§3. Thereafter he discusses the divergence of names and of things, speaking, of that which is ungenerate as without a cause, and of that which is non-existent, as the Scindapsus, Minotaur, Blityri, Cyclops, Scylla, which never were generated at all, and shows that things which are essentially different, are mutually destructive, as fire of water, and the rest in their several relations. But in the case of the Father and the Son, as the essence is common, and the properties reciprocally interchangeable, no injury results to the Nature.

Since, however, after the passage cited above, he professes that he will allege something stronger still, let us examine this also, as well as the passage cited, lest we should seem to be withdrawing our opposition in face of an overwhelming force. “If, however,” he says, “I am to abandon all these positions, and fall back upon my stronger argument, I would say this, that even if all the terms that he advances by way of refutation were established, our statement will none the less be manifestly shown to be true. If, as will be admitted, the divergence of the names which are significant of properties marks the divergence of the things, it is surely necessary to allow that with the divergence of the names significant of essence is also marked the divergence of the essences. And this would be found to hold good in all cases, I mean in the case of essences, energies, colours, figures, and other qualities. For we denote by divergent appellations the different essences, fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white and black, triangle and circle. Why need we mention the intelligible essences, in enumerating which the Apostle marks, by difference of names, the divergence of essence?”

Who would not be dismayed at this irresistible power of attack? The argument transcends the promise, the experience is more terrible than the threat. “I will come,” he says, “to my stronger argument.” What is it? That as the differences of properties are recognized by those names which signify the special attributes, we must of course, he says, allow that differences of essence are also expressed by divergence of names. What then are these appellations of essences by which we learn the divergence of Nature between the Father and the son? He talks of fire and water, air and earth, cold and heat, white and black, triangle and circle. His illustrations have won him the day: his argument carries all before it: I cannot contradict the statement that those names which are entirely incommunicable indicate difference of natures. But our man of keen and quick-sighted intellect has just missed seeing these points:—that in this case the Father is God and the Son is God; that “just,” and “incorruptible,” and all those names which belong to the Divine Nature, are used equally of the Father and of the Son; and thus, if the divergent character of appellations indicates difference of natures, the community of names will surely show the common character of the essence. And if we must agree that the Divine essence is to be expressed by names781    On this point, besides what follows here, see the treatise against Tritheism addressed to Ablabius., it would behove us to apply to that Nature these lofty and Divine names rather than the terminology of “generate” and “ungenerate,” because “good” and “incorruptible,” “just” and “wise,” and all such terms as these are strictly applicable only to that Nature which passes all understanding, whereas “generated” exhibits community of name with even the inferior forms of the lower creation. For we call a dog, and a frog, and all things that come into the world by way of generation, “generated.” And moreover, the term “ungenerate” is not only employed of that which exists without a cause, but has also a proper application to that which is nonexistent. The Scindapsus782    These are names applied to denote existences purely imaginary; the other names belong to classical mythology. is called ungenerate, the Blityri783    These are names applied to denote existences purely imaginary; the other names belong to classical mythology. is ungenerate, the Minotaur is ungenerate, the Cyclops, Scylla, the Chimæra are ungenerate, not in the sense of existing without generation, but in the sense of never having come into being at all. If, then, the names more peculiarly Divine are common to the Son with the Father, and if it is the others, those which are equivocally employed either of the non-existent or of the lower animals—if it is these, I say, which are divergent, let his “generate and ungenerate” be so: Eunomius’ powerful argument against us itself upholds the cause of truth in testifying that there is no divergence in respect of nature, because no divergence can be perceived in the names784    That is, in the names more peculiarly appropriate to the Divine Nature.. But if he asserts the difference of essence to exist between the “generate” and the “ungenerate,” as it does between fire and water, and is of opinion that the names, like those which he has mentioned in his examples, are in the same mutual relation as “fire” and “water,” the horrid character of his blasphemy will here again be brought to light, even if we hold our peace. For fire and water have a nature mutually destructive, and each is destroyed, if it comes to be in the other, by the prevalence of the more powerful element. If, then, he lays down the doctrine that the Nature of the Ungenerate differs thus from that of the Only-begotten, it is surely clear that he logically makes this destructive opposition to be involved in the divergence of their essences, so that their nature will be, by this reasoning, incompatible and incommunicable, and the one would be consumed by the other, if both should be found to be mutually inclusive or co-existent.

