Chapter 6.—Why We Do Not in the Trinity Speak of One Person, and Three Essences. What He Ought to Believe Concerning the Trinity Who Does Not Receive What is Said Above. Man is Both After the Image, and is the Image of God.

11. But lest I should seem to favor ourselves [the Latins], let us make this further inquiry. Although they [the Greeks] also, if they pleased, as they call three substances three hypostases, so might call three persons three “prosopa,” yet they preferred that word which, perhaps, was more in accordance with the usage of their language. For the case is the same with the word persons also; for to God it is not one thing to be, another to be a person, but it is absolutely the same thing. For if to be is said in respect to Himself, but person relatively; in this way we should say three persons, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; just as we speak of three friends, or three relations, or three neighbors, in that they are so mutually, not that each one of them is so in respect to himself. Wherefore any one of these is the friend of the other two, or the relation, or the neighbor, because these names have a relative signification. What then? Are we to call the Father the person of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, or the Son the person of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, or the Holy Spirit the person of the Father and of the Son? But neither is the word person commonly so used in any case; nor in this Trinity, when we speak of the person of the Father, do we mean anything else than the substance of the Father. Wherefore, as the substance of the Father is the Father Himself, not as He is the Father, but as He is, so also the person of the Father is not anything else than the Father Himself; for He is called a person in respect to Himself, not in respect to the Son, or the Holy Spirit: just as He is called in respect to Himself both God and great, and good, and just, and anything else of the kind; and just as to Him to be is the same as to be God, or as to be great, or as to be good, so it is the same thing to Him to be, as to be a person. Why, therefore, do we not call these three together one person, as one essence and one God, but say three persons, while we do not say three Gods or three essences; unless it be because we wish some one word to serve for that meaning whereby the Trinity is understood, that we might not be altogether silent, when asked, what three, while we confessed that they are three? For if essence is the genus, and substance or person the species, as some think, then I must omit what I just now said, that they ought to be called three essences, as they are called three substances or persons; as three horses are called three horses, and the same are called three animals, since horse is the species, animal the genus. For in this case the species is not spoken of in the plural, and the genus in the singular, as if we were to say that three horses were one animal; but as they are three horses by the special name, so they are three animals by the generic one. But if they say that the name of substance or person does not signify species, but something singular and individual; so that any one is not so called a substance or person as he is called a man, for man is common to all men, but in the same manner as he is called this or that man, as Abraham, as Isaac, as Jacob, or anyone else who, if present, could be pointed out with the finger: so will the same reason reach these too. For as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, are called three individuals, so are they called three men, and three souls. Why then are both the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, if we are to reason about them also according to genus and species and individual, not so called three essences, as they are called three substances or persons? But this, as I said, I pass over: but I do affirm, that if essence is a genus, then a single essence has no species; just as, because animal is a genus, a single animal has no species. Therefore the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are not three species of one essence. But if essence is a species, as man is a species, but those are three which we call substances or persons, then they have the same species in common, in such way as Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob have in common the species which is called man; not as man is subdivided into Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, so can one man also be subdivided into several single men; for this is altogether impossible, since one man is already a single man. Why then is one essence subdivided into three substances or persons? For if essence is a species, as man is, then one essence is as one man is: or do we, as we say that any three human beings of the same sex, of the same constitution of body, of the same mind, are one nature,—for they are three human beings, but one nature,—so also say in the Trinity three substances one essence, or three persons one substance or essence? But this is somehow a parallel case, since the ancients also who spoke Latin, before they had these terms, which have not long come into use, that is, essence or substance, used for them to say nature. We do not therefore use these terms according to genus or species, but as if according to a matter that is common and the same. Just as if three statues were made of the same gold, we should say three statues one gold, yet should neither call the gold genus, and the statues species; nor the gold species, and the statues individuals. For no species goes beyond its own individuals, so as to comprehend anything external to them. For when I define what man is, which is a specific name, every several man that exists is contained in the same individual definition, neither does anything belong to it which is not a man. But when I define gold, not statues alone, if they be gold, but rings also, and anything else that is made of gold, will belong to gold; and even if nothing were made of it, it would still be called gold; since, even if there were no gold statues, there will not therefore be no statues at all. Likewise no species goes beyond the definition of its genus. For when I define animal, since horse is a species of this genus, every horse is an animal; but every statue is not gold. So, although in the case of three golden statues we should rightly say three statues, one gold; yet we do not so say it, as to understand gold to be the genus, and the statues to be species. Therefore neither do we so call the Trinity three persons or substances, one essence and one God, as though three somethings subsisted out of one matter [leaving a remainder, i. e.]; although