117

uttering a particle, but that a certain correctness of names exists by nature, and is the same for all, both Greeks and barbarians.” 11.6.3 And proceeding next he says: “Will you not then in this way consider both the lawgiver here and the one among the barbarians, as long as he renders the proper form of the name for each thing in whatever syllables, to be in no way an inferior lawgiver, whether here or anywhere else.” 11.6.4 Then next again, after saying that the one who has knowledge of the correctness of names is a dialectician and a lawgiver, he speaks thus: “It is the work of a carpenter, then, to make a rudder with a pilot supervising, if the rudder is to be a good one. It appears so. 11.6.5 But it is for a lawgiver, as it seems, to make a name, having a dialectician as a supervisor, if a name is to be well given. That is so. It seems then, O Hermogenes, that it is not a trivial matter, as you think, the giving of a name, nor the work of trivial men, nor of the first to come along. And Cratylus speaks the truth, saying that names belong to things by nature, and that not everyone is a craftsman of names, but only that man who looks to the name that by nature belongs to each thing and is able to put its form into letters and syllables.” 11.6.6 Having said so much after very many things, he again makes mention of barbarians and then expressly confesses that most names have come to the Greeks from barbarians, saying in these very words: 11.6.7 “I observe that the Greeks have taken many names from the barbarians, especially those living among barbarians. What then? If someone should investigate these according to the Greek language to see how fittingly they are given, and not according to that one from which the name happens to come, you know that he would be at a loss. Naturally.” 11.6.8 So says Plato. But Moses anticipates him, who, being as he was a wise lawgiver and at the same time a dialectician, hear what he says: “And God formed out of the ground all the beasts of the field and all the birds of the air and brought them to Adam, to see what he would call them. and whatever 11.6.9 Adam called each living soul, that was its name.” For by saying “that was its name,” what else does he show than that the names were given according to nature? For he says that what was just now named was also contained long before in nature, and that this name both existed and preexisted for each of the things named, which the man indicated, having been divinely inspired 11.6.10 by a greater power, has established. And the name Adam itself, being a Hebrew name, in Moses would be the eponym of the earth-born man, because among the Hebrews the earth is called Adam, from which the first earth-born man is etymologically 11.6.11 called Adam by Moses. The name could also have another meaning, if interpreted as ‘red’ and indicating the nature of the body, but the earthy and of the earth and earth-born or the bodily and 11.6.12 fleshly man he designated by the appellation of Adam. But the children of the Hebrews also call man by another name, naming him Enos, which they say is the rational principle in us, being different in nature from the earthy Adam. And Enos also contains a fitting meaning, forgetful 11.6.13 when interpreted in the Greek tongue. And such is the nature of the rational principle in us on account of its entanglement with the mortal and irrational. For the rational principle that is entirely pure and incorporeal and divine has not only the memory of things that have happened before, but also through its supreme excellence of contemplation has embraced the knowledge of things that are to be. But that which is compressed in flesh and pierced through with bones and sinews and weighed down by the body, a great and heavy mass, the wise man among the Hebrews, perceiving its great forgetfulness and ignorance, has called it with a well-aimed appellation, naming it Enos, which 11.6.14 signifies the forgetful one. At any rate, it is found in a certain prophet: “‘What is man, that you are mindful of him? or the son of man, that you visit him?’” in place of which the Hebrew, for the first name of man, has included ‘Enos,’ as if it said more clearly: What

117

μόριον ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι, ἀλλ' ὀρθότητά τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων πεφυκέναι καὶ Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασι.» 11.6.3 Καὶ προϊὼν ἑξῆς φησιν· «Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀξιώσεις καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην τόν τε ἐνθάδε καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἕως ἂν τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος ἀποδιδῷ τὸ προσῆκον ἑκάστῳ ἐν ὁποιαισοῦν συλλαβαῖς, οὐδὲν χείρω νομοθέτην εἶναι τὸν ἐνθάδε ἢ τὸν ὁπουοῦν ἄλλοθι.» 11.6.4 Εἶθ' ἑξῆς πάλιν τὸν ἐπιστήμονα τῆς ὀρθότητος τῶν ὀνομάτων διαλεκτικὸν εἶναι φήσας καὶ νομοθέτην οὕτω λέγει· «Τέκτονος μὲν ἄρα ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ποιῆσαι πηδάλιον ἐπιστατοῦντος κυβερνήτου, εἰ μέλλει καλὸν εἶναι τὸ πηδάλιον. Φαίνεται. 11.6.5 Νομοθέτου δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὄνομα, ἐπιστάτην ἔχοντος διαλεκτικὸν ἄνδρα, εἰ μέλλει καλῶς ὄνομα τεθήσεσθαι. Ἔστι ταῦτα. Κινδυνεύει ἄρα, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, εἶναι οὐ φαῦλον, ὡς σὺ οἴει, ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος θέσις οὐδὲ φαύλων ἀνδρῶν οὐδὲ τῶν ἐπιτυχόντων. καὶ Κρατύλος ἀληθῆ λέγει, λέγων φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐ πάντα δημιουργὸν ὀνομάτων εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸν ἀποβλέποντα εἰς τὸ τῇ φύσει ὄνομα ὂν ἑκάστῳ καὶ δυνάμενον αὐτοῦ τὸ εἶδος τιθέναι εἴς τε τὰ γράμματα καὶ τὰς συλλαβάς.» 11.6.6 Τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν μετὰ πλεῖστα βαρβάρων αὖθις ἀναφέρει τὴν μνήμην κἄπειτα εἰς Ἕλληνας παρὰ βαρβάρων ἥκειν τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων διαρρήδην ὁμολογεῖ, φάσκων αὐτοῖς ῥήμασιν· 11.6.7 «Ἐννοῶ ὅτι πολλὰ οἱ Ἕλληνες ὀνόματα, ἄλλως τε καὶ οἱ ὑπὸ τοῖς βαρβάροις οἰκοῦντες, παρὰ τῶν βαρβάρων εἰλήφασι. Τί οὖν δή; Εἴ τις ζητοῖ ταῦτα κατὰ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν φωνὴν ὡς ἐοικότως κεῖται, ἀλλὰ μὴ κατ' ἐκείνην ἐξ ἧς τὸ ὄνομα τυγχάνει ὄν, οἶσθα ὅτι ἀποροῖ ἄν. Εἰκότως.» 11.6.8 Ταῦτα ὁ Πλάτων. φθάνει γε μὴν αὐτὸν ὁ Μωσῆς, ὃς οἷα δὴ σοφὸς νομοθέτης ὢν ὁμοῦ καὶ διαλεκτικὸς ἐπάκουσον τί φησί· «Καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς ἐκ τῆς γῆς πάντα τὰ θηρία τοῦ ἀγροῦ καὶ πάντα τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ ἤγαγεν αὐτὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἀδάμ, ἰδεῖν τί καλέσει αὐτά. καὶ πᾶν 11.6.9 ὃ ἂν ἐκάλεσεν αὐτὸ Ἀδὰμ ψυχὴν ζῶσαν, τοῦτο ἦν ὄνομα αὐτοῦ.» διὰ γὰρ τοῦ φάναι «τοῦτο ἦν ὄνομα αὐτοῦ» τί ἄλλο ἢ κατὰ φύσιν τεθεῖσθαι τὰς προσηγορίας παρίστησι; τὸ γὰρ ἐπικληθὲν ἄρτι φησὶ τοῦτο καὶ πάλαι πρότερον ἐν τῇ φύσει περιέχεσθαι εἶναί τε καὶ προϋπάρχειν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἐπωνομασμένων τοῦτο ὄνομα, ὅπερ ὁ δηλούμενος ἄνθρωπος ἐπιθειάσας 11.6.10 δυνάμει κρείττονι τέθειται. καὶ αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ Ἀδάμ, Ἑβραῖον ὑπάρχον ὄνομα, παρὰ τῷ Μωσεῖ τοῦ γηγενοῦς ἀνθρώπου γένοιτ' ἂν ἐπώνυμον, ὅτι δὴ παρ' Ἑβραίοις Ἀδὰμ ἡ γῆ καλεῖται, παρ' ὃ καὶ ὁ πρῶτος γηγενὴς ἐτύμως 11.6.11 Ἀδὰμ ὑπὸ Μωσέως ἀνείρηται. ἔχοι δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλην ἡ προσηγορία διάνοιαν, εἰς τὸ ἐρυθρὸν μεταλαμβανομένη καὶ τὴν τοῦ σώματος παριστῶσα φύσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν γεώδη καὶ γήινον καὶ γηγενῆ ἢ τὸν σωματικὸν καὶ 11.6.12 σάρκινον ἄνθρωπον τῷ τοῦ Ἀδὰμ ἐπεσημήνατο προσρήματι. καλοῦσι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως παῖδες Ἑβραίων τὸν ἄνθρωπον, Ἐνὼς ἐπονομάζοντες, ὃν δή φασιν εἶναι τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν λογικόν, ἕτερον ὄντα τὴν φύσιν τοῦ γεώδους Ἀδάμ. διάνοιαν δὲ περιέχει καὶ ὁ Ἐνὼς οἰκείαν, ἐπιλήσμων 11.6.13 τῇ Ἑλλήνων ἑρμηνευόμενος φωνῇ. τοιοῦτον δὲ πέφυκεν ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν λογικὸν τῆς πρὸς τὸ θνητὸν καὶ ἄλογον συμπλοκῆς ἕνεκα. τὸ μὲν γὰρ πάντη καθαρὸν καὶ ἀσώματον καὶ θεῖον λογικὸν οὐ μόνον τῶν πρόσθεν γενομένων τὴν μνήμην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι τὴν γνῶσιν δι' ἄκραν ἀρετὴν θεωρίας περιείληφε. τὸ δ' ἐν σαρξὶ πεπιλημένον ὀστέοις τε καὶ νεύροις καταπεπαρμένον ὄγκον τε μέγαν καὶ βαρὺν ἐπηχθισμένον τὸ σῶμα λήθης πολλῆς καὶ ἀμαθίας συνιδὼν ὁ παρ' Ἑβραίοις λόγιος εὐθυβόλῳ κέκληκε προσρήματι Ἐνὼς ἐπονομάσας, ὅπερ 11.6.14 δηλοῖ τὸν ἐπιλήσμονα. κεῖται γοῦν παρά τινι προφήτῃ· «Τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι μιμνήσκῃ αὐτοῦ; ἢ υἱὸς ἀνθρώπου, ὅτι ἐπισκέπτῃ αὐτόν;» ἀνθ' οὗ τὸ Ἑβραϊκὸν ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς πρώτης τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κλήσεως τὸ Ἐνὼς περιείληφεν, ὡσεὶ ἔλεγε σαφέστερον· Τί