The first part of my contentions against Eunomius has with God’s help been sufficiently established in the preceding work, as all who will may see fro

 And let no one suppose that it is through pride or desire of human reputation that I go down to this truceless and implacable warfare to engage with t

 First of all, however, I think it advisable to run briefly over our own doctrinal views and our opponent’s disagreement with them, so that our review

 But to the best of my ability I will raise my voice to rebut our enemies’ argument. They say that God is declared to be without generation, that the G

 Now if the term ungenerate did not signify the being without origin, but the idea of simplicity entered into the meaning of such a term, and He were c

 But, saith he, He is without both quantity and magnitude. Granted: for the Son also is unlimited by quantity and magnitude, and yet is He the Son. But

 But this thing he leaves untold, and only says that ungeneracy should not be predicated of God as a mere conception. For what is so spoken, saith he,

 But before we examine what he has written, it may be better to enquire with what purpose it is that he refuses to admit that ungenerate can be predica

 For after saying that the Only-begotten God is not the same in essence with the true Father, and after sophistically inferring this from the oppositio

 Accordingly, enveloping his former special-pleading in the mazy evolutions of his sophistries, and dealing subtly with the term ungenerate, he steals

 Seeing, then, the mischief resulting to the dupes of this fallacious reasoning—that to assent to His not being very God is a departure from our confes

 It will presently be time to bring to their own recollection the method of this argument. Suffice it first to say this. There is no faculty in human n

 If, then, the lower creation which comes under our organs of sense transcends human knowledge, how can He, Who by His mere will made the worlds, be wi

 How pitiable are they for their cleverness! how wretched, how fatal is their over-wise philosophy! Who is there who goes of his own accord to the pit

 This, then, was the meaning of his safe guidance on the way to what he sought—that he was not blindly led by any of the means ready to hand for his in

 He shows, I think, by the relation of these elements to each other, or rather by their distance, how far the divine nature is above the speculations o

 Knowing, then, how widely the Divine nature differs from our own, let us quietly remain within our proper limits. For it is both safer and more revere

 And on other accounts also it may be called safe to let alone the Divine essence, as unspeakable, and beyond the scope of human reasoning. For the des

 Wherefore Holy Scripture omits all idle inquiry into substance as superfluous and unnecessary. And methinks it was for this that John, the Son of Thun

 But, nevertheless, with only such a nature for their base of operations, they open their mouths wide against the unspeakable Power, and encompass by o

 I have said, then (for I make my master’s words my own), that reason supplies us with but a dim and imperfect comprehension of the Divine nature neve

 But although our great master has thus cleared away all unworthy notions respecting the Divine nature, and has urged and taught all that may be revere

 And yet it is plain to every one who has given any attention to the uses of words, that the word incorruption denotes by the privative particle that n

 While, however, we strenuously avoid all concurrence with absurd notions in our thoughts of God, we allow ourselves in the use of many diverse appella

 And if any one would distinguish such notions by words, he would find it absolutely necessary to call that which admits of no changing to the worse un

 I say, then, that men have a right to such word-building, adapting their appellations to their subject, each man according to his judgment and that t

 For God is not an expression, neither hath He His essence in voice or utterance. But God is of Himself what also He is believed to be, but He is named

 But in applying such appellations to the Divine essence, “which passeth all understanding,” we do not seek to glory in it by the names we employ, but

 But let us hear how, “in the way most needed, and the form that preceded” (for with such rhymes he again gives us a taste of the flowers of style), le

 If, then, the creation is of later date than its Creator, and man is the latest in the scale of creation, and if speech is a distinctive characteristi

 He says that God was what He is, before the creation of man. Nor do we deny it. For whatsoever we conceive of God existed before the creation of the w

 But that we might gain some sort of comprehension of what with reverence may be thought respecting Him, we have stamped our different ideas with certa

 They say that God is ungenerate, and in this we agree. But that ungeneracy itself constitutes the Divine essence, here we take exception. For we maint

 With such gibes at the term “conception,” he shows, to the best of his ability, that it is useless and unprofitable for the life of man. What, then, w

 But why enumerate the greater and more splendid results of this faculty? For every one who is not unfriendly to truth can see for himself that all els

 Now that He did not teach us such things by some visible operation, Himself presiding over the work, as we may see in matters of bodily teaching, no o

 For that one who proposes to himself to terrify or charm an audience should have plenty of conception to effect such a purpose, and should display to