whatever that is, it is unfolded in these three. For there is nothing else of that essence besides the Trinity. Yet we say three persons of the same essence, or three persons one essence; but we do not say three persons out of the same essence, as though therein essence were one thing, and person another, as we can say three statues out of the same gold; for there it is one thing to be gold, another to be statues. And when we say three men one nature, or three men of the same nature, they also can be called three men out of the same nature, since out of the same nature there can be also three other such men. But in that essence of the Trinity, in no way can any other person whatever exist out of the same essence. Further, in these things, one man is not as much as three men together; and two men are something more than one man: and in equal statues, three together amount to more of gold than each singly, and one amounts to less of gold than two. But in God it is not so; for the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit together is not a greater essence than the Father alone or the Son alone; but these three substances or persons, if they must be so called, together are equal to each singly: which the natural man does not comprehend. For he cannot think except under the conditions of bulk and space, either small or great, since phantasms or as it were images of bodies flit about in his mind.

12. And until he be purged from this uncleanness, let him believe in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, one God, alone, great, omnipotent, good, just, merciful, Creator of all things visible and invisible, and whatsoever can be worthily and truly said of Him in proportion to human capacity. And when he is told that the Father only is God, let him not separate from Him the Son or the Holy Spirit; for together with Him He is the only God, together with whom also He is one God; because, when we are told that the Son also is the only God, we must needs take it without any separation of the Father or the Holy Spirit. And let him so say one essence, as not to think one to be either greater or better than, or in any respect differing from, another. Yet not that the Father Himself is both Son and Holy Spirit, or whatever else each is singly called in relation to either of the others; as Word, which is not said except of the Son, or Gift, which is not said except of the Holy Spirit. And on this account also they admit the plural number, as it is written in the Gospel, “I and my Father are one.”643    John x. 30 He has both said “one,”644    Unum and “we are645    Sumusone,” according to essence, because they are the same God; “we are,” according to relation, because the one is Father, the other is Son. Sometimes also the unity of the essence is left unexpressed, and the relatives alone are mentioned in the plural number: “My Father and I will come unto him, and make our abode with him.”646    John xiv. 23We will come, and we will make our abode, is the plural number, since it was said before, “I and my Father,” that is, the Son and the Father, which terms are used relatively to one another. Sometimes the meaning is altogether latent, as in Genesis: “Let us make man after our image and likeness.”647    Gen. i. 26 Both let us make and our is said in the plural, and ought not to be received except as of relatives. For it was not that gods might make, or make after the image and likeness of gods; but that the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit might make after the image of the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, that man might subsist as the image of God. And God is the Trinity. But because that image of God was not made altogether equal to Him, as being not born of Him, but created by Him; in order to signify this, he is in such way the image as that he is “after the image,” that is, he is not made equal by parity, but approaches to Him by a sort of likeness. For approach to God is not by intervals of place, but by likeness, and withdrawal from Him is by unlikeness. For there are some who draw this distinction, that they will have the Son to be the image, but man not to be the image, but “after the image.” But the apostle refutes them, saying, “For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, forasmuch as he is the image and glory of God.”648    1 Cor. xi. 7 He did not say after the image, but the image. And this image, since it is elsewhere spoken of as after the image, is not as if it were said relatively to the Son, who is the image equal to the Father; otherwise he would not say after our image. For how our, when the Son is the image of the Father alone? But man is said to be “after the image,” on account, as we have said, of the inequality of the likeness; and therefore after our image, that man might be the image of the Trinity;649    [Augustin would find this “image” in the ternaries of nature and the human mind which illustrate the Divine trinality. The remainder of the treatise is mainly devoted to this abstruse subject; and is one of the most metaphysical pieces of composition in patristic literature. The exegetical portion of the work ends substantially with the seventh chapter. The remainder is ontological, yet growing out of, and founded upon the biblical data and results of the first part.—W.G.T.S.] not equal to the Trinity as the Son is equal to the Father, but approaching to it, as has been said, by a certain likeness; just as nearness may in a sense be signified in things distant from each other, not in respect of place, but of a sort of imitation. For it is also said, “Be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind;”650    Rom. xii. 2 to whom he likewise says, “Be ye therefore imitators of God as dear children.”651    Eph. v. 1 For it is said to the new man, “which is renewed to the knowledge of God, after the image of Him that created him.”652    Col. iii. 10 Or if we choose to admit the plural number, in order to meet the needs of argument, even putting aside relative terms, that so we may answer in one term when it is asked what three, and say three substances or three persons; then let no one think of any bulk or interval, or of any distance of howsoever little unlikeness, so that in the Trinity any should be understood to be even a little less than another, in whatsoever way one thing can be less than another: in order that there may be neither a confusion of persons, nor such a distinction as that there should be any inequality. And if this cannot be grasped by the understanding, let it be held by faith, until He shall dawn in the heart who says by the prophet, “If ye will not believe, surely ye shall not understand.”653    Isa. vii. 9

CAPUT VI.

