But I do not think that we need linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows. To the more attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our opponent will itself appear in the light of a special pleader on the side of orthodoxy. He says, for instance, that imperishability and immortality are the very essence of the Deity. For my part I see no need to contend with him, no matter whether these qualities aforesaid only accrue to the Deity, or whether they are, by virtue of their signification, His essence; whichever of these two views is adopted, it will completely support our argument. For if the being imperishable only accrues to the essence, the not being generated will also most certainly only accrue to it; and so the idea of ungeneracy will be ejected from being the mark of the essence. If, on the other hand, because God is not subject to destruction, one affirms imperishability to be His essence, and, because He is stronger than death, one therefore defines immortality to be His very essence, and if the Son is imperishable and immortal (as He is), imperishability and immortality will also be the essence of the Only-begotten. If, then, the Father is imperishability, and the Son imperishability, and each of these imperishabilities is the essence, and no difference exists between them as regards the idea of imperishability, one essence will differ from the other essence in no way at all, seeing that in both equally the nature is a stranger to any corruption. Even if he should resume the same method as before, and place us on the horns of his dilemma from which, as he thinks, there is no escape, saying that, if we distinguish that which accrues from that which is, we make the Deity composite, whereas if we acknowledge His simplicity, then the imperishability and the ungeneracy are seen at once to be significative of His very essence—even then again we can show that he is fighting for our side. For if he will have it that God is made composite by our saying that anything accrues to Him, then he certainly cannot eject the Fatherhood either from the essence, but must confess that He is Father by His nature as much as He is imperishable and immortal; and so without intending it he must admit the Son also to partake of that intimate nature; for it will not be possible, if God is essentially Father, to exclude the Son from a relationship to Him thus essential. But if he says that the Fatherhood accrues to God, but is outside the circle of the substance, then he must concede to us that we may say anything we like accrues to the Deity, since the Divine simplicity is in no way marred, if His quality of ungeneracy is made to mean something outside the essence. If, however, he declares that the imperishability and the ungeneracy do mean the essence, and if he insists that these two words are equivalent, since, by reason of the same meaning lying in each, there is no difference between them, and if he thus assert that the very idea of imperishability and ungeneracy is one and the same, the One who is the first of these must necessarily be the second too. But that the Son is imperishable, let us observe, even these men entertain no doubt; therefore, by Eunomius’ argument, the Son also is ungenerate, if imperishability and ungeneracy are to mean the same thing. So that he must accept one of two alternatives; either he must agree with us that ungeneracy is other than imperishability, or, if he abides by his assertions, he must in various ways speak blasphemy about the Only-begotten, making Him, for instance, perishable, in order that he may not have to say that He is ungenerate; or ungenerate, in order that he may not prove Him perishable.
