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some things are demonstrable, and others are not, and saying that nothing (p. 540) of divine things is demonstrable, for there is neither contact with it nor knowledge of it, he uses the divine Scripture against itself, having shown through each other the things in it that are set at war with one another; for if because there is no contact with God and no knowledge, there is no demonstration either, and yet that these things exist, there will also be a demonstration.

What then is the conclusion from these things and the unassailable and consistent testimony to Scripture? That it both is and is not, in one way and in another; and this is what we have said, that some divine things are known and demonstrated, but others are incomprehensible and unsearchable; it is wrong, therefore, to say that there is no demonstration for any of the divine things; for there is for some, and in some way. For just as the incarnation of the Lord is both beyond nature and according to nature, and when spoken of remains unspoken, and when conceived of, unknown, since some things are beyond nature, such as the Virgin's conception, and others are according to nature, such as the swelling of the womb after conception, so also the divine is both demonstrable and not demonstrable; being indivisibly divided, however, by the difference of the ways, since "it is known both through knowledge and through unknowing"; for that He is and that He is one is both known and demonstrated, but what He is and what sort of one He is, is utterly incomprehensible.

But the philosopher, hearing the great Dionysius saying that "the Godhead, celebrated as both monad and Triad, is neither a monad nor a triad known by any of the beings," seems to have understood it somehow in this way: that by no one was it known that He is a monad. But that great one does not say this, but that He is known and celebrated as a monad, yet not as one of the numerable monads recognized among beings, which would not even properly be monads, if indeed the monad is not a number, so that for this reason That is rather and only known as a monad, (p. 542) which is not known through number and in numbers; for it is properly not a number. The Godhead, then, is a monad, but not one of those recognized among beings, just as Gregory the Theologian also, after saying "the nature of God is ungraspable and incomprehensible," immediately adds, becoming an interpreter of the meaning of his utterance: "I mean not that He is, but what He is." But this philosopher considers equally ungraspable and indemonstrable both what He is and that He is, and his solemn pretext is to show through demonstration that all divine things are beyond demonstration. But I, after saying a little something to him about this, will move my discourse to the subjects proposed.

Are you not yourself the one who says that for none of the divine things is there a demonstration? If, then, what is beyond demonstration has been demonstrated by you, it is not divine; but if the attribute is fitting for God, it would not admit of demonstration. But you, I know not how, say different things at different times and things contrary to one another, not only regarding the demonstrated divine, which is, as you yourself say, beyond demonstration, but also whenever you mention the ascent that occurs from created things to the creator. For what? will there not be a demonstration from created things that there is a creator? Are not some of the invisible things known from the visible things? And will you not accept the divine Paul testifying that "the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made," but will you say that all divine things are beyond all contact and knowledge?

"Yes," he says, "but my discourse is about the syllogisms which we compose for each of them according to the outward reason; but each person thinks such things by himself." What then, is it not possible for a person to also bring forth through the tongue or hand those things which he thinks by himself, making conversation through the outward reason or composing writings, just as also happens with immediate and universal propositions? For the (p. 544) knowledge of these things is naturally produced in the soul, being gathered by induction intellectually, but it is also brought to the outward reason, being made known again through induction. But you, however, would also

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ἀποδεικτά ἐστι, τά δ᾿ οὔ, καί λέγων ὡς οὐδέν ἀποδεικτόν (σελ. 540) τῶν θείων, ἐπαφή γάρ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε ἐπιστήμη, τῇ θείᾳ Γραφῇ καθ᾿ ἑαυτῆς χρῆται, τά ἐν αὐτῇ κατ᾿ ἀλλήλων ἐκπεπολεμωμένα δι᾿ ἀλλήλων δείξας˙ εἰ γάρ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπαφή Θεοῦ καί ἐπιστήμη, οὐδέ ἀπόδειξις, καί ὅτι ἔστι ταῦτα, καί ἀπόδειξις ἔσται.

Τί δή τό ἐκ τούτων συναγόμενον καί τό ἄμαχόν τε καί ὁμόλογον τῇ Γραφῇ προσμαρτυροῦν; Ὅρτι καί ἔστι καί οὐκ ἔστι, καθ᾿ ἕτερον ἕτερον τρόπον˙ τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ὅ ἡμεῖς εἰρήκαμεν, ὅτι τά μέν τῶν θείων γινώσκεταί τε καί ἀποδείκνυται, τά δ᾿ ἀπερινόητά ἐστι καί ἀνεξιχνίαστα˙ πλημμελές ἄρα τό λέγειν ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπόδειξις ἐπ᾿ οὐδενός τῶν θείων˙ ἔστι γάρ ἐφ᾿ ὧν, καί ἔστιν ὥς. Ὡς γάρ ἡ ἐνανθρώπησις τοῦ Κυρίου ὑπέρ φύσιν τέ ἐστι καί κατά φύσιν, καί λεγομένη ἄρρητος μένει καί νοουμένη ἄγνωστος, ἐπεί τά μέν ὑπέρ φύσιν, ὡς ἡ τῆς παρθένου κύησις, τά δέ κατά φύσιν, ὡς ὁ τῆς νηδύος ὄγκος μετά σύλληψιν, οὕτω καί τό θεῖον ἀποδεικτόν τέ ἐστι καί οὐκ ἀποδεικτόν˙ ἀμερίστως μέντοι μεριζόμενον τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν τρόπων, ἐπεί «καί διά γνώσεως γινώσκεται καί δι᾿ ἀγνωσίας»˙ ὅτι μέν γάρ ἔστι καί ὅτι ἕν ἐστι καί γινώσκεται καί ἀποδείκνυται, τί δέ ἐστι καί τί γε ἕν ἀπερινόητον ἐστι παντάπασιν.

Ἀλλ᾿ ὁ φιλόσοφος ἀκούων ∆ιονυσίου τοῦ μεγάλου λέγοντος ὡς «ἡ θεότης καί μονάς καί Τριάς ὑμνουμένη οὐκ ἔστι οὐδέ μονάς οὐδέ τριάς ὑπό τινος τῶν ὄντων διεγνωσμένην οὕτω πως ὡς ἔοικεν ἐνόησεν ὡς ὑπ᾿ οὐδενός ὅτι ἔστι μονάς ἐγνώσθη˙ ὁ δέ μέγας ἐκεῖνος οὐ τοῦτό φησιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅτι μέν ἔστι μονάς γνώσκεταί τε καί ὑμνεῖται, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τῶν συνεγνωσμένων ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἐναρίθμων μονάδων, αἵ γε οὐδέ μονάδες ἄν κυρίως εἶεν, εἴ γε ἡ μονάς οὐκ ἀριθμός, ὥστε διά τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον ἔγνωσται μονάς καί μόνον, (σελ. 542) ὅ,τι μή δι᾿ ἀριθμοῦ τε καί ἐν ἀριθμοῖς γνωρίζεται˙ ἡ γάρ κυρίως οὐκ ἀριθμός˙ μονάς οὖν ἡ θεότης, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι διεγνωσμένη, καθάπερ καί Γρηγόριος ὁ θεολόγος εἰπών «τήν τοῦ Θεοῦ φύσιν ἄληπτόν τε καί ἀπερίληπτον» εὐθύς ἐπάγει, τῆς τοῦ ρητοῦ διανοίας ἑρμηνεύς γινόμενος˙ «λέγω δέ οὐχ ὅτι ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾿ ἥτις ἐστίν». Ὁ δέ φιλόσοφος οὗτος ἄληπτον ἐπίσης καί ἀναπόδεικτον τίθεται καί τό τί ἐστι καί τό ὅτι ἐστί, καί ἡ σεμνή πρόφασις αὐτῷ τό δι᾿ τἀποδείξεως δεικνύειν ὅτι πάντα τά θεῖα ὑπέρ ἀπόδειξιν. Ἐγώ δέ μικρόν τι περί τούτου πρός αὐτόν εἰπών ἐπί τά προτεθειμένα μετοίσω τόν λόγον.

Οὐ σύ γε αὐτός εἶ ὁ λέγων ἐπ᾿ οὐδενός εἶναι τῶν θείων ἀπόδειξιν; Εἰ τοίνυν ἀποδέδεικταί σοι τό ὑπέρ ἀπόδειξιν, οὐ θεῖον˙ εἰ δέ πρέπον ἐστί τῷ Θεῷ τό πρόσρημα, ἀπόδειξιν οὐκ ἐπιδέξαιτ᾿ἄν˙ σύ δ᾿ οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ὅπως ἄλλοτε ἄλλα λέγεις καί τἀντανία πρός ἄλληλα, οὐ μόνον ἐπί τοῦ ἀποδεδειγμένου θείου, ὡς αὐτός λέγεις, ὑπέρ ἀπόδειξιν, ἀλλά καί ὁπηνίκα τῆς ἐγγινομένης ἀπό τῶν κτισμάτων ἐπί τόν δημιουργόν ἀνόδου μέμνησαι. Τίς γάρ, οὐδέ ἀπό τῶν δημιουργημάτων ἔσται ἀπόδειξις ὅτι ἐστί δημιουργός; Οὐδέ γνωστά ἐστί τινα τῶν ἀοράτων ἀπό τῶν ὁρωμένων; Οὐδέ τόν θεῖον Παῦλον δέξῃ μαρτυροῦντα ὅτι «τά ἀόρατα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀπό κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα καθορᾶται», ἀλλ᾿ ὑπέρ πᾶσαν ἐπαφήν καί γνῶσιν πάντ᾿ ἐρεῖς τά θεῖα;

«Ναί» φησιν, «ἀλλ᾿ ἐμοί περί ὧν ἑκάστου συντίθεμεν συλλογισμῶν κατά τόν ἔξω λόγον ὁ λόγος˙ τά τοιαῦτα δ᾿ ἕκαστος καθ᾿ ἑαυτόν διανοεῖται». Τί οὖν, ἅπερ ἕκαστος καθ᾿ ἑαυτόν διανοεῖται, ταῦτ᾿ οὐχί καί προφέρειν ἔχει διά γλώττης ἤ χειρός διά τοῦ ἔξω λόγου ποιούμενος τήν ὁμιλίαν ἤ συγγράμματα συντάττων, ὥσπερ κἀπί τῶν ἀμέσων καί καθόλου γίνεται προτάσεων; Τούτων γάρ ἡ (σελ. 544) γνῶσις δι᾿ ἐπαγωγῆς διανοητικῶς ἐπισυναγομένη τῇ ψυχῇ πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι, ἀλλά καί πρός τόν ἔξω λόγον φέρεται δι᾿ ἐπαγωγῆς γνωριζομένη πάλιν. Σύ δ᾿ ὅμως καί τοῦτ᾿ ἄν