11. Cur in Trinitate non dicatur una persona, et tres essentiae. De Trinitate quid credere debet qui supra dicta non capit. Homo et ad imaginem et imago Dei. Sed ne nobis videar suffragari, hoc quoque requiramus. Quanquam et illi, si vellent, sicut dicunt tres substantias, tres hypostases, possent dicere tres personas tria prosopa. Illud autem maluerunt, quod forte secundum linguae suae consuetudinem aptius diceretur. Nam et in personis eadem ratio est: non enim aliud est Deo esse, aliud personam esse, sed omnino idem. Nam si esse ad se dicitur, persona vero relative; sic dicamus tres personas, Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum, quemadmodum dicuntur aliqui tres amici, aut tres propinqui, aut tres vicini, quod sint ad invicem, non quod unusquisque eorum sit ad se ipsum. Quapropter quilibet ex eis amicus est duorum caeterorum, aut propinquus aut vicinus, quia haec nomina relativam significationem habent. Quid ergo? num placet ut dicamus Patrem personam esse Filii et Spiritus sancti, aut Filium personam esse Patris et Spiritus sancti, aut Spiritum sanctum personam esse Patris et Filii? Sed neque persona ita dici alicubi solet, neque in hac Trinitate cum dicimus personam Patris, aliud dicimus quam substantiam Patris. Quocirca, ut substantia Patris ipse Pater est, non quo Pater est, sed quo est; ita et persona Patris, non aliud quam ipse Pater est: ad se quippe dicitur persona, non ad Filium vel Spiritum sanctum; sicut ad se dicitur Deus et magnus, et bonus, et justus, et si quid aliud hujus modi. Et quemadmodum hoc illi est esse quod Deum esse, quod magnum, quod bonum esse; ita hoc illi est esse, quod personam esse. Cur ergo non haec tria simul unam personam dicimus, sicut unam essentiam et unum Deum, sed tres dicimus personas, cum tres Deos aut tres essentias non dicamus; nisi quia volumus vel unum aliquod vocabulum servire huic significationi qua intelligitur Trinitas, ne omnino taceremus interrogati, quid tres, cum tres esse fateremur? Nam si genus est essentia, species autem substantia sive persona, ut nonnulli sentiunt, omitto illud quod jam dixi, oportere appellari tres essentias, ut appellantur tres substantiae vel personae, sicut appellantur tres equi, eademque animalia tria, cum sit species equus, animal genus. Neque enim species ibi pluraliter dicta est, et genus singulariter, tanquam diceretur tres equi unum animal: sed sicut tres equi speciali nomine, ita tria animalia generali nomine. Quod si dicunt substantiae vel personae nomine non speciem significari, sed aliquid singulare atque individuum; ut substantia vel persona non ita dicatur sicut dicitur homo, quod commune est omnibus hominibus, 0944 sed quomodo dicitur hic homo, velut Abraham, velut Isaac, velut Jacob, vel si quis alius qui etiam digito praesens demonstrari possit: sic quoque illos eadem ratio consequetur. Sicut enim dicuntur Abraham, Isaac et Jacob tria individua, ita tres homines, et tres animae. Cur ergo et Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, si secundum genus et speciem et individuum etiam ista disserimus, non ita dicuntur tres essentiae, ut tres substantiae seu personae? Sed hoc, ut dixi, omitto: illud dico, si essentia genus est, una essentia jam non habet species; sicut quia genus est animal, unum animal jam non habet species. Non sunt ergo tres species unius essentiae, Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus. Si autem species est essentia, sicut species est homo, tres vero illae quas appellamus substantias sive