 For it is not the case that, while the intelligence implanted in us by the Giver is fully competent to conjure up non-realities, it is endowed with no

 But as far as possible to elucidate the idea, I will endeavour to illustrate it by a still plainer example. Let us suppose the inquiry to be about som

 This example being understood, it is time to go on to the thing which it illustrates. This much we comprehend, that the First Cause has His existence

 Such are his charges against us not indeed his notions as expressed in his own phraseology, for we have made such alterations as were required to cor

 If, then, God gives things their names as our new expositor of the Divine record assures us, naming germ, and grass, and tree, and fruit, He must of n

 Such is the nature of this new-fangled Deity, as deducible from the words of our new God-maker. But he takes his stand on the Scriptures, and maintain

 But it may be said that the voice of the Father was addressed to the Holy Spirit. But neither does the Holy Spirit require instruction by speech, for

 But, says he, the record of Moses does not lie, and from it we learn that God spake. No! nor is great David of the number of those who lie, and he exp

 What, then, do we think of this passage? For it may be that, if we understand it, we shall also understand the meaning of Moses. It often happens that

 But to return to the matter in question. We assert that the words “He said” do not imply voice and words on the part of God but the writer, in showin

 For the case is different from that of men endowed by nature with practical ability, where you may look at capability and execution apart from each ot

 But if any one would give a more sensuous interpretation to the words “God said,” as proving that articulate speech was His creation, by a parity of r

 And the futility of such assertions may be seen also by this. For as the natures of the elements, which are the work of the Creator, appear alike to a

 And if any one cites the confusion of tongues that took place at the building of the tower, as contradicting what I have said, not even there is God s

 But some who have carefully studied the Scriptures tell us that the Hebrew tongue is not even ancient like the others, but that along with other mirac

 For to suppose that God used the Hebrew tongue, when there was no one to hear and understand such a language, methinks no reasonable being will consen

 But this is denied by Eunomius, the author of all this contumely with which we are assailed, and the companion and adviser of this impious band. For,

 On these passages it is probable that our opponents will take their stand. And I will agree for them with what is said, and will myself take advantage

 But since the nature of most things that are seen in Creation is not simple, so as to allow of all that they connote being comprehended in one word, a

 In like manner before him Jacob, having taken hold of his brother’s heel, was called a supplanter , from the attitude in which he came to the birth. F

 But I will pass over his other babblings against the truth, possessing as they do no force against our doctrines, for I deem it superfluous to linger

 To pass on, then, to what remains. He brings forward once more some of the Master’s words, to this effect: “And it is in precisely the same manner tha

 But to return. Such names are used of our Lord, and no one familiar with the inspired Scriptures can deny the fact. What then? Does Eunomius affirm th

 But, like a mighty wrestler, he will not relinquish his irresistible hold on us, and affirms in so many words, that “these names are the work of human

 “But God,” he says, “gave the weakest of terrestrial things a share in the most honourable names, though not giving them an equal share of dignity, an

 This it is that our strong-minded opponent, who accuses us of dishonesty, and charges us with being irrational in judgment,—this it is that he pretend

 But what is our author’s meaning, and what is the object of this argument of his? For no one need imagine that, for lack of something to say, in order

 He does not, in fact, partake of that dignity which the meaning of those names indicates and whereas wise Daniel, in setting right the Babylonians’ e

 But in dwelling on such nonsense I fear that I am secretly gratifying our adversaries. For in setting the truth against their vain and empty words, I

 But I fear that all we shall find in the discourse of Eunomius will turn out to be mere tumours and sea lungs, so that what has been said must necessa

 Basil, he says, asserts that after we have obtained our first idea of a thing, the more minute and accurate investigation of the thing under considera

 And Moses, seeing God in the light, and John calling Him the true Light , and in the same way Paul, when our Lord first appeared to him, and a Light s

 I have deluged my discourse with much nonsense of his, but I trust my hearers will pardon me for not leaving unnoticed even the most glaring of his in

 Then going farther, as if his object were thus far attained, he takes up other charges against us, more difficult, as he thinks, to deal with than the

 But all this is beside our purpose. Would that our charges against him were limited to this, and that he could be thought to err only in his delivery,

 But it is time to examine the argument that leads to this profanity, and see how, as regards itself, it is logically connected with his whole discours

 But in His very essence, he says, God is indestructible. Well, what other conceivable attribute of God does not attach to the very essence of the Son,

