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not even in our case are they indicative of essences but of energies? How then could one say that the names concerning God are His essence, when not even a word could be found to signify that super-essentiality? For as many as are lovers of true reality do not think it right to praise the divine super-essentiality either as word or power or life or essence or goodness, but as transcendently set apart from every name and thing; but since this is the cause of all things, it must be praised from all the effects, since all things are also around it and for its sake, as it seems to the great Dionysius and to the truth and to all its hymnographers from eternity. Since, therefore, all things are around the divine super-essentiality, and those things around it are divine essences according to you, then all things are divine essences according to you.

Furthermore, since not only affirmations, but also negations are among the things concerning God, these too will be divine essences according to you, although they are not naturally suited to declare what He is, but what He is not. But if these are not, although they are more fitting to God than the affirmations concerning God, how then could the affirmations be divine essences? And how are the things concerning Him for God, what the *per se* attributes are for other essences? “Because,” he says, “it is not possible both to be and not to be.” What is this new and paradoxical knowledge of God? For what belongs to something *per se* cannot (p. 554) in any way not be that thing. What do I mean? It belongs *per se* to man to be rational; it is not possible, therefore, for man not to be rational. But of the things said concerning God, life and essence and power, God exists as transcendently set apart from all these things, so He is said by way of pre-eminence not to be these things, and not being these things is more fitting to God and more true than being them; therefore, the things concerning Him are not for God what the *per se* attributes are for other essences. Not only are contradictory opposites said of God at the same time, but also contraries. For He is said to be clothed “with light as with a garment” and to “dwell in unapproachable light,” but also “He made darkness His secret place” and “darkness was under His feet.” But for other essences it is not possible for contraries to be present *per se*; therefore it is among the impossibilities for the things concerning Him to be for God what the *per se* attributes are for others.

Furthermore, of the things concerning God, some are said more, and some less, both in the case of affirmations—for life is said more than breeze—and in the case of negations, though in reverse—for not a breeze is said more than not life; and all negations are more fitting to God than all affirmations. But of the *per se* attributes of other essences, nothing belongs to them more or less, for man is not more animal than rational; since neither is one essence more of an essence than another, nor is one essential property more so than another. And indeed, the *per se* being spoken of in four ways, in no way could the things concerning God be *per se*; for neither is the divine because of them, for it is uncaused, nor are these in the definition that shows what God is, for it is not even permitted to ask at all what God is, nor could the divine be included in their definition, for the divine is beyond conception. (p. 556) And how could they be self-subsistent, as long as they are said of a subject in some way and do not cast off their being 'about' something? And why do we not say that they are *per se* to God, but concerning God? And since Gregory, who is named for theology, says that we know God not from the things in Him, but from the things concerning Him, it will follow according to the philosopher's argument that we know God in the same way as we know other essences; for we know them from their *per se* attributes, and these are for God the things said concerning Him, from which we know Him.

Furthermore, if God knows Himself as He is, and the things concerning God are for Him what the *per se* is for other essences, and we know Him as He is from the things concerning Him, then we also

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μηδ᾿ ἐφ᾿ ἡμῶν οὐσιῶν ἀλλ᾿ ἐνεργειῶν δηλωτικῶν γε ὄντων; Πῶς ἄν οὖν ἐπί Θεοῦ τά ὀνόματα οὐσίαν φαίη τις, ὅπου γε οὐδ᾿ ἄν λόγος εὑρεθείη σημαντικός τῆς ὑπερουσιότητος ἐκείνης; Ὅσοι γάρ τῆς ὄντως ἀληθείας εἰσίν ἐρασταί οὐ θεμιτόν οἴονται ὑμνεῖν τήν ὑπερουσιότητα τήν θεαρχικήν οὔτε ὡς λόγον ἤ δύναμιν ἤ ζωήν ἤ οὐσίαν ἤ ἀγαθότητα, ἀλλ᾿ ὡς παντός ὀνόματός τε καί πράγματος ὑπεροχικῶς ἀφειμένην˙ ἀλλ᾿ ἐπεδήπερ αὕτη πάντων ἐστίν αἰτία, ἐκ πάντων τῶν αἰτιατῶν αὐτήν ὑμνητέον, ἐπεί καί περί αὐτήν πάντα καί αὐτῆς ἕνεκεν, ὡς ∆ιονυσίῳ τε τῷ μεγάλῳ καί τῇ ἀληθείᾳ δοκεῖ καί πᾶσι τοῖς ἐξ αἰῶνος ὑμνολόγοις αὐτῆς. Ἐπεί τοίνυν περί αὐτήν πάντα τήν θεαρχικήν ὑπερουσιότητα, τά δέ περί αὐτήν οὐσίαι θεῖαι κατά σέ, πάντα ἄρα θεῖαι οὐσίαι κατά σέ εἰσιν.

