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those who have emulated? For one ought to have done the very opposite; to greatly admire the one group, as leaping over the hurdles of nature, and to grant some pardon to the other, 12.38 as being dragged down by their innate passions. For that these things are very difficult, you also know; "For not from an oak," according to the poetic saying, "or from a pine" have you been born. Plato also made this clear in the first dialogue of the *Republic*, when he introduced Cephalus conversing with Socrates and saying: "Know well that, for my part, as the other pleasures of the body fade away, so much do the desires 12.39 and pleasures of discourse grow." Then when Socrates asked if the passion for pleasures still rose up against him, he replied and said: "Hush, man; most gladly have I escaped from them, as from a raging and savage master." Here, then, concerning shameful pleasure he has related such things; but in the *Gorgias* concerning justice 12.40 and injustice he speaks thus: "For it is difficult, O Callicles, and worthy of much praise, for one who has great power to do wrong, to live justly; and few such men there are. Since both here and elsewhere there have been, and I think there will be, men who are good and honorable in this virtue, of justly administering whatever 12.41 one entrusts to them." And again: "But among so many arguments which have been tested, this one alone stands firm, that one must be more cautious of doing wrong than of suffering wrong, and that a man must practice above all not seeming to be good, but being good, both 12.42 in private and in public." And again Socrates offered these words to Crito; for after many others he added these things also: "In no way, then, must one do wrong. {-} Nor, then, when wronged, must one do wrong in return, as the many think, since in no way must one do wrong. {-} What then? Must one do evil, Crito, or not? {-} Surely one must not, Socrates. {-} But must one do evil in return for suffering evil, as the many say? Is it just or unjust? {-} In no way. {-} For doing evil to men in no way differs from doing wrong. {-} You speak well. {-} Therefore, one must neither do wrong in return, nor do evil to any man, no matter what one may suffer from them." Such, then, was the teaching about injustice and justice that Socrates and 12.43 Plato made, truly praiseworthy and rational and consistent with human nature; for nature has taught all men ethical lessons. For the creator, having fashioned the race of men, implanted in their nature the discernment of good things and their opposites. Hence not only Socrates and Plato and Aristides the son of Lysimachus and certain others of the Greeks abhorred the unjust life, but also many of the barbarians. 12.44 For Hellanicus in his histories said that the Hyperboreans live beyond the Riphean mountains, and practice justice, not eating meat, but using fruits. And others record that the Brahmans live in the forests, covering their bodies with leaves. 12.45 And they say that Anacharsis the Scythian was a philosopher; and the love of philosophy so inflamed him, that he became most renowned and famous among all. For not only when awake did he struggle against the passions of the soul, but even when asleep he showed signs of self-control; for he was accustomed to hold his genitals with his left hand, and to hold his lips together with his right, somehow indicating by this that the struggle of the tongue is much greater 12.46 and requires greater assistance for its security. And Hermippus of Berytus says that Chiron 12.46 the Centaur was a teacher of justice, and Homer called him "the most just of the Centaurs." Therefore, it is not at all fitting to marvel at Hesiod, who says the path of virtue is rough and steep and difficult to travel, nor at Simonides, who said that "virtue dwells on precipitous 12.47 rocks." For what Homer testified about Chiron and the Hippemolgi, and what Anacharsis the Scythian pursued in deed, these things the lauded poets recommended in word. And Antisthenes the Cynic—and he too was a Socratic—of the

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ἐζηλωκότας; Πᾶν γὰρ τοὐναντίον ἔδει ποιεῖν· τοὺς μὲν ἄγαν θαυμάζειν ὡς ὑπεραλλο μένους τὰ τῆς φύσεως σκάμματα, τοῖς δὲ νέμειν τινὰ ξυγγνώμην, 12.38 ὡς ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμφύτων κατασυρομένοις παθῶν. Ὅτι γὰρ δὴ ταῦτα παγχάλεπα, ἴστε καὶ ὑμεῖς· "Οὐ γὰρ ἐκ δρυός", κατὰ τὸν ποιητικὸν λόγον, "ἢ ἀπὸ πεύκης" γεγένησθε. ∆εδήλωκε δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐν τῷ τῆς Πολιτείας πρώτῳ διαλόγῳ, τὸν Κέφαλον εἰσαγαγὼν τῷ Σωκράτει διαλεγόμενον καὶ λέγοντα· "Εὖ ἴσθι, ὅτι ἔμοιγε ὅσον αἱ ἄλλαι αἱ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα ἡδοναὶ ἀπομαραίνονται, τοσοῦτον αὔξονται αἱ περὶ τοὺς λόγους ἐπιθυμίαι 12.39 τε καὶ ἡδοναί." Εἶτα πυθομένου τοῦ Σωκράτους, εἰ ἔτι τὸ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἐπανίσταται πάθος, ὑπολαβὼν ἔφη· "Εὐφήμει ἄνθρωπε· ἀσμενέστατα μέντοι αὐτὰ ἀπέφυγον, ὥσπερ λυττῶντά τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἀποφυγών." Ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν περὶ τῆς αἰσχρᾶς ἡδονῆς τοιαῦτα διεξελήλυθεν· ἐν δὲ τῷ Γοργίᾳ περὶ δικαιοσύνης 12.40 καὶ ἀδικίας ὧδέ φησιν· "Χαλεπὸν γάρ, ὦ Καλλίκλεις, καὶ πολλοῦ ἐπαίνου ἄξιον, ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐξουσίᾳ γενόμενον τοῦ ἀδικεῖν, δικαίως διαβιῶναι· ὀλίγοι δὲ γίνονται οἱ τοιοῦτοι. Ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἄλλοθι γεγόνασιν, οἶμαι δὲ ἔσονται καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ ταύτην τὴν ἀρετήν, ἤν τοι δικαίως διαχειρίζωσιν, ἃ ἄν τις ἐπι 12.41 τρέπῃ." Καὶ αὖ πάλιν· "Ἀλλ' ἐν τοσούτοις λόγοις πολλῶν ἐλεγχομένων, μόνος οὗτος ἠρεμεῖ ὁ λόγος, ὡς εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, καὶ παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀνδρὶ μελετητέον οὐ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ 12.42 ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ." Καὶ τούτους δὲ πάλιν τοὺς λόγους ὁ Σωκρά της τῷ Κρίτωνι προσενήνοχε· μετὰ γὰρ πολλοὺς ἑτέρους καὶ τάδε προστέθεικεν· "Οὐδαμῶς ἄρα δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. {-} Οὐδὲ ἀδι κούμενον ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ οἴονται, ἐπειδήπερ οὐδα μῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν. {-} Τί δὲ δή; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὦ Κρίτων, ἢ οὔ; {-} Οὐ δεῖ δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες. {-} ∆εῖ δὲ ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ πολλοί φασι; δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον; {-} Οὐδαμῶς. {-} Τὸ γάρ που κακὸν ποιεῖν ἀνθρώποις τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὐδὲν διαφέρει. {-} Καλῶς λέγεις. {-} Οὔτε οὖν ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα ἀνθρώπων, οὐδ' ἂν ὁτιοῦν πάσχῃ τις ὑπ' αὐτῶν." Τοιαύτην μὲν οὖν ἀδικίας πέρι καὶ δικαιοσύνης Σωκράτης καὶ 12.43 Πλάτων διδασκαλίαν ἐποιησάτην, ἀξιέπαινον ἀληθῶς καὶ λογικὴν καὶ τῇ φύσει τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ξυμβαίνουσαν· τὰ γὰρ ἠθικὰ μαθή ματα πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἡ φύσις ἐπαίδευσεν. ∆ιαπλάσας γάρ τοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ γένος ὁ ποιητὴς ἐντέθεικε τῇ φύσει τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐναντίων διάγνωσιν. Ὅθεν οὐ μόνον Σω κράτης καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὸν ἄδικον ἐβδελύξαντο βίον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν βαρ βάρων πολλοί. 12.44 Καὶ γὰρ Ἑλλάνικος ἐν ταῖς ἱστορίαις ἔφη τοὺς Ὑπερβορέους οἰκεῖν μὲν ὑπὲρ τὰ Ῥίπαια ὄρη, ἀσκεῖν δὲ δικαιοσύνην, μὴ κρη φαγοῦντας, ἀλλ' ἀκροδρύοις χρωμένους. Καὶ τοὺς Βραχμᾶνας ἱστοροῦσιν ἕτεροι ἐν ταῖς ὕλαις διάγειν, φύλλοις τὸ σῶμα 12.45 καλύπτοντας. Καὶ Ἀνάχαρσιν δὲ τὸν Σκύθην φιλόσοφον γεγε νῆσθαί φασιν· οὕτως δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπυρπόλησεν ἔρως, ὡς ὀνομαστότατον γενέσθαι καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀοίδιμον. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐγρηγορὼς πρὸς τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἠγωνίζετο πάθη, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθεύδων τὰ τῆς ἐγκρατείας παρεδήλου σημεῖα· εἰώθει γὰρ τῇ μὲν λαιᾷ τὰ αἰδοῖα κατέχειν, τῇ δεξιᾷ δὲ τὰ χείλη ξυνέχειν, ταύτῃ πῃ δηλῶν, ὡς πολλῷ μείζων ἐστὶν ἡ ἀγωνία τῆς γλώττης 12.46 καὶ μείζονος ἐπικουρίας εἰς ἀσφάλειαν δεῖται. Καὶ Χείρωνα δὲ 12.46 τὸν Κένταυρον Ἕρμιππός φησιν ὁ Βηρύτιος δικαιοσύνης γενέσθαι διδάσκαλον, καὶ Ὅμηρος δὲ αὐτὸν "δικαιότατον τῶν Κενταύ ρων" ἐκάλεσεν. Οὐ τοίνυν μάλα προσήκει θαυμάζειν οὔτε Ἡσίοδον, τραχεῖαν λέγοντα τῆς ἀρετῆς τὴν ὁδὸν καὶ προσάντη καὶ δύσβατον, οὔτε Σιμωνίδην "τὰν ἀρετὰν" εἰρηκότα "ναίειν δυσβάτοις ἐπὶ 12.47 πέτραις." Ἃ γὰρ δὴ τῷ Χείρωνι καὶ τοῖς Ἱππημολγοῖς προσεμαρτύρησεν Ὅμηρος, καὶ ἅπερ Ἀνάχαρσις ἔργῳ μετῆλθεν ὁ Σκύθης, ταῦτα λόγῳ παρῄνεσαν οἱ ἐπαινούμενοι ποιηταί. Καὶ Ἀντισθένης δὲ ὁ Κυνικὸς-Σωκρατικὸς δὲ καὶ οὗτος-τοῦ