 Now that the idea of ungeneracy and the belief in the Divine essence are quite different things may be seen by what he himself has put forward. God, h

 But it will be well, I think, to pass over his nauseating observations (for such we must term his senseless attacks on the method of conception), and

 But if it were in any way possible by some other means to lay bare the movements of thought, abandoning the formal instrumentality of words, we should

 All his argument, then, in opposition to the doctrine of conception I think it best to pass over, though he charge with madness those who think that t

 But, like some viscous and sticky clay, the nonsense he has concocted in contravention of our teaching of conception seems to hold us back, and preven

 But I will pass over both this and their reading of Epicurus’ nature-system, which he says is equivalent to our conception, maintaining that the doctr

 But, says he, since God condescends to commune with His servants, we may consequently suppose that from the very beginning He enacted words appropriat

 But our pious opponent will not allow of God’s using our language, because of our proneness to evil, shutting his eyes (good man!) to the fact that fo

 But most people, perhaps, will think this too far removed from the scope of our present inquiry. This, however, no one will regard as out of keeping w

 Since, then, it is improper to regard God as the inventor of such names, lest the names even of these idol gods should seem to have had their origin f

 And if we set forth the opinion of most commentators on these words of the Psalmist, that of Eunomius regarding them will be still more convicted of f

 But the names which the Lord gives to such stars we may plainly learn from the prophecy of Esaias, which says, “I have called thee by thy name thou a

 I will pass over, then, the abuse with which he has prefaced his discussion of these matters, as when he uses such terms as “alteration of seed,” and

 I pass in silence his blasphemy in reducing God the Only-begotten to a level with all created things, and, in a word, allowing to the Son of God no hi

 For, proceeding with his discourse, he asks us what we mean by the ages. And yet we ourselves might more reasonably put such questions to him. For it

 But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses i

 Such is our position our adversary’s, with regard to the precise meaning of this term , is such as can derive no help from any reasonings he only sp

 He says, “The Life that is the same, and thoroughly single, must have one and the same outward expression for it, even though in mere names, and manne

 But why do we linger over these follies, when we ought rather to put Eunomius’ book itself into the hands of the studious, and so, apart from any exam

 But if he should still answer with regard to this opposition (of the Divine names), that it is only the term Father, and the term Creator, that are ap

 But let us examine a still more vehement charge of his against us it is this: “If one must proceed to say something harsher still, he does not even k

 What, then, does Eunomius say to this? “If He is imperishable only by reason of the unending in His Life, and ungenerate only by reason of the unbegin

 What, then, out of all that we have said, has stirred him up to this piece of childish folly, in which he returns to the charge and repeats himself in

 Such are the clever discoveries of Eunomius against the truth. For what need is there to go through all his argument with trifling prolixity? For in e

 Either, he says, that which is endless is distinct in meaning from that which is imperishable, or else the two must make one. But if he call both one,

 But that he himself also may be brought to the knowledge of his own trifling, we will convict him from his own statements. For in the course of his ar

 Thus far our argument goes with him. But the riddle with which he accompanies his words we must leave to those trained in the wisdom of Prunicus to in

 But let us leave this, and along with it the usual foul deluge of calumny in his words and let us go on to his subsequent quotations (of Basil). But

 But who, pray, is so simple as to be harmed by such arguments, and to imagine that if names are once believed to be an outcome of the reasoning facult

 But I do not think that we need linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows. To the more attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our

 But now I do not know which it is best to do to pursue step by step this subject, or to put an end here to our contest with such folly. Well, as in t

 When, then, he is on the point of introducing this treatment of terms of “privation,” he takes upon himself to show “the incurable absurdity,” as he c

 Every term—every term, that is, which is really such—is an utterance expressing some movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound th

 Well, then, if God did not exist formerly, or if there be a time when He will not exist, He cannot be called either unending or without beginning and

 Thus much, then, is known to us about the names uttered in any form whatever in reference to the Deity. We have given a simple explanation of them, un

 How it is possible, then, to assign one’s gratuities to the non-subsistent, let this man, who claims to be using words and phrases in their natural fo

 Well, if the term imperishable or indestructible is not considered by this maker of an empty system to be privative of destruction, then by a stern ne

 “But I do not see,” he rejoins, “how God can be above His own works simply by virtue of such things as do not belong to Him .” And on the strength of

