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Being lazy, the one holding this opinion might say to himself: 'Come now, let me not labor at all, nor trouble myself in vain; for what is fated will happen of necessity.' But the one who is zealous about something, or teaching, or exhorting either himself or another, and to be persuaded and not to be persuaded, and to sin and not to sin, and to rebuke those who sin and to praise those who do right, how is he not clearly refuted, leaving aside the work of what is in our power and of free will, but attaching to it only the name of fate? 6.6.17 Just as if someone were to call the nature of the good, by whose presence the living being is best governed, by the name of evil. For thus, since we are clearly aware of ourselves not being compelled by any other cause in educating our sons and flogging slaves who have done wrong and in wishing for this thing and not wishing for it, but independently, by our own authority, coming to such movements, he would be in error who says these things happen by fate, with a view to paralyzing both our own zeal and the exhortations and admonitions directed to others, from 6.6.18 which we see the affairs of men are especially set right. And indeed this argument would also overthrow laws which are established for the benefit of men. For what need is there to command or to forbid those who are constrained by another necessity? But neither will it be necessary to punish sinners, since they did not sin from their own cause, nor to bestow honors on those who do the best things, each of which has provided much cause for the checking of 6.6.19 injustice and for readiness in doing good. But this opinion would also overthrow piety towards the divine, if indeed God and the very authors of these oracles contribute nothing to us, neither praying nor being pious, since we are fettered by the necessities of fate. 6.6.20 But to say that we are moved like inanimate things, pulled this way and that by some external power like puppets, so as to will by necessity to do these things and to choose other things against our choice, how would it not be shameless and most impudent, since we are clearly aware of ourselves being eager for certain things by our own impulse and movement, and again, when we are neglectful, we take hold of ourselves and for this reason succeed or not, and are compelled by nothing else, but choose some things with willing judgment, and flee and refuse others from our own choice? 6.6.21 Thus, then, the account of free will was so clear that, just as feeling pain and pleasure, and seeing this thing and hearing that, are apprehended not by reasoning but by direct experience, so we are conscious of ourselves setting out from ourselves and our own will and choosing certain things, but rejecting others, so that by all means the freedom and the free will of the rational 6.6.22 and intellectual nature within us is rightly acknowledged. But if also countless things happening to us against our choice disturb the majority of people, one must here distinguish the nature of the things in which we exist, and the principle according to which things not in our power happen must be considered. For thus the cause of these things also no irrational fate will undertake, but rather another principle, suspended from the providence of the universe. Come then, let us carefully examine the problem. 6.6.23 The ordinances of 6.6.24 true piety declare that all things together exist and are governed by the providence of God. But now, specifically according to kind, each of the things that come to be—some moved by state, others by nature, others by impulse and imagination, others by reason and their own judgment and choice, and some things happening according to a primary principle, others as consequences of things that have happened previously—has constituted the varied and manifold order of the universe, the Cause of all things having distributed to each kind of being a certain particular and distinct constitution of nature. 6.6.25 Therefore one might at leisure go through the account of the other things, but the account concerning free will one might learn more easily 6.6.26 as follows: Since man happens to be not a single-natured thing, nor constituted from one nature, but from two

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ἀπορρᾳθυμῶν εἴποι ἂν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὁ ταύτην ἔχων τὴν δόξαν· Ἄγε μηδαμῶς φιλοπονήσω μηδὲ μάτην ἐνοχλήσω ἐμαυτῷ· γενήσεται γὰρ τὸ εἱμαρτὸν ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ὁ δὲ περί τι σπουδάζων ἢ διδάσκων ἢ προτρέπων ἢ ἑαυτὸν ἢ ἄλλον καὶ τὸ πείθεσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ πείθεσθαι καὶ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν καὶ μὴ τό τε ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσι καὶ τὸ ἐπαινεῖν τοὺς κατορθοῦντας, πῶς οὐκ ἐναργῶς ἐλέγχεται τὸ μὲν ἔργον καταλιπὼν τοῦ παρ' ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου, τὸ δὲ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ὄνομα 6.6.17 αὐτῷ συνάπτων μόνον; ὥσπερ εἴ τις τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν, ἧς κατὰ τὴν παρουσίαν ἄριστα διοικεῖται τὸ ζῷον, τῷ τοῦ κακοῦ προσαγορεύοι ὀνόματι. οὕτως γὰρ ἐπεὶ ἐναργῶς ἑαυτῶν αἰσθανόμεθα μὴ βιαζομένων ὑπ' ἄλλης τινὸς αἰτίας ἐν τῷ παιδεύειν τοὺς υἱεῖς καὶ μαστίζειν τοὺς οἰκέτας ἁμαρτήσαντας καὶ ἐν τῷ τόδε τι βούλεσθαι καὶ μὴ βούλεσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοτελῶς ἐκ τῆς ἰδίας ἐξουσίας εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας κινήσεις ἀφικνουμένων, ἁμαρτάνοι ἂν ὁ ταῦτα λέγων γίνεσθαι καθ' εἱμαρμένην, πρὸς τὸ παραλύειν τάς τε ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προθυμίας καὶ τὰς εἰς ἄλλους γινομένας παρακλήσεις καὶ νουθετήσεις, ἐξ 6.6.18 ὧν ὁρῶμεν μάλιστα κατορθούμενα τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πράγματα. καὶ μὴν καὶ νόμους ἀνατρέποι ἂν οὗτος ὁ λόγος τοὺς τοῦ συμφέροντος ἕνεκεν ἀνθρώποις κειμένους. τί γὰρ χρὴ προστάττειν ἢ ἀπαγορεύειν τοῖς ὑφ' ἑτέρας ἀνάγκης κατισχημένοις; ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοὺς ἁμαρτάνοντας δεήσει κολάζειν μὴ παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν ἡμαρτηκότας οὐδὲ τοῖς τὰ κάλλιστα πράττουσι τιμὰς ἀπονέμειν, ὧν ἑκάτερον πολλὴν αἰτίαν παρέσχηκεν εἰς ἀναστολὴν 6.6.19 ἀδικίας καὶ εἰς εὐποιίας ἑτοιμότητα. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐσέβειαν ἀνατρέποι ἂν ἥδε ἡ δόξα, εἴ γε μηδὲν ἡμῖν ὁ θεὸς μηδὲ μὴν αὐτοὶ οἱ τῶνδε χρησμῳδοὶ μήτ' εὐχομένοις μήτ' εὐσεβοῦσι συμβάλλονται εἱμαρμένης ἀνάγ6.6.20 καις πεπεδημένοις. τὸ δὲ δίκην ἀψύχων λέγειν κινεῖσθαι ἡμᾶς, τῇδε καὶ τῇδε ὑπό τινος ἔξωθεν δυνάμεως νευροσπαστουμένους, εἰς τὸ ἐπάναγκες ἐθελῆσαι τάδε πρᾶξαι καὶ ἑλέσθαι παρὰ προαίρεσιν ἕτερα, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἀναιδὲς καὶ ἀναισχυντότατον, ἐπείπερ ἐναργῶς αἰσθόμεθα ἑαυτῶν ὑμετέρᾳ ὁρμῇ καὶ κινήσει τάδε τινὰ προθυμουμένων καὶ ἀμελούντων πάλιν ἑαυτῶν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα καὶ παρὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν κατορθούντων ἢ μὴ κατορθούντων καὶ ἐξ οὐδενὸς ἑτέρου βιαζομένων, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἑκουσίῳ γνώμῃ αἱρουμένων, τὰ δὲ φευγόντων καὶ παραιτουμένων ἐκ τῆς ἡμῶν αὐτῶν προαιρέσεως; 6.6.21 οὕτω δὲ ἄρα ἐναργὴς ἦν ὁ τοῦ αὐθεκουσίου λόγος ὥστε ὁμοίως τὸ ἀλγεῖν καὶ τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὁρᾶν καὶ τόδ' ἀκούειν οὐ συλλογισμῷ, ἀλλ' ἐνεργείᾳ καταλαμβανομένων συναισθέσθαι ἑαυτῶν ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας βουλῆς ὁρμώντων καὶ τάδε τινὰ αἱρουμένων, τινὰ δὲ ἀποστρεφομένων, ὥστε ἐξ ἅπαντος τὸ ἐλεύθερον καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν λο6.6.22 γικῆς καὶ νοερᾶς φύσεως ἐνδίκως ὁμολογεῖσθαι. εἰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ προαίρεσιν μυρία συμβαίνοντα ἡμῖν τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταράττει, διαιρετέον ἐνταῦθα τὴν τῶν ἐν οἷς ἐσμὲν φύσιν, καὶ τὸν λόγον, καθ' ὃν τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν γίνεται, ἐπιθεωρητέον. οὕτω γὰρ καὶ τούτων τὸ αἴτιον οὔ τις ἄλογος ἀναδέξεται εἱμαρμένη, λόγος δὲ πάλιν ἄλλος τῆς τῶν ὅλων προνοίας ἀπηρτημένος. φέρ' οὖν ἐπιμελῶς τὸ πρόβλημα ἐπισκεψώμεθα· 6.6.23 Πάντα μὲν ἀθρόως ἐκ θεοῦ προνοίας εἶναί τε καὶ διοικεῖσθαι οἱ τῆς 6.6.24 ἀληθοῦς εὐσεβείας θεσμοὶ διαγορεύουσιν. ἤδη δὲ κατ' εἶδος ἰδίως ἕκαστα τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ μὲν ἕξει, τὰ δὲ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ὁρμῇ καὶ φαντασίᾳ, τὰ δὲ λογισμῷ καὶ κρίσει οἰκείᾳ τε καὶ προαιρέσει κινούμενα, καὶ ἄλλα μὲν κατὰ προηγούμενον λόγον γιγνόμενα, ἕτερα δὲ κατ' ἐπισυμβεβηκότα τοῖς προηγουμένως γεγονόσι ποικίλην καὶ πολύτροπον τὴν τοῦ παντὸς συνεστήσατο διακόσμησιν, ἑκάστῳ γένει τῶν ὄντων ἰδίαν καὶ ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ φύσεως κατα6.6.25 σκευὴν τοῦ τῶν ὅλων αἰτίου διανείμαντος. σχολῇ μὲν οὖν τις τὸν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων διεξέλθοι λόγον, τὸν δὲ περὶ τοῦ αὐτεξουσίου ῥᾷον καταμάθοι ἂν 6.6.26 ὧδε· ἐπεὶ μὴ μονογενὲς χρῆμα μηδ' ἐκ μιᾶς συνεστὼς φύσεως τυγχάνει ὢν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἐκ δυοῖν