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defining nature as imperishable and immortal, but the sensible world exists in flux and decay, in change and alteration of its substance, and with all things being summed up under one principle, and teaching that the ungenerated and that which properly and truly is, is one, the cause of all things both incorporeal and corporeal; 11.9.4 see in what way Plato, having scraped away not only the thought, but even the very words and expressions of the Hebrew scripture, appropriates the doctrine, clarifying it more broadly somehow in this way: “What is that which is always, but has no becoming? and what is that which is always becoming, but never is? The one, apprehended by thought with reason, is always in the same state; the other is an object of opinion with irrational sensation, coming to be and perishing, but never really is.” 11.9.5 Has not the admirable man clearly shown that he has refashioned the oracle in Moses which said "I am who I am" by means of "What is that which is always, but has no becoming?" and clarifying this even more clearly in saying that that which is is nothing other than what is not seen with eyes of flesh, but apprehended by the mind. For having asked what that which is is, he answers himself, saying: “that which is apprehended by thought with 11.9.6 reason.” But that of Solomon which says: "What is it that has been? The very thing that will be. And what is it that has been made? The very thing that will be made," he would be clear in interpreting with almost the same words, saying: “the other is an object of opinion with irrational sensation, coming to be and perishing, but never really is.” To which he adds: 11.9.7 “For all these are parts of time, the 'was' and the 'will be'; which we, without noticing, apply to the eternal substance, incorrectly. For we say that it was and is and will be. But to it, only 'is' belongs, according to the true account; but 'was' and 'will be' are proper to be said of becoming which is in time; for they are motions. But that which is always in the same state immovably it is not fitting to become either older or younger through time, nor to have ever become, nor to have become now, nor to be hereafter at all, nor any of those things which becoming has attached to the things that move in the sensible world, but these have become forms of time, which imitates eternity and revolves according to number. And in addition to these, there are still such things as, that which has become is that which has become, and that which is becoming is that which is becoming, and moreover that which will be is that which will be.” 11.9.8 And lest anyone think that we are misinterpreting the words of the philosopher, I shall use commentaries that bring to light the meaning of these words. Many, indeed, have applied themselves to the theory of these things, but for me it is sufficient for now to set forth the words of an eminent man, Numenius the Pythagorean, which he sets forth somehow in this way in his second book *On the Good*:

11.10.1 11. FROM *ON THE GOOD* BY NUMENIUS THE PYTHAGOREAN “Come then, let us with all our power ascend as close as possible to that which is and say: That which is neither ever was nor will ever not be, but is always in a definite time, 11.10.2 the present alone. If then someone wishes to call this present 'eternity,' I too would advise it; but we must think that past time, having already fled, has escaped and run away into no longer being; and the future, in turn, is not yet, but promises that it will be able to come into being. 11.10.3 It is not reasonable, therefore, in any way to think of that which is as either not being, or no longer, or not yet, since if this were so stated, a great impossibility arises in the argument, 11.10.4 for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time. And if this is so, scarcely could anything else be, if that which is is itself not being in respect to its very being. That which is, therefore, is both eternal and stable, always in the same state and the same. Neither has it come into being and then been destroyed, nor has it grown and then diminished, nor indeed has it ever become greater or less. 11.10.5 And indeed, among other things, it will not be moved in respect to place; for it is not right for it to be moved, nor indeed