Ἀλλ' οὐδὲν οἶμαι χρῆναι τούτοις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐνδιατρίβειν οὐδὲ τὰ καθεξῆς εἰρημένα δι' ἀκριβείας ἐλέγχειν: ἱκανῶς γὰρ τοῖς ἐπιστατικωτέροις αὐτὸς ὁ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ πονηθεὶς λόγος συνήγορος τῶν τῆς εὐσεβείας δογμάτων ἀναφανήσεται. φησὶ γὰρ « τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτὴν ἀφθαρσίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀθανασίαν ὡσαύτως ». ἐγὼ δὲ εἴτε πρόσεστι ταῦτα τῇ θείᾳ φύσει εἴτε αὐτὰ ταῦτα κατὰ τὸ σημαινόμενον ἡ οὐσία ἐστίν, οὐδὲν οἶμαι χρῆναι πρὸς αὐτὸν διαμάχεσθαι: ὅ τι γὰρ ἂν νικήσῃ τῶν εἰρημένων, τὸν ἡμέτερον πάντως συστήσει λόγον. εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσείη τῇ οὐσίᾳ τὸ μὴ φθείρεσθαι, πρόσεστιν αὐτῇ πάντως καὶ τὸ μὴ διὰ γεννήσεως εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως ὁ τῆς ἀγεννησίας λόγος ἔξω τῆς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν σημασίας ἀπωσθήσεται. εἰ δὲ ὅτι οὐ φθείρεται ὁ θεός, ἀφθαρσίαν τις λέγοι τὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι θανάτου κρείττων ἐστί, διὰ τοῦτο αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν ἀθανασίαν εἶναι ὁρίζοιτο, ἄφθαρτος δὲ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ἀθάνατος, ἀφθαρσία ἂν εἴη καὶ ἀθανασία καὶ τοῦ μονογενοῦς ἡ οὐσία. εἰ οὖν ἀφθαρσία μὲν ὁ πατήρ, ἀφθαρσία δὲ ὁ υἱός, οὐσία δὲ τούτων ἑκάτερον, οὐδεμία δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ἔννοιαν ἐπινοεῖται διαφορά, κατ' οὐδὲν πάντως ἡ οὐσία τῆς οὐσίας διενεχθήσεται, εἴπερ ἐπίσης ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρων ἡ φύσις τῆς φθορᾶς ἠλλοτρίωται. κἂν τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν ἐπαναλαμβάνων ταῖς ἀφύκτοις ἡμᾶς, ὡς οἴεται, τῶν διλημμάτων ἀνάγκαις καταδῇ, λέγων εἰ μὲν διορίζοιτο παρ' ἡμῶν τὸ προσὸν τοῦ ὄντος, σύνθετον τὸ θεῖον κατασκευάζεσθαι, εἰ δὲ ἡ ἁπλότης ὁμολογοῖτο, αὐτῆς τῆς οὐσίας σημαντικὴν τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν καὶ τὴν ἀγεννησίαν πάντως ἀναφανήσεσθαι, πάλιν αὐτὸν σύμμαχον τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀποδείξομεν λόγων. εἰ γὰρ πάντη σύνθετον ποιεῖ τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν τῷ προσεῖναί τι λέγειν αὐτῇ, οὐδὲ τὴν πατρότητα πάντως ἐκτὸς τῆς οὐσίας ἀποποιήσεται, ἀλλὰ φύσει πατέρα ὁμολογήσει ὡς ἄφθαρτόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον, καὶ οὕτως καὶ μὴ βουλόμενος εἰς τὴν τῆς φύσεως οἰκειότητα τὸν υἱὸν καταδέξεται. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δυνατὸν ἐκείνου φύσει πατρὸς ὄντος τῆς φυσικῆς πρὸς αὐτὸν σχέσεως τὸν υἱὸν ἀφορίζεσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἔξω τῆς φύσεως προσεῖναι λέγοι τῷ θεῷ τὴν πατρότητα, καὶ ἡμῖν δώσει πάντως κατ' ἐξουσίαν προσεῖναί τι λέγειν τῷ πατρί, ὡς οὐδὲν τῆς ἁπλότητος ἀθετουμένης, εἰ ἔξω τῆς οὐσίας τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀγεννησίαν σημαίνοιτο. εἰ δὲ αὐτῆς φησι τῆς οὐσίας σημαντικὸν τὸ ἄφθαρτον καὶ τὸ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἰσοδυναμεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἑκάτερα τῶν ὀνομάτων διϊσχυρίζοιτο, ὡς μηδεμίαν ἐπ' αὐτῶν εἶναι διαφορὰν τῷ ταὐτὸν ἑκατέροις ἐγκεῖσθαι τὸ σημαινόμενον, καὶ μίαν λέγοι τοῦ ἀφθάρτου καὶ τοῦ ἀγεννήτου τὴν ἔννοιαν, ὁ τὸ ἓν τούτων ὢν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον πάντως ἐστίν. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄφθαρτος ὁ υἱὸς εἶναι καὶ παρὰ τούτων οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλεται: ἀγέννητος ἄρα κατὰ τὸν Εὐνομίου λόγον καὶ οὗτός ἐστιν, εἴπερ ταὐτὸν σημαίνει τῇ ἀγεννησίᾳ τὸ ἄφθαρτον. ὥστε δυοῖν θάτερον, ἢ ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν τὸ ἀγέννητον σημαίνειν συνθήσεται ἢ ἐπιμένων τοῖς δεδογμένοις πολλαχῶς περὶ τὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν βλασφημήσει, ἤτοι φθαρτὸν αὐτὸν ποιῶν ἵνα μὴ ἀγέννητον λέγῃ, ἢ ἀγέννητον εἶναι κατασκευάζων ἵνα μὴ φθαρτὸν ἀποδείξῃ.