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«to show that it is not from the Son». I omit, then, through how many ways the argument proceeding has demonstrated this; but is "not from the Son" not the same as "from the Father alone"? For if the Spirit is not from the Son, He is from the Father alone, and if from the Father alone, not also from the Son, and they are so equally balanced to one another that in all the arguments by which it is inferred that the Holy Spirit is not also from the Son, if someone were to set the conclusion as being "from the Father alone" instead of this, it would make no difference. If then this is so, as indeed it is, we have shown this very thing, that the Holy Spirit is not also from the Son, having shown that He proceeds from the Father alone; but if in the case of the Son "not from another" is immediately understood because of its proximity, as you yourself say, so also in the case of the Spirit (p. 524) it is similarly understood, and we have what we seek, and you are here convicted by your own arguments and unwillingly support our arguments. And if the proof is found from this very thing, one should marvel at the manifestness of the truth and the power of the supporting argument.

But he who has nothing to accuse, out of an untimely ambition to seem to be the only one, uses things from the school of futility against us as if against the heterodox; (for envy is not accustomed to distinguish the pious from the impious), for which reason he also tries to obscure the manifestness of the truth and thinks to escape notice, pouring around himself the ink of his art, or rather, of his evil art. Hence he was the first of all theologians of all time both to discover and to declare just now that there is no demonstration in any divine matter. Why, O philosopher? But he would have said, if he were present, first mocking us for our ignorance, as is his custom, or rather for our slowness to learn, as "since the divine is beyond both knowledge and intellect and opinion, and all sensation and thought and contact and cognition, and showing this just now, flowing with my argument like rivers, I inundated those who do not think so".

Well done; but bear with being further questioned by us slow learners, for this too is not from philosophy: "of that, then, of which there is both knowledge and intellection and opinion, and imagination and sensation, can there be a demonstration?" He would have said "most certainly," since this too is in his arguments. Since these things have been thus agreed upon beforehand, listen, O philosopher, to the one who has been settled above your floods, I mean Dionysius the Great, the hymnographer of the divine names, who says, praising wisdom itself, that "God is known both through knowledge (p. 526) and through unknowing, and there is of Him both intellection and reason and knowledge and contact and sensation and opinion and imagination and name and all other things." Therefore there is also a demonstration of Him, first according to what has been agreed upon beforehand by you, for He has all the properties of demonstrable things, and second, because of the most comprehensive statement later added by the saint: for he says, "of God there are also all other things," and one of all things is also demonstration, so there is also a demonstration of Him.

In addition to these, the contrary affirmations of beings spoken of God are not contrary to each other, and the negations do not overturn the affirmations; for opposites according to one and a single cause of identity at once pre-exist and are contained, and according to this very argument, therefore, if there is not demonstration of divine things and there is, then to say there is a demonstration of none of the divine things or of all is not true, but rather that there is for some, and there is not for others. For what does this inspired writer say next, as he proceeds? "The divine is neither conceived, nor spoken, nor named, and it is not any of the beings, nor is it known in any of the beings." What then? Is it in the same way that there is both intellection of Him and "other things," and that He is "neither conceived, nor becomes in any of the beings"? Surely in a different way;

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«δεῖξαι ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ». Παρίημι τοίνυν δι᾿ ὅσων ὁ λόγος τοῦτο προϊών ἀπέδειξεν˙ ἀλλά τό «οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ» οὐ ταὐτόν τῷ «ἐκ μόνου τοῦ Πατρός»; Εἰ γάρ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τό Πνεῦμα, ἐκ μόνου τοῦ τοῦ Πατρός, καί εἰ ἐκ μόνου τοῦ Πατρός, οὐχί καί ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ, καί τοσοῦτον ἰσορρόπως ἔχουσι πρός ἄλληλα ὡς ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς λόγοις δι᾿ ὧν συνάγεται μή εἶναι καί ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τό Πνεῦμα τό ἅγιον, εἴ τις ἀντί τούτου τό ἐκ μόνου τοῦ Πατρός εἶναι συμπέρασμα τιθείη, μηδέν ἄν διαφέρειν. Εἰ τοίνυν τοῦθ᾿ οὕτως ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὖν ἔχει, τοῦτ᾿ αὐτό ἐδείξαμεν ὅτι οὐχί καί ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τό Πνεῦμα τό ἅγιον, ἐκ μόνου δεδειχότες τοῦτο τοῦ Πατρός ἐκπροευόμενον˙ εἰ δ᾿ ἐπί τοῦ Υἱοῦ συννοεῖται εὐθύς τό "οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλου" διά τό σύνεγγες, ὡς καί αὐτός λέγεις, κἀπί τοῦ Πνεύματος (σελ. 524) οὖν ὁμοίως συννοεῖται, καί τό ζητούμενον ἔχομεν καί σέ ὑπό τῶν οἰκείων κἀνταῦθα ἐξεληλεγμένον λόγων καί τοῖς ἡμετέροις ἄκοντα συνηγοροῦντα λόγοις. Εἰ δέ καί αὐτόθεν εὕρηται τό δεῖγμα, θαυμάσαι ἔδει τῆς ἀληθείας τό ἐμφανές καί τοῦ συνηγόρου λόγου τήν δύναμιν.

