LECTURE 6 (254 a 3-b 6)

IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT SOME THINGS ARE ALWAYS AT REST AND ALL OTHER THINGS ARE ALWAYS MOVED

1014. After rejecting two parts of the above division, he here rejects the third part, namely, that it would be possible to say that beings are divided into only two dispositions such that some things are always at rest and others are always moved, and that there is no third genus of beings which sometimes are moved and sometimes are at rest.

             He rejects this in two ways.

             First he rejects this, just as he did the two previous positions, because it is repugnant to the senses. For not only do we see by the senses that certain things are moved (by which he destroyed the first position that everything is always at rest), and that certain things are at rest (by which he destroyed the second position that everything is always moved), but we also see that mutations or variations from motion to rest and from rest to motion occur in the same things. From this it is clear that there are some things which are sometimes moved and sometimes at rest.

             1015. Secondly, where he says, 'We may further point out . . .' (254 a 7), he disproves the same thing by showing that those who introduce this difficulty are opposing things which are clear in nature.

             First he discusses the motion of increase. We see the motion of increase in things which were not always increased. Otherwise, if they were always increased, the increase would not be to a determined quantity, but to infinity.

             Secondly, he discusses violent local motion. Motion is not violent unless a thing which previously was at rest according to its nature is moved contrary to its nature. For motion is not violent unless there is a recession from natural rest. If, then, nothing which is at rest can be moved, it follows that that which is naturally at rest cannot be moved later by violence.

             Thirdly, generation and corruption are destroyed by this position. For generation is a mutation from non-being to being, while corruption is from being to non-being. In order for a thing to be corrupted, it must previously have been a being for some time. And in order for a thing to be generated, it must previously have been non-being for some time. However, that which is being or non-being for some time is at rest (we are speaking of rest in the broad sense). If, then, nothing at rest can be moved, it follows that nothing which is not for some time can be generated, and nothing which is for some time can be corrupted.

             Fourthly, this position universally destroys every motion. For in every motion there is generation and corruption, either simply or in a qualified sense. For that which is moved to something as to a terminus is generated 'this' in respect to the motions of alteration and increase, or it is generated 'in this' in respect to local motion. For example, that which is moved from black to white, or from small to large, becomes white or large, and that which is moved to some place comes to exist in that place. But when a thing is changed from something as from a terminus from which, either a 'this' is corrupted, as in the motion of alteration and increase, for example, black or small, or else a 'from here' is corrupted, as in local motion. Since, then, in every motion there is generation and corruption, then when the above position denies generation and corruption, it consequently denies all motion.

             Therefore, since the things which have been said are impossible, it becomes clear that some things are moved, not always, but sometimes, and some things are at rest, not always, but sometimes.

             1016. Next where he says, 'We have now to take . . .' (254 a 15), he investigates the other two alternatives of the above division.

             First he explains his intention. Secondly, he develops this intention, where he says, 'Now of things that cause motion . . .' (254 b 7).

             Concerning the first part he makes three points. First he shows to what position the fourth alternative pertains. Secondly, where he says, 'We must take our start . . .' (254 a 16), he summarizes what was said in this chapter. Thirdly, where he says, 'It remains, then . . .' (254 b 3), he shows what remains to be said.

             He says, therefore, first that to hold that all things are sometimes at rest and sometimes moved pertains to the ancient arguments which we discussed when we treated the eternity of motion. Especially Empedocles seems to have held that all things are at one time moved under the rule of friendship and strife and in the other intermediate times they are at rest.

             1017. Next where he says, 'We must take our start . . .' (254 a 16), he summarizes what was said in this chapter.

             First he summarizes the division given above. Secondly, where he says, 'Now we have said . . .' (254 a 23), he summarizes the refutation of the first part in which it was held that all things are always at rest. Thirdly, where he says, 'It is likewise impossible . . .' (254 a 33), he summarizes the refutation of the other two alternatives.

             He says, therefore, first that in order for his intention to be made more clear in the following, we ought to start with those things which we have just determined, and take the same beginning as before; namely, beings must first of all exist in one of these three dispositions: either all things are at rest, or all are moved, or some are at rest and some are moved.

             And this third alternative is again divided into three. For if some of the things which exist are at rest and some are moved, then it must be that either all things are such that they are sometimes at rest and sometimes moved, or certain things are always at rest and certain things always moved, or else a third alternative is added to these two; namely, there are some things which are sometimes at rest, but not always, and other things which are sometimes moved, but not always.

             1018. Next where he says, 'Now we have said . . .' (254 a 23), he disproves the first alternative.

             He says that it was asserted above that it is not possible for all things to be always at rest. But something must here be added to this. He says two things against this position.

             First he says that it is necessary to posit some motion at least in the soul. For someone might wish to say that it is true that nothing is moved. This is what the followers of Melissus held, saying that being is infinite and immobile. But this does not seem to be so according to the senses. Rather many beings are moved, as the senses judge.

             If, therefore, someone were to say that the opinion which holds that something is moved is false, it follows that motion exists. For if there is false opinion, there is motion. And universally if opinion exists, motion exists. Similarly, if fantasy exists, motion exists.

             This is so because a fantasy is a motion of the sensitive part which is made by a sense in act. And opinion is a motion of reason which proceeds from reasoning. And it still more clearly follows that there is motion in opinion or fantasy, if at one time something seems to us to be so and at another time not. This happens when things seem to us to be sometimes at rest and sometimes not. Therefore, it absolutely follows that motion exists.

             Secondly, against this opinion he says that to attempt to destroy this opinion and to seek an argument to prove those things which we ought to hold in greater dignity than to say that they need proof (for they are per se obvious) is to judge poorly in distinguishing between better and worse in morals, between the credible and the incredible in logic, and between principles and non-principles in demonstrations.

             For he who searches for an argument to prove things which are per se obvious, and thus are principles, does not know that they are principles while he intends to prove them through other principles. Similarly, it seems that he does not know how to recognize what is credible and incredible. For what is credible per se he intends to prove through another as if it were not credible per se. Nor does he seem capable of distinguishing between better and worse, because the more obvious he proves through the less obvious. Now it is obvious per se that some things are moved. Therefore, we should not try to prove this with arguments.

             1019. Next where he says, 'It is likewise impossible . . .' (254 a 33), he rejects the two other alternatives of the foregoing division.

             He says that just as it is impossible for all things to be always at rest, so too it is impossible for all things to be always moved, or for some things to be always moved and others to be always at rest so that there is nothing which is sometimes moved and sometimes at rest. Against all of these it is sufficient to ground our belief on one thing; namely, we see that certain things are sometimes moved and sometimes at rest. From this it is clear that it is impossible to say that all things are continually at rest, which was the first alternative, or that all things are continually moved, which was the second alternative, or that certain things are always moved and others are always at rest, and there is no intermediary.

             1020. Next where he says, 'It remains, then . . .' (254 b 3), he shows what remains to be said. He concludes from the foregoing that since three alternatives of the above division cannot stand, it remains to be considered which of the other two is truer, whether, namely, all things can be moved and be at rest, or whether certain things can be moved and be at rest while there are some things which are always at rest and some which are always moved. This last is what we intend to demonstrate. For thus it will be shown that the first motion is eternal and the first mover is immobile.