V. Quaerit iterum unde malum, et quae radix ejus.

7. Et quaerebam unde malum, et male quaerebam; et in ipsa inquisitione mea non videbam malum. Et constituebam in conspectu spiritus mei universam creaturam, quidquid in ea cernere possumus; sicuti est terra, et mare, et aer, et sidera, et arbores, et animalia mortalia; et quidquid in ea non videmus, sicut firmamentum coeli, insuper et omnes Angelos et cuncta spiritualia ejus; sed etiam ipsa, quasi corpora essent, locis et locis ordinavit imaginatio mea: et feci unam massam grandem distinctam generibus corporum creaturam tuam ; sive quae vera corpora erant, sive quae ipse pro spiritibus finxeram: et eam feci grandem, non quantum erat, quod scire non poteram; sed quantum libuit, undiqueversum sane finitam. Te autem, Domine, ex omni parte ambientem eam et penetrantem, sed usquequaque infinitum: tanquam si mare esset ubique, et undique per immensa spatia infinitum solum mare, et haberet intra se spongiam quamlibet magnam, sed finitam tamen; plena esset utique spongia illa ex omni sua parte ex immenso mari: sic creaturam tuam finitam te infinito plenam putabam, et dicebam: Ecce Deus, et ecce quae creavit Deus, et bonus est Deus, atque his validissime longissimeque praestantior; sed tamen bonus bona creavit, et ecce quomodo ambit atque implet ea. Ubi ergo malum, et unde, et qua huc irrepsit? Quae radix ejus, et quod semen ejus? An omnino non est? Cur ergo timemus et cavemus quod non est? Aut si inaniter timemus, certe vel timor ipse malum est, quo incassum stimulatur et excruciatur cor: et tanto gravius malum, quanto non est quod timeamus, et timemus. Idcirco aut est malum quod timemus, aut hoc malum est quia timemus. Unde est igitur, quoniam Deus fecit haec omnia, bonus bona? Majus quidem et summum bonum minora fecit bona, sed tamen et creans et creata bona sunt omnia. Unde est malum? An unde fecit ea , materies aliqua mala erat, et formavit atque 0737 ordinavit eam, sed reliquit aliquid in illa, quod in bonum non converteret? Cur et hoc? An impotens erat totam vertere et commutare, ut nihil mali remaneret, cum sit omnia potens? Postremo, cur inde aliquid facere voluit, ac non potius eadem omnipotentia fecit ut nulla esset omnino? Aut vero existere poterat contra ejus voluntatem? Aut si aeterna erat, cur tam diu per infinita retro spatia temporum, sic eam sivit esse, ac tanto post placuit aliquid ex ea facere? Aut jam si aliquid subito voluit agere, hoc potius ageret omnipotens, ut illa non esset, atque ipse solus esset totum, verum et summum et infinitum bonum. Aut si non erat bene ut non aliquid boni etiam fabricaretur , et conderet qui bonus erat; illa sublata et ad nihilum redacta materia quae mala erat, bonam ipse institueret unde omnia crearet. Non enim esset omnipotens, si condere non posset aliquid boni, nisi ea, quam ipse non condiderat, adjuvaretur materia. Talia volvebam pectore misero, ingravidato curis mordacissimis de timore mortis, et non inventa veritate: stabiliter tamen haerebat in corde meo, in catholica Ecclesia fides Christi tui Domini et Salvatoris nostri; in multis quidem adhuc informis, et praeter doctrinae normam fluitans , sed tamen eam non relinquebat animus, imo in dies magis magisque imbibebat.