personas, sic eamdem speciem communiter habent, quemadmodum Abraham, Isaac et Jacob speciem quae homo dicitur, communiter habent; non sicut homo subdividitur in Abraham, Isaac et Jacob, ita unus homo et in aliquos singulos homines subdividi potest: omnino enim non potest, quia unus homo jam singulus homo est. Cur ergo una essentia in tres substantias, vel personas subdividitur? Nam si essentia species est sicut homo, sic est una essentia sicut unus homo: an sicut dicimus aliquos tres homines ejusdem sexus, ejusdem temperationis corporis, ejusdemque animi, unam esse naturam; tres enim sunt homines, sed una natura: sic etiam ibi dicimus tres substantias unam essentiam, aut tres personas unam substantiam vel essentiam? Hoc vero utcumque simile est, quia et veteres qui latine locuti sunt, antequam haberent ista nomina, quae non diu est ut in usum venerunt, id est essentiam vel substantiam, pro his naturam dicebant. Non itaque secundum genus et species ista dicimus; sed quasi secundum communem eamdemque materiam. Sicut ex eodem auro si fierent tres statuae, diceremus tres statuas unum aurum, nec tamen diceremus genus aurum, species autem statuas; nec aurum speciem, statuas vero individua. Nulla quippe species individua sua transgreditur, ut aliquid extra comprehendat. Cum enim definiero quid sit homo, quod est nomen speciale, singuli quique homines qui sunt individua eadem definitione continentur, nec aliquid ad eam pertinet quod homo non sit. Cum vero aurum definiero, non solae statuae, si aureae fuerint, sed et annuli, et si quid aliud de auro fuerit, ad aurum pertinebit, etsi nihil inde fiat, aurum dicitur, quia etiamsi non sint aureae, non ideo non erunt statuae. Item nulla species excedit definitionem generis sui. Cum enim definiero animal, quoniam generis hujus species est equus, omnis equus animal est, non autem statua omnis aurum est. Ideo quamvis in tribus statuis aureis, recte dicamus tres statuas unum aurum; non tamen ita dicimus, ut genus aurum, species vero statuas intelligamus. Nec sic ergo Trinitatem dicimus tres personas vel substantias, unam essentiam et unum Deum, tanquam ex una materia tria quaedam subsistant, etiamsi quidquid illud est, in his 0945 tribus explicatum sit. Non enim aliquid aliud ejus essentiae est praeter istam Trinitatem: tamen tres personas ejusdem essentiae, vel tres personas unam essentiam dicimus: tres autem personas ex eadem essentia non dicimus, quasi aliud ibi sit quod essentia est, aliud quod persona; sicut tres statuas ex eodem auro possumus dicere; aliud enim illuc est esse aurum, aliud esse statuas. Et cum dicuntur tres homines una natura, vel tres homines ejusdem naturae, possunt etiam dici tres homines ex eadem natura, quia ex eadem natura et alii tres tales homines possunt existere; in illa vero essentia Trinitatis, nullo modo alia quaelibet persona ex eadem essentia potest existere. Deinde in his rebus non tantum est unus homo, quantum tres homines simul; et plus sunt aliquid homines duo, quam unus homo: et in statuis aequalibus plus auri est tres simul quam singulae, et minus auri est una quam duae. At in Deo non ita est: non enim major essentia est Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus simul, quam solus Pater aut solus Filius; sed tres simul illae substantiae sive personae, si ita dicendae sunt, aequales sunt singulis: quod animalis homo non percipit. Non enim potest cogitare nisi moles et spatia, vel minuta vel grandia, volitantibus in animo ejus phantasmatibus tanquam imaginibus corporum.

