Chap. XII.—Of True Virtue; And of the Estimation of a Good or Bad Citizen.

What would you do to those who give the name of justice to the tortures inflicted by tyrants of old, who fiercely raged against the innocent; and though they are teachers of injustice and cruelty, wish to appear just and prudent, being blind and dull, and ignorant of affairs and of truth? Is justice so hateful to you, O abandoned minds, that ye regard it as equal with the greatest crimes? Is innocence so utterly lost in your eyes, that you do not think it worthy of death only,990    Ne morte quidem simplici dignum putetis.   but it is esteemed as beyond all crimes to commit no crime, and to have a breast pure from all contagion of guilt? And since we are speaking generally with those who worship gods, let us have your permission to do good with you; for this is our law, this our business, this our religion. If we appear to you wise, imitate us; if foolish, despise us, or even laugh at us, if you please; for our folly is profitable to us. Why do you lacerate, why do you afflict us? We do not envy your wisdom. We prefer this folly of ours—we embrace this. We believe that this is expedient for us,—to love you, and to confer all things upon you, who hate us.  

There is in the writings of Cicero991    [From the Republic, iii. xvii. 27.]   a passage not inconsistent with the truth, in that disputation which is held by Furius against justice: “I ask,” he says, “if there should be two men, and one of them should be an excellent man, of the highest integrity, the greatest justice, and remarkable faith, and the other distinguished by crime and audacity; and if the state should be in such error as to regard that good man as wicked, vicious, and execrable, but should think the one who is most wicked to be of the highest integrity and faith; and if, in accordance with this opinion of all the citizens, that good man should be harassed, dragged away, should be deprived of his hands, have his eyes dug out, should be condemned, be bound, be branded, be banished, be in want, and lastly, should most justly appear to all to be most wretched; but, on the other hand, if that wicked man should be praised, and honoured, and loved by all,—if all honours, all commands, all wealth, and all abundance should be bestowed upon him,—in short, if he should be judged in the estimation of all an excellent man, and most worthy of all fortune,—who, I pray, will be so mad as to doubt which of the two he would prefer to be?” Assuredly he put forth this example as though he divined what evils were about to happen to us, and in what manner, on account of righteousness; for our people suffer all these things through the perverseness of those in error. Behold, the state, or rather the whole world itself, is in such error, that it persecutes, tortures, condemns, and puts to death good and righteous men, as though they were wicked and impious. For as to what he says, that no one is so infatuated as to doubt which of the two he would prefer to be, he indeed, as the one who was contending against justice, thought this, that the wise man would prefer to be bad if he had a good reputation, than to be good with a bad reputation.  

But may this senselessness be absent from us, that we should prefer that which is false to the true? Or does the character of our good man depend upon the errors of the people, more than upon our own conscience and the judgment of God? Or shall any prosperity ever allure us, so that we should not rather choose true goodness, though accompanied with all evil, than false goodness together with all prosperity? Let kings retain their kingdoms, the rich their riches, as Plautus says,992    Curcul., i. 3, 22.   the wise their wisdom; let them leave to us our folly, which is evidently proved to be wisdom, from the very fact that they envy us its possession: for who would envy a fool, but he who is himself most foolish? But they are not so foolish as to envy fools; but from the fact of their following us up with such care and anxiety, they allow that we are not fools. For why should they rage with such cruelty, unless it is that they fear lest, as justice grows strong from day to day, they should be deserted together with their decaying993    Cariosis. There is a great variety of readings in this place.   gods? If, therefore, the worshippers of gods are wise, and we are foolish, why do they fear lest the wise shall be allured by the foolish?  

CAPUT XII. De vera virtute; atque de existimatione boni aut mali civis.

Quid iis facias, qui jus vocant carnificinas veterum tyrannorum adversus innocentes rabide saevientium? Et cum sint injustitiae crudelitatisque doctores, justos se esse tamen ac prudentes videri volunt, caeci et hebetes, et rerum et veritatis ignari. Adeone vobis, o perditae mentes, invisa justitia est, ut eam summis sceleribus adaequetis? Adeone apud vos perit innocentia, 0587B ut ne morte quidem simplici dignam judicetis? Sed supra omnia facinora habeatur, nullum facinus admittere, pectusque purum ab omni sceleris contagione praestare. Et quoniam communiter cum deorum cultoribus loquimur, liceat per vos benefacere vobiscum. Haec est enim lex nostra, hoc opus, haec religio. Si vobis sapientes videmur,imitamini: si stulti, contemnite, aut etiam ridete, si libet; nobis enim stultitia nostra prodest. Quid laceratis? quid affligitis? non invidemus sapientiae vestrae. Hanc stultitiam malumus: hanc amplectimur. Hoc nobis credimus expedire, ut vos diligamus, et in vos ipsos, qui odistis, omnia conferamus.

Est apud Ciceronem non abhorrens a vero locus, in ea disputatione, quae habetur a Furio contra justitiam. «Quaero, inquit, si duo sint, quorum alter optimus 0587C vir, aequissimus, summa justitia, singulari fide; 0588A alter insignis scelere et audacia: et si in eo sit errore civitas, ut bonum illum virum, sceleratum, facinorosum, nefarium putet, contra autem, qui sit improbissimus, existimet esse summa probitate, ac fide; proque hac opinione omnium civium, bonus ille vir vexetur, rapiatur, manus ei denique auferantur, effodiantur oculi, damnetur, vinciatur, uratur, exterminetur, egeat postremo, jure etiam optimo omnibus miserrimus esse videatur: contra autem ille improbus laudetur, colatur, ab omnibus diligatur; omnes ad cum honores, omnia imperia, omnes opes, omnes denique copiae conferantur; vir denique optimus omnium existimatione, et dignissimus omni fortuna judicetur: quis tandem erit tam demens, qui dubitet utrum se esse malit.» Profecto quasi divinaret, quae 0588B nobis mala, et quomodo eventura essent propter justitiam, hoc posuit exemplum. Haec enim populus noster patitur omnia, errantium pravitate. Ecce in eo est errore civitas, vel potius orbis ipse totus, ut bonos et justos viros, tamquam malos et impios, persequatur, excruciet, damnet, occidat. Nam quod ait, neminem esse tam dementem, qui dubitet utrum se esse malit; ille quidem, ut is qui contra justitiam disserebat, hoc sensit, malle sapientem malum esse cum bona existimatione, quam bonum cum mala.

A nobis autem absit haec amentia, ut falsum vero anteponamus. An boni nostri qualitas ex populi potius pendebit erroribus, quam ex conscientia nostra, et judicio Dei? Aut aliqua nos illiciet umquam felicitas, ut non potius veram bonitatem cum omni malo, quam falsam cum omni prosperitate malimus? Sua 0588C sibi habeant regna reges, suas divitias divites (ut loquitur 0589A Plautus), suam vero prudentium prudentes: relinquant nobis stultitiam nostram, quam vel ex hoc apparet esse sapientiam, quod eam nobis invident. Quis enim stulto invideat, nisi qui sit ipse stultissimus? Illi autem non sunt adeo stulti, ut stultis invideant: sed ex eo, quod accurate, quod sollicite persequuntur, 0589A stultos non esse concedunt. Cur enim tam crudeliter saeviant, nisi quia metuunt, ne in dies invalescente justitia, cum diis suis cariosis relinquantur? Si ergo cultores deorum sapientes sunt, et nos stulti, quid metuant, ne sapientes illiciantur a stultis?