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which you call a demonstration? For if the demonstration according to Aristotle is a firm conviction, and it is impossible to attain this, then the demonstration according to Aristotle does not exist among the things that are.

Further, the universals, which are the principles of demonstration, have their certainty through induction; but induction consists in adducing all the particulars and leaving none out; but the particulars are inexhaustible; therefore it is impossible for induction to occur, and so the universals are uncertain and unknowable, even that they are universal. And not only do we not know them better than by demonstration, but we do not even have a firm opinion about them; and from such principles, how could a demonstration arise, which is an unshakeable conviction?

Come now, let us propose something of what is inferred and demonstrated by the philosophers in this way. The sun is ever-moving, for the circular motion of the heavenly bodies is continuous and uninterrupted. The sun is always carried by the heavenly revolution from east to west, for it is carried along with it. The sun, when carried in the hemisphere above us (p. 582) in a clear sky, if it should appear incomplete in its circle, has the body of the moon running under it while it is in a perpendicular position; for it is never blocked by another body when the sky is clear. They will say these things about the moon as well, with slight modification. "But how do you know this 'always' and this 'universal'?" we will say to them. "From induction," he says, "this knowledge, treasured in our souls, becomes the principle of demonstrations." "How from induction? Speak more clearly." "I saw," he says, "the eclipse of the sun occurring at a conjunction, and the one after that, and very many others, and through the power in me, which is by nature always apt to connect similar things, I grasped the universal knowledge; again, from the daily continuous motion of the heaven, from many sensations the universal has been synthesized for me."

What then, O philosopher? Did you perceive also the days and periods and eclipses that happened before you were born, and all those that will happen after you? Certainly not. But are those you have perceived more numerous than those you have not yet? It is certainly not possible even to comprehend in number the excess of what you have not perceived. How then did you synthesize the universal from induction, without including all the particulars? For this is your argument, and a true one, that if someone is to receive accurate knowledge through induction, it is necessary to have contact with all the particulars by means of the appropriate criterion in us for each one, and to hear each of the audible things, and to see the visible things. But you, having not seen most of the days and periods and eclipses, yet making pronouncements about all of them, think that you know it better than by demonstration, and, by coming to demonstration through this knowledge, that you have a conviction that is both true and firm, when it is exceedingly false and fallible?

For the continuous motion of the sun was interrupted in the time of Joshua son of Nun, and in the time of Hezekiah it went backwards (p. 584) and carried away the treasured universal knowledge from your soul. And what about the darkness that punished Egypt, and that for many days? Is it possible for the moon to be in conjunction with the sun for three successive days? And the eclipse that occurred at the saving passion of the Lord, did it not happen when the moon was fourteen days old, when it was utterly impossible for the moon to be in a perpendicular position to the sun? And that we may also speak to you of future things, how will the stars of heaven fall, if the circular motion is uninterrupted? How will the heaven be rolled up like a scroll? When the sun is turned into blood, how will the moon not give her light? Have you seen an eclipse of the moon without the interposition of the earth?

If, then, the universal gathered from things concerned with generation becomes the principle of an art, but of things that are always the same, the principle of demonstration and knowledge

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ἥν ὑμεῖς ἀπόδειξίν φατε; Εἰ γάρ ἡ κατ᾿ Ἀριστοτέλην ἀπόδειξις ὑπόληψις βεβαία, ταύτης δέ τυχεῖν ἀμήχανον, ἡ κατ᾿ Ἀριστοτέλην ἄρ᾿ ἀπόδειξις οὐκ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν.

Ἔτι, τά καθόλου, ἅ εἰσιν ἀρχαί τῆς ἀποδείξεως, δι᾿ ἐπαγωγῆς ἔχουσι τήν πίστιν˙ ἐπαγωγή δέ ἐστιν ἐν τῷ πάντα τά μερικά ἐπαγαγεῖν καί μηδέν ἀφεῖναι˙ τά δέ μερικά ἀδιεξίτητα˙ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄρ᾿ ἐπαγωγήν γενέσθαι καί τά καθόλου ἄρα ἄπιστα καί ἀνεπίστητα καί ὅτι γε καθόλου. Καί οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἐπιστάμεθα αὐτά κρεῖττον ἤ κατά ἀπόδειξιν, ἀλλ᾿ οὐδέ δόξαν βεβαίαν ἔχομεν περί αὐτῶν˙ ἐκ δέ τῶν τοιούτων ἀρχῶν πῶς ἄν γένοιτο ἀπόδειξις, ἥτις ἐστίν ὑπόληψις ἀμετάπειστος;

