LECTURE 6

THERE IS NO ALTERATION IN THE FIRST SPECIES OF QUALITY IN REGARD TO HABITS OF THE SOUL

             919. After the Philosopher has shown that there is no alteration in the first species of quality with respect to dispositions of the body, he here shows the same thing with respect to habits of the soul.

             First he treats the appetitive part. Secondly, where he says, 'Nor is there alteration . . .' (Appendix A, 706), he treats the intellective part.

             Concerning the first part he makes two points. First he shows that there is no alteration primarily and per se in the transmutation of virtue and vice. Secondly, where he says, 'Both the reception of . . .' (Appendix A, 703), he shows that the transmutation of virtue and vice follows from an alteration.

             920. He concludes, therefore, first from the above that in regard to the virtues and vices of the soul which pertain to the appetitive part there is no alteration primarily and per se. In drawing this conclusion he indicates that in proving the following points he will use the same arguments with which he proved the foregoing points.

             For this proof he assumes a certain proposition, namely, that virtue is a type of perfection. He proves this as follows. Each thing is perfect when it is able to attain its proper virtue, just as a natural body is perfect when it is able to produce something like itself, which is the virtue of nature.

             He proves this as follows. A thing is most perfect in respect to nature when it possesses the virtue of nature, for the virtue of nature is an indication of the completion of nature. Moreover, when a thing possesses its nature completely, then it is called perfect. This is true not only of natural things but also of mathematicals, whose forms are taken as their natures. For a thing is most circular, that is, it is a perfect circle, when it is most perfect in respect to nature, that is, when it has the perfection of its form.

             It is, therefore, clear that since the virtue of each thing follows from the perfection of its form, then each thing is perfect when it has its own virtue. And thus it follows that virtue is a perfection.

             When this proposition has been thusly proven, the Commentator says that one must argue as follows. Every perfection is simple and indivisible. But in no case is either motion or alteration simple and indivisible, as was proven above. Therefore in respect to virtue there is no alteration.

             But this process does not apply to what is added in respect to vice, namely, that vice is the corruption and removal of perfection. For although perfection is simple and indivisible, nevertheless, to withdraw from perfection is not simple and indivisible. Rather this occurs in many ways. Nor is it the custom of Aristotle to omit that on which a conclusion chiefly depends, unless it can be understood from things posited nearby.

             Therefore it is better to say that he argues here about virtue just as he did above about form and figure. For nothing is said to be altered when it is perfected, nor for the same reason, when it is corrupted. If, therefore, virtue is a perfection, and vice a corruption, then there is no alteration in respect to virtue and vice, just as there is no alteration in respect to forms and figures.

             921. Next where he says, 'Both the reception of . . .' (Appendix A, 703), he shows that the transmutation of virtue and vice follows from an alteration.

             First he states his intention. He says that the reception of virtue and the removal of vice, or vice versa, occurs when something is altered. The reception and removal of virtue and vice follow from this alteration. However, neither of them is an alteration primarily and per se.

             Next where he says, 'It is clear that something . . .' (Appendix A, 704), he proves his position. He says that it is clear from the following that something must be altered in order that virtue or vice be received and removed.

             He seems to prove this in two ways. He does this first with respect to two opinions of men concerning virtue and vice.

             The Stoics said that virtues are certain impassive things, and there cannot be virtue in the soul unless all passions like fear, hope, and such things are removed from the soul. They said that such passions are certain disturbances and sicknesses of the soul. And they said that virtue is a certain tranquillity, as it were, and health of the soul. On the other hand they said that every passivity of the soul is a vice.

             The opinion of the Peripatetics, derived from Aristotle, is that virtue consists in a determinate moderation of the passions. For moral virtue is a mean between passions, as is said in Ethics, II. And according to this, vice, as opposed to virtue, is not any kind of passivity but a certain tendency toward the passions which are contrary to virtue either by way of excess or defect.

             Whichever view may be true, in order that virtue be received there must be a transmutation of the passions, i.e., the passions are either totally removed or are modified. For since passions are in the sensitive appetite, alteration occurs with respect to them. It follows, therefore, that the reception or removal of virtue and vice occurs with respect to some alteration.

