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Clement of Alexandria, The Stromata, or Miscellanies
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Book I Chapter I.—Preface—The Author’s Object—The Utility of Written Compositions.
Chapter III.—Against the Sophists.
Chapter IV.—Human Arts as Well as Divine Knowledge Proceed from God.
Chapter V.—Philosophy the Handmaid of Theology.
Chapter VI.—The Benefit of Culture.
Chapter VII.—The Eclectic Philosophy Paves the Way for Divine Virtue.
Chapter VIII.—The Sophistical Arts Useless.
Chapter IX.—Human Knowledge Necessary for the Understanding of the Scriptures.
Chapter X.—To Act Well of Greater Consequence Than to Speak Well.
Chapter XI.—What is the Philosophy Which the Apostle Bids Us Shun?
Chapter XII.—The Mysteries of the Faith Not to Be Divulged to All.
Chapter XIII.—All Sects of Philosophy Contain a Germ of Truth.
Chapter XIV.—Succession of Philosophers in Greece.
Chapter XV.—The Greek Philosophy in Great Part Derived from the Barbarians.
Chapter XVI.—That the Inventors of Other Arts Were Mostly Barbarians.
Chapter XVII.—On the Saying of the Saviour, “All that Came Before Me Were Thieves and Robbers.”
Chapter XVIII.—He Illustrates the Apostle’s Saying, “I Will Destroy the Wisdom of the Wise.”
Chapter XIX.—That the Philosophers Have Attained to Some Portion of Truth.
Chapter XX.—In What Respect Philosophy Contributes to the Comprehension of Divine Truth.
Chapter XXII.—On the Greek Translation of the Old Testament.
Chapter XXIII.—The Age, Birth, and Life of Moses.
Chapter XXIV.—How Moses Discharged the Part of a Military Leader.
Chapter XXV.—Plato an Imitator of Moses in Framing Laws.
Chapter XXVII.—The Law, Even in Correcting and Punishing, Aims at the Good of Men.
Chapter XXVIII.—The Fourfold Division of the Mosaic Law.
Chapter XXIX.—The Greeks But Children Compared with the Hebrews.
Book II. Chapter I.—Introductory.
Chapter II.—The Knowledge of God Can Be Attained Only Through Faith.
Chapter III.—Faith Not a Product of Nature.
Chapter IV.—Faith the Foundation of All Knowledge.
Chapter V.—He Proves by Several Examples that the Greeks Drew from the Sacred Writers.
Chapter VI.—The Excellence and Utility of Faith.
Chapter VII.—The Utility of Fear. Objections Answered.
Chapter VIII.—The Vagaries of Basilides and Valentinus as to Fear Being the Cause of Things.
Chapter IX.—The Connection of the Christian Virtues.
Chapter X.—To What the Philosopher Applies Himself.
Chapter XI.—The Knowledge Which Comes Through Faith the Surest of All.
Chapter XIII.—On First and Second Repentance.
Chapter XIV.—How a Thing May Be Involuntary.
Chapter XV.—On the Different Kinds of Voluntary Actions, and the Sins Thence Proceeding.
Chapter XVI.—How We are to Explain the Passages of Scripture Which Ascribe to God Human Affections.
Chapter XVII.—On the Various Kinds of Knowledge.
Chapter XIX.—The True Gnostic is an Imitator of God, Especially in Beneficence.
Chapter XX.—The True Gnostic Exercises Patience and Self-Restraint.
Chapter XXI.—Opinions of Various Philosophers on the Chief Good.
Book III. Caput I.—Basilidis Sententiam de Continentia Et Nuptiis Refutat.
Caput II.—Carpocratis Et Epiphanis Sententiam de Feminarum Communitate Refutat.
Caput IV.—Quibus Prætextibus Utantur Hæretici ad Omnis Genetis Licentiam Et Libidinem Exercendam.
Caput VII.—Qua in Re Christianorum Continentia Eam Quam Sibi Vindicant Philosophi Antecellat.
Caput X.—Verba Christi Matt. xviii. 20, Mystice Exponit.
Caput XI.—Legis Et Christi Mandatum de Non Concupiscendo Exponit.
Caput XIV.—2 Cor. xi. 3, Et Eph. iv. 24, Exponit.
Caput XV.—1 Cor. vii. 1 Luc. xiv. 26 Isa. lvi. 2, 3, Explicat.
Caput XVI.—Jer. xx. 14 Job xiv. 3 Ps. l. 5 1 Cor. ix. 27, Exponit.
