Gregory Palamas, Volume 1

119

They know Christ as God most high, as the spirit of Python said concerning Silas and Paul, "these are servants of the most high God", but not for this reason shall we say that the demons are enlightened by God, although there is nothing higher than the most high, nor equal to him.

But what is beyond demonstration, which the wise of the Greeks and this man who follows them think is something great, far transcends both all things intelligible by nature (p. 578) and things not intelligible by nature, but which have come into being by us and our own thought, as we also showed before. But if the demonstration according to them were refuted as being of things that in no way and by no means exist, then this "beyond demonstration" will surely put on the cap of Hades and vanish. What then is the end of demonstration? The discovery of the truth. What is the means? The cause that it is so and not otherwise. What is the beginning? Common notions and axioms that are known by nature and confessed by all.

Let us begin then from the beginning. Nothing is found both confessed by all and unconfessed; but there are certain skeptics who also contradict what is common to all. And yet that something comes to be from what in no way and by no means exists has been decided by Aristotle to be a common notion to all, and that the material cause always precedes the formal, and very many other such things of this kind; but we do not agree; but both wise and simple, we hold the very opposite opinion concerning them, for we believe that all things were created from non-being by God, and that the light of the stars, being their form, pre-existed. If, therefore, things not confessed by all are not known by nature either, and nothing is confessed by all, then according to you and them, nothing is known by nature. And since things known by nature fail you, demonstration will certainly fail along with them; for you yourself declare in your letters to us that every demonstrative principle and premise must be known by nature.

Further, the premises must possess necessity, since demonstration in the proper sense, according to Aristotle, deals with necessary and eternal things, that is, with things that always exist, which indeed also derive their proofs from things that always exist. For such are the things that are truly necessary. But that which always exists is without beginning (p. 580) and without end. For that which was when it was not, and will be when it will not be, how is it always existing? And how is it necessary? But nothing among existing and created things is like this. Therefore, there is no demonstration concerning anything, since Aristotle also says explicitly, "of perishable things there is no demonstration", and the conclusion of the demonstration must be imperishable and eternal.

Again, since there is nothing more primary than the immediate and first premise, from where does the demonstrator have knowledge of it? Is it not from experience? This is surely clear to everyone. But experience is fallible. If, therefore, knowledge is better than demonstration—for indeed the knowledge of the principles is better—and this knowledge is fallible, how is demonstration not fallible? Or rather, how demonstration

119

Θεόν ὕψιστον ἴσασι τόν Χριστόν, ὡς τό πνεῦμα τοῦ Πύθωνος ἔλεγε περί Σίλα καί Παύλου, «οὗτοι δοῦλοι τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ὑψίστου εἰσίν», ἀλλ᾿ οὐ διά τοῦτο πεφωτισμένους ὑπό Θεοῦ ἐροῦμεν τούς δαίμονας, καίτοι τοῦ ὑψίστου ὑψηλότερον οὐδέν οὐδ᾿ ἴσον.

Τοῦ δέ ὑπέρ ἀπόδειξιν, ὅπερ Ἑλλήνων οἱ σοφοί καί ὁ τούτοις ἑπόμενος οὗτος οἴονταί τι μέγα, τά τε φύσει (σελ. 578) νοητά πάντα καί τῶν μή φύσει νοητῶν, ὑφ᾿ ἡμῶν δέ καί τῆς ἡμετέρας διανοίας γενομένων, ὑπερανέχει πολλά, καθάπερ καί πρότερον ἐδείξαμεν˙ εἰ δέ καί ἡ κατ᾿ ἐκείνους ἀπόδειξις τῶν μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς ὄντων ἐξελεγχθείη, καί τό ὑπέρ ἀπόδειξιν τοῦτο τήν κυνῆν πάντως Ἅδου περιβαλόμενον οἰχήσεται. Τί οὖν τό τέλος τῆς ἀποδείξεως; Ἡ τῆς ἀλθείας εὕρεσις. Τί τό μέσον; Τό αἴτιον ὅ οὕτως ἔχει καί οὐκ ἄλλως. Τίς ἡ ἀρχή; Κοιναί ἔννοιαι καί ἀξιώματα τά φύσει γνώριμα καί πᾶσιν ἀνωμολογημένα.

