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The same is true also for all things that partake of the one, and very reasonably so. For if the one-in-itself is no more one than not one, according to your wisdom, much more so all the things that are one by partaking of it; not only in the case of the one, but also of two or three and every numerable thing; for since quantity is never substance, two is no more two than not two; for even if they are two in number, they are not in any case two in existence. So the philosopher has not proved that God is not one, but that the one is not being, if indeed it is no more one than not one, and he has simply done away with all number. This is, so that we may speak according to his own science, a paralogism, the one from ignorance of refutation, which the noble man also uses when theologizing, through which, having sophistically argued, he did away with all number (for it is not one and not one in the same respect), and so one could easily refute that each of the beings is no more being than not being.

Nevertheless, even if he has spoken falsely about all other things—for one sun shines upon us, but several luminaries, and very many stars—yet on his own account he has not spoken falsely; for being one, he is not one in his discourses, but other and contrary to himself. For he who here insists that God is not one in existence, hear what he says above: “What the things said of them in themselves are to other substances, these are for God the things said about him; for it is not possible to be and not to be; if someone then were to ask you,” he says, “are these things which you say are about God without hypostasis or do they partake of some existence? And if this, are they substances (p. 550) or accidents? How will you escape saying also that the divine substance is not demonstrable”?

What then is it that he says? Since everything is either substance or accident, and the things about God are not accidents, they are therefore substances of God; if therefore one should say he knows any of these, he is therefore saying that the substance of God is knowable and demonstrable. He who says that God is nothing in existence, now again says that everything is this in existence, necessarily pushing us toward this by the comprehensiveness of the division, as he at least thinks. It was possible, then, to show that not all beings are comprehended in this division; but even if they are included, it is not thereby necessary that that which is above being should be comprehended in the division of beings; for according to the great Dionysius, God is the hypostasizer of these things, but he himself is not constituted by them, nor do the things about God contribute anything to God's being, nor is his nature knowable, so that it might also have an essential difference, just as Basil the Great also says. For being in the proper sense and pre-existing and being alone and being simply and unitively, he needs no difference in order to be; for those many beings after him need distinction; therefore the things about God are not substances of God, but he himself is the substance of the things about him.

In that he himself is substance, he is both ineffable and incomprehensible, but in that he is the substance of beings, and life of the living, and wisdom of the wise, and simply the being-ness, so to speak, of all who partake of being and of well-being, and a beautifying power, he is also conceived and spoken of and demonstrated, even if not to the extent that he is. And if the things about God also partake of some existence, it is not as substances, nor as without hypostasis, as you yourself deem right, but as being energies of God; but if one were to speak of the results of the energies, some of these are indeed substances, but by no means divine. No, (p. 552) but so that I may omit the multitude of what are called by him divine substances, lest I myself should fall into a multitude of words, if the things said about God are substances of God, and created things are also said to be about God, as one may find in many places of the holy Scripture, the substance of God will be, according to him, created.

And indeed the wise and the good and the light and the life and nearly all that is said about him brought forth through names, how could it be a substance, of the names, if one were to examine,

112

Τό αὐτό δέ καί ἐπί πάντων ὅσα τοῦ ἑνός μετέχει, καί μάλα γε εἰκότως. Εἰ γάρ τό αὐτοέν οὐ μᾶλλον ἕν ἤ οὐχ ἕν κατά τήν σήν σοφίαν, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ὅσα τῷ μετέχειν τούτου ἕν ἐστιν˙ οὐκ ἐπί τοῦ ἑνός δέ μόνον, ἀλλά κἀπί τῶν δύο ἤ τριῶν καί παντός ἀριθμητοῦ˙ τοῦ γάρ ποσοῦ μηδέποτε οὐσίας ὄντος, τά δύο οὐ μᾶλλον δύο ἤ μή δύο˙ καί γάρ εἰ κατ᾿ ἀριθμόν δύο, ἀλλά καθ᾿ ὕπαρξιν οὐ δύο πάντως. Ὥστε οὐ τόν Θεόν οὐχ ἕν ἀπέδειξεν ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἀλλά τό ἕν οὐκ ὄν, εἴπερ οὐ μᾶλλον ἕν ἤ οὐχ ἕν, καί ἁπλῶς πάντα ἀριθμόν ἀνεῖλε. Τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν, ἵνα κατά τήν αὐτοῦ φῶμεν ἐπιστήμην, παραλογισμός, ὁ παρά τήν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν, ᾧ καί θεολογῶν ὁ γεννάδας χρῆται, δι᾿ οὗ καί σοφισάμενος, πάντα ἀριθμόν ἀνεῖλε (οὐ γάρ κατά τό αὐτό ἕν τε καί οὐχ ἕν), ρᾳδίως δ᾿ ἄν οὕτω τις καί ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων μή μᾶλλον ὄν ἤ μή ὄν ἐλέγξειεν.

Οὐ μήν ἀλλ᾿ εἰ καί τῶν ἄλλων πάντων κατεψεύσατο, εἷς γάρ ἐπιλάμπει ἥλιος ἡμᾶς, πλείου δέ φωστῆρες, πλεῖστοι δέ ἀστέρες, ἀλλ᾿ ἑαυτόῦ γε ἕνεκα οὐκ ἔψευσται˙ εἷς γάρ ὤν, οὐχ εἷς ἐστι ταῖς διαλέξεσιν, ἀλλ᾿ ἄλλος καί ἐναντίος ἑαυτῷ. Ὁ γάρ ἐνταῦθα μή καθ᾿ ὕπαρξιν ἕν εἶναι τόν Θεόν ἰσχυριζόμενος, ἀκούσατε τί λέγει ἀνωτέρω˙ «ἅ ἐστι ταῖς ἄλλαις οὐσίαις τά καθ᾿ αὐτό αὐταῖς λεγόμενα, ταῦτα καί τῷ Θεῷ τά περί αὐτόν λεγόμενα ὑπάρχει˙ οὐ γάρ ἐνδέχεται εἶναί τε καί μή˙ εἴ τις οὖν ἔροιτό σε», φησί, «ταῦτα ἅ φῄς περί Θεόν εἶναι ἀνυπόστατά ἐστιν ἤ μετέχει τινός ὑπάρξεως; καί εἰ τοῦτο, οὐσίαι εἰσίν (σελ. 550) ἤ συμβεβηκότα; πῶς ἐκφεύξῃ τό καί μή οὐσίαν θείαν ἀποδεικτήν λέγειν»;

Τί οὖν ἐστιν ὅ φησιν; Ἐπειδή πᾶν ἤ οὐσία ἤ συμβεβηκός, τά δέ περί Θεόν συμβεβηκότα οὔκ εἰσιν, οὐσίαι ἄρα τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰσιν˙ εἰ οὖν τούτων τί τις φαίη γινώσκειν, καί τήν οὐσίαν ἄρα λέγει τοῦ Θεοῦ γνωστήν εἶναι καί ἀποδεκτήν. Ὁ γοῦν μηδέν εἶναι λέγων τόν Θεόν καθ᾿ ὕπαρξιν, πάντα νῦν αὖθις λέγει τοῦτο εἶναι καθ᾿ ὕπαρξιν τῷ συμπεριληπτικῷ τῆς διαιρέσεως ἀναγκαίως πρός τοῦτο συνωθῶν ἡμᾶς ὥς γ᾿ οἴεται. Ἐνῆν μέν οὖν δεῖξαι ὡς οὐδέ τά ὄντα πάντα τῇ διαιρέσει ταύτῃ συμπερικλείεται˙ εἰ δέ καί συμπεριβάλλεται, οὐδ᾿ οὕτως ἀνάγκη τό ὑπέρ τό ὄν συμπεριειλῆφθαι τῇ τῶν ὄντων διαιρέσει˙ ὑποστάτης γάρ κατά τόν μέγα ∆ιονύσιον τούτων ἐστίν ὁ Θεός, ἀλλ᾿ οὐχ ὑπό τούτων συνέστηκεν αὐτός, οὐδέ τι συντελοῦσι τά περί Θεόν εἰς τό εἶναι τό Θεόν, οὐδέ γνωστή ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις, ἵνα καί διαφοράν οὐσιώδη σχοίη, καθά καί Βασίλειος ὁ μέγας λέγει. Κυρίως γάρ ὤν καί προών καί μόνος ὤν καί ἁπλῶς καί ἑνιαίως ὤν, διαφορᾶς οὐδεμιᾶς δεῖται εἰς τό εἶναι˙ τοῖς γάρ μετ᾿ ἐκεῖνον πολλοῖς οὖσι δεῖ διαστολῆς˙ οὔκου οὐσίαι Θεοῦ τά περί τόν Θεόν, ἀλλ᾿ αὐτός ἐστιν οὐσία τῶν περί αὐτόν.

Ἧ μέν ἐστιν αὐτός οὐσία, ἄρρητός τε καί ἀπερινόητος, ᾗ δέ ἐστιν οὐσία τῶν ὄντων, καί ζωή τῶν ζώντων καί σοφία τῶν σοφιζομένων καί ἁπλῶς πάντων τῶν τοῦ εἶναι καί τοῦ εὖ εἶναι μετεχόντων ὀντότης, ἵν᾿ οὕτως εἴπω, καί δύναμις καλλοποιός, καί νοεῖται καί λέγεται καί ἀποδείκνυται, εἰ καί μή ἐφ᾿ ὅσον ἐστίν. Εἰ δέ καί ὑπάρξεώς τινος μετέχει τά περί Θεόν, οὐχ ὡς οὐσίαι, οὐδ᾿ ὡς ἀνυπόστατα, καθάπερ δικαιοῖς αὐτός, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς ἐνέργειαι οὖσαι τοῦ Θεοῦ˙ εἰ δέ τά τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἀποτελέσματά τις εἴποι, καί τούτων οὐσίαι μέν ἔστιν ἅ, θεῖαι δ᾿ οὔμενουν. Οὐ μή, (σελ. 552) ἀλλ᾿ ἵνα τό πλῆθος ἀφῶ τῶνπαρ᾿ αὐτοῦ θείων οὐσιῶν λεγομένων, ὡς μή καί αὐτός πλήθει περιπέσω λόγων, εἰ τά περί Θεόν λεγόμενα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστιν οὐσίαι, περί Θεόν δέ λέγεται καί τά κτίσματα, ὡς πολλαχοῦ τῆς ἱερᾶς εὕροι τις ἄν Γραφῆς, κτιστή ἔσται κατ᾿ αὐτόν ἡ οὐσία τοῦ Θεοῦ.

Καί μήν τό σοφόν καί ἀγαθόν καί τό φῶς καί ἡ ζωή καί ὅσα σχεδόν λέγεται περί αὐτόν δι᾿ ὀνομάτων προαγόμενα, πῶς ἄν οὐσία εἴη, τῶν ὀνομάτων, εἴ τις ἐξετάσειε,