Book IV. Chapter I.—Order of Contents.
Chapter II.—The Meaning of the Name Stromata or Miscellanies.
Chapter III.—The True Excellence of Man.
Chapter IV.—The Praises of Martyrdom.
Chapter V.—On Contempt for Pain, Poverty, and Other External Things.
Chapter VI.—Some Points in the Beatitudes.
Chapter VII.—The Blessedness of the Martyr.
Chapter VIII.—Women as Well as Men, Slaves as Well as Freemen, Candidates for the Martyr’s Crown.
Chapter IX.—Christ’s Sayings Respecting Martyrdom.
Chapter X.—Those Who Offered Themselves for Martyrdom Reproved.
Chapter XI.—The Objection, Why Do You Suffer If God Cares for You, Answered.
Chapter XII.—Basilides’ Idea of Martyrdom Refuted.
Chapter XIII.—Valentinian’s Vagaries About the Abolition of Death Refuted.
Chapter XIV.—The Love of All, Even of Our Enemies.
Chapter XV.—On Avoiding Offence.
Chapter XVI.—Passages of Scripture Respecting the Constancy, Patience, and Love of the Martyrs.
Chapter XVII.—Passages from Clement’s Epistle to the Corinthians on Martyrdom.
Chapter XVIII.—On Love, and the Repressing of Our Desires.
Chap. XIX.—Women as well as Men Capable of Perfection.
Chapter XXI.—Description of the Perfect Man, or Gnostic.
Chapter XXIII.—The Same Subject Continued.
Chapter XXIV.—The Reason and End of Divine Punishments.
Chapter XXV.—True Perfection Consists in the Knowledge and Love of God.
Chapter XXVI.—How the Perfect Man Treats the Body and the Things of the World.
Chapter III.—The Objects of Faith and Hope Perceived by the Mind Alone.
Chapter IV.—Divine Things Wrapped Up in Figures Both in the Sacred and in Heathen Writers.
Chapter V.—On the Symbols of Pythagoras.
Chapter VI.—The Mystic Meaning of the Tabernacle and Its Furniture.
Chapter VII.—The Egyptian Symbols and Enigmas of Sacred Things.
Chapter VIII.—The Use of the Symbolic Style by Poets and Philosophers.
Chapter IX.—Reasons for Veiling the Truth in Symbols.
Chapter X.—The Opinion of the Apostles on Veiling the Mysteries of the Faith.
Chapter XII.—God Cannot Be Embraced in Words or by the Mind.
Chapter XIII.—The Knowledge of God a Divine Gift, According to the Philosophers.
Chapter XIV.—Greek Plagiarism from the Hebrews.
Chapter II.—The Subject of Plagiarisms Resumed. The Greeks Plagiarized from One Another.
Chapter III.—Plagiarism by the Greeks of the Miracles Related in the Sacred Books of the Hebrews.
Chapter V.—The Greeks Had Some Knowledge of the True God.
Chapter VI.—The Gospel Was Preached to Jews and Gentiles in Hades.
Chapter VII.—What True Philosophy Is, and Whence So Called.
Chapter VIII.—Philosophy is Knowledge Given by God.
Chapter IX.—The Gnostic Free of All Perturbations of the Soul.
Chapter X.—The Gnostic Avails Himself of the Help of All Human Knowledge.
Chapter XI.—The Mystical Meanings in the Proportions of Numbers, Geometrical Ratios, and Music.
Chapter XII.—Human Nature Possesses an Adaptation for Perfection The Gnostic Alone Attains It.
Chapter XIII.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven Corresponding with the Dignities of the Church Below.
Chapter XIV.—Degrees of Glory in Heaven.
Chapter XV.—Different Degrees of Knowledge.
Chapter XVI.—Gnostic Exposition of the Decalogue.
Chapter XVII.—Philosophy Conveys Only an Imperfect Knowledge of God.
Chapter XVIII.—The Use of Philosophy to the Gnostic.
Chapter II.—The Son the Ruler and Saviour of All.
Chapter III.—The Gnostic Aims at the Nearest Likeness Possible to God and His Son.
Chapter IV.—The Heathens Made Gods Like Themselves, Whence Springs All Superstition.
Chapter V.—The Holy Soul a More Excellent Temple Than Any Edifice Built by Man.
Chapter VI.—Prayers and Praise from a Pure Mind, Ceaselessly Offered, Far Better Than Sacrifices.
Chapter VII.—What Sort of Prayer the Gnostic Employs, and How It is Heard by God.