12. Ex qua immunditia donec purgetur, credat in Patrem et Filium et Spiritum sanctum, unum Deum, solum, magnum, omnipotentem, bonum, justum, misericordem, omnium visibilium et invisibilium conditorem, et quidquid de illo pro humana facultate digne vereque dici potest. Neque cum audierit Patrem solum Deum, separet inde Filium, aut Spiritum sanctum: cum eo quippe solus Deus, cum quo et unus Deus est; quia et Filium cum audimus solum Deum, sine ulla separatione Patris aut Spiritus sancti oportet accipere. Atque ita dicat unam essentiam, ut non existimet aliud alio, vel majus, vel melius , vel aliqua ex parte diversum. Non tamen ut Pater ipse sit et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, et quidquid aliud ad alterutrum singula dicuntur; sicut Verbum quod non dicitur nisi Filius, aut Donum quod non dicitur nisi Spiritus sanctus: propter quod etiam pluralem numerum admittunt, sicut in Evangelio scriptum est: Ego et Pater unum sumus (Joan. X, 30). Et unum dixit; et, sumus: unum, secundum essentiam, quod idem Deus; sumus, secundum relativum, quod ille Pater, hic Filius. Aliquando et tacetur unitas essentiae, et sola pluraliter relativa commemorantur: Veniemus ad eum ego et Pater, et habitabimus apud eum (Id. XIV, 23). Veniemus0946 et habitabimus, pluralis numerus est, quia praedictum est, Ego et Pater, id est, Filius et Pater, quae relative ad invicem dicuntur. Aliquando latenter omnino, sicut in Genesi: Faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram (Gen. I, 26). Et faciamus, et nostram, pluraliter dictum est, et nisi ex relativis accipi non oportet . Non enim ut facerent dii, aut ad imaginem et similitudinem deorum; sed ut facerent Pater et Filius et Spiritus sanctus, ad imaginem Patris et Filii et Spiritus sancti, ut subsisteret homo imago Dei. Deus autem Trinitas. Sed quia non omnino aequalis fiebat illa imago Dei, tanquam non ab illo nata, sed ab eo creata, hujus rei significandae causa, ita imago est ut ad imaginem sit: id est, non aequatur parilitate, sed quadam similitudine accedit. Non enim locorum intervallis, sed similitudine acceditur ad Deum, et dissimilitudine receditur ab eo. Sunt enim qui ita distinguunt, ut imaginem velint esse Filium: hominem vero non imaginem, sed ad imaginem. Refellit autem eos Apostolus dicens: Vir quidem non debet velare caput, cum sit imago et gloria Dei (I Cor. XI, 7.). Non dixit, Ad imaginem; sed imago. Quae tamen imago, cum alibi dicitur, Ad imaginem, non quasi ad Filium dicitur, quae imago aequalis est Patri; alioquin non diceret, ad imaginem nostram. Quomodo enim nostram, cum Filius solius Patris imago sit? Sed propter imparem, ut diximus, similitudinem dictus est homo ad imaginem: et ideo nostram, ut imago Trinitatis esset homo; non Trinitati aequalis sicut Filius Patri, sed accedens, ut dictum est, quadam similitudine; sicut in distantibus significatur quaedam vicinitas, non loci, sed cujusdam imitationis. Ad hoc enim et dicitur, Reformamini in novitate mentis vestrae (Rom. XII, 2): quibus item dicit, Estote itaque imitatores Dei, sicut filii charissimi (Ephes. V, 1). Novo enim homini dicitur: Qui renovatur in agnitionem. Dei, secundum imaginem ejus qui creavit eum (Coloss. III, 10). Aut si jam placet propter disputandi necessitatem, etiam exceptis nominibus relativis, pluralem numerum admittere, ut uno nomine respondeatur, cum quaeritur, quid tria, et dicere tres substantias sive tres personas; nullae moles aut intervalla cogitentur, nulla distantia quantulaecumque dissimilitudinis, ut ibi intelligatur aliud alio vel paulo minus, quocumque modo minus esse aliud alio potest: ut neque personarum sit confusio, nec talis distinctio qua sit impar aliquid. Quod si intellectu capi non potest, fide tencatur, donec illucescat in cordibus ille qui ait per prophetam, Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis (Isai. VII, 9).