Ἔτι, ἐπεί μή μόνον αἱ θέσεις, ἀλλά καί ἀφαιρέσεις τῶν περί Θεόν εἰσιν, ἔσονται καί αὗται θεῖαι οὐσίαι κατά σέ, καίτοι μή πεφυκυῖαι δηλοῦν ὅ ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾿ ὅ μή ἐστιν. Ἀλλ᾿ εἰ μή αὗται, καίτοι μᾶλλον τῶν περί Θεόν θέσεων ἁρμόττουσαι Θεοῷ, πῶς ἄρ᾿ αἱ θέσεις εἶεν ἄν οὐσίαι θεῖαι; Πῶς δέ καί ἅ ταῖς ἄλλαις οὐσίαις τά καθ᾿ αὑτό, ταῦτα Θεῷ τά περί αὐτόν ἐστιν; «Ἐπεί» φησί «μή ἔστιν εἶναί τε καί μή». Τίς ἡ νέα αὕτη καί παράδοξος θεογνωσία; Τό γάρ καθ᾿ αὑτό τινι ὑπάρχον οὐκ ἔνι (σελ. 554) κατ᾿ ἔνι κατ᾿ οὐδένα τρόπον μή εἶναι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο. Οἷον τί λέγω; Καθ᾿ αὑτό ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τό εἶναι λογικόν˙ οὐκ ἔνι γοῦν τόν ἄνθρωπον μή εἶναι λογικόν. Τῶν δέ περί Θεόν λεγομένων, ζωή τε καί οὐσία καί δύναμις, ἀλλά καί πάντων τούτων ὑπερεξηρημένος ὑπάρχει ὁ Θεός καθ᾿ ὑπεροχήν μή εἶναι ταῦτα λέγεται, καί τοῦ εἶναι ταῦτα τό μή εἶναι θεοπρεστέστερόν τε καί ἀληθέστερον˙ οὐκ ἄρα τῷ Θεῷ τά περί αὐτόν ἅ ταῖς ἄλλαις οὐσίαις τά καθ᾿ αὑτό. Οὐ μόνον δέ τά ἀντιφατικῶς ἀντικείμενα λέγεται ἅμα ἐπί τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀλλά καί τἀναντία˙ «φῶς γάρ ὡς ἱμάτιον» λέγεται περιβλῆσθαι καί «φῶς οἰκεῖν ἀπρόσιτον», ἀλλά καί «ἔθετο σκότος ἀποκρυφήν αὐτοῦ» καί «γνόφος ὑπό τούς πόδας αὐτοῦ»˙ ταῖς δέ ἄλλαις οὐσίαις οὐκ ἔνι καθ᾿ αὐτό τά ἐναντία εἶναι˙ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄρ᾿ εἶναι τῷ Θεῷ τά περί αὐτόν ἅ τά καθ᾿ αὑτό τοῖς ἄλλοις.

Ἔτι τῶν περί τόν Θεόν τά μέν μᾶλλον λέγεται, τά δ᾿ ἧττον, καί ἐπί τῶν θέσεων, μᾶλλον γάρ ζωή ἤ αὔρα, καί ἐπί τῶν ἀφαιρέσεων, εἰ καί ἀντεστραμμένως, μᾶλλον γάρ οὐκ αὔρα ἤ οὐχί ζωή˙ καί αἱ ἀφαιρέσεις δέ πᾶσαι τῶν θέσεων πασῶν μᾶλλον προσήκουσι Θεῷ. Τῶν δέ καθ᾿ αὑτό ταῖς ἄλλαις οὐσίαις οὐδέν μᾶλλον καί ἧττον πρόσεστιν αὐταῖς, οὐδέ γάρ μᾶλλον ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῶον ἤ λογικόν˙ ἐπεί γάρ οὐδ᾿ οὐσία μᾶλλον οὐσίας οὐδ᾿ οὐσιῶδες ἕτερον ἑτέρου μᾶλλον. Καί μέν δή τετραχῶς τοῦ καθ᾿ αὑτό λεγομένου, καί οὐδένα τρόπον τά περί Θεόν ἄν εἴη καθ᾿ αὑτό˙ οὔτε γάρ δι᾿ αὐτά τό θεῖον, καί γάρ ἀναίτιον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ταῦτα τῷ τί ἐστι Θεός, δεικνύντι, καί γάρ οὐδ᾿ ἐφεῖται ζητεῖν ὅλως τί ἐστι Θεός, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ τό θεῖον ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἄν αὐτῶν ληφθείη, καί γάρ ὑπέρ ἔννοιαν τό θεῖον. (σελ. 556) Αὐθυπόστατα δέ πῶς ἄν εἴη, μέχρις ἄν καθ᾿ ὑποκειμένου πως λέγοιτο καί τό εἶναι περί τι μή ἀποβάλλοι; ∆ιατί δέ καί μή καθ᾿ αὑτό αὐτά φαμεν Θεῷ ἀλλά περί Θεόν; Ἐπεί δέ καί Γρηγόριος ὁ τῆς θεολογίας ἐπώνυμος οὐκ ἐκ τῶν κατ᾿ αὐτόν, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκ τῶν περί αὐτῶν φησι γινώσκειν τόν Θεόν ἡμᾶς, συμβήσεται κατά τόν τοῦ φιλοσόφου λόγον οὕτω γινώσκειν ἡμᾶς τόν Θεόν, ὡς καί τάς ἄλλας οὐσίας γινώσκομεν˙ ἐκ γάρ τῶν καθ᾿ αὑτό αὐταῖς ὑπαρχόντων γινώσκομεν αὐτάς, ταῦτα δέ Θεῷ τά περί αὐτόν ἐστι λεγόμενα ἐξ ὧν αὐτόν γινώσκομεν.

Ἔτι, εἰ ὁ Θεός γινώσκει ἑαυτόν ᾗ ἐστι, τά δέ περί Θεόν αὐτῷ ἐστιν ἅ ταῖς ἄλλαις οὐσίαις τό καθ᾿ αὑτό, ἡμεῖς δ᾿ ἐκ τῶν περί αὐτόν γινώσκομεν αὐτόν ᾗ ἐστι, καί ἡμεῖς