             922. Secondly, where he says, 'All moral virtue occurs . . .' (Appendix A, 705), he proves the same thing as follows. Every moral virtue consists of some pleasure or sadness. For he is not just who does not rejoice in just acts and who is not saddened by their opposites. And the same applies to the other moral virtues. This is so because the operation of every appetitive power in which there is moral virtue is terminated at pleasure and sadness. Pleasure results from the attainment of that toward which the appetite is moved, and sadness from the triumph of that which the appetite flees. And thus one who desires or hopes is delighted when he attains what he desires or hopes for; and similarly he is angered whenever he takes vengeance; and one who fears and hates is saddened when the evil which he flees triumphs. Every sadness or pleasure occurs either in respect to the act of a present thing or through memory of a past thing, or through hope for something future. Therefore, if there is pleasure in respect to act, the cause of this pleasure is sensation. For an object does not properly cause pleasure if it is not sensed. Likewise, if pleasure occurs through memory or hope, this proceeds from the senses as long as we either recall whatever pleasures we have undergone with respect to the senses in the past, or as long as we hope to undergo such things in the future. From this it is clear that pleasure and sadness belong to the sensitive part, in which alteration occurs, as was said above. If, therefore, moral virtue and the opposite vice exist in pleasure and sadness, and if there is alteration in respect to pleasure and sadness, then it follows that the reception or removal of virtue and vice follow from an alteration.

             But it is to be noted that he distinctly says that the whole of moral virtue exists in pleasures and sadnesses, in distinction from intellectual virtue, which has its own pleasure. But this latter pleasure does not pertain to the senses. Hence it has no contrary, nor is it altered, except metaphorically.

             923. Next where he says, 'Nor is there alteration . . .' (Appendix A, 706), he shows that there is no alteration in the intellective part of the soul.

             He proves first this in general; and secondly, in particular, where he says, 'Neither, therefore, is there . . .' (Appendix A, 707).

             Concerning the first part he introduces the following argument. Knowing is primarily called a relation, namely, to the knowable, the assimilation of which in the knower is knowledge.

             This he proves as follows. In no genus other than relation does it happen that something new comes to a thing without it changing. For one thing becomes equal to another, not by its own mutation, but by that of the other. We see, moreover, that knowledge occurs without any mutation in intellective potency but only through something existing in the sensitive part. For from experiences of particulars, which pertain to the sensitive part, we achieve a knowledge of the universal in the intellect, as was proven in Metaphysics, I, and in Posterior Analytics, II. Since, therefore, there is no motion in relation, as was proven above, it follows that there is no alteration in the acquisition of knowledge.

             924. Next where he says, 'Neither, therefore, is there . . .' (Appendix A, 707), he shows in particular that there is no alteration in the intellective part.

             He does this first by considering the one who has knowledge. This refers to the use of knowledge. Secondly, where he says, 'Since the reception of . . .' (Appendix A, 708), he considers the first acquisition of knowledge.

             He says, therefore, first that since there is no alteration in the intellective part, it cannot be said that the very act of knowledge, which is consideration, is a generation, unless one would say that the eye's exterior act of looking, and the act of touching something, are generations. For just as sight is the act of the visual power and touching is the act of the tactile power, so consideration is the act of the intellective power. Act is not said to be the generation of a principle, but rather a process from an active principle. And so understanding is neither generation nor alteration. Nevertheless, nothing prevents an act from following from generation or alteration, as making hot follows from the generation of fire. And likewise seeing or touching follows from the immutation of the sense by a sensible object.

             925. Next where he says, 'Since the reception of . . .' (Appendix A, 708), he shows that in the acquisition of knowledge there is neither generation or alteration.

             Whatever happens to a thing only through the rest and abating of disturbances or motions does not happen through generation or alteration. But understanding, which is speculative thought, and prudence, which is practical reason, come to the soul through the rest and abating of corporeal motions and sensible affections. Understanding and prudence, therefore, do not come to the soul through generation or alteration.

             For the clarification of this argument, he adds examples. Let it be proposed that someone who has knowledge is sleeping, or is not sober, or is ill. It is clear that he is unable to use his knowledge and to act in accordance with it. And it is clear that when this disturbance becomes quiet, and the mind returns to its own state, then he is able to use his knowledge and act in accordance with it. Nevertheless we do not say that when the sleeping man is aroused, or when the drunken man becomes sober, or when the mind of the sick man is returned to its proper state through health, that then he is made to be one who knows as if knowledge were newly generated in him. For there was in him an habitual potency 'for the suitability of knowledge', i.e., to be restored to the appropriate state in which he could use his knowledge.