How then is the Son “in the Father” without being destroyed, and how does the Father, coming to be “in the Son,” remain continually unconsumed, if, as Eunomius says, the special attribute of fire, as compared with water, is maintained in the relation of the Generate to the Ungenerate? Nor does their definition regard communion as existing between earth and air, for the former is stable, solid, resistent, of downward tendency and heavy, while air has a nature made up of the contrary attributes. So white and black are found in opposition among colours, and men are agreed that the circle is not the same with the triangle, for each, according to the definition of its figure, is precisely that which the other is not. But I am unable to discover where he sees the opposition in the case of God the Father and God the Only-begotten Son. One goodness, wisdom, justice, providence, power, incorruptibility,—all other attributes of exalted significance are similarly predicated of each, and the one has in a certain sense His strength in the other; for on the one hand the Father makes all things through the Son, and on the other hand the Only-begotten works all in Himself, being the Power of the Father. Of what avail, then, are fire and water to show essential diversity in the Father and the Son? He calls us, moreover, “rash” for instancing the unity of nature and difference of persons of Peter and Paul, and says we are guilty of gross recklessness, if we apply our argument to the contemplation of the objects of pure reason by the aid of material examples. Fitly, fitly indeed, does the corrector of our errors reprove us for rashness in interpreting the Divine Nature by material illustrations! Why then, deliberate and circumspect sir, do you talk about the elements? Is earth immaterial, fire an object of pure reason, water incorporeal, air beyond the perception of the senses? Is your mind so well directed to its aim, are you so keen-sighted in all directions in your promulgation of this argument, that your adversaries cannot lay hold of, that you do not see in yourself the faults you blame in those you are accusing? Or are we to make concessions to you when you are establishing the diversity of essence by material aid, and to be ourselves rejected when we point out the kindred character of the Nature by means of examples within our compass?

Πλὴν ἐπειδή τι μετὰ τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἐπαγγέλλεται λέγειν, ὡς ἂν μὴ φόβῳ τῶν δυνατωτέρων καθυφιέναι δοκοίημεν τὴν ἀντίρρησιν, κἀκεῖνο τοῖς εἰρημένοις προσεξετάσωμεν. « εἰ δὲ ἔδει », φησί, « πάντων ἀφέμενον ἐπὶ τὸν ἰσχυρότερον χωρῆσαι λόγον, ἐκεῖνα φήσαιμι ἄν, ὅτι καὶ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πρὸς ἔλεγχον προβληθέντων ὀνομάτων παραδεχθέντων οὐδὲν ἧττον ἀληθὴς ὁ παρ' ἡμῶν φανερωθήσεται λόγος. εἴπερ ἡ παραλλαγὴ τῶν τὰς ἰδιότητας σημαινόντων ὀνομάτων τὴν παραλλαγὴν ἐμφαίνει τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀνάγκη δήπου συγχωρεῖν καὶ τῇ παραλλαγῇ τῶν τὰς οὐσίας σημαινόντων συνεμφαίνεσθαι τὴν παραλλαγὴν τῶν οὐσιῶν. καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχον εὕροι τις ἄν, λέγω δὲ οὐσιῶν ἐνεργειῶν χρωμάτων σχημάτων τῶν ἄλλων ποιοτήτων. πῦρ τε γὰρ καὶ ὕδωρ, διαφόρους οὐσίας, παρηλλαγμέναις σημαίνομεν προσηγορίαις, ἀέρα τε καὶ γῆν, ψυχρόν τε αὖ καὶ θερμόν, λευκόν τε καὶ μέλαν ἢ τρίγωνον καὶ περιφερές: τί γὰρ δεῖ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν λέγειν οὐσιῶν, ἃς καταλέγων ὁ ἀπόστολος τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν ὀνομάτων τὴν παραλλαγὴν ἐνέφηνε τῶν οὐσιῶν »; τίς οὐκ ἂν καταπλαγείη πρὸς τὴν ἀνανταγώνιστον ταύτην τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος δύναμιν; ὑπὲρ τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν ὁ λόγος, φοβερωτέρα τῆς ἀπειλῆς ἡ πεῖρα. ἐπὶ τὸν ἰσχυρότερον, φησίν, ἥξω τῶν λόγων. τίς οὗτός ἐστιν; ὅτι τῆς τῶν ἰδιωμάτων διαφορᾶς διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων γινωσκομένης τῶν σημαινόντων τὰς ἰδιότητας ἀνάγκη δήπου συγχωρεῖν, φησί, καὶ τὰς τῶν οὐσιῶν διαφορὰς ἐν ταῖς τῶν ὀνομάτων παραλλαγαῖς ἑρμηνεύεσθαι. τίνες οὖν αἱ τῶν οὐσιῶν προσηγορίαι δι' ὧν ἐπὶ πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ τὸ παρηλλαγμένον ἐδιδάχθη τῆς φύσεως; πῦρ λέγει καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν, ψυχρόν τε καὶ θερμόν, λευκόν τε καὶ μέλαν, τρίγωνον καὶ περιφερές. νενίκηκε τοῖς ὑποδείγμασιν, ὑπερέσχε κατὰ κράτος τῷ λόγῳ: οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὸς ἀντιλέγω τὰ διὰ πάντων ἀκοινώνητα τῶν ὀνομάτων τὴν τῶν φύσεων διαφορὰν συνενδείκνυσθαι. ἀλλὰ τουτὶ μόνον οὐκ εἶδεν ὁ ὀξὺς καὶ διορατικὸς τὴν διάνοιαν, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα ὅ τε πατὴρ θεὸς καὶ ὁ υἱὸς θεὸς δίκαιός τε καὶ ἄφθαρτος καὶ πάντα τὰ τῆς θεολογίας ὀνόματα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον ἐπί τε « τοῦ » πατρὸς καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ λέγεται, ὥστε εἰ τὸ παρηλλαγμένον τῶν προσηγοριῶν τὴν διαφορὰν σημαίνει τῶν φύσεων, ἡ κοινότης τῶν ὀνομάτων τὸ κοινὸν τῆς οὐσίας πάντως ἐνδείξεται. καὶ εἰ χρὴ συνθέσθαι τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν δι' ὀνομάτων μηνύεσθαι, πρέπον ἂν εἴη τὰς ὑψηλὰς ταύτας καὶ θεοπρεπεῖς φωνὰς ἐφαρμόζειν τῇ φύσει μᾶλλον ἢ τὴν τοῦ « γεννητοῦ » καὶ « ἀγεννήτου » ἐπωνυμίαν, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν τε καὶ ἄφθαρτον, δίκαιόν τε καὶ σοφὸν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μόνῃ προσφυῶς τῇ ὑπερεχούσῃ πάντα νοῦν ἐφαρμόζεται φύσει, τὸ δὲ γεννητὸν καὶ πρὸς τὰ εὐτελῆ τῆς κάτω κτίσεως τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν ἔχει. γεννητὸν γάρ φαμεν καὶ κύνα καὶ βάτραχον καὶ πάντα ὅσα διὰ γεννήσεως ἔχει τὴν πάροδον: ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀγέννητον ὄνομα οὐ μόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄνευ αἰτίας ὑφεστῶτος λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον ἔχει τὴν οἰκειότητα. ἀγέννητος λέγεται καὶ ὁ σκινδαψός, ἀγέννητον καὶ τὸ βλίτυρι, ἀγέννητος ὁ Μινώταυρος, ὁ Κύκλωψ, ἡ Σκύλλα, ἡ Χίμαιρα, οὐ τῷ ἀγεννήτως εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τῷ μὴ γενέσθαι ὅλως. εἰ οὖν τὰ θειότερα τῶν ὀνομάτων κοινὰ τῷ υἱῷ πρὸς τὸν πατέρα, τὰ δὲ ὅσα ἢ πρὸς τὸ ἀνύπαρκτον ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὰ ταπεινὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν ἔχει, ταῦτα παρήλλακται, τὸ γεννητὸν ἔστω καὶ τὸ ἀγέννητον, ἡ ἰσχυρὰ τοῦ Εὐνομίου καθ' ἡμῶν ἐπιχείρησις αὐτὴ κρατύνει τῆς ἀληθείας τὸ δόγμα, μηδεμίαν εἶναι κατὰ τὴν φύσιν διαφορὰν μαρτυροῦσα διὰ τὸ μηδὲ τοῖς ὀνόμασί τινα παραλλαγὴν καθορᾶσθαι. εἰ δὲ ἐν τῷ γεννητῷ καὶ ἀγεννήτῳ τὸ διάφορον τῆς οὐσίας τίθεται καὶ οὕτως οἴεται τὰ ὀνόματα καθ' ὁμοιότητα τῶν ἐν τοῖς ὑποδείγμασιν εἰρημένων διακεῖσθαι ὡς τῷ πυρὶ καὶ τῷ ὕδατι πρὸς ἄλληλα, πάλιν ἐνταῦθα τὸ φρικτὸν τῆς βλασφημίας καὶ σιωπώντων ἡμῶν φανερωθήσεται. τὸ πῦρ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ φθαρτικὴν κατ' ἀλλήλων τὴν φύσιν ἔχει καὶ ἴσως ἑκάτερον ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ γενόμενον τῇ ἐπικρατήσει τοῦ πλεονάζοντος φθείρεται. εἰ οὖν οὕτω διεστάναι τοῦ « ἀγεννήτου » τὴν φύσιν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μονογενοῦς δογματίζει, πάντως ὅτι καὶ τὴν φθαρτικὴν ταύτην ἐναντιότητα τῇ παραλλαγῇ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐνυπάρχειν κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον δίδωσιν, ὡς ἀσύμβατον αὐτῶν διὰ τούτου καὶ ἀκοινώνητον εἶναι τὴν φύσιν καὶ ἐνδαπανᾶσθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον, εἰ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἀμφότερα ἢ μετ' ἀλλήλων γένοιντο.