Chapter VIII.—The Gnostic So Addicted to Truth as Not to Need to Use an Oath.
Chapter IX.—Those Who Teach Others, Ought to Excel in Virtues.
Chapter X.—Steps to Perfection.
Chapter XI.—Description of the Gnostic’s Life.
Chapter XII.—The True Gnostic is Beneficent, Continent, and Despises Worldly Things.
Chapter XIII.—Description of the Gnostic Continued.
Chapter XIV.—Description of the Gnostic Furnished by an Exposition of 1 Cor. vi. 1, Etc.
Chapter XV.—The Objection to Join the Church on Account of the Diversity of Heresies Answered.
Chapter XVI.—Scripture the Criterion by Which Truth and Heresy are Distinguished.
Chapter XVII.—The Tradition of the Church Prior to that of the Heresies.
Book VIII. Chapter I.—The Object of Philosophical and Theological Inquiry—The Discovery of Truth.
Chapter II.—The Necessity of Perspicuous Definition.
Chapter III.—Demonstration Defined.
Chapter IV.—To Prevent Ambiguity, We Must Begin with Clear Definition.
Chapter V.—Application of Demonstration to Sceptical Suspense of Judgment.
Chapter VI.—Definitions, Genera, and Species.
Chapter VII.—On the Causes of Doubt or Assent.
For to him knowledge (gnosis) is the principal thing. Consequently, therefore, he applies to the subjects that are a training for knowledge, taking from each branch of study its contribution to the truth. Prosecuting, then, the proportion of harmonies in music; and in arithmetic noting the increasing and decreasing of numbers, and their relations to one another, and how the most of things fall under some proportion of numbers; studying geometry, which is abstract essence, he perceives a continuous distance, and an immutable essence which is different from these bodies. And by astronomy, again, raised from the earth in his mind, he is elevated along with heaven, and will revolve with its revolution; studying ever divine things, and their harmony with each other; from which Abraham starting, ascended to the knowledge of Him who created them. Further, the Gnostic will avail himself of dialectics, fixing on the distinction of genera into species, and will master1502 2 Cor. vi. 14, 15. Our choice lies between the reading of the text, προσίσεται; that of Hervetus, προσοίσεται; the conjecture of Sylburgius, προσείσεται, or προσήσεται, used a little after in the phrase προσήσεται τὴν ἀλήθειαν. the distinction of existences, till he come to what are primary and simple.
But the multitude are frightened at the Hellenic philosophy, as children are at masks, being afraid lest it lead them astray. But if the faith (for I cannot call it knowledge) which they possess be such as to be dissolved by plausible speech, let it be by all means dissolved,1503 2 Cor. vi. 17, 18. There is some difficulty in the sentence as it stands. Hervetus omits in his translation the words rendered here, “let it be by all means dissolved.” We have omitted διὰ τούτους, which follows immediately after, but which is generally retained and translated “by these,” i.e., philosophers. and let them confess that they will not retain the truth. For truth is immoveable; but false opinion dissolves. We choose, for instance, one purple by comparison with another purple. So that, if one confesses that he has not a heart that has been made right, he has not the table of the money-changers or the test of words.1504 τῶν λόγων, Sylburgius; τὸν λόγον is the reading of the text. And how can he be any longer a money-changer, who is not able to prove and distinguish spurious coin, even offhand?
Now David cried, “The righteous shall not be shaken for ever;”1505 Ps. cxii. 6. neither, consequently, by deceptive speech nor by erring pleasure. Whence he shall never be shaken from his own heritage. “He shall not be afraid of evil tidings;”1506 Ps. cxii. 7. consequently neither of unfounded calumny, nor of the false opinion around him. No more will he dread cunning words, who is capable of distinguishing them, or of answering rightly to questions asked. Such a bulwark are dialectics, that truth cannot be trampled under foot by the Sophists. “For it behoves those who praise in the holy name of the Lord,” according to the prophet, “to rejoice in heart, seeking the Lord. Seek then Him, and be strong. Seek His face continually in every way.”1507 Ps. cv. 3, 4. “For, having spoken at sundry times and in divers manners,”1508 Heb. i. 1. it is not in one way only that He is known.
It is, then, not by availing himself of these as virtues that our Gnostic will be deeply learned. But by using them as helps in distinguishing what is common and what is peculiar, he will admit the truth. For the cause of all error and false opinion, is inability to distinguish in what respect things are common, and in what respects they differ. For unless, in things that are distinct, one closely watch speech, he will inadvertently confound what is common and what is peculiar. And where this takes place, he must of necessity fall into pathless tracts and error.
