ARTICLE I

This Question Treats of the Mind, Which Contains the Image of the Trinity, and in the First Article We Ask: Is THE MIND, AS CONTAINING WITHIN ITSELF THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY, THE ESSENCE OF THE SOUL OR ONE OF ITS POWERS?

Difficulties:

It seems that it is the essence of the soul, for

1. Augustine says: "The terms mind and spirit are not taken relatively," but denote the essence, and nothing but the essence, of the soul. Therefore, the mind is the essence of the soul.

2. Different classes of powers of the soul are found only in its essence. But the appetitive and intellective are different classes of powers of the soul. For The Soul gives five most general classes of powers of the soul: vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, locomotive, and intellective. But the mind includes within it appetitive and intellective powers, for Augustine puts understanding and will in the mind. It seems, then, that the mind is not a power, but the very essence of the soul.

3. Augustine says: "We are in the image of God by the fact that we exist, that we know that we exist, and that we love this knowledge and this existence." He also bases the attribution of the likeness of God in us upon knowledge, mind, and love. Since, then, loving is the act of love, and knowing is the act of knowledge, it seems that existence is the act of the mind. But existence is the act of essence. Therefore, the mind is the very essence of the soul.

4. Mind has the same nature in angels and in us. But the very essence of an angel is its mind. For this reason Dionysius frequently calls angels divine or intellectual minds. Therefore, our mind, also, is the very essence of our soul.

5. Augustine says: "Memory, understanding, and will are one mind, one essence, one life." Therefore, as life belongs to the essence of the soul, so does mind.

6. An accident cannot be the source of a substantial distinction. But, by his possession of mind, man is substantially distinguished from brute animals. So, mind is not an accident. But a power of the soul is a property of the soul, according to Avicenna, and so it belongs to the class of accident. Therefore, mind is not a power, but the very essence of the soul.

7. Acts specifically different do not come from one power. But, as is clear from Augustine, acts specifically different--namely: remembering, understanding, and willing--come from the mind. Therefore, mind is not a power of the soul, but its very essence.

8. One power is not the subject of another power. But mind is the subject of the image of the Trinity, which is constituted by the three powers. Therefore, mind is not a power, but the essence of the soul.

9. No power contains in itself other powers. But the mind includes understanding and will. Therefore, it is not a power, but the essence.

To the Contrary:

1'. Powers of the soul are its only parts. But mind is the higher part of the soul, as Augustine says. Therefore, mind is a power of the soul.

2'. The essence of the soul is common to all the powers, because all are rooted in it. But mind is not common to all the powers, because it is distinguished from sense. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul.

3'. We cannot speak of highest and lowest in the essence of the soul. But there are highest and lowest in mind. For Augustine divides mind into higher and lower reason. Therefore, mind is a power of the soul and not its essence.

4'. The essence of the soul is the principle of life. But mind is not the principle of life, but of understanding. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul, but one of its powers.

5'. A subject is not predicated of an accident. But mind is predicated of memory, understanding, and will, which are in the soul as in a subject. Therefore, mind is not the essence of the soul.

6'. According to Augustine, the relation of the soul to the image does not arise from the whole soul, but only from part of it, namely, the mind. Therefore, the mind does not denote the whole soul, but a part of it.

7'. The name mind (mens) seems to have been attributed [to the soul] from the fact that it remembers (memini). But memory refers to a power of the soul. Therefore, mind also denotes a power and not the essence.

REPLY:

The term mind (mens) is taken from the verb measure (mensurare). For a thing of any genus is measured by that which is least and first in its genus, as is clear from the Metaphysics. So, the word mind is applied to the soul in the same way as understanding is. For understanding knows about things only by measuring them, as it were, according to its own principles. But, since it signifies reference to act, understanding designates a faculty of the soul. But a power or faculty lies between essence and activity, as Dionysius says.

Since, however, the essences of things are not known to us, and their powers reveal themselves to us through their acts, we often use the names of the faculties and powers to denote the essences. But, since knowledge of a thing comes only from that which is proper to it, when an essence takes its name from one of its powers, it must be named according to a power proper to it. It is commonly true of powers that that which can do more can do less, but not conversely. So, a man who can carry a thousand pounds can carry a hundred, as is said in Heaven and Earth. Hence, if a thing is to be classified by its power, it must be classified according to the utmost of its power.

Now, among souls, the soul in plants has only the lowest level of power, and so is classified according to this when it is called nutritive or vegetative. The soul of a brute animal, however, reaches a higher level, that of sense, and so its soul is called sensitive, or, sometimes, even simply sense. But the human soul reaches the highest level which there is among powers of soul and takes its name from this, being called intellective or, sometimes, also understanding and mind, inasmuch as from the intellective soul such power naturally arises, as is proper to the human soul above other souls.

It is clear, then, that in us mind designates the highest power of our soul. And since the image of God is in us according to that which is highest in us, that image will belong to the essence of the soul only in so far as mind is its highest power. Thus, mind, as containing the image of God, designates a power of the soul and not its essence. Or, if we take mind to mean essence, it means it only inasmuch as such a power flows from the essence.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Mind is not taken to mean essence, as essence is contrasted with power, but as absolute essence is distinguished from that which is relatively so called. Thus, mind is distinguished from knowledge of itself in this, that through knowledge mind is referred to itself, but mind itself is an absolute term. Or we can say that mind is taken by Augustine to mean the essence of the soul along with this power.