Πῶς οὖν ἐν τῷ πατρὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ οὐ φθείρεται, καὶ πῶς ἐν τῷ υἱῷ ὁ πατὴρ ὢν εἰς τὸ διηνεκὲς ἀντέχει μὴ δαπανώμενος, εἴπερ ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς πρὸς τὸ ὕδωρ ἰδιότης καὶ ἐν τῇ τοῦ γεννητοῦ πρὸς τὸ ἀγέννητον διασῴζεται σχέσει, καθώς φησιν ὁ Εὐνόμιος; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ γῆς πρὸς ἀέρα κοινωνίαν ὁ λόγος βλέπει: ἡ μὲν γὰρ σταθερὰ καὶ ἐμβριθὴς καὶ ἀντίτυπος καὶ κατωφερὴς καὶ βαρεῖα, τῷ δὲ ἀέρι ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ φύσις. ὁμοίως τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν ἐν τῇ ἐναντιότητι τῶν χρωμάτων εὑρίσκεται καὶ τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ περιφερὲς μὴ ταὐτὸν εἶναι συντίθεται: ἐκεῖνο γάρ ἐστιν ἑκάτερον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ σχήματος, ὅπερ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἕτερον. ἐπὶ δὲ θεοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ θεοῦ τοῦ μονογενοῦς υἱοῦ κατὰ τί βλέπει τὴν ἐναντίωσιν οὐχ εὑρίσκω. ἀγαθότης μία, σοφία δικαιοσύνη φρόνησις δύναμις ἀφθαρσία τὰ ἄλλα πάντα, ὅσα τῆς ὑψηλῆς ἐστι σημασίας, ἐφ' ἑκατέρου ὡσαύτως λέγεται καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἐν τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἕτερον τὴν ἰσχὺν ἔχει: ὅ τε γὰρ πατὴρ διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὰ πάντα ποιεῖ ὅ τε μονογενὴς δύναμις ὢν τοῦ πατρὸς ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὸ πᾶν κατεργάζεται. τίνα τοίνυν χρείαν πληροῖ πῦρ τε καὶ ὕδωρ εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἐπὶ υἱοῦ τε καὶ πατρὸς κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀλλοτριότητος; καὶ τίς ὁ ἰσχυρὸς ἐκεῖνος καὶ ἀπόρρητος λόγος ὁ διὰ τούτων ἀποδεικνύμενος; ἀλλὰ « τολμηροὺς » ἡμᾶς ὀνομάζει Πέτρου καὶ Παύλου τήν τε τῆς φύσεως ἑνότητα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὑποστάσεων διαφορὰν παραστήσαντας καὶ δεινά φησι παρ' ἡμῶν τολμᾶσθαι, εἰ τοῖς ὑλικοῖς ὑποδείγμασι τῇ τῶν νοητῶν θεωρίᾳ τὸν λόγον προσάγομεν. καλῶς ὁ διορθωτὴς τῶν ἡμετέρων πταισμάτων, καλῶς ἐπικαλεῖ τὴν τόλμαν ἡμῖν τοῖς τὸ θεῖον διὰ τῶν ὑλικῶν ἑρμηνεύουσι. τί οὖν περὶ τῶν στοιχείων ἐρεῖς, ὁ σταθερός τε καὶ περιεσκεμμένος, ἄϋλον τὴν γῆν, νοητὸν τὸ πῦρ, ἀσώματον τὸ ὕδωρ, ἔξω τῆς αἰσθητῆς ἀντιλήψεως τὸν ἀέρα; οὕτω συντέτακταί σοι πρὸς τὸν σκοπὸν ἡ διάνοια, οὕτω πανταχόθεν ὀξυωπεῖς, ἄληπτον τοῖς ἀντιτεταγμένοις διεξάγων τὸν λόγον, ὡς μὴ βλέπειν ἐν σεαυτῷ τὰ κατὰ τῶν κατηγορουμένων ἐγκλήματα; ἢ σοὶ μὲν διὰ τῆς ὕλης τὸ κατ' οὐσίαν ἀλλότριον κατασκευάζοντι συγχωρήσομεν, ἡμεῖς δὲ διὰ τῶν χωρητῶν ἡμῖν ὑποδειγμάτων τὸ οἰκεῖον τῆς φύσεως ἀποδεικνύντες ἀπόβλητοι;