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you who possess all authority to say whatever you wish, would reveal to us, and you will provide us a marvelous witness for yourself, saying: ‘To conceive God is difficult, but to express it is impossible.’ But if this seems so to you, what is that which, I know not whether for yourself or against yourself, you write as a preface to the Latins, that ‘you say more than you think’? But I, from the works of creation, not only comprehend that there is a creator, but also that He is one, and I comprehend and demonstrate it: for I see that all things required one and the same will and wisdom and power to come into being from non-being: and one will together with wisdom and power belongs to one nature: therefore, our creator God is one by nature.

Again take up your defenses, put forward your Aristotle’s rules, ask your precipitous questions, but wait a little, and we will set these things before you for examination. But now let us see through what arguments he constructs that it is in no way reasonable for God to be called one. ‘By participation,’ he says, ‘He is not, by existence He is not, by causality He is not one: therefore in no way is God one.’ Now then, I think I should pass over participation and existence; for, on the one hand, no one was ignorant that nothing is in God by participation, and on the other, no one has inquired what God is by existence. But as for by causality, how it is not reasonable to call God one, I am unable to perceive, not only how it is not reasonable, but even how he dared to say it, when the saints clearly declare this. But if it is not reasonable to call God one by causality, then He will not be the cause of the one, for He has his appellations from those things of which He is the cause; and if God is not the cause of the one, He is the cause of none of the beings; for by the being of the (p. 546) one, all beings exist, and each of the beings is one either by genus or by species or by number, and not even could each of these in turn be many in their respective difference, if the one did not exist; for the one is the elemental and cohesive and constitutive principle of all things. So that he who is not the cause of the one is the cause of nothing.

‘But if as cause,’ he says, ‘of the one God is one, He is no more one than many, for He is also the cause of the many.’ I therefore pass over saying that the one is not annulled by the many, but the many by the one, and that God, remaining in the one, also brings forth the many, and not only brings them forth, but also knows them, with the unity not being multiplied by the differences in the multitudes; but if God is no more one than many, why do we say one God, and not many gods? And why do we call Him many-named, but do not divide Him along with the names? ‘But I did not say,’ he says, ‘no more one than many, but no more one than not-one.’ If therefore He is, and is not one, He must be many.

‘How then,’ he says, ‘does Dionysius the Great say concerning God that He is neither one?’ But not for the negation of the one, my good sir; for it is his directive not to think that negations are opposed to affirmations in the case of God. But you bring forward ‘not-one’ for the negation of the one, adding that incomparable reason that if He is one by causality, He will not be one by existence, so that he says ‘no more one than not-one.’ What indeed does this ‘by existence’ mean to you, you inescapable dialectician? For if it means simply to be, how will that which is one by causality then in no way be one? For by the very fact of His being, God is established as one beyond the one in beings and as cause of the one in beings, unswervingly, so to speak, giving of Himself and imparting of His own unity by goodness, and being participated in without participation. But if this ‘by existence’ means to you that the (p. 548) one is not the substance of God and for this reason it is not reasonable to call God one, then the sun is not one either, since the one is not its substance; but if the sun is one by participation in the one-itself, it is no more one than not-one, since by existence it is not one.

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ἡμῖν ἐκφήναις, ὁ κτά πᾶσαν ἐξουσίαν ὅ,τι ἄν ἐθέλοις λέγων, καί μάρτυρα ἡμῖν σοι παρέξεις θαυμαστόν λέγοντα˙ «Θεόν νοῆσαι μέν χαλεπόν, φράσαι δέ ἀδύνατον». Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ τοῦθ᾿ οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ, τί τε ἐκεῖνο ὅπερ οὐκ οἶδ᾿ ἤ τοι περί σαυτοῦ ἤ κατά σαυτοῦ προοιμιαζόμενος πρός τούς Λατίνου γράφεις, ὅτι «πλείω λέγεις ἤ νοεῖς»; Ἐγώ δέ οὐ μόνον ὅτι ἔστι δημιουργός κατανοῶ ἐκ τῶν δημιουργημάτων, ἀλλά καί ὅτι εἷς ἐστι καί νοῶ καί ἀποδείκνυμι˙ πάντα γάρ ὁρῶ μιᾶς καί τῆς αὐτῆς βουλήσεως καί σοφίας καί δυνάμεως δεόμενα γενέσθαι ἐκ μή ὄντων˙ μία δέ βούλησις ἅμα καί σοφία καί δύναμις μιᾶς φύσεώς ἐστιν˙ εἷς ἄρα τῇ φύσει ὁ δημιουργός Θεός ἡμῶν.

Πάλιν ἀνάλαβέ σου τά ἀμυντήρια, προβαλοῦ τούς Ἀριστοτέλους τοῦ σοῦ κανόνας, ἐρώτα τάς πεύσεις τάς ἀμφικρήμνους, μικρόν δ᾿ ὅμως μεῖνον καί ταῦτά σοι προθήσομεν εἰς ἐξέτασιν. Νῦν δ᾿ ἴδωμεν διά τίνων κατασκευάζει μηδαμῶς εὔλογον εἶναι τόν Θεόν ἕνα λέγεσθαι. «Κατά μετοχή» φησιν «οὐκ ἔστι, καθ᾿ ὕπαρξιν οὐκ ἔστι, κατ᾿ αἰτίαν οὐκ ἔστιν ἕν˙ κατ᾿ οὐδένα ἄρα τρόπον ἔστιν ὁ Θεός ἕν». Τήν μέν οὖν μετοχήν καί ὕπαρξιν παρεῖναί μοι δοκῶ˙ τό μέν γάρ οὐδείς ἠγνόησεν ὅτι μή κατά μετοχήν ἔστι τι Θεῷ, τό δέ οὐδείς ἐζήτησε τί ἐστι καθ᾿ ὕπαρξιν Θεός. Κατ᾿ αἰτίαν δέ πῶς οὐκ εὔλογον ἕνα τόν Θεόν λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἔχω συνιδεῖν, οὐ μόνον ὅπως οὐκ εὔλογον, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδ᾿ ὅπως ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν, σαφῶς τοῦτο τῶν ἁγίων διαγορευόντων. Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ κατ᾿ αἰτίαν τόν Θεόν ἕν οὐκ εὔλογον εἰπεῖν, οὐδέ τοῦ ἑνός αἴτιος ἔσται, καί γάρ ὧν ἐστιν αἴτιος, ἀπό τούτων ἔχει τάς προσηγορίας˙ εἰ δέ τοῦ ἑνός οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ Θεός αἴτιος, οὐδενός τῶν ὄντων ἐστίν αἴτιος˙ τῷ γάρ εἶναι τό (σελ. 546) ἕν, πάντα ἐστί τά ὄντα, καί τῶν ὄντων ἕκαστον ἕν ἐστιν ἤ γένει ἤ εἴδει ἤ ἀριθμῷ, καί οὐδ᾿ ἄν πολλά ἕκαστον αὖθις τούτων εἴη τῇ κατ᾿ αὐτά διαφορᾷ, εἰ μή τό ἕν εἴη˙ τό γάρ ἕν ἐστι στοιχειωτικόν καί συνεκτικόν καί συστατικόν ἁπάντων. Ὥσθ᾿ ὁ τοῦ ἑνός μή ὤν αἴτιος οὐδενός ἐστιν αἴτιος.

«Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ ὡς αἴτιός» φησι «τοῦ ἑνός ἕν ἐστιν ὁ Θεός, οὐ μᾶλλον ἕν ἤ πολλά, καί γάρ καί τῶν πολλῶν αἴτιος». Παρίημι τοίνυν λέγειν ὡς τοῖς μέν πολλοῖς οὐ συναιρεῖται τό ἕν, τῷ δέ ἑνί τά πολλά, καί ὡς ὁ Θεός ἐν τῷ ἑνί μένων καί τά πολλά προάγει, καί οὐ προάγει μόνον, ἀλλά καί γινώσκει, τοῦ ἑνιαίου μή πληθυνομένου τάς ἐν τοῖς πλήθεσι διαφορᾶς˙ ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μή μᾶλλον ὁ Θεός ἕν ἤ πολλά, διατί εἷς μέν Θεός λέγομεν, πολλοί δέ οὐ λέγομεν; ∆ιατί δέ πολυώνυμον αὐτόν καλοῦμεν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ τοῖς ὀνόμασι συνδιαιροῦμεν; «Ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ εἶπόν» φησιν «οὐ μᾶλλον ἕν ἤ πολλά, ἀλλ᾿ οὐ μᾶλλον ἕν ἤ οὐχ ἕν». Εἰ οὖν ἔστιν, οὐχ ἕν δέ ἐστι, πολλά ἄν εἴη.

«Πῶς οὖν», φησί, «∆ιονύσιος ὁ μέγας περί τοῦ Θεοῦ φησιν ὡς οὔτε ἕν ἐστιν»; Ἀλλ᾿ οὐκ ἐπ᾿ ἀναιρέσει τοῦ ἑνός, ὦ βέλτιστε˙ παράγγελμα γάρ ἐστιν αὐτοῦ μή οἴεσθαι τάς ἀποφάσεις ἀντικειμένας εἶναι ταῖς καταφάσεσιν ἐπί Θεοῦ. Σύ δ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ἀναιρέσει τοῦ ἑνός προφέρεις τό οὐχ ἕν, τήν ἀσυνείκαστον ἐκείνην αἰτίαν προστιθείς ὡς εἰ κατ᾿ αἰτίαν ἔστιν ἕν, καθ᾿ ὕπαρξιν οὐκ ἔσται ἕν, ὥστε φησίν «οὐ μᾶλλον ἕν ἤ οὐχ ἕν». Τί δή σοι βούλεται τό καθ᾿ ὕπαρξιν τοῦτο, ὦ διαλεκτικέ σύ καί ἄφυκτε; Εἰ μέν γάρ τό ἁπλῶς εἶναι, πῶς τό κατ᾿ αἰτίαν ἕν οὐκ ἔσται αὖθις οὐδαμῶς ἕν; Αὐτῷ γάρ τῷ εἶναι ὁ Θεός ἕν ὑπέρ τό ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἕν καί τοῦ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἑνός αἴτιος καθίσταται, ἀκλίτως ἵν᾿ οὕτως εἴπω ἑαυτόν ἐπιδιδούς καί τῆς οἰκείας ἑνότητος ἀγαθότητι μεταδιδούς καί ἀμεθέκτως μετεχόμενος. Εἰ δέ τό καθ᾿ ὕπαρξιν τοῦτό σοι βούλεται ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ τό (σελ. 548) ἕν καί διά τοῦτο οὐκ εὔλογον ἕνα λέγειν τόν Θεόν, οὐδ᾿ ὁ ἥλιος λοιπόν εἷς ἐστιν, ἐπεί οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ τό ἕν οὐσία˙ εἰ δέ κατά μετοχήν τοῦ αὐτοενός εἷς ἐστιν ὁ ἥλιος, οὐ μᾶλλον εἷς ἤ οὐχ εἷς, ἐπεί καθ᾿ ὕπαρξιν οὐκ ἔστιν εἷς.