2. There are two ways of classifying powers of the soul: first, according to their objects; and second, according to their subjects, or, what comes to the same thing, according to their manner of acting. If we classify them according to their objects, we have the five classes of powers of the soul mentioned above. However, if we classify them according to their subjects or manner of acting, there are three classes of powers of the soul: vegetative, sensitive, and intellective. For the activity of the soul can be related to matter in three ways.

In the first of these, the relation is such that the activity is performed as a natural activity. The source of this kind of activity is the nutritive power, and the exercise of the acts of this power takes place through active and passive qualities, just as other material activity does. In the second way, the relation is such that the activity of the soul does not reach matter itself, but only the conditions of matter, as in the activity of the sensitive power. For, in sense, the species is received without matter, but with the conditions of matter. In the third way, the relation is such that the activity of the soul is beyond both matter and the conditions of matter. The intellective part of the soul acts in this way.

According to these different divisions of powers of the soul, two powers of the soul can belong to the same or different classes when compared with each other. For, if sensible appetite and intellectual appetite, which is will, are considered with reference to their object, both belong to the same class, because the good is the object of both. But, if we view them with reference to their manner of acting, they belong to different classes, for we classify the lower appetite as sensitive, and the higher as intellective. For, just as the sense grasps its object under the material conditions it has here and now, so, too, the sense appetite tends toward its object in the same way, and thus to a particular good. But the higher appetite is directed to its object after the manner in which the understanding perceives. So, with reference to manner of acting, will belongs to the intellective class.

The manner of acting follows the state of the agent, for, as the agent is more perfect, so its activity is more perfect. Therefore, if we consider powers of this kind as they issue from the essence of the soul, which is, as it were, their subject, we find that will is on an equal footing with understanding, whereas the lower appetite, which is divided into the concupiscible and irascible, is not. Therefore, mind can include both understanding and will without thereby being the essence of the soul. Thus, mind denotes a certain class of powers of the soul, the group in which we include all the powers which withdraw entirely from matter and the conditions of matter in their activity.

3. According to Augustine and other saints, the image of the Trinity is attributed to man under diverse formulae, and there is no need that the members of one formula correspond to those of another. This is clearly the case when Augustine makes the image of the Trinity follow mind, cognition, and love, and also memory, understanding, and will. Now, although will and love are parallel, as are understanding and cognition, it is not necessary that mind parallel memory, for mind includes all three which are given in the other way of attributing this likeness. Similarly, the attribution of Augustine referred to in the objection differs from the two we have just mentioned. So, there is no need for existence to relate as proper act to mind, in so far as it is mind, although loving so relates to love and knowing so relates to knowledge.

4. Angels are called minds not because the mind or understanding of an angel, in so far as it designates a power, is its essence, but because they have no other powers of the soul except those which are included in the mind, and, so, are completely mind. Our soul, however, since it is the act of the body, has other powers which are not included in the mind, namely, sensitive and nutritive powers. So, soul cannot be called mind as an angel can.

5. Living adds something to existing, and understanding something to living. But, for something to have the image of God in it, it must reach the highest kind of perfection to which a creature can aspire. So, if a thing has existence only, as stones, or existence and life, as plants and beasts, these are not enough to preserve the character of image. To have the complete character of image the creature must exist, live, and understand. For in this it has most perfectly the generic likeness to the essential attributes.

Therefore, since in applying the image mind takes the place of the divine essence, and memory, intellect, and will take the place of the three Persons, Augustine attributes to mind those things which are needed for the image in creatures when he says: "Memory, understanding, and will are one life, one mind, and one essence." Still, it is not necessary to conclude from this that in the soul mind and life mean the same as essence, for to be, to live, and to understand are not the same thing in us as they are in God. Nevertheless, these three are called one essence since they flow from the one essence of the mind, one life because they belong to one kind of life, and one mind because they are included in one mind as parts in the whole, just as sight and hearing are included in the sensitive part of the soul.

6. Since, according to the Philosopher, we do not know the substantial differences of things, those who make definitions sometimes use accidental differences because they indicate or afford knowledge of the essence as the proper effects afford knowledge of a cause. Therefore, when sensible is given as the constitutive difference of animal, it is not derived from the sense power, but the essence of the soul from which that power comes. The same is true of rational, or of that which has mind.

7. Just as we do not understand that the sensitive part of the soul is a single power over and above the particular powers contained in it, but, rather, a kind of potential whole, including all those powers as parts, so, too, mind is not a single power over and above memory, understanding, and will, but a kind of potential whole including these three. In the same way, we see that the power of house building embraces those of cutting the stones and building the wall. The same holds true for the other powers.

8. Mind, when taken for the power itself, is not related to understanding and will as subject, but as whole to parts. But, if it is taken for the essence of the soul, in so far as such a power naturally flows from it, mind does denote the subject of the powers.

9. A single particular power does not contain many powers, but there is nothing to prevent a general power from embracing many powers as parts, just as one part of the body includes many organic parts, as the hand includes the fingers.