ARTICLE X

In the Tenth Article We Ask: CAN ONE KNOW THAT HE HAS CHARITY?

Difficulties:

It seems that he can, for

1. What is seen through its essence is perceived with greatest certainty. But, as Augustine says, charity is seen through its essence by him who has it. Therefore, charity is perceived by him who possesses it.

2. Charity causes pleasure principally in its acts. But habits of the moral virtues are perceived through the pleasures which they cause in acts of the virtues, as is clear from what the Philosopher says. Therefore, charity is perceived by one who has it.

3. Augustine says: "One knows the love by which he loves better than the brother whom he loves." But he knows with greatest certainty that the brother whom he loves exists. Therefore, he also knows with greatest certainty that the love with which he loves exists within him.

4. The attraction of charity is stronger than that of any other virtue. But one is certain that he has other virtues in himself because he has an inclination to their acts. For it is hard for one who has the habit of justice to do what is unjust, but easy to do what is just, as is said in the Ethics. And anyone can perceive this facility within him. Therefore, he can also perceive that he has charity.

5. The Philosopher says that it is impossible for us to have the most noble habits and for them to be hidden from us. But charity is the most noble habit. Therefore, it would be inconsistent to say that one who has charity does not know that he has it.

6. Grace is spiritual light. But this light is perceived with greatest certainty by those who are bathed in it. Therefore, those who have grace perceive with greatest certainty that they have it. The same should be said for charity, without which one does not have grace.

7. According to Augustine, no one can love something which he does not know. But one loves the charity within him. Therefore, he knows that charity exists in him.

8. The unction [of God] teaches all that is necessary for salvation. But to have charity is necessary for salvation. Therefore, one who has charity knows that he has it.

9. The Philosopher says: "Virtue is more certain than any art." But one who has an art knows that he has it. So, also, when one has a virtue, and, thus, when one has charity, which is the greatest of the virtues, he knows that he has it.

To the Contrary:

1'. Ecclesiastes (9:1) reads: "Yet man knoweth not whether he be worthy of love or hatred." But he who has charity is worthy of divine love according to Proverbs (8:17): "I love them that love me." Therefore, no one knows that he has charity.

2'. No one can know with certainty when God comes to dwell in him. Job (9:11) says: "If he come to me, I shall not see him." But God dwells in man through charity, for the first Epistle of St. John (4:16) says: "He that abideth in charity, abideth in God and God in him." Therefore, no one can know with certainty that he has charity.

REPLY:

One who has charity can surmise that he has charity from probable signs, as when he sees that he is ready to undertake spiritual works, and that he effectively hates evil, as also through other things of this sort which charity effects in a man. But one cannot know with certainty that he has charity unless it be revealed to him by God.

The reason for this, as is clear from what has been said earlier, is that the knowledge by which one knows that he has a habit presupposes the knowledge by which he knows what the habit is. What a habit is, however, cannot be known unless one bases his judgment about it upon that to which that habit is ordained, which is the measure of that habit.

But that to which charity is ordained cannot be comprehended, because its immediate object and end is God, the highest good, to whom charity unites us. Hence, one cannot know from the act of love which he perceives within him whether he has reached the stage where he is united to God in the way which is needed for the nature of charity.

Answers to Difficulties:

1. Charity is seen through its essence, in so far as through its essence it is the source of the act of love, in which both are known. Thus, through its essence, also, it is a source of its knowledge, although a remote source. Nevertheless, it is not necessary that it be perceived with certainty, for the act of love which we perceive in ourselves, in so far as it is perceptible, is not an adequate indication of charity because of the similarity between natural love and infused love.

2. The pleasure which remains in an act by reason of charity can also be caused by some acquired habit. Therefore, it is not a sufficient indication to show that charity is present because we do not perceive a thing with certainty from common marks.

3. Although the mind knows most certainly the love with which it loves a brother, in so far as it is love, it does not know as certainly that it is charity.

4. Although the inclination with which charity tends to action is a source of perceiving charity, it is not enough for perfect perception of charity. For no one can perceive that he has a given habit unless he knows perfectly that to which the habit is ordained, for it is through this that he judges about the habit. In charity this cannot be known.

5. The Philosopher is speaking of habits of the intellective part, which, if they are perfect, cannot be concealed from those who have them, because certainty belongs to their perfection: Hence, anyone who knows, knows that he knows, since to know is to perceive the cause of a thing, that it is the cause of it, and that it cannot be otherwise. Similarly, one who has the habit of the understanding of principles knows that he has that habit. But the perfection of charity does not consist in certitude of knowledge but in strength of affection. Therefore, the case is not the same.

6. When we are speaking metaphorically, we should not apply the likeness to every detail. Thus, grace is not compared to light in so far as it plainly pours itself out on spiritual vision as physical light does on bodily vision. Rather, the comparison lies in this, that grace is the source of spiritual life as light of the heavenly bodies is a source of bodily life in things here below, as Dionysius says. This holds also for other likenesses.

7. "To have charity" can be understood in two ways. In one it has the force of a statement; in the other, the force of a term. It has the force of a statement, for instance, when one says: "It is true that someone has charity." It is used with the force of a term when we predicate something about the phrase "to have charity" or about its meaning.

However, it does not belong to the affections to join or divide, but only to be drawn to things themselves, for good and evil are its conditions. Therefore, when one says: "I love," or "I want to have charity," the phrase "to have charity" is taken in the sense of a term, as though I said: "This is what I want, to have charity." Now, nothing prevents us from knowing this. For I know what it is to have charity, even if I do not have it. Thus, even one who does not have charity desires to have charity. Nevertheless, it does not follow that one knows that he has charity, taking this with the force of a statement, affirming that he does have charity.

8. Although it is necessary to have charity to be saved, it is not necessary to know that one has charity. In fact, it is generally more advantageous not to know, because thus solicitude and humility are preserved. The saying, "The unction of God teaches all that is needed for salvation," should be understood as referring to all that has to be known for salvation.

9. Virtue is more certain than any art with the certainty of tendency to one thing, but not with the certainty of knowledge. For virtue, as Cicero says, tends to one thing in the manner of a nature. But nature reaches a single end more surely and more directly than art does. It is in this sense, too, that virtue is said to be more certain than art, and not in the sense that one perceives virtue in himself more surely than art.