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τὴν φύσιν ἄφθαρτόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον εἶναι ὁριζομένων, τὸ δ' αἰσθητὸν ἐν ῥύσει καὶ φθορᾷ μεταβολῇ τε καὶ τροπῇ τῆς οὐσίας ὑπάρχειν, πάντων δ' ἐπὶ μίαν ἀρχὴν ἀνακεφαλαιουμένων, ἕν τε εἶναι τὸ ἀγένητον καὶ τὸ κυρίως καὶ ἀληθῶς ὂν δογματιζόντων, τὸ πάντων ἀσωμάτων τε καὶ σωμά11.9.4 των αἴτιον· θέα τίνα τρόπον οὐ μόνον τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς λέξεις αὐτὰς καὶ τὰ ῥήματα τῆς Ἑβραίων γραφῆς παραξέσας ὁ Πλάτων ἐξοικειοῦται τὸ δόγμα, πλατύτερον ὧδέ πη διασαφῶν· «Τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον; καὶ τί τὸ γινόμενον μὲν ἀεί, ὂν δὲ οὐδέποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτὸν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθήσει ἀλόγῳ δοξαστὸν γινόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν.» 11.9.5 Ἆρ' οὐ σαφῶς πέφηνεν ὁ θαυμάσιος τὸ μὲν παρὰ Μωσεῖ φῆσαν λόγιον «ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὢν» μεταποιήσας διὰ τοῦ «τί τὸ ὂν ἀεί, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον;» καὶ τοῦτό γε λευκότερον διασαφήσας ἐν τῷ φάναι μηδ' ἄλλο εἶναι τὸ ὂν ἢ τὸ οὐ σαρκὸς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρώμενον, νῷ δὲ καταλαμβανόμενον. ἐρωτήσας γοῦν τί τὸ ὄν, αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ἀποκρίνεται, λέγων· «τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ 11.9.6 λόγου περιληπτὸν ὄν.» τὸ δὲ Σολομώντειον φῆσαν· «τί τὸ γεγονός; αὐτὸ τὸ γενησόμενον· καὶ τί τὸ πεποιημένον; αὐτὸ τὸ ποιηθησόμενον» αὐτοῖς σχεδὸν ῥήμασι διερμηνεύσας δῆλος ἂν εἴη λέγων· «τὸ δ' αἰσθήσει ἀλόγῳ δοξαστὸν γινόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον, ὄντως δὲ οὐδέποτε ὄν.» οἷς καὶ ἐπιφέρει· 11.9.7 «Ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα μέρη χρόνου, τὸ ἦν καὶ ἔσται· ἃ δὴ φέροντες λανθάνομεν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀΐδιον οὐσίαν, οὐκ ὀρθῶς. λέγομεν γὰρ δὴ ὡς ἦν ἐστί τε καὶ ἔσται. τῇ δὲ τὸ ἔστι μόνον κατὰ τὸν ἀληθῆ λόγον προσήκει· τὸ δὲ ἦν καὶ τὸ ἔσται περὶ τὴν ἐν χρόνῳ γένεσιν οὖσαν πρέπει λέγεσθαι· κινήσεις γάρ ἐστον. τὸ δὲ ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔχον ἀκινήτως οὔτε πρεσβύτερον οὔτε νεώτερον προσήκει γίνεσθαι διὰ χρόνον οὐδὲ γενέσθαι ποτὲ οὐδὲ γεγονέναι νῦν οὐδ' εἰσαῦθις ἔσεσθαι τὸ παράπαν οὐδ' ὅσα γένεσις τοῖς ἐν αἰσθήσει φερομένοις προσῆψεν, ἀλλὰ χρόνου ταῦτα, αἰῶνα μιμουμένου καὶ κατ' ἀριθμὸν κυκλουμένου, γέγονεν εἴδη. καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἔτι τὰ τοιάδε, τὸ γεγονὸς εἶναι γεγονὸς καὶ τὸ γιγνόμενον εἶναι γιγνόμενον ἔτι τε τὸ γενησόμενον εἶναι γενησόμενον.» 11.9.8 Καὶ ἵνα γε μή τις ἡμᾶς παρερμηνεύειν ἡγήσηται τὰς τοῦ φιλοσόφου φωνάς, ὑπομνήμασι χρήσομαι τῶνδε τῶν λόγων τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκφαίνουσι. πλείους μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν τούτων ἐπιβεβλήκασι θεωρίαν, ἐμοὶ δ' ἐξαρκεῖ τὰ νῦν ἀνδρὸς ἐπιφανοῦς Νουμηνίου τοῦ Πυθαγορείου παραθέσθαι λέξεις, ἃς ἐν τῷ Περὶ τἀγαθοῦ δευτέρῳ συγγράμματι ὧδέ πη διέξεισιν·

11.10.1 ιαʹ. ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΑΓΑΘΟΥ ΝΟΥΜΗΝΙΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΕΙΟΥ «Φέρε οὖν ὅση δύναμις ἐγγύτατα πρὸς τὸ ὂν ἀναγώμεθα καὶ λέγωμεν· τὸ ὂν οὔτε ποτὲ ἦν οὔτε ποτὲ μὴ γένηται, ἀλλ' ἔστιν ἀεὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ὡρισμένῳ, 11.10.2 τῷ ἐνεστῶτι μόνῳ. τοῦτον μὲν οὖν τὸν ἐνεστῶτα εἴ τις ἐθέλει ἀνακαλεῖν αἰῶνα, κἀγὼ συμβούλομαι· τὸν δὲ παρελθόντα χρόνον οἴεσθαι χρὴ ἡμᾶς διαπεφευγότα ἤδη διαπεφευγέναι ἀποδεδρακέναι τε εἰς τὸ εἶναι μηκέτι· ὅ τε αὖ μέλλων ἐστὶ μὲν οὐδέπω, ἐπαγγέλλεται δὲ οἷός τε ἔσεσθαι ἥξειν εἰς τὸ εἶναι. 11.10.3 οὔκουν εἰκός ἐστιν ἑνί γε τρόπῳ νομίζειν τὸ ὂν ἤτοι μὴ εἶναι ἢ μηκέτι ἢ μηδέπω, ὡς τούτου γε οὕτως λεγομένου ἓν γίνεταί τι ἐν τῷ λόγῳ μέγα ἀδύνα11.10.4 τον, εἶναί τε ὁμοῦ ταὐτὸν καὶ μὴ εἶναι. εἰ δὲ οὕτως ἔχει, σχολῇ γ' ἂν ἄλλο τι εἶναι δύναιτο, τοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ μὴ ὄντος κατὰ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν. τὸ ἄρα ἂν ἀΐδιόν τε βέβαιόν τε ἐστὶν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὸν καὶ ταὐτόν. οὐδὲ γέγονε μέν, ἐφθάρη δὲ οὐδ' ἐμεγεθύνατο μέν, ἐμειώθη δὲ οὐδὲ μὴν ἐγένετό πω πλεῖον ἢ ἔλασ11.10.5 σον. καὶ μὲν δὴ τά τε ἄλλα καὶ οὐδὲ τοπικῶς κινηθήσεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ κινηθῆναι, οὐδὲ μὲν