             He says, moreover, that something of this kind occurs when one acquires knowledge originally. For this seems to take place because of a certain rest and abating of disturbance, i.e., of disordered motions, such as are in boys both with respect to the body, since the whole nature is changing because of growth, and also with respect to the sensitive part, since the passions are dominant in them.

             Hence that which he calls 'rest' can be applied to the disturbance of bodily motion, which becomes quiet when nature achieves its state. That which he calls 'abating' can be applied to the passions of the sensitive parts, which are not wholly at rest, but which are inactive. That is, they are subdued by reason and do not ascend to disturb reason, just as we speak of a settling in liquids, when the lees sink to the bottom and that which is above remains pure.

             This is the reason why young men cannot learn by taking what is said by others. With their internal senses they are unable to pass judgment on what they have heard or on anything which presents itself to their thought as well as their seniors or elders (which mean the same, for 'presbyter' in Greek is the same as 'senior' in Latin). This is because there are many disturbances and motions around these young men, as was said. But a disturbance of this kind may be removed completely, or at least mitigated, sometimes by nature as when one has reached advanced old age in which motions of this kind cease and sometimes by other causes such as practice and habit. Then they are able to learn well and judge well. Thereafter exercise of the moral virtues, through which such passions are curbed, is especially effective for acquiring knowledge.

             Whether the disturbance of the passions ceases through nature or through the exercise of virtue, some alteration is involved because passions of this kind are in the sensitive part. In the same way there is also a bodily alteration when one who is sleeping arises and awakens and proceeds to act. From this it is clear that the acquisition of knowledge is not an alteration, but follows from an alteration.

             From this he further concludes universally that alteration occurs in the external senses, and in the sensibles, and in the whole sensitive part of the soul (which he says because of the internal passions). But in no other part of the soul is there alteration, except per accidens.

             926. What Aristotle says here about the acquisition of knowledge seems to follow the Platonic opinion. For Plato held that, just as separated forms are the causes of the generation and existence of natural things because corporeal matter in some way participates in these separated forms, likewise they are also the cause of knowledge in us because our soul in some way participates in them. This participation of separated forms in our soul is knowledge. So it will be true that knowledge is received from a principle, not through the generation of knowledge in the soul, but only through the rest of the bodily and sensible passions by which the soul is impeded from using knowledge. Thus it will also be true that, with no mutation in the intellect, a man becomes a knower only because of the presence of the sensible things which we experience, as is also true of relations. For according to this sensible things are not necessary for knowledge, except that the soul is aroused in some way by them.

             Aristotle's opinion, however, is that knowledge occurs in the soul because intelligible species, abstracted by the agent intellect, are received into the possible intellect, as is said in De Anima, III. Hence, in the same place, it is said that to know is to suffer something, although the passivity of sense and intellect is different.

             Nor is it inconsistent that Aristotle uses this opinion from Plato. For before he proves his own opinion, he customarily uses the opinion of others. For example, in Book III he used Plato's opinion that every sensible body has heaviness and lightness, the contrary of which he himself shows in De Caelo, I.

             927. Nevertheless, these arguments are also valid according to the opinion of Aristotle.

             To see this it must be realized that that which is receptive can be related to the form which it receives in three ways.

             Sometimes the receiver is in the ultimate disposition for the reception of a form, with no hindrance existing either in itself or in another. In this case the receiver immediately receives the form, without any alteration, because of the presence of the agent, as is clear in air which is illuminated by the presence of the sun.

             Sometimes, however, the receiver is not in the ultimate disposition for the reception of a form. In this case there is required a per se alteration according to which matter acquires a disposition in order to be suited to this form, as when fire comes to be from the air.

             Sometimes the receiver is in the ultimate disposition for form, but there is some hindrance, as when air is hindered from receiving light, either because of closed windows or because of clouds. In this case an alteration or a mutation per accidens is required to remove the hindrance.

             Now the possible intellect, considered in itself, is always in the ultimate disposition to receive the intelligible species. Therefore, if there is no hindrance, then immediately upon presentation of the objects taken through experience the intelligible species comes to it, just as a form is in a mirror as a result of the presence of a body. And his first argument, in which he says that knowledge is a relation, deals with this. But if there is a hindrance, as happens in youths, such hindrances must be banished so that the intelligible species may be received in the intellect. And thus an alteration is necessary per accidens.