 He declares that God surpasses mortal beings as immortal, destructible beings as indestructible, generated beings as ungenerate, just in the same degr

 Therefore let us again handle this dictum of his: “God is not called immortal by virtue of the absence of death.” How are we to accept this statement,

 Still I cannot see what profit there is in deigning to examine such nonsense. For a man like myself, who has lived to gray hairs , and whose eyes are

 But it is time now to expose that angry accusation which he brings against us at the close of his treatise, saying that we affirm the Father to be fro

 “The evangelist Luke, when giving the genealogy according to the flesh of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ, and stepping up from the last to the first

 With what eyes will you now dare to gaze upon your guide? I speak to you, O flock of perishing souls! How can you still turn to listen to this man who

 Such, to use your own words, is the “evil,” as one might expect, not indeed “of valuing the character for being clever before one is really such” (for

Every term—every term, that is, which is really such—is an utterance expressing some movement of thought. But every operation and movement of sound thinking is directed as far as it is possible to the knowledge and the contemplation of some reality. But then the whole world of realities is divided into two parts; that is, into the intelligible and the sensible. With regard to sensible phænomena, knowledge, on account of the perception of them being so near at hand, is open for all to acquire; the judgment of the senses gives occasion to no doubt about the subject before them. The differences in colour, and the differences in all the other qualities which we judge of by means of the sense of hearing, or smell, or touch, or taste, can be known and named by all possessing our common humanity; and so it is with all the other things which appear to be more obvious to our apprehension, the things, that is, pertaining to the age in which we live, designed for political and moral ends. But in the contemplation of the intelligible world, on account of that world transcending the grasp of the senses, we move, some in one way, some in another, around the object of our search; and then, according to the idea arising in each of us about it, we announce the result as best we can, striving to get as near as possible to the full meaning of the thing thought about through the medium of expressive phrases. In this, though it is often possible to have achieved the task in both ways, when thought does not fail to hit the mark, and utterance interprets the notion with the appropriate word, yet it may happen that we may fail even in both, or in one, at least, of the two, when either the comprehending faculty or the interpreting capacity is carried beside the proper mark. There being, then, two factors by which every term is made a correct term, the mental exactitude and the verbal utterance, the result which commands approval in both ways, will certainly be the preferable; but it will not be a lesser gain, not to have missed the right conception, even though the word itself may happen to be inadequate to that thought. Whenever then, our thought is intent upon those high and unseen things which sense cannot reach (I mean, upon that divine and unspeakable world with regard to which it is an audacious thing to grasp in thought anything in it at random and more audacious still to trust to any chance word the representing of the conception arising from it), then, I say, turning from the mere sound of phrases, uttered well or ill according to the mental faculty of the speaker, we search for the thought, and that alone, which is found within the phrases, to see whether that itself be sound, or otherwise; and we leave the minutiæ of phrase and name to be dealt with by the artificialities of grammarians. Now, seeing that we mark with an appellation only those things which we know, and those things which are above our knowledge it is not possible to seize by any distinctive terms (for how can one put a mark upon a thing we know nothing about?), therefore, because in such cases there is no appropriate term to be found to mark the subject adequately, we are compelled by many and differing names, as there may be opportunity, to divulge our surmises as they arise within us with regard to the Deity. But, on the other hand, all that actually comes within our comprehension is such that it must be of one of these four kinds: either contemplated as existing in an extension of distance, or suggesting the idea of a capacity in space within which its details are detected, or it comes within our field of vision by being circumscribed by a beginning or an end where the non-existent bounds it in each direction (for everything that has a beginning and an end of its existence, begins from the non-existent, and ends in the non-existent), or, lastly, we grasp the phænomenon by means of an association of qualities wherein dying, and sufferance, and change, and alteration, and such-like are combined. Considering this, in order that the Supreme Being may not appear to have any connection whatever with things below, we use, with regard to His nature, ideas and phrases expressive of separation from all such conditions; we call, for instance, that which is above all times pre-temporal, that which is above beginning unbeginning, that which is not brought to an end unending, that which has a personality removed from body incorporeal, that which is never destroyed imperishable, that which is unreceptive of change, or sufferance, or alteration, passionless, changeless, and unalterable. Such a class of appellations can be reduced to any system that they like by those who wish for one; and they can fix on these actual appellations other appellations “privative,” for instance, or “negative,” or whatever they like. We yield the teaching and the learning of such things to those who are ambitious for it; and we will investigate the thoughts alone, whether they are within or beyond the circle of a religious and adequate conception of the Deity.

Πᾶς λόγος ὅ γε ἀληθῶς λόγος σημαντική τίς ἐστι τῶν κατ' ἔννοιαν κινημάτων φωνή. πᾶσα δὲ τῆς ὑγιοῦς διανοίας ἐνέργειά τε καὶ κίνησις πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὄντων γνῶσίν τε καὶ θεωρίαν, ὡς ἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ, βλέπει. διχῆ δὲ μεμέρισται τῶν ὄντων ἡ φύσις εἴς τε τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν διαιρουμένη: ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν κατ' αἴσθησιν φαινομένων διὰ τὸ πρόχειρον τῆς κατανοήσεως κοινὴ πρόκειται πᾶσιν ἡ γνῶσις, οὐδεμίαν περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἀμφιβολίαν ἐμποιούσης τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἐπικρίσεως. τάς τε γὰρ τῶν χρωμάτων καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ποιοτήτων διαφοράς, ὅσα δι' ἀκοῆς ἢ ὀσφρήσεως ἢ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἁφὴν ἢ τὴν γεῦσιν αἰσθήσεως ἐπικρίνομεν, ὁμοφώνως πάντες οἱ τῆς αὐτῆς κοινωνοῦντες φύσεως γινώσκομέν τε καὶ ὀνομάζομεν, καὶ ὅσα τῶν λοιπῶν τὴν κατάληψιν ἐπιπολαιοτέραν ἔχειν δοκεῖ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον ἀναστρεφομένων πραγμάτων, ἃ πρός τε τὸν πολιτικὸν καὶ τὸν ἠθικὸν τοῦ βίου σκοπὸν καταγίνεται. ἐν δὲ τῇ θεωρίᾳ τῆς νοερᾶς φύσεως διὰ τὸ ὑπερκεῖσθαι αὐτὴν τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καταλήψεως στοχαστικῶς τῆς διανοίας ἐπορεγομένης τῶν ἐκφευγόντων τὴν αἴσθησιν ἄλλοι ἄλλως κινούμεθά τε περὶ τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἐγγινομένην ἑκάστῳ περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον διάνοιαν, ὅπως ἂν οἷόν τε ᾖ, τὸ νοηθὲν ἐξαγγέλλομεν, ἐγγίζοντες ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα τῇ δυνάμει τῶν νοηθέντων διὰ τῆς τῶν ῥημάτων ἐμφάσεως. ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστι μὲν πολλάκις καὶ δι' ἀμφοτέρων κατορθωθῆναι τὸ σπουδαζόμενον, τῆς τε διανοίας οὐχ ἁμαρτούσης τοῦ ζητουμένου καὶ τῆς φωνῆς εὐθυβόλως τὸ νοηθὲν διὰ τῆς προσφυοῦς ἑρμηνείας ἐξαγγελλούσης: ἔστι δὲ τυχὸν καὶ ἀμφοτέρων ἢ τοῦ ἑτέρου γε τούτων ἀποτυχεῖν, ἢ τῆς καταληπτικῆς διανοίας ἢ τῆς ἑρμηνευτικῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ προσήκοντος παρενεχθείσης. δύο τοίνυν ὄντων δι' ὧν ἅπας εὐθύνεται λόγος, τῆς τε κατὰ τὸν νοῦν ἀσφαλείας καὶ τῆς ἐν ῥήμασι προφορᾶς, κρεῖττον μὲν ἂν εἴη τὸ δι' ἀμφοτέρων εὐδόκιμον, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ ἀγαθὸν τῆς προσηκούσης μὴ διαμαρτεῖν ὑπολήψεως, κἂν ὁ λόγος ἐλάττων τῆς διανοίας τύχῃ. ὅταν τοίνυν περὶ τῶν ὑψηλῶν καὶ ἀθεάτων ἡ διάνοια τὴν σπουδὴν ἔχῃ, ὧν οὐκ ἐφικνεῖται ἡ αἴσθησις (λέγω δὲ περὶ τῆς θείας καὶ ἀφράστου φύσεως, ἐν οἷς τολμηρὸν μὲν καὶ τὸ προχείρως τι τῇ διανοίᾳ λαβεῖν, τολμηρότερον δὲ τὸ ταῖς ἐπιτυχούσαις ἐπιτρέπειν φωναῖς τὴν τῆς ἐγγινομένης ἡμῖν ὑπολήψεως ἑρμηνείαν) τότε χαίρειν ἐάσαντες τὸν ἐν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἦχον, οὕτως ἢ ἑτέρως κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν τῶν φθεγγομένων ἐξαγγελλόμενον, μόνην ἐξετάζομεν τὴν διάνοιαν τὴν ἐμφαινομένην τοῖς ῥήμασιν, εἴτε ὑγιῶς εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, τὰς ῥηματικὰς ταύτας ἢ ὀνοματικὰς ἀκριβολογίας γραμματιστῶν τέχναις παραχωρήσαντες. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν μόνα τὰ γινωσκόμενα διὰ τῆς ὀνοματικῆς σημειούμεθα κλήσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὲρ τὴν γνῶσιν ὄντα σημειωτικαῖς τισι προσηγορίαις διαλαμβάνειν οὐχ οἷόν τε (πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις τὸ ἀγνοούμενον σημειώσαιτο;) διὰ τοῦτο οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπ' αὐτῶν προσφυοῦς εὑρισκομένης προσηγορίας, ἣ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἱκανῶς παραστήσει, πολλοῖς καὶ διαφόροις ὀνόμασιν, ὅπως ἂν ᾖ δυνατόν, ἀνακαλύψαι βιαζόμεθα τὴν ἐγγενομένην ἡμῖν περὶ τοῦ θείου ὑπόνοιαν. ἀλλὰ μὴν τὰ ὑπὸ κατάληψιν ἡμετέραν ἐρχόμενα τοιαῦτά ἐστιν, ὥστε πάντως ἢ ἐν διαστηματικῇ τινι παρατάσει θεωρεῖσθαι τὰ ὄντα ἢ τοπικοῦ χωρήματος παρέχειν τὴν ἔννοιαν, ἐν ᾧ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον εἶναι καταλαμβάνεται, ἢ τῇ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ τέλος περιγραφῇ ἐντὸς γίνεται τῆς ἡμετέρας ἐπόψεως, ἐπίσης καθ' ἑκάτερον πέρας τῷ μὴ ὄντι περιγραφόμενα (πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἀρχήν τε καὶ τελευτὴν ἔχον τοῦ εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἄρχεται καὶ εἰς τὸ μὴ ὂν καταλήγει), ἢ τὸ πάντων ἔσχατον διὰ τῆς σωματικῆς τῶν ποιοτήτων συνθήκης καταλαμβάνομεν τὸ φαινόμενον, ᾗ φθορὰ καὶ πάθος καὶ τροπὴ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα συνέζευκται. διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἂν μηδεμίαν οἰκειότητα πρὸς τὰ κάτω πράγματα ἡ ὑπερκειμένη φύσις ἔχειν δοκοίη, τοῖς ἀποχωριστικοῖς τῶν τοιούτων νοήμασί τε καὶ ῥήμασιν ἐπὶ τῆς θείας κεχρήμεθα φύσεως, τὸ ὑπεράνω τῶν αἰώνων προαιώνιον λέγοντες καὶ τὸ ὑπὲρ ἀρχὴν ἄναρχον καὶ τὸ μὴ τελειούμενον ἀτελεύτητον ἀσώματόν τε τὸ χωρὶς σώματος τὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχον καὶ τὸ μὴ φθειρόμενον ἄφθαρτον καὶ τὸ τροπῆς ἢ πάθους ἢ ἀλλοιώσεως ἀνεπίδεκτον ἀπαθὲς καὶ ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀναλλοίωτον. τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων τεχνολογούντων μὲν ὡς ἂν ᾖ φίλον αὐτοῖς οἱ βουλόμενοι καὶ ὀνόματα ἄλλα τοῖς ὀνόμασι τούτοις ἐφαρμοζόντων, « στερητικὰ ἢ ἀφαιρετικὰ » ἢ ὅ τι φίλον αὐτοῖς ὀνομάζοντες, ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ διδάσκειν ἢ μανθάνειν τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς φιλοτίμοις παραχωρήσαντες μόνον τὸν νοῦν ἐξετάσωμεν, εἰ τῆς εὐσεβοῦς τε καὶ θεοπρεποῦς ὑπολήψεως ἐντός ἐστιν ἢ κεχώρισται.