The distinction of names and things also in the Scriptures themselves produces great light in men’s souls. For it is necessary to understand expressions which signify several things, and several expressions when they signify one thing. The result of which is accurate answering. But it is necessary to avoid the great futility which occupies itself in irrelevant matters; since the Gnostic avails himself of branches of learning as auxiliary preparatory exercises, in order to the accurate communication of the truth, as far as attainable and with as little distraction as possible, and for defence against reasonings that plot for the extinction of the truth. He will not then be deficient in what contributes to proficiency in the curriculum of studies and the Hellenic philosophy; but not principally, but necessarily, secondarily, and on account of circumstances. For what those labouring in heresies use wickedly, the Gnostic will use rightly.
Therefore the truth that appears in the Hellenic philosophy, being partial, the real truth, like the sun glancing on the colours both white and black, shows what like each of them is. So also it exposes all sophistical plausibility. Rightly, then, was it proclaimed also by the Greeks:—“Truth the queen is the beginning of great virtue.”1509 Pindar.
Κατ' ἐπακολούθημα τοίνυν καὶ τοῖς εἰς γνῶσιν γυμνάζουσιν αὐτὸν προσανάκειται, παρ' ἑκάστου μαθήματος τὸ πρόσφορον τῇ ἀληθείᾳ λαμβάνων, τῆς μὲν οὖν μουσικῆς τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἡρμοσμένοις ἀναλογίαν διώκων, ἐν δὲ τῇ ἀριθμητικῇ τὰς αὐξήσεις καὶ μειώσεις τῶν ἀριθμῶν παρασημειούμενος καὶ τὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους σχέσεις καὶ ὡς τὰ πλεῖστα ἀναλογίᾳ τινὶ ἀριθμῶν ὑποπέπτωκεν, [ἐν δὲ] τῇ γεωμετρικῇ οὐσίαν αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς θεωρῶν καὶ ἐθιζόμενος συνεχές τι διάστημα νοεῖ[ν] καὶ οὐσίαν ἀμετάβλητον, ἑτέραν τῶνδε τῶν σωμάτων οὖσαν· ἔκ τε αὖ τῆς ἀστρονομίας γῆθεν αἰωρούμενος τε τῷ νῷ συνυψωθήσεται οὐρανῷ καὶ τῇ περιφορᾷ συμπεριπολήσει, ἱστορῶν ἀεὶ τὰ θεῖα καὶ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνίαν, ἀφ' ὧν ὁρμώμενος Ἀβραὰμ εἰς τὴν τοῦ κτίσαντος ὑπεξανέβη γνῶσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ διαλεκτικῇ προσχρήσεται ὁ γνωστικός, τὴν εἰς εἴδη τῶν γενῶν ἐκλεγόμενος διαίρεσιν, καὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντων προσήσεται διάκρισιν. μέχρις ἂν τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἁπλῶν ἐφάψηται. οἱ πολλοὶ δὲ καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες τὰ μορμολυκεῖα, οὕτως δεδίασι τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, φοβούμενοι μὴ ἀπαγάγῃ αὐτούς. εἰ δὲ τοιαύτη παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐστιν ἡ πίστις (οὐ γὰρ ἂν γνῶσιν εἴποιμι), ἵνα λυθῇ πιθανολογίᾳ, λυθήτω, διὰ τούτου μάλιστα ὁμολογούντων οὐχ ἕξειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἀνίκητος γάρ, φησίν, ἡ ἀλήθεια, ψευδοδοξία δὲ καταλύεται. αὐτίκα πορφύραν ἐξ ἀντιπαραθέσεως ἄλλης πορφύρας ἐκλεγόμεθα. ὥστ' εἴ τις ὁμολογεῖ καρδίαν μὴ ἔχειν διηρθρωμένην, τράπεζαν