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his struggle tends toward no end at all. For if this becomes manifest, if nothing else, at least because of not wanting to speak idly he will refrain from the objection; and it will be manifest immediately if we learn from him for what reason he stripped for this contest, and this is shown to be useless.

He himself says, therefore, in his preface and in his words to us that, «it is necessary now to say toward what my arguments on these matters are tending: I considered how it might be possible in one argument to refute them all and to show the syllogisms made by the Latins to be sophisms. I saw, therefore, that it was possible to achieve this if one were able to show that these are neither dialectical nor demonstrative; but to show that they are not dialectical was very easy for me, by merely pointing out that the premises they take are disputed by us just as much as the conclusion; but to show that they are not demonstrative was altogether impossible (p. 518) for one who has conceded that it is possible to reason demonstratively on divine matters». Consider what you are saying, O philosopher: it was very easy for you to show that all the arguments proposed syllogistically by the Latins in favor of their own dogma have premises that are as disputed as the conclusion, and you are anxious lest, ceasing to call these syllogisms dialectical, they might call them demonstrative and place you in the utmost perplexity? And is a syllogism that has disputed premises, and these as much as the conclusion, demonstrative, or does it seem to be?

Who among those nurtured in the discipline of reasoning or even those moderately acquainted with it would ever say this? For you showed, as you yourself say there, that all their syllogisms are sophisms; then you are afraid that they might say that those which have been exposed as sophistical are demonstrative? And is it at all possible for the sophistical to be demonstrative? You have suffered something similar, my good man, as if someone, when the sun and moon are under the earth, were to say that those above the earth are passing this part of the time in deep darkness, as being deprived also of the light of the moon, and then feared that they might say this is the steady light of day and thus prove him to be lying; for a syllogism shown not to be dialectical, it is possible to suppose it is demonstrative, as something better than this, but as something worse than the dialectical, it is among the impossibilities for anyone ever to think this to be demonstrative, just as it is possible to suppose that the air of a full-mooned night is brighter than day, but not darker.

Therefore, you should have said this to them and been rid of the matter; but you, after refuting those who drew false conclusions from things no less obscure, or rather, from things clearly false, then, fearing that they might seem to have concluded demonstratively from falsehoods, (p. 518) you came to the necessity of saying that there is no demonstration in divine matters and of intemperately contradicting us when we say that some divine things are so manifest according to the traditions of the fathers, that there is both contact with them and demonstration and knowledge, but also beyond the mind that sees intellectually and beyond the one who has ascended even above the intellectual energies themselves and, by a cessation of every perceptive power, has been super-united by ineffable grace to the incomprehensible things.

It follows therefore from what the philosopher, by force indeed, as he himself says, yet nevertheless submitted to, that all the syllogisms spoken against him by the Latins are irreproachable; for, according to him, the patristic traditions agree with these. It seems, therefore, that he condemns himself as not having been able to refute them. For if he knew that he was able to do this, how could he have feared that they might call the sophistical syllogisms demonstrative, one of the outsiders might have said; but I would not say this; rather indeed

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ἀγών αὐτῷ πρός οὐδέν ὅλως τείνει τέλος. Ἄν γάρ τοῦτο γένηται κατάδηλον, εἰ μηδέν ἄλλο, διά γοῦν τό μή θέλειν ματαιολογεῖν ἀφέξεται τῆς ἐνστάσεως˙ ἔσται δέ κατάδηλον εὐθύς ἄν παρ᾿ ἐκείνου μάθωμεν οὗπερ ἕνεκα πρός τήν ἀγωνίαν ἀπεδύσατο ταύτην, καί τοῦτ᾿ ἀχρεῖον ὄν φανῇ.

Φησί τοίνυν αὐτός ἐν τῇ προθεωρίᾳ κἀν τοῖς πρός ἡμᾶς λόγοις ὡς, «δεῖ νῦν εἰπεῖν πρός τί μοι τείνουσιν οἱ περί τούτων λόγοι˙ ἐσκεψάμην πῶς ἄν εἴη ἑνί λόγῳ ἅπαντας ἀνασκευάσαι καί δεῖξαι σοφίσματα τούς ὑπό Λατίνων γινομένους συλλογισμούς. Ἑώρων οὖν δυνατόν ὄν τούτου τυχεῖν εἴ τις οἷος τ᾿ εἴη δεῖξαι τούτους μήτε διαλεκτικούς ὄντας μήτε ἀποδεικτικούς˙ ἀλλά τό μέν μή εἶναι αὐτούς διαλεκτικούς προχειρότατον ἦν μοι δεῖξαι, δηλώσαντι μόνον ὡς ἅ λαμβάνουσιν ἐπίσης ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητεῖται τῷ συμπεράσματι˙ τό δέ μή εἶναι ἀποδεικτικούς ἀδύνατον ὅλως ἦν δεῖξαι (σελ. 518) συγχωρήσαντι δυνατόν εἶναι ἀποδεικτικῶς ἐπί τῶν θείων συλλογίσασθαι». Σκέψαι τί λέγεις, ᾦ φιλόσοφε˙ προχειρότατον ἦν σοι δεῖξαι πάντας τούς ὑπό Λατίνων ὑπέρ τοῦ οἰκείου δόγματος συλλογιστικῶς προτεινομένους λόγουσ τάς προτάσεις ἔχοντας ἐπίσης ἀμφισβητουμένας τῷ συμπεράσματι καί ἀγωνιᾷς μή τούς συλλογισμούς τούτους ἀφέμενοι τοῦ διαλεκτικούς καλεῖν ἀποδεικτικούς προσαγορεύσωσι καί εἰς ἀπορίαν τήν ἐσχάτην περιστήσωσί σε; Καί ἔστι ἀποδεικτικόν ἤ εἶναι ἤ δοκεῖν συλλογισμόν τόν τάς προτάσεις ἀμφισβητουμένας ἔχοντα, καί ταῦτα ἐπίσης τῷ συμπεράσματι;