Ὁ δέ μηδέν ἔχων ἐγκαλεῖν ὑπό τῆς ἐπί τῷ μόνος εἶναί τει δοκεῖν ἀκαίρου φιλοτιμίας τοῖς ἐκ τοῦ διδασκαλείου τῆς ματαιότητος καί καθ᾿ ἡμῶν ὥσπερ κατά τῶν ἑτεροδόξων χρῆται˙ (διαστέλλειν γάρ τῶν δυσσεβῶν τούς εὐσεβεῖς ὁ φθόνος οὐκ εἴωθε), διό καί τό φανερόν τἀληθοῦς συσκιάζειν πειρᾶται καί λαθεῖν οἴεται, τῆς τέχνης, μᾶλλον δέ τῆς κακοτεχνίας, τό μέλαν περιχεάμενος. Ἐντεῦθεν μηδ᾿ εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν ἐπ᾿ οὐδενός τῶν θείων ἄρτι πρῶτος τῶν ἐκ τοῦ παντός αἰῶνος θεολόγων καί ἐξεῦρε καί ἀπεφήνατο. ∆ιατί, ὦ φιλόσοφε; Ἀλλ᾿ εἶπεν ἄν, εἰ παρῆν, ἐπισκώψας ἡμᾶς πρότερον τῆς ἀμαθίας ἕνεκεν, ὥσπερ εἴωθε, μᾶλλον δέ τῆς δυσμαθείας, ὡς «ἐπεί τό θεῖον ὑπέρ ἐπιστήμην τέ ἐστι καί νοῦν καί δόξαν, αἴσθησίν τε πᾶσαν καί διάνοιαν καί ἐπαφήν καί γνῶσιν, καί τοῦτο δεικνύς ἔναγχος, κατά ποταμούς τῷ λόγῳ ρέων τούς μή οὕτω κατέκλυσα φρονοῦντας».

Εὖγε˙ ἀλλ᾿ ἀνάσχου προσερωτώμενος ὑπό τῶν δυσμαθῶν ἡμῶν, καί τοῦτο γάρ οὐκ ἀπό φιλοσοφίας˙ «οὗ τοίνυν ἐπιστήμη τέ ἐστι καί νόησις καί δόξα, φαντασία τε καί αἴσθησις, τούτου ἔστιν εἶναι ἀπόδειξις»; Πάνυ γε ἄν εἶπεν, ἐπεί καί τοῦτ᾿ ἔνεστι κἀν τοῖς ἐκείνου λόγοις. Ἐπειδή ταῦθ᾿ οὕτω προδιωμολόγηται, ἄκουσον, ὦ φιλόσοφε, τοῦ ὑπερανῳκισμένου τῶν σῶν κατακλυσμῶν, ∆ιονυσίου τοῦ μεγάλου λέγω, τοῦ τῶν θείων ὀνομάτων ὑμνῳδοῦ, ὅς φησι τήν αὐτοσοφίαν ἐξυμνῶν ὡς «ὁ Θεός καί διά γνώσεως (σελ. 526) γινώσκεται καί δι᾿ ἀγνωσίας, καί ἔστιν αὐτοῦ καί νόησις καί λόγος καί ἐπιστήμη καί ἐπαφή καί αἴσθησις καί δόξα καί φαντασία καί ὄνομα καί τἄλλα πάντα». Οὐκοῦν καί ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ, τοῦτο μέν καί κατά τά σοί προδιωμολογημένα, ἔχει γάρ καί τά τῶν ἀποδεικτῶν ἅπαντα, τοῦτο δέ καί διά τόν ὕστερον ἐπενηνεγμένον τῷ ἁγίῳ συμπεριληπτικώτατον λόγον˙ «ἔστι γάρ φησι «τοῦ Θεοῦ καί τἄλλα πάντα», ἕν δέ τῶν πάντων καί ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστε καί ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν αὐτοῦ.

Πρός δέ τούτοις καί αἱ ἐναντίαι θέσεις τῶν ὄντων ἐπί Θεοῦ λεγόμεναι ἀλλήλαις οὐκ ἐναντιοῦνται καί αἱ ἀφαιρέσεις οὐκ ἀνατρέπουσι τάς θέσεις˙ τά γάρ ἀντικείμενα κατά μίαν καί ἑνικήν ταὐτότητος αἰτίαν ἅμα προέχει καί περιέχει, καί κατά τουτονί τοιγαροῦν τόν λόγον, εἰ μή ἔστιν ἐπί τῶν θείων ἀπόδειξις καί ἔστιν, ἐπ᾿ οὐδενός ἄρ᾿ εἶναι φάναι τῶν θείων ἀπόδειξιν ἤ παντός οὐκ ἀληθές, ἀλλ᾿ εἶναι μέν ἐπί τινων, οὐκ εἶναι δ᾿ ἐφ᾿ ἑτέρων. Τί γάρ ἐφεξῆς καί ὁ θεορρήμων οὗτος λέγει προϊών; «Οὔτε νοεῖται τό θεῖον, οὔτε λέγεται, οὔτε ὀνομάζεται, καί οὐκ ἔστι τι τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέ ἔν τινι τῶν ὄντων γινώσκεται; Τί οὖν; Κατά τόν αὐτόν τρόπον ἔστι τε νόησις αὐτοῦ καί «ἄλλα, καί οὔτε νοεῖται, οὔτε ἔν τινι τῶν ὄντων γινέσκεται». Πάντως καθ᾿ ἕτερον˙