οὐκ ἔχει τὴν τῶν ἀργυραμοιβῶν οὐδὲ μὴν τὸ κριτήριον τῶν λόγων. καὶ πῶς ἔτι τραπεζίτης οὗτος, δοκιμάσαι μὴ δυνάμενος καὶ διακρῖναι τὸ ἀκίβδηλον νόμισμα τοῦ παραχαράγματος; κέκραγεν δὲ ὁ ∆αβίδ· ὅτι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα οὐ σαλευθήσεται δίκαιος· οὔτ' οὖν ἀπατηλῷ λόγῳ οὐδὲ μὴν πεπλανημένῃ ἡδονῇ, ὅθεν οὐδὲ τῆς οἰκείας κληρονομίας σαλευθήσεται. ἀπὸ ἀκοῆς ἄρα πονηρᾶς οὐ φοβηθήσεται. οὔτ' οὖν διαβολῆς κενῆς οὐδὲ μὴν ψευδοδοξίας τῆς περὶ αὑτόν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς πανούργους δεδίξεται λόγους ὁ διαγνῶναι τούτους δυνάμενος ἢ πρός τε τὸ ἐρωτᾶν ὀρθῶς καὶ ἀποκρίνασθαι· οἷον θριγκὸς γάρ ἐστι διαλεκτική, ὡς μὴ καταπατεῖσθαι πρὸς τῶν σοφιστῶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ἐπαινουμένους γὰρ χρὴ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματι τῷ ἁγίῳ τοῦ κυρίου κατὰ τὸν προφήτην εὐφραίνεσθαι τὴν καρδίαν ζητοῦντας τὸν κύριον. ζητήσατε οὖν αὐτὸν καὶ κραταιώθητε, ζητήσατε τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ διὰ παντὸς παντοίως. πολυμερῶς γὰρ καὶ πολυτρόπως λαλήσας οὐχ ἁπλῶς γνωρίζεται. Οὔκουν ὡς ἀρεταῖς ταύταις συγχρώμενος ἡμῖν ὁ γνωστικὸς πολυμαθὴς ἔσται, ἀλλὰ συνεργοῖς τισι, κἀν τῷ διαστέλλειν τά τε κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια προσήσεται τὴν ἀλήθειαν· ἔστι γὰρ πάσης πλάνης καὶ ψευδοδοξίας αἴτιον τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι διακρίνειν, πῇ τε ἀλλήλοις τὰ ὄντα κοινωνεῖ καὶ πῇ διενήνοχεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ κατὰ τὰ διωρισμένα τις τὸν λόγον ἐφοδεύοι, λήσεται συγχέας τά τε κοινὰ καὶ τὰ ἴδια, τούτου δὲ γινομένου εἰς ἀνοδίαν καὶ πλάνην ἐμπίπτειν ἀναγκαῖον. ἡ διαστολὴ δὲ τῶν τε ὀνομάτων τῶν τε πραγμάτων κἀν ταῖς γραφαῖς αὐταῖς μέγα φῶς ἐντίκτει ταῖς ψυχαῖς· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἐπακούειν τῶν τε πλείονα σημαινουσῶν λέξεων καὶ τῶν πλειόνων, ὅταν ἕν τι σημαίνωσιν· ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς ἀποκρίνεσθαι περιγίνεται. τὴν πολλὴν δὲ ἀχρηστίαν παραιτητέον, ἀπασχολοῦσαν περὶ τὰ μηδὲν προσήκοντα, οἱονεὶ δὲ συναιτίοις προγυμνάσμασιν εἴς τε τὴν ἀκριβῆ παράδοσιν τῆς ἀληθείας, ὅσον ἐφικτόν, καὶ ἀπερίσπαστον συγχρωμένου τοῖς μαθήμασι τοῦ γνωστικοῦ καὶ εἰς προφυλακὴν τῶν κακοτεχνούντων λόγων πρὸς ἐκκοπὴν τῆς ἀληθείας. οὐκ ἀπολειφθήσεται τοίνυν τῶν προκοπτόντων περὶ τὰς μαθήσεις τὰς ἐγκυκλίους καὶ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον, τὸν δὲ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ δεύτερον καὶ περιστατικόν· οἷς γὰρ ἂν πανούργως χρήσωνται οἱ κατὰ τὰς αἱρέσεις πονούμενοι, τούτοις ὁ γνωστικὸς εἰς εὖ καταχρήσεται. μερικῆς οὖν τυγχανούσης τῆς κατὰ τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐμφαινομένης ἀληθείας, ἡ τῷ ὄντι ἀλήθεια, ὥσπερ ἥλιος ἐπιλάμψας τὰ χρώματα καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ὁποῖον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, διαδείκνυσιν, οὕτως δὲ καὶ αὐτὴ πᾶσαν ἐλέγχει σοφιστικὴν πιθανολογίαν. εἰκότως ἄρα προαναπεφώνηται καὶ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν· ἀρχὰ μεγάλας ἀρετᾶς, ὤνασσα ἀλήθεια.