Τί ποτε τῶν παιδείᾳ λόγων συντεθραμμένων ἤ καί τῶν μετρίως ἡμμένων ταύτης τοῦτ᾿ εἴποι; Σοφίσματα γάρ ἔδειξας, ὡς αὐτός ἐκεῖ λέγεις, τούς συλλογισμούς αὐτῶν ὄντας ἅπαντας˙ εἶτα δέδοικας μή τούς σοφιστικούς ὄντας ἐξεληλεγμένους ἀποδεικτικούς εἶναι φῶσι; Καί ἔστι τόν σοφιστικόν ἀποδεικτικόν ὅλως εἶναι; Ταὐτόν τι πέπονθας, ὦγαθέ, ὥσπερ ἄν τις, ὑπό γῆν ἡλίου καί σελήνης ὄντων, τό τοῦ χρόνου τοῦτο μέρος ἐν βαθεῖ σκότει διανύειν ἔλεγε τούς ὑπέρ γῆν, ὡς καί τοῦ τῆς σελήνης φωτός ἐστερημένους, εἶτ᾿ ἐδεδίει μή τό σταθερόν εἶναι τοῦτο τῆς ἡμέρας φῶσι καί οὕτω ψευδόμενον ἀπελέγξωσιν αὐτόν˙ συλλογισμόν γάρ μή διαλεκτικόν μέν δεικνύμενον, ὡς τούτου κρείττονα ἔστιν ἀποδεικτικόν ὑπολαβεῖν, ὡς δέ χείρω τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ, τῶν ἀδυνάτων οἰηθῆναί ποτέ τινα τοῦτον ἀποδεικτικόν, ὥσπερ καί ἀέρα πανσελήνου μέν νυκτός φανότερον ἔστιν ὑπολαβεῖν ἡμέραν, σκοτεινότερον δ᾿ οὐκ ἔστι.

Τοῦτο τοίνυν πρός αὐτούς εἰπόντα σε χρῆν ἀπηλλάχθαι πραγμάτων˙ σύ δ᾿ ἐκ τῶν οὐχ ἧττον ἀσαφῶν, μᾶλλον δέ σαφῶς ψευδῶν, τά ψευδῆ συναγαγόντας ἀπελέγξας, εἶτα φοβηθείς μή ἐκ ψευδῶν ἀποδεικτικῶς δόξωσι συναγαγεῖν, (σελ. 518) εἰς τό μηδεμίαν ἀπόδειξιν ἐπί τῶν θείων εἶναι λέγειν εἰς ἀνάγκην ἦλθες καί ἡμῖν ἀντιλέγειν ἀκρατῶς λέγουσιν ὡς τά μέν τῶν θείων οὕτως ἐστίν ἐμφανῆ κατά τάς τῶν πατέρων παραδόσεις, ὡς καί ἐπαφήν εἶναι τούτων καί ἀπόδειξιν καί ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλά καί ὑπέρ τόν νοερῶς ὁρῶντα νοῦν καί ὑπέρ τόν καί αὐτάς τάς νοεράς ἐνεργείας ὑπεραναβάντα καί κατά ἀπόπαυσιν πάσης ἀντιληπτικῆς δυνάμεως χάριτι ἀρρήτῳ ὑπερηνωμένον τοῖς ἀπερινοήτοις.

Συμβαίνει τοίνυν ἐξ ὧν ὁ φιλόσοφος βίᾳ μέν, ὡς αὐτός φησιν, ὑπέστη δ᾿ ὅμως ἀνεπιλήπτους εἶναι τούς πρός αὐτόν παρά Λατίνων εἰρημένους ἅπαντας συλλογισμούς˙ συναιροῦνται γάρ τούτοις κατ᾿ αὐτόν αἱ πατερικαί παραδόσεις. Ἔοικε τοιγαροῦν ἑαυτοῦ καταγινώσκειν ὡς μή δυνηθέντος ἀπελέγξαι τούτους. Εἰ γάρ τοῦτο δυνηθείς ἠπίστατο, πῶς ἄν ἐφοβήθη μή ἀποδεικτικούς τούς σοφιστικούς καλέσωσιν, εἶπεν ἄν τις τῶν ἀλλοτρίων˙ ἐγώ δ᾿ οὐ τοῦτο φαίην ἄν˙ μᾶλλον μέν οὖν