Φέρε δή προθῶμέν τινα τῶν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις οὕτω πως συναγομένων καί ἀποδεικνυμένων. Ὁ ἥλιος ἀεικίνητος, ἡ γάρ κύκλῳ τῶν οὐρανίων σωμάτων κίνησις συνεχής καί ἀδιάκοπος. Ὁ ἥλιος ὑπό τῆς οὐρανίου περιφορᾶς ἀπ᾿ ἀνατολῶν ἐπί δυσμάς ἀεί φέρεται, καί γάρ ταύτῃ συμπεριφέρεται. Ὁ ἥλιος ἐν τῷ ὑπέρ ἡμᾶς ἡμισφαιρίῳ φερόμενος (σελ. 582) αἰθρίας οὔσης, εἰ ἐλλιπής τόν κύκλον φαίνοιτο, τό τῆς σελήνης ὑποτρέχον ἔχει σῶμα κατά κάθετον οὔσης˙ καί γάρ ὑπ᾿ ἄλλου σώματος αἰθρίας οὔσης οὐδέ ποτε διατειχίζεται. Ταῦτα καί περί σελήνης μικρόν ὑπαλλάξαντες ἐροῦσιν. "Ἀλλά πόθεν τοῦτο τό ἀεί ἐπίστασθε καί τό καθόλου;" Πρός αὐτούς ἡμεῖς ἐροῦμεν. "Ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς" φησιν "ἡ γνῶσις αὕτη ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντεθησαυρισμένη, τῶν ἀποδείξεων γίνεται ἀρχή". "Πῶς ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, σαφέστερον εἰπέ". "Εἶδον" φησι "τήν τοῦ ἡλίου ἔκλειψιν ἐν συνόδῳ γενομένην καί τήν μετ᾿ ἐκείνην καί μάλα ἄλλην καί ἄλλην, καί διά τῆς ἐν ἐμοί δυνάμεως, ἥτις ἀεί πέφυκε τά ὅμοια ἐπισυνάπτειν, τήν καθόλου γνῶσιν ἔλαβον˙ πάλιν ἐκ τῆς ὁσημέραι συνεχοῦς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ κινήσεως, ἐκ πολλῶν τῶν αἰσθημάτων τό καθόλου μοι συνῆκται".

Τί οὖν, ὦ φιλόσοφε; καί τῶν πρό τοῦ γεννηθῆναί σε ἡμερῶν καί περιόδων καί ἐκλείψεων γεγενημένων ᾔσθου καί τῶν μετά σέ γενησομένων ἁπασῶν; Πάντως οὐ˙ πλείους δέ τίνες, ὧν ᾔσθου ἤ ὧν οὔπω; Πάντως οὐδ᾿ ἀριθμῷ περιλαβεῖν ἐστι τό πλεονάζον τῆς ἀναισθησίας. Πῶς οὖν ἐπισυνῆψας τό καθόλου ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, μή πάντα συμπεριλαβών τά μερικά; Λόγος γάρ οὗτος ὑμέτερος καί ἀληθής ὡς, εἰ μέλλει τις τήν δι᾿ ἐπαγωγῆς γνῶσιν ἀκριβῆ λαβεῖν, πάντων ἐπαφήν σχεῖν τῶν μερικῶν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἐν ἡμῖν πρός ἕκαστον καταλλήλῳ κριτηρίῳ, καί τῶν μέν ἀκουστῶν ἀκοῦσαι ἕκαστον, τά δέ ὁρατά ἰδεῖν. Σύ δέ τάς πλείστας μή ἑωρακώς ἡμέρας καί περιόδους καί ἐκλείψεις, περί πασῶν ἀποφαινόμενος, οἴει κρεῖττον ἤ κατά ἀπόδειξιν ἐπίστασθαι καί, διά τῆς ἐπιστήμης ταύτης ἐπί τήν ἀπόδειξιν ἐρχόμενος, ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ τε καί βεβαίαν ἔχειν τήν λίαν οὖσαν ψευδῆ καί σφαλεράν;

∆ιεκόπη μέν γάρ ἐπί Ἰησοῦ τοῦ Ναυῆ ἡ συνεχής ἡλίου κίνησις, ἐπί τοῦ Ἐζεκίου δέ εἰς τοὔμπαλιν ἐχώρησε (σελ. 584) καί τήν ἐντεθησαυρισμένην τοῦ καθόλου γνῶσιν ἐξεφόρησέ σου τῆς ψυχῆς. Τό δέ τήν Αἴγυπτον κολάσαν σκότος τί, καί ταῦτα πολυήμερον; Ἆρ᾿ ἔστι τρεῖς ἐφεξῆς ἡμέρας συνελθεῖν ἡλίῳ τήν σελήνην; Ἡ δ᾿ ἐπί τοῦ σωτηρίου πάθους τοῦ Κυρίου ἔκλειψις γεγενημένη, οὐ τεσσαρεσκαιδεκαταίας οὔσης τῆς σελήνης γέγονεν, ἡνίκα τῷ ἡλίῳ τήν σελήνην καί κάθετον εἶναι τῶν πάντῃ ἀδυνάτων ἦν; Ἵνα δέ σοι καί περί μελλόντων εἴπωμεν, πῶς πεσοῦνται τά ἄστρα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, εἰ ἀδιάκοπος ἡ κύκλῳ κίνησις; Πῶς ὁ οὐρανός ὡς βίβλος εἱλιθήσεται; Πῶς εἰς αἷμα τοῦ ἡλίου μεταστρεφομένου ἡ σελήνη οὐ δώσει τό φέγγος αὐτῆς; Εἶδες ἔκλειψιν σελήνην ἄνευ διαφράξεως τῆς γῆς;

Εἰ γοῦν ἐπισυνηγμένον μέν τό καθόλου ἀπό τῶν περί γένεσιν ἀρχή τέχνης γίνεται, τῶν δ᾿ ἀεί ὡσαύτως ἐχόντων ἀρχή τῆς ἀποδείξεως καί ἐπιστήμη