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For the divine is incomprehensible to the mind and beyond what is comprehensible to the mind; and many existing things which are comprehensible to the mind are beyond demonstration, so that the divine surpasses even that which is beyond demonstration, of which you speak, with incomparable and immeasurable excellences, and he who thinks to magnify the divine things too much by saying they are beyond Aristotelian demonstration has unwittingly moved toward the opposite. Therefore we, through the guidance of the fathers, finding a demonstration of that which is beyond demonstration and is superior to it, by this means pursue some, but not all, divine things, and holding the rest to be beyond even this (p. 532), we place the divine many times higher than that which, according to Aristotle, is said by your wisdom to be beyond demonstration. Do you see how much more fitting for God our views are than yours?

And what of your dialectic which you think alone applies to divine things? Does it not always have the major premise in syllogisms as a universal? And does not the knowledge of universals come to us through sensations? How then could there be a dialectical syllogism concerning things beyond sensation? And if someone should grant that knowledge is gathered through contact with intelligibles, yet divine things are also beyond mind; how then could there be a dialectical syllogism concerning things beyond mind? ‘But to the dialectical syllogism,’ he says, ‘all things are subject without distinction, since it is occupied with all things’; this is why he deems it right that we become dialecticians instead of faithful, although for this reason he has again become a fugitive from the name of demonstration. But what ‘all things,’ my good sir? All existing things, certainly; but how could that which is beyond being have a subject? For Aristotle says that this provides a way to all methods; but how can there be a method for incomprehensible things, if a method is a system of comprehensions? Dialectic in the proper sense, as you yourself would say, has not only its subject indefinite, but also the object of inquiry for each problem and the very premises, but the true theologian has almost all things defined: the object of inquiry always and entirely, and most, if not all, of the premises, both from the divinely inspired or divinely transmitted sources, for which he even takes his stand, and through which he holds his own conviction to be most certain and unshakeable.

Further, if we pursue the knowledge of divine things through the dialectical syllogism, but only the knowledge of the world through the demonstrative, as you say, the dialectical would be superior (p. 534) to the demonstrative; but your Aristotle would never concede this; for that whose subject is superior is itself superior. And if it also has an addition, and this one so great and beyond great, how great then is the addition of betterment. And indeed, with what is dialectic concerned and what does it seek? Is it not, in sum, all four things: genus, definition, species, and accident? Now, you yourself do not accept accident in the case of divine things; and could there be any definition at all of that of which not even 'what it is' is sought? And of the formless, what is the species? And what sort of genus for that which has no species, and especially since, being truly and alone, it requires no essential difference in order to be? For all these things are required for the distinction of a multitude, but it will show the divine as being none of these things; but not as beyond being, but as in no way and by no means being; for it neither knows nor teaches what transcends this tetrad. And if anyone concedes it at all, he will grant this to demonstration, for through it alone is an unshakeable conviction said to arise, which is what we have concerning divine things.

But 'I have been compelled,' he says, 'while contradicting the most contentious Latins.' Now, that there was no necessity, and that the statement 'that demonstration can in no way exist for any of the divine things' is placed there completely in vain, we have shown before; but if indeed there was some necessity, it was better to be silent and to seek, even from the unlearned among us, if not knowledge, at least not to heal evils with evils unthinkingly, and

108

Νῷ γάρ ἄληπτον τό θεῖον καί ὑπέρ τά νῷ ληπτά˙ πολλά δέ τῶν ὄντων καί νῷ ληπτῶν ἐστιν ὑπέρ ἀπόδειξιν, ὥστε τό θεῖον καί τοῦ ὑπέρ ἀπόδειξιν, οὗ σύ φῄς, ὑπερβάλλει ἀπαραβλήτοις καί ἀξυμλήτοις ὑπεροχαῖς, καί ὁ μεγαλύνειν ἄγαν οἰόμενος τῷ ὑπέρ τήν ἀριστοτελικήν ἀπόδειξιν τά θεῖα λέγειν ἔλαθεν ἑαυτόν πρός τἀναντία χωρῶν. ∆ιόπερ ἡμεῖς διά τῆς τῶν πατέρων ποδηγίας ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ὑπέρ ἀπόδειξιν εὑρόμενοι τούτου κρείττοντα, ταύτῃ τε μή πάνθ᾿ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ᾿ ἔστιν ἅ τῶν θείων θηρώμενοι καί ὑπέρ ταύτην (σελ. 532) τἄλλο δοξάζοντες, πολλαπλασίως τοῦ κατ᾿ Ἀριστοτέλην ὑπό τῆς σῆς σοφίας λεγομένου ὑπέρ ἀπόδειξιν τό θεῖον ὑπερτιθέαμεν. Ὅρᾷς ὅσῳ τῶν σῶν θεοπρεπέστερα τά ἡμέτερα;

Τί δ᾿ ἡ σή διαλεκτική ἥν μόνην ἐπιβάλλειν οἴει τοῖς θείοις; Οὐ τήν ἐν συλλογισμοῖς μείζω πρότασιν ἀεί καθόλου ἔχει; Ἡ δέ τῶν καθόλου γνῶσις οὐ δι᾿ αἰσθημάτων ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται; Πῶς οὖν ἐπί τῶν ὑπέρ αἴσθησιν εἴη ἄν διαλεκτικός συλλογισμός; Εἰ δέ τις ἐνδοίη δι᾿ ἐπαφῶ νοητῶν συνάγεσθαι τήν γνῶσιν, ἀλλά τά θεῖα καί ὑπέρ νοῦν ἐστι˙ πῶς οὖν τῶν ὑπέρ νοῦν εἴη ἄν διαλεκτικός συλλογισμός; «Ἀλλά τῷ διαλεκτικῷ», φησί, «συλλογισμῷ ἀδιορίστως πάντα ὑπόκειται, περί πάντα καταγινομένῳ»˙ τοῦτό ἐστι δι᾿ ὅ διαλεκτικούς ἡμᾶς ἀντί πιστῶν καταστῆναι ἀξιοῖ, καίτοι τοῦ τῆς ἀποδείξεως ὀνόματος φυγάς διά τοῦτ᾿ αὖθις γεγονώς. Ἀλλά ποῖα πάντα, ὦ βέλτιστε; Τά ὄντα πάντως πάντα˙ τό δ᾿ ὑπέρ τό ὄν πῶς ἄν ἔχοι ὑποκείμενον; Πρός μέν γάρ πάσας τάς μεθόδους ὁδόν ἔχειν τοῦτόν φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης˙ μέθοδος δέ τῶν ἀκαταλήπτων πῶς, εἴπερ ἡ μέθοδος σύστημα ἐκ καταλήψεων; Οὐ τό ὑποκείμενον δέ μόνον ἀόριστον ἔχει, ἀλλά καί τό ζητούμενον ἐφ᾿ ἑκάστου προβλήματος καί αὐτάς γε τάς προτάσεις ἥ γε κυρίως, ὡς ἄν αὐτός φαίης, διαλεκτική, ὁ δέ ἀληθής θεολόγος, ὡρισμένα ἅπαντα σχεδόν, τό μέν ζητούμενον ἀεί καί ἅπαν, προτάσεων δέ τάς πλείστας, εἰ μή πάσας, ἀμφότερα δέ ἐκ τῶν θεοπνεύστων ἤ καί θεοπαραδότων, ὑπέρ ὧν καί ἐνίσταται, δι᾿ ἅ καί τήν οἰκείαν ὑπόληψιν βεβαιοτάτην ἔχει καί ἀμετάπειστον.

Ἔτι, εἰ διά μέν τοῦ διαλεκτικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ καί τήν τῶν θείων γνῶσιν θηρώμεθα, διά δέ τοῦ ἀποδεικτικοῦ μόνην, ὡς σύ λέγεις, τήν τοῦ κόσμου, κρείττων ἄν εἴη (σελ. 534) ὁ διαλεκτικός τοῦ ἀποδεικτικοῦ˙ τοῦτο δ᾿ ὁ σός Ἀριστοτέλης οὐκ ἄν ποτε συγχωρήσειεν˙ οὗ γάρ τό ὑποκείμενον κρεῖττον καί αὐτό κρεῖττον˙ εἰ δέ καί προσθήκην τοῦτ᾿ ἔχει, καί ταῦθ᾿ οὕτω μέγα καί ὑπέρ τό μέγα, καί ἡ προσθήκη τῆς βελτιώσεως ὅσον. Καί μέν δή περί τίνα καταγίνεται ἡ διαλεκτική καί τίνα ἅ ζητεῖ; Οὐχ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ τέτταρα τά πάντα, γένος, ὅρον, εἶδος καί τό συμβεβηκός; Τό μέν οὖν συμβεβηκός οὐδ᾿ αὐτός ἐπί τῶν θείων δέχῃ˙ ὅρος δέ πᾶν ἄν εἴη, οὗ μηδέ τό τί ἐστι ζητεῖται; Τοῦ δ᾿ ἀνειδέου εἶδος τί; Γένος δέ ποῖον οὗ μή εἶδος, καί μάλισθ᾿ ὅτι ὄντως ὤν καί μόνος οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσιώδους διαφορᾶς δεῖται πρός τό εἶναι; Τῆς γ αρ πληθύος διαστολῆς δεομένων ταῦθ᾿ ἅπαντά ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς οὐδέν τούτων ὑπάρχον δείξει τό θεῖον˙ ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὡς ὑπέρ ὄν, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὄν˙ τῆς γάρ τετρακτύος ταύτης ὑπεραῖρον οὔτ᾿ οἶδεν οὔτε παραδίδωσιν˙ εἰ δ᾿ ὅλως συγχωρήσει τις, τῇ ἀποδείξει τοῦτο δώσει, δι᾿ αὐτῆς γάρ λέγεται μόνης ὑπόληψις ἀμετάπειστος ἐγγίνεσθαι, ἥν ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν ἐπί τῶν θείων.

Ἀλλ᾿ «ἠνάγκασμαί» φησι «τοῖς ἀντιλογικωτάτοις Λατίνοις ἀντιλέγων». Ὅτι μέν οὖν οὐδεμία τις ἐπῆν ἀνάγκη, παντάπασι δέ μάτην τό «μηδαμῶς ἐπ᾿ οὐδενός τῶν θείων εἶναι δύνασθαι ἀπόδειξιν» ἐκεῖ κεῖται, πρότερον ἐδείξαμεν˙ εἰ δ᾿ ἄρα καί ἀνάγκη τις ἐπῆν, σιωπᾶν μᾶλλον ἔδει καί ζητεῖν καί παρ᾿ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἰδιωτῶν, εἰ καί μή τήν γνῶσιν, ἀλλά μή κακοῖς ἀπερισκέπτως ἰᾶσθαι τά κακά, καί