Ἀρξώμεθα δή ἀπό τῆς ἀρχῆς. Οὐδέν εὑρίσκεται πᾶσιν συνωμολογημένον τε καί ἀνωμολογημένον˙ εἰσί δ᾿ ἐφεκτικοί τινες οἵ καί κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἀντιλέγουσι. Καί μήν ἐκ μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς γίνεσθαί τι κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἔννοια τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει δέδοκται καί τό ὑλικόν αἴτιον ἀεί τοῦ εἰδικοῦ προεῖναι καί πλεῖσθ᾿ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα τοῦτον ἔχοντα τόν τρόπον˙ ἀλλ᾿ ἡμῖν οὐ συνδοκεῖ˙ πᾶν δέ τοὐναντίον περί αὐτῶν δοξάζομεν σοφοί τε καί ἰδιῶται, γεγενῆσθαι μέν γάρ ἐκ μή ὄντων ἅπανθ᾿ ὑπό τοῦ Θεοῦ, προϋποστῆναι δέ τό φῶς ἀστέρων, εἶδος ὄν αὐτῶν. Εἰ τοίνυν τά μή πᾶσι συνομολογούμενα μηδέ φύσει γνώριμα, πᾶσι δέ συνομολογούμενον οὐδέν, κατά σέ τε καί ἐκείνους οὐδέν τῇ φύσει γνώριμον˙ τῶν δέ φύσει γνωρίμων ὑμᾶς ἐπιλιπόντων συνεπιλείψει πάντως καί ἡ ἀπόδειξις˙ πᾶσαν γάρ ἀποδεικτικήν ἀρχήν καί πρότασιν φύσει γνώριμον εἶναι δεῖν καί αὐτός ἐν τοῖς πρός ἡμᾶς σου γράμμασι διαγορεύεις.

Ἔτι, τό ἀναγκαῖον δεῖ ἔχειν τάς προτάσεις, ἐπεί καί ἡ κυρίως ἀπόδειξις κατ᾿ Ἀριστοτέλην ἐπί τῶν ἀναγκαίων τε καί ἀϊδίων, τουτέστι τῶν ἀεί ὄντων, ἅ δή κἀκ τῶν ἀεί ὄντων λαμβάνουσι τάς ἀποδείξεις˙ τοιαῦτα γάρ τά ὄντως ἀναγκαῖα˙ τό δ᾿ ἀεί ὄν ἄναρχόν ἐστι (σελ. 580) καί ἀτελεύτητον˙ ὅ γάρ ἦν τότε οὐκ ἦν καί ἔσται ὅτι οὐκ ἔσται, πῶς ἀεί ὄν; πῶς δ᾿ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι; Τοιοῦτον δέ τῶν ὄντων καί κτιστῶν οὐδέν. Οὐδέ ἀπόδειξις ἄρ᾿ ἐπ᾿ οὐδενός ἐστιν, ἐπεί καί Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπί λέξεως φησι, «τῶν φθαρτῶν ἀπόδειξις οὐκ ἔστι», καί τό συμπέρασμα τῆς ἀποδείξεως δεῖ εἶναι ἄφθαρτον καί ἀΐδιον.

Ἔτι, ἐπεί τῆς ἀμέσου καί πρώτης προτάσεως οὐδέν ἀρχοειδέστερον, πόθεν αὐτῆς ἔχει τήν ἐπιστήμην ὁ ἀποδεικτικός; Οὐκ ἀπό τῆς ἐμπειρίας; παντί που δῆλον. Ἀλλ᾿ ἡ πεῖρα σφαλερά. Εἰ τοίνυν κρείττων ἀποδείξεως ἐπιστήμη, καί γάρ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν κρείττων, σφαλερά δ᾿ αὕτη, πῶς ἡ ἀπόδειξις οὐ σφαλερά; Μᾶλλον δέ πῶς ἀπόδειξις