I think I will pass over the things with which you boast, exalting yourself with big words as one having power in arguments. For just as above he was unwittingly affected by things contrary to his own (p. 562) thesis, so too here, wishing to show yourself most skilled in demonstration and theology, you appeared as one of those uninitiated in such matters; for you were shown to be completely ignorant of both the conversion, which most premises of theological syllogisms necessarily have, with some terms being equivalent on account of the utter singularity of the subject, and again of those causes in demonstrations that are simultaneous, albeit in a different manner, and that the lesser of the premises are not lesser, unless they are also lesser in power, and that a demonstration from fewer premises is not simply considered superior, but better than it is the one from more, whenever it has more intelligible premises. Therefore, these things and whatever lies between them, with which you trifle in no trifling matters against yourself, I will pass over; for they would deceive, I think, no ear, and even if they do, it is of no concern to me.

What then would you seem to say? "The demonstrator demonstrates through a middle term, and this a cause; but it is highly erroneous to suppose that there is some cause through which the Spirit is from the Father alone; how then could you posit 'to be by nature from him' as a cause?" This argument, then, shows not only the demonstration, but also your own syllogisms about God, O philosopher, and simply all that exist and will exist, to be non-syllogistic and erroneous; for without a middle term, and this being the cause of the conclusion, there is no sound syllogism; but if the middle term is a middle term only in name, according to you it will be highly erroneous concerning the divine.

But let us leave this. But I ask you, the only sound theologian: we too are from God ("for all things," it says, "are from God"), and the only-begotten is from God; we too are sons of God ("for I said," it says, "you are gods and all sons of the most high"), and the only-begotten is the Son of God; but we are from (p. 564) God and are sons of God the Father, Son, and Spirit; for in these three the most high has been made known to us; and therefore we are from these, but the Son is from the Father alone; is there then some cause for which we are from the tri-hypostatic divinity, but the Son is from the Father alone? If there is not, then we too are from God without a cause; but if it is for a cause, it is the divine goodness, on account of which there is creation and the grace in creatures; and these things are common to the Father, Son, and Spirit; for both to be and to be well are for all from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit; if, therefore, by the grace of God we are from God, that which is not according to grace, yet is from God, we are from God, that which is not according to grace, yet is from God, how else then than by nature? And this "by nature" shows nothing other than that the Father alone is the cause of those things timelessly projected from him; how then is it erroneous to say this? But even if one were to call this "by nature" a cause, this too is not erroneous; for being joined to the Father, it shows that He Himself is the cause, and to the Son and the Holy Spirit, that they themselves are caused; for instance, "why is the Father properly the Father of the Son? Because he is by nature his Father." Similarly for the Son and the Spirit.

Then, it is not the mode of existence, but that of relationship which is shown from this. Therefore it is not erroneous here to speak of a cause "that declares the relationship," "while the mode of existence is kept ineffable," just as the great Basil also writes to the divine Serapion, clarifying for him how the Holy Spirit is said to be from God; thus our own words agree precisely with those who speak in the Spirit about the Spirit. Let these things, then, be so in this regard.

But concerning contact and knowledge, how it occurs in divine matters, we have spoken at the beginning; and he clearly misrepresents the great Dionysius, saying that he says "not even by the shadow of the

Ἅ δή τοὐντεῦθεν αὐχεῖς σαυτόν ἐξαίρων ταῖς μαγαληγορίαις ὡς τό ἐν λόγοις κράτος ἔχοντα, παρεῖναί μοι δοκῶ. Καί γάρ ὥσπερ ἀνωτέρω τἀναντία τῆς οἰκείας (σελ. 562) θέσεως ἔλαθεν παθών, οὕτω δή κἀνταῦθα ἀποδεικτικώτατον ἅμα καί θεολογικώτατον θέλων δεῖξαι σεαυτόν, τῶν περί τά τοιαῦτ᾿ ἀμυήτων εἷς ἐφάνης˙ τήν τε γάρ ἀντιστροφήν, ἥν ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἱ πλείους προτάσεις ἔχουσι τῶν θεολογικῶν συλλογισμῶν, ἔστιν ὧν ἐξισαζόντων ὅρων διά τό μοναδικώτατον τοῦ προκειμένου, καί αὖθις τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν αἰτίων ὅσα ἅμα, εἰ καί τρόπον ἕτερον, ἀγνοῶν παντάπασιν ἐδείχθης, καί ὅτι τά ἐλάττω τῶν αἰτημάτων οὐκ ἐλάττω, ὅταν μή καί δυνάμει ᾖ ἐλάττω, καί ὅτι οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων αἰτημάτων ἀπόδειξις φέρεται τό κρεῖττον, ἀλλά βελτίων αὐτῆς ἡ ἐκ πλειόνων, ὅταιν γνωριμωτέρας ἔχῃ τάς προτάσεις. Ταῦτα μέν οὖν καί ὅσα μεταξύ τούτων ἐν οὐ παικτοῖς παίζεις κατά σεαυτοῦ παρήσω˙ κλέψειεν γάρ ἄν οὐδεμίαν, ὡς οἶμαι, ἀκοήν, κἄν κλέψωσιν, οὐδείς μοι λόγος.

∆ι᾿ ὅδε τί δόξειας ἄν λέγειν; «∆ιά μέσου δείκνυσιν ὁ ἀποδεικτικός, καί τούτου αἰτίου˙ πλημμελές δέ λίαν αἴτιον εἶναι οἴεσθαί τι, δι᾿ ὅ τό Πνεῦμα ἐκ μόνου τοῦ Πατρός˙ πῶς οὖν σύ τό φύσει ἐξ αὐτοῦ εἶναι ὡς αἴτιον ἄν θείης»; Οὗτος μέν οὖν ὁ λόγος οὐ τήν ἀπόδειξιν μόνον, ἀλλά καί τούς σούς, ὦ φιλόσοφε, καί πάντας ἁπλῶς τούς τε ὄντας τούς τε ἐσομένους περί Θεοῦ συλλογισμούς ἀσυλλογίστους δείκνυσι καί πλεμμελεῖς˙ χωρίς γάρ μέσου, καί τούτου τοῦ συμπεράσματος αἰτίου, συλλογισμός οὐκ ἔστιν ἀσφαλής˙ ἄν δέ τό μέσον φερωνύμως ἔχῃ μέσον, κατά σέ λίαν ἔσται περί τό θεῖον πλημμελής.

Ἀλλά τοῦτο μέν ἀφῶμεν. Ἐρωτῶ δέ σε τόν μόνον ἀσφαλῆ θεορρήμονα˙ ἐκ Θεοῦ καί ἡμεῖς («τά γάρ πάντα» φησιν «ἐκ Θεοῦ»), ἐκ Θεοῦ καί ὁ μονογενής˙ υἱοί Θεοῦ καί ἡμεῖς («εἶπα γάρ» φησι «θεοί ἐστε καί υἱοί ὑψίστου πάντες») Υἱός Θεοῦ καί ὁ μονογενής˙ ἀλλ᾿ ἡμεῖς μέν ἐκ (σελ. 564) Θεοῦ τε καί υἱοί Θεοῦ Πατρός, Υἱοῦ καί Πνεύματος˙ ἐν γάρ τοῖς τρισί τούτοις ὁ ὕψιστος ἡμῖν ἐγνώσθη˙ καί τοίνυν ἐκ τούτων μέν ἡμεῖς, ὁ δέ Υἱός ἐκ μόνου τοῦ Πατρός˙ ἔστι δή τι αἴτιον δι᾿ ὅ ἡμεῖς μέν ἐκ τῆς τρισυποστάτου θεότητος, ὁ δέ Υἱός ἐκ μόνου τοῦ Πατρός; Εἰ μέν οὐκ ἔστι, καί ἡμεῖς λοιπόν ἀναιτίως ἐκ Θεοῦ, εἰ δέ δι᾿ αἰτίαν, τήν ἀγαθότητα τήν θείαν δι᾿ ἥν ἡ κτίσις καί ἡ ἐν τοῖς κτίσμασι χάρις˙ ταῦτα δέ κοινά Πατρός, Υἱοῦ καί Πνεύματος˙ τό τε γάρ εἶναι καί τό εὖ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἐκ Πατρός δι᾿ Υἱοῦ ἐν ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι˙ εἰ τοίνυν χάριτι Θεοῦ ἠμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, τό μή κατά χάριν, ὄν δέ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμεῖς ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, τό μή κατά χάριν, ὄν δέ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, πῶς ἄλλως γε ἤ φύσει; Τό δέ φύσει τοῦτο οὐδέν ἕτερόν τι δείκνυσιν ἤ τόν Πατέρα μόνον αἴτιον τῶν ἀχρόνως ἐξ αὐτοῦ προβαλλομένων˙ πῶς οὖν τοῦτο λέγειν πλημμελές; Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ καί τό φύσει τοῦτο αἴτιόν τις εἴποι, οὐδέ τοῦτο πλημμελές˙ τῷ τε γάρ Πατρί συναπτόμενον, ἐκεῖνον αὐτόν δείκνυσι τό αἴτιον, τῷ τε Υἱῷ καί τῷ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι, ταῦτ᾿ αὐτά αἰτιατά˙ οἷον "διατί ὁ Πατήρ, Πατήρ κυρίως τοῦ Υἱοῦ; διότι φύσει ἐστί Πατήρ ἐκείνου". Ἐπί τοῦ Υἱοῦ καί τοῦ Πνεύματος ὁμοίως.

Ἔπειτα οὐδ᾿ ὁ τρόπος τῆς ὑπάρξεως, ἀλλ᾿ ὁ τῆς οἰκειότητος ἐντεῦθεν δεικνύμενός ἐστιν. Οὔκουν πλημελές ἐνταῦθ᾿ αἴτιον «τό τήν οἰκειότητα δηλοῦν» εἰπεῖν, «τοῦ τρόπου τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἀρρήτου φυλαττομένου», καθάπερ καί ὁ μέγας Βασίλειος πρός Σεραπίωνα τόν θεῖον γράφει, διευκρινῶν αὐτῷ πῶς ἐκ Θεοῦ λέγεται τό Πνεῦμα τό ἅγιον˙ οὕτω τοῖς ἐν Πνεύματι λαλοῦσι περί Πνεύματος ἀκριβῶς ὁμολογεῖ τά ἡμέτερα. Ταύτῃ μέν οὖν ταῦτ᾿ ἐχέτω.

Περί δέ ἁφῆς καί ἐπιστήμης, ὅπως ἐπί τῶν θείων γίνεται, εἰρήκαμεν ἀρχόμενοι˙ τοῦ δέ μεγάλου ∆ιονυσίου καταψεύδεται σαφῶς λέγων αὐτόν λέγειν «μηδέ τῇ